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Reasons and Beliefs
Journal of Philosophical Research (2019)
  • Attila Tanyi
  • Matteo Morganti, University of Rome 'Roma Tre'
The present paper identifies a challenge for a certain view of practical reasons, according to which practical reasons (both normative and motivating) are states of affairs. The problem is that those who endorse such a view seem forced to maintain both a) that the contents of beliefs are states of affairs and b) that the conception according to which the contents of beliefs are states of affairs is outlandish. The suggestion is put forward that, by distinguishing the content of a belief (as a proposition) from its object (as a state of affairs), the conflict between a) and b) can be neutralised. The resulting proposal is of interest for all those sharing the view that practical reasons must be states of affairs, i.e., things capable of being the case.
  • Practical reasons,
  • Jonathan Dancy,
  • content of belief,
  • object of belief,
  • states of affairs
Publication Date
Citation Information
Attila Tanyi and Matteo Morganti. "Reasons and Beliefs" Journal of Philosophical Research Vol. 44 (2019)
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