Article
Takeover Defenses and Dilution: A Welfare Analysis
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
(2001)
Abstract
Existing theory suggests that, in an unregulated market for corporate control, the level of takeovers is suboptimal because shareholders do not receive the full benefit from them. However, existing theory neglects that the threat of takeover may divert managerial effort from productive to defensive activities. This paper shows that, when this is considered, takeovers may, in fact, be excessive.
Disciplines
Publication Date
2001
Citation Information
Atreya Chakraborty. "Takeover Defenses and Dilution: A Welfare Analysis" Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 36 Iss. 3 (2001) Available at: http://works.bepress.com/atreya_chakraborty/26/