Power, Conflict and Resistance: Social Movements, Networks and Hierarchies

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Introduction

This is a book which has been a long time in the making. Like many of its kind, it has taken on an energy of its own since its beginnings in what was then an article project seven years ago. It started out rather smaller, as an attempt to explain what was then the major event of world politics: the American lurch to global empire under the Bush regime. We noticed, first of all, the parallels of Bush’s actions with ongoing patterns in the world-system, and secondly, the ways in which the dominant discourse articulated a network-hierarchy binary in a manner reminiscent of Deleuze turned upside-down. From this we constructed an initial argument that the world-system is an arborescent assemblage, that networks and flows are therefore likely to constantly slip away from it, and that imperial violence can be understood in terms of attempts to trap these escaping flows. Add in the question of sociopolitical and ethnoreligious movements, already raised in the previous work of one of us (Karatzogianni, 2006) and here extended into the concepts of affinity-networks and reactive networks, and we had the beginnings of something exciting. But the project grew as we engaged with the world-systems and Marxist scholarship, and new concepts and issues found a place in the scenario: global cities, bifurcations, hegemonic transitions, the relationship between capitalism and the state, the position of East Asia, the ‘shadow state’ and more besides. Soon we found we had the framework for a comprehensive new theorization of the forces at work in global politics, a framework which crosses the boundaries between international relations, international political economy, comparative politics, conflict studies, social movement studies and critical theory to produce a study of a scope uncommon in this age of disciplinary separations, and perhaps better placed alongside the broader scholarship of a bygone age (or of the far side of a short channel).

Power, Conflict and Resistance in the Contemporary World: Social Movements, Networks and Hierarchies aims at exploring centrifugal tendencies from a more political perspective, and relating these tendencies more explicitly to the world system and to global power-relations. It is also seeking to integrate specific issues of resistance into a wider perspective based on an overarching theoretical approach by stressing the specifically networked (rather than simply decentred) structure of the kinds of resistances and survival strategies. We are viewing resistance in terms of decenring rather than a centralising ‘democratic’ project. While drawing on the insights of several theoretically diverse authors, we aim to apply them in areas these authors do not address, in particular in relation to global war, system integration and disintegration, and the possibility of a non-striated world beyond the nation-state.
In this sense, theoretically we hold a perspectival position. Our view is that many diverse perspectives all have partial contributions to make. Actuality is in excess over any way of interpreting it; therefore, one comes closest to understanding by attempting to see from many different perspectives and directions, each giving a partial truth. We also attempt to fit these together as best we can. Hence the contrasting social ontologies of the theorists we use are not so much barriers as different points of view to be appreciated. This is not to downplay the reality of these differences, but to emphasise the possibility of interweaving the theories in any case.

The great strength of continental theorists is to produce massive elaborate architectures of theory based on tendential lines and telling examples. Their great weakness is that as a result, each theory ends up with a partial picture which overreaches – they draw as an entire map something which is only part of the picture. Hence the totalitarian endo-colonial logic of Virilio, the simulacra world of Baudrillard, the network capitalism of Hardt and Negri, the proliferating transversal connections of Bhabha or Mbembe are all part of the picture of what is going on – the task of analysis is to locate each of these in the whole picture, in relation to one another and to different social forces. So the rhizomes of resistance include the transversal connections, but are opposed by state and capitalist logics, which they contradict. Endo-colonialism controls entire spaces in the core and the global cities in an attempt to suppress these flows by pure repression. Network capitalism, a different strategy to recuperate the flows, emerges as a more vital alternative which is beginning to form, and may be longer-lasting should the former stagnate from its own deathliness.

Most theorists either focus exclusively on or claim as determinant a single dominant social logic. This leads to perspectives, which are useful, but overstated and very partial. For example, Baudrillard may be right about the structure of massified thought, but errs in expanding it too far afield, assuming it to be universal and failing to see the pockets of de-massification. Negri’s early work may be accurate in theorising resistance in the core and semi-core, but inadequate in relation to the mediations, which persist in more peripheral regions. Autonomists and Situationists may be right about the pervasive importance of what they call “capitalism” (in fact, alienation), but fail because of this to draw important distinctions – between capital, state, tribute systems, patronage, inclusion and exclusion – which differentiate distinct social forces. In contrast, Gramscians see the distinctions, but at the expense of the centrality of alienation. In some cases, we are selective in what we use from an author’s work. For instance, in Zizek we reject most of his political/strategic perspective – the idea of scarcity and lack as existentially basic, the assumption that Lacanian theory provides a complete structural picture, the insistence on the party or state as totaliser, the hostility to horizontalism and the “right to narrate” and to inclusiveness towards others; but take on board aspects of his analysis of the current dominant social logics – which do sometimes reveal features similar to those of Lacanian theory. What world system theory calls chaos, breakdown, or in Chew’s (2006) case dark age, may well be the progressive – decentring, rhizomatic, rewilding, transversalising – option, whereas the alternative of a new hegemon is a form of recuperation and crisis management. It may be most productive, therefore, to combine all the perspectives as if they were analyses of particular social logics, while adding to them theories of the
relations between these logics. Eventually, one may have to come back to the epistemo-ontological disputes; but this may be done more productively once the empirical reach of the social logics theorised by different perspectives is established.

There are several groups of thinkers we use. We mainly draw on: phenomenology/everyday life, empirical scholarship mainly in anthropology and politics, poststructuralism, structural Marxism, open Marxism, anarchism, Baudrillard, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari and postcolonial theory. Deleuze and Guattari have a special status as our theoretical ancestors, whose perspective guides our research. In addition to Deleuze and Guattari themselves, there is a group of theorists who use similar ideas of politics of desire or critique of representation, authors such as Lefebvre, Barthes, Reich, Baudrillard, Virilio, the Situationists, Hakim Bey, and various anarchist and autonomist authors; these authors resonate strongly with Deleuze and are simply inserted at the relevant points. We could term these people the compadres or fictive kin of Deleuze and Guattari and of our own work. There are of course subtle differences between all these authors and our own approach, but differences which are small enough to leave out of a study of this scale. This is a work of interpretation of the structures of the contemporary world, focused on putting theorists to work in understanding empirical and situational phenomena; such matters would be out of place here – we shall leave them for ‘pure’ theorists (or address them ourselves later, in the modality of ‘pure’ theory). Then there are thinkers with considerable relevance but a different ontological framework, usually within Marxism, postcolonial theory and/or world systems analysis – figures such as Harvey, Gramsci, Cox, Arrighi, Wallerstein, Spivak and Bhabha. These people belong, so to speak, to different ‘bands’ from ours, and are connected to us by weaker affinities than the first group. In these cases we take their structure and findings and attempt to reinterpret them in Deleuzian terms.

Finally, there are authors with whom we have substantial disagreements on points of principle, but who have given us important insights into the contemporary world – authors such as Zizek, Hardt and Negri, and the various ‘Essex School’ authors. (Given their paradigmatic differences, we treat the early and current Negri as separate ‘figures’ in our theoretical world). These authors belong to a rival, often antagonistic ‘band’, but one to which we still share some affinities in spite of our frequent conflicts. In these cases we have used the authors’ works like a toolbox, taking what we like and criticizing what we don’t. Some of these authors would doubtless hate to be used in this way, but we hope that our actions are ‘predation’ in the Amazonian sense, absorbing their vital energies in an antagonistic way, rather than in Appadurai’s sense of simply excluding the Other.

This approach may give the impression to some of incoherence, theoretical over weighting, or unnecessary syncretism. Our response is that we are trying to do something ‘productive’, in the spirit of Deleuze and Guattari – to complexify not simplify the picture, to produce effective connections, to bring into being concepts which generate new ways of seeing. Some would be more satisfied to see attempts to cram the entire world into a small handful of concepts drawn from a single theoretical corpus; it would be more pleasing to academia in its stance as an apparatus of axiomatisation and
discipline, though less appropriate to its other claimed role as pioneer of truth. Our goal for this study is met if others find here inspiration, or tools they can put to work. For us, the crucial ‘stakes’ are not in the collision of theories at the level of high abstraction, but how the different perspectives on the world can help us to relate to it more actively and affirmatively.

There are four levels of theorization here:

1) high-level theory about how to analyse things (abstract-concrete, rhizomes, world system, simulation, non-war, alienation)

2) discussion of the functioning of abstract social logics (state, capitalism, network vs hierarchy, active vs. reactive)

3) discussion of specific assemblages of abstract social logics into specific types of social phenomena or assemblages (globalisation, global cities, neoliberalism, social movements, shanty-town politics, indigenous politics)

4) discussions of specific instances of these social phenomena in particular times and places (Afghanistan, Iraq, anti-terror paranoia, political Islam, specific indigenous and activist movements).

All the levels for the linking of Deleuze to specific events are needed for the overall conceptual framework to work. Because the specific instances (the empirical level) are not going to make sense except as instances of types of assemblages, and the assemblages don't link to the theories without the social logics.

This strategy is reflected in the book’s architecture. In the first chapter, we set out the Deleuzian conceptual framework which informs the rest of the book. Following that, we examine World Systems Theory, in an attempt to enable it to engage it with contemporary under-reported conflicts, and to engage with forms of power based on patronage networks and new social movements. In the following two chapters we engage with different types of networked conflicts. In one chapter we deal with those involving social movements and the use of technology (e.g. the anti-globalisation movement and sociopolitical cyberconflicts in general) and in another chapter ethnoreligious conflicts in both highly reported conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan and indigenous movements which cannot afford the use of technology at all, as they are marginalised and unreported in the mainstream media. In the concluding chapter we present positive examples of emancipatory politics based on lines of flight and network forms of social action as ways to break down hierarchies, and the ways in which the substitution of networks for hierarchic forms undermines logics of closure, fixity and constitutive antagonism and thus enables conflict-resolution and non-oppressive social relations.

In the first chapter, we provide an outline of our theoretical framework. We discuss Deleuzian philosophy with a view to introducing a new theory of social logics and assemblages. We explain the concepts of rhizomatic and arborescent structures and the
differences of active and reactive forces. We then proceed to theorise in detail the social logics that sustain the contemporary world-system and the forms of hierarchical structure, from forms of alienation to capitalism and the state. By locating the world-system in a higher-level theoretical context of social, ecological and psychological alienation and the imposition of scarcity as an existential condition, we lay the ground for the following chapters, where we explore the possibilities of escape from the entire logic of alienation underpinning the world-system.

In the second chapter we deal with issues of Power and discuss some of the concepts we find useful in world-systems analysis and then examine various processes in the global system, such as global development and structural crisis, the relationship between capital and state, the transformation of the state, and the transnational capitalist state. We explain why many theorists view the world-system as being in a condition of crisis, why America is often viewed as losing its systemic hegemony and why systemic insertions in the global South are in a particular state of unrest. We then analyse structural cycles in the world system by looking into hegemonic decline and hegemonic transition and look at how world system theorists view the future of global politics, exploring what comes next in relation to theories focused on a new Chinese hegemony, global cities and networked Empire.

In the third chapter we begin to discuss Resistance by looking at anti-systemic movements using the network form, and specifically the affinity-network form characterised by active desire. Here we look at generic advantages and disadvantages of networks, the arts of resistance in autonomous social movements and global protest. We also look at the power of indigenous network movements, societies without the state and the indigenous revolution in Deleuze and Guattari. In addition to exploring these issues theoretically and in strategic terms, we examine a number of empirical cases ranging from European autonomism to Lakota cultural survival and resistance in the Himalayas. We also situate the rise of networks in the historical context of postcolonial struggles and the 1968 upheavals.

In the fourth chapter, we look at one of the main sources of Conflict in the present world: reactive and predatory ethnoreligious networks. We explore reactive networks and their relationship with hierarchies, and at empirical cases of the affinity-reactive tension. In detail we examine ethnoreligious reactive networks in the Iraqi insurgency, but also tensions between ethnicity and nationality, the formation of ethnic groups in Afghanistan and the ‘small world networks’ of the global jihadist movement, including al-Qaeda. We also explore in theoretical terms the difference between active and reactive networks and the social construction of ethnicity. We also link these networks to world system theory arguments that terrorism occurs in periods of hegemonic decline.

The concluding chapter draws the political implications of the earlier chapters, arguing for an emancipatory politics based on lines of flight and network forms of social action as ways to break down hierarchies. The chapter is pointing towards the possibility of a networked world in which hierarchies no longer operate, while also exploring the strategies which might be used to bring about such a world as smoothly as possible.
We would like to thank all of those who have contributed to our intellectual development over the last seven years, as well as those whose affinities and solidarities have provided us with networks of support. Listing would be too identitarian and exclusionary for our liking, as there are sure to be those whose role would be missed; in any case, we trust that the people this applies to will know who they are. Andrew Robinson would like to acknowledge receipt of a Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellowship during 2004-6 which supported some of the preliminary work towards this book.

At this point, we feel we should leave our readers to explore the perspective we have weaved together, wishing you positive energies to find the best you can in it, and use it creatively in your own networks and connections. As Deleuze and Guattari sometimes tell us, a book is a rhizome. It is also, we think, a tool and a material for use in *bricolage*, and we intend for our work to be used in what Barthes would term a ‘writerly’ rather than a ‘readerly’ way. We are not laying down the law of the Master, but offering a way of seeing differently, complete with an affirmative ethic of active desire. If the energies of life flow more brightly through this book, then we have achieved what we sought.

Andrew Robinson and Athina Karatzogianni,
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Chapter 1: Rhizomatic Politics – A new theory of social logics and assemblages

Deleuzian philosophy: singularities, difference and the critique of representation

The underlying task of Deleuzian philosophy is the affirmation of difference. This goal is expressed in a theoretical method which consists of a proliferation of complex, diversity-affirming concepts to aid in thinking the world ‘otherwise’ and bringing a new world into being. In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the main purpose of philosophy is the invention of concepts. ‘The philosopher is the concept’s friend… [P]hilosophy is the discipline that involves creating concepts’ (1996: 5). Creating concepts creates new lenses, new ways of seeing; ‘every concept is a combination that did not exist before’ (1996: 75). A concept is a ‘fragmentary whole’, totalising incompletely its components (1996: 16), giving consistency to the chaos of immanence, ‘making a section of chaos’ (1996: 42).

Deleuze’s critique of representation stems from his affirmation of difference and rejection of the primacy of identity, sameness and/or negativity. ‘Everywhere, the depth of difference is primary (1994: 51). Accord to Deleuze, difference cannot be thought as long as it is subject to the requirements of representation (1994: 262). Representation is not identical with all communication or ‘repetition’, or with the creation of concepts. Rather, it is specified by its emphasis on fixity, the idea of a total system of classification without excess, viewing things as fixed ‘molar’ beings rather than ‘molecular’ becomings or singularities, ignoring the specificity of each entity or connection by assuming its reducibility to general categories. Representation presupposes identity, when difference is primary; ‘representation subordinates difference to identity’ (1994: 65). Various dogmatic postulates serve to ‘crush thought under an image… of the Same and the Similar’, hence suppressing the very ‘act of thinking’ (1994: 167). Saskia Sassen rightly suggests that Deleuze uses the term ‘representation’ to refer to something akin to ‘disciplinary knowledge’, echoing the concerns of authors such as Foucault and Saïd (2006: 379).

Deleuze maintains that the idea of representation has at its root a moral imperative to suppress difference for the good of order (1994: 127). It is thus complicit in statist and dominatory thought. It requires a monocentric (arborescent) world hostile to difference (1994: 263). That which communicates in ‘pure forces’ is contrasted to representation (1994: 10); it is an ‘original, intensive depth’ which is missed, and not at all enhanced, by the addition of representations governed by a master-signifier (1994: 50). Representation ‘mediates everything but mobilises and moves nothing’; it fails to capture affirmative difference (1994: 55-6). The uniqueness or ‘singularity’ of each person, being, relation, thing, etc, confounds the possibility of non-repressive representation. A representative claims to speak for ‘everyone’ but always leaves out some unrepresented singularity which is other than ‘everyone’ (1994: 52; c.f. 1994: 130). Guattari argues that the ‘infernal machine of “substitutionism”’, organisations claiming to represent ordinary people, is increasingly unable to represent or negotiate for the oppressed (1984: 204).
The categories of representation are ‘too general or too large for the real’, like a net so loose that even the largest fish pass through (1994: 68).

This leads to a systematic attempt to recompose philosophy as the systematic analysis of immanence. A central premise of Deleuzian philosophy is the replacement of essences with multiplicities, which ‘specify the structure of spaces of possibilities, spaces which, in turn, explain the regularities exhibited by morphogenetic processes’ (de Landa 2002:10). Multiplicities, the concepts which take the place of essences in depicting broad categories of phenomena, are defined by singularities, the uniqueness affirmative difference of each thing. These singularities may influence behavior by acting as attractors for the trajectories of the flows which are constitutive of existence, underlying the apparently fixed forms of molar entities. According to Deleuzian philosopher Manuel deLanda,

Deleuze …..must be given credit for working out in detail… the requirements for the elimination of an immutable world of transcendent archetypes. Given that essences are typically postulated to explain the existence of individuals or of natural kinds, eliminating them involves giving an alternative explanation, not just reducing these individuals and kinds to social conventions.

(de Landa, 2002:88)

This means in practice that a theoretical division emerges between the types of forces or flows operating in a social field, and the actual assemblages which they form (roughly correlating with the distinction between the ‘virtual’ as the field of flows and the ‘actual’ as the field of assemblages). Disparate, incommensurable entities are often joined together into assemblages which have a machinic coherence but are not united by similarity or sameness. As deLanda puts it, ‘a large number of different trajectories, starting their evolution at very different places in the manifold, may end up in exactly the same final state (the attractor), as long as all of them begin somewhere within the “sphere of influence” of the attractor’ (2002: 14). Nevertheless, the structure of attraction or coherence of an assemblage creates ‘inherent or intrinsic long-term tendencies of a system… states which the system will spontaneously tend to adopt in the long run as long as it is not constrained by other forces’ (2002: 14). Therefore, it is possible to analyse assemblages and systems of assemblages in terms of their long-term tendencies, which in this text we refer to as social logics. In Harvey’s terms, we can say that abstract machines operate on a relational level, whereas assemblages appear in absolute or relative space (Spaces of Global Capital 2006: 142).

This also implies that there is an inside-outside relationship between different kinds of assemblages: there is not necessarily a single social totality, but rather, a field in which different social logics put into motion different (or sometimes the same) assemblages, in relations and conflicts which involve antagonisms between incommensurable forces. Abstract machines (including arborescent abstract machines with a master-signifier) do not directly realise themselves but only become actualised via concrete machines and ‘concrete micro-political “negotiations”’ (1984: 159); hence, molar forces as historical or genealogical phenomena can only be studied through molecular forces. Because of
distinction of virtual social logics and actual assemblages, a statement can be true at one level but false at the other – for instance, a regime may overall be far short of fascist, yet its government or police may behave in a manner expressing a fascist logic or tending it in a fascist direction. There is greater sophistication of perception in awareness of the structural logic than in simply descriptive appreciation of the surface level of social machines. Hence for instance, protesters might appropriately perceive that they are up against police or government fascism, even if political scientists, seeing only the actual, would be amazed at the view that the state in question is anything but liberal-democratic – even if, indeed, the state in question is among the most liberal. The ‘microfascist’ virtual machine operating through the liberal-democratic assemblage can only be discerned through a different kind of analysis.

In theorizing the distinctiveness, clarity and machinic predictability of the virtual machines or social logics, one must not lose sight of the complexity of their inscriptions in the actual, which are not simply reducible to the virtual machines but involve a proliferation of difference. As deLanda explains the difference between essences and multiplicities is that while essences are traditionally regarded as possessing a clear and distinct nature, multiplicities are, by design obscure and distinct; their differentiated structures emerge cumulatively as an entity develops, or undergoes a process of ‘becoming’. While the structure and often the core of an assemblage inflects its becoming, it does not provide ‘a clear and distinct blueprint’ of what it is to become (deLanda 2002: 17). ‘Each of the singularities defining a multiplicity must be thought as possessing the capacity to be extended or prolonged as an infinite series of ideal events. Deleuze refers to this virtual process as a “condensation of singularities”’ (deLanda 2002: 81). In addition to affirming immanence, deLanda argues that Deleuze must, and does, provide ‘mechanisms of immanence (however speculative) to explain the existence, relative autonomy and genetic power of the virtual’ (2002: 123).

In short, the first task in creating immanent forms of relations is what Deleuze calls a condensation of singularities, a process involving the continuous creation of communications between the series emanating from every singularity, linking them together through non-physical resonances, while simultaneously ramifying or differentiating the series, ensuring they are linked together only by their differences (ibid). De Landa argues that we need to conceive a continuum which yields, through progressive differentiation, all the discontinuous individuals that populate the actual world. This plane of immanence or consistency ‘cannot be conceived as a single homogenous topological space, but rather as a heterogeneous space made up of population of multiplicities, each of which is a topological space on its own’. It becomes a ‘space of spaces’ of entities capable of differentiation, providing ‘consistency’ as the synthesis of heterogeneity (2002: 78). The plane of consistency, or ‘machinic phylum’, is not a logical totality, but it is a machinic totality or continuum (1984: 120).

In world-systems theory, drawing from complexity and chaos theory, ‘bifurcation’ is mentioned as the point in which the system reaches a critical point, where hegemony can break down (see below). Bifurcation similarly arises in Deleuzian systems, being theorized as occurring when a singularity undergoes a symmetry-breaking transition and
becomes-other. The effects of such becomings vary with the ‘control knobs’ or parameters existing in the particular state of being in which the changes occur (deLanda 2002: 18). If we understand the contemporary world system as experiencing a bifurcation, of being away from equilibrium, then this is the moment where it exhibits its full complexity as a non-linear system, and this ‘nonequilibrium reveals the potentialities hidden in the nonlinearities, potentialities that remain dormant near or at equilibrium” (Nicolis and Prigogine 1989, quoted in de Landa 2002: 72). In other words, in the vicinity of the bifurcation the capacity to transmit information is maximized (de Landa, 2002: 87). If we agree with the proponents of world-systems theory that the contemporary world system is in such bifurcation point, then it would be possible to utilize some of the maximized capacity for information, which this current chaotic moment presents us with. An opening is provided, not only for systemic recompositions around a new hegemon, but also for becomings-other which lead beyond the state-space and into the field of molecular becomings.

Deleuzian theory thus provides, on a high theoretical level, a systematic alternative to the various arborescent systems of what Deleuze and Guattari term ‘royal science’. It is an alternative both to the drive to systematize and reduce to totality which persists in much Marxist social theory, and to the dominant ‘postmodernist’ or poststructuralist theories in which lack and alienation are taken as primary and/or the social field is deemed too complex for systematic analysis. It is, hence, a recomposition of theoretical thought beyond the break associated with the critique of metanarratives. Postcolonial theorists Robert Young (1990:19) and Murphy (1991:124) view postmodernism as European culture’s awareness that it’s no longer the centre of the universe (Slater 2004). Similarly, for Rosi Braidotti, authors such as Deleuze, Guattari and Foucault ‘challenged both the negativity and the static nature of the Lacanian master code on which all forms of mediation are supposed to hinge... Power as a positive or potentia is crucial in forming the subject as an entity enmeshed in a network of inter-related social and discursive effects’, providing a material, not merely linguistic, account of systems of mediation (Braidotti 2006: 89).

The depth of the Deleuzian critique of representation and essences has theoretical and political consequences. The Deleuzian approach echoes certain aspects of Marxist (especially autonomist, Situationist and open Marxist) theorizing. For instance, Deleuze insists on the importance of relational as opposed to reified theorizing (1994: 152). Hence, for instance, Deleuze and Guattari’s theories of capitalism and the state resonate closely with those of authors such as Negri, Holloway and Vaneigem, as well as with those of other radical poststructuralists such as Virilio and Baudrillard. They also map easily onto the categories of world-systems analysis. Where a Deleuzian approach differs from, for instance, the work of Hardt and Negri or of the open Marxists is in its rejection of assumptions of totality or totalisation, whether in the analysis of the present (of capitalism or Empire), in ideas of human essence or species-being, or in the agents and processes of transformation. Hence, Deleuzian politics diverges quite sharply from Marxist projects of counter-hegemony, resonating instead with currents of anarchism such as post-left anarchy, Wardian ‘evolutionary anarchism’ and authors such as Richard
Day, while also echoing strongly the radical antagonisms of 1970s European autonomism.

Assemblages, layers of analysis and the problem of the ‘outside’

Deleuzian theory thus yields a multi-layered approach to empirical analysis. Theorists make a mistake if, when seeking to apply Deleuze, they short-circuit too readily between high-level concepts such as the abstract and virtual, and specific phenomena of the present situation. In particular, a crucial distinction must be maintained between forces or logics on the one hand, and assemblages on the other. We would suggest that Deleuzian theory yields at least four different levels of analysis: high-level theory about ontology and concept-formation, such as the analysis of abstract and concrete machines, and the critique of alienation or representation; theories of the functioning of abstract social logics, such as capital, the state and the affinity-network form; discussions of specific assemblages which bring social logics into specific groupings, such as neoliberal globalization, the developmentalist state, indigenous politics, or social movements; and discussions of specific instances of assemblages arising at a particular place and time – political Islam in Afghanistan, Aymara social movements in Bolivia, anti-terror paranoia in Britain, autonomous social movements in Europe. To fully appreciate the theoretical significance of specific phenomena at the fourth, empirical level, it is necessary to trace them through the different theoretical layers, and hence locate them in relation to the struggle between difference, active forces, autonomy and liberation on the one hand, and control, reactive forces and repression on the other.

The analysis of social formations should proceed on the level of assemblages, but while paying attention to the social logics beneath. According to Surin, cultural and social formations are constituted on the basis of ‘concerts’ or ‘accords’, organising principles, which make possible the grouping into particular configurations of whole ranges of events, personages, processes, institutions, movements, and so forth, such as that the resulting configurations become integrated formations. Surin sees capitalism as a set of accords, which regulate the operations of the various components of an immensely powerful and comprehensive system of accumulation, and as such situated at the crossing-point of all kinds of formations, having the capacity to integrate and recompose capitalist and non-capitalist sectors or modes of production. In this sense, capital, the ‘accord of accords’ par excellence can bring together heterogeneous phenomena, and make them express the same world, that of capitalist accumulation (Surin 2006:65 quotes Deleuze 1993:130–7). A distinction can thus be made between the logic of capital as a virtual machine of axiomatisation (see below), and capitalism or the world-system as a specific assemblage or ‘accord’. When we refer to the world-system or the dominant system, we are referring to a specific assemblage in which hierarchical logics are primary. When we refer to capital or the state, we are referring to a social logic. Capital and the state (articulated together) drive the dominant system, but it is not identical to them.

Assemblages are somewhat distinct from machines, in that a machine is a type of assemblage which channels or expresses a flow – roughly speaking, which actualises a free-flowing social logic in an assemblage. A machine is a system of interruptions or
breaks introduced into a flow along particular lines (1983: 36). Since these flows come from other ‘machines’ in an apparently endless series, this makes the whole of existence a web of connected ‘machines’, but the implication is that the ‘differenciation’ posited as primary in Deleuzian ontology is being effected in this way, through the processing of the undifferentiated by machines which produce differences. The chains of machines, however, do not include antiproductive forces or exclusions, which arise from inhibiters and repressers (1983: 38-9). Hence, a ‘machine’ is in a sense an ‘undistorted’ actualisation of a social logic or flow, whereas other kinds of assemblages fuse social logics and flows in such ways that they block each other. This is not to say that a ‘machine’ is a ‘pure’ actualisation; one must bear in mind that we are dealing with multiplicities and not essences. Each instance of actualisation of the same force or flow will ‘differenciate’ itself, making itself different from the other instances. Nevertheless, a ‘machine’ which is produced from desiring-production, which does not subordinate desire to social production or representation, is distinct from repressive, alienated and mediated types of assemblages.

While the political goal of Deleuzian theory is the production of ‘machines’ for the expression of active forces and logics (which we will later inflect as the construction of affinity-networks against both alienated and reactive forces), the relationship between social logics and assemblages in empirical analysis is far more complex. Actual assemblages (such as social groups) can express one logic exclusively or overwhelmingly, or be driven or ‘hegemonised’ by a single force; but they are also very often syncretic or segmentary, combining different social forces in a more-or-less coherent arrangement. Hence, for Deleuze and Guattari, complicated machine or organism is never a single thing, and its structural unity must be called into question (1983: 284-5). Desiring-machines are always molecular, engaged in their own assembly, and their function and formation are indiscernible from one another (1983: 286). On the other hand, molar machines are structurally unified, each appear as a single object or subject, and they have limited and exclusive connections and exclusions (1983: 287).

Hence, the division at the second level, between social logics or forces, can run either between social groups (for instance, between an autonomous social movement and a state), or between factions or individuals within a social group (for instance, between horizontalists and verticalists in the World Social Forum), or between the same people in different sets of relations (for instance, between hidden and public transcripts), or even within individuals (between different subject-positions, desires and attachments – for instance, between ‘common sense’ and ‘good sense’ in Gramsci’s theory). In all of these cases, the social logic can be identified at a theoretical level as something which exists outside other social logics, though at another level it might be combined with them. In addition, each social logic has its own grouping of ‘organic ideologies’ which are ideational assemblages drawn from its perspective or standpoint. This leads to a reconceptualisation of the social field as a field of radically antagonistic conflict among social logics, similar to the Marxist idea of class struggle but without the assumption of a subsuming totality which renders the conflicts internal (or their resolution aufhebung). This echoes the idea of ‘social war’ in insurrectionary anarchism (Bonanno n.d.), and James Scott’s analysis of everyday life as ‘infrapolitics’ (see below). Nothing is too
small to be a site of social antagonism. Struggles over apparently inconsequential issues can be crucial because they are struggles about who makes the rules (Migdal 2001: 50).

When we talk, therefore, of the logic of the excluded and of affinity-networks (or any of the other ‘abstract machines’), we are referring to a driving-force which can be expressed at different levels: as an entire group constructed wholly or overwhelmingly as an affinity-network, as one of several competing tendencies within a group, as a set of relations arising in particular situations but not others, or as a particular aspect of a person’s attachments which are only sometimes expressed. The political goal of Deleuzian theory is to actualize the active social logics entirely, hence to take them to the point where they construct the entire social/ecological field, hence to release these forces from their entrapment within or submersion beneath other social logics. As a technique, this involves finding the forces of autonomy, the logics which function outside the arborescent, hierarchical and representational logics (capital, state, etc), and inducing these to expand, pushing them to their limit, bringing them into new combinations and connections. A syncretic partly-autonomous force is thus vastly better than a force entirely subjected to arborescence, but the goal is to create a fully autonomous force – a process known as a ‘line of flight’ or ‘determinatization’.

Hence, the ‘excluded’ as a structural category exist and can be specified, but only certain actions of the structurally excluded (and some actions of the structurally included) are driven by an affinity-network logic. This does not mean that the included are an ‘in-itself’ waiting for a ‘for-itself’ or that they must ‘become’ what they ‘are’ (formulae leaving too much space for representationalist recuperation); rather, it means that the excluded as a social logic runs both within and between groups, and that actually-existing groups, and even individuals (or ‘dividuals’ to use Massumi’s term), are torn between different social forces.

Autonomy arises in Deleuzian theory as a matter of lines of flight, the creation of ‘minorities’ (meaning nondenumerable or marked terms) and their struggle against ‘majorities’ (meaning fixed and unmarked entities and ‘global-locals’). Powers of becoming of universal minoritarianism belong to a different realm from Power and Domination, a realm of autonomy (1987: 106). Hence, what is unbearable for the powerful about the struggles of minorities is not their content, which can often be conceded; it is the fact that people are formulating their own desires which do not flow from the system (1987: 470-1). An actual minority can be a becoming but can also be reterritorialised as a being, ‘a minority as a state’. It generates a becoming only when it ceases to be defined by its relation to a majority (1987: 291). If a minority is reinscribed, this is known as axiomatisation, which as a concept, is close to the Situationist idea of recuperation. In Situationism, a line of flight is recuperated if it is drawn back ‘inside’ the dominant assemblage from which it has fled, usually by being ‘mediated’ and ‘alienated’, and hence turned into a commodity or role. Struggles of minorities arising as demands for inclusion, or the ‘addition of axioms’, are important (producing real improvements for the excluded) and hopeful (providing opportunities for lines of flight), but ultimately do not go far enough. To take a historical example, the Black Civil Rights movement in America was constituted as a struggle for ‘addition of axioms’ (for
inclusion of Southern Blacks in the stratum of the included), its transmutation into urban
revolts and movements such as the Black Panthers constituted a ‘line of flight’ and
established autonomous agencies fighting against the dominant system, but the later
commodification and sale of Panther and Black Consciousness imagery is ‘re recuperation’,
the conversion of the dangerous excess into a safe commodity.

Active and reactive forces: between desire and repression

In this book, we rely on the distinction between active and reactive to understand
different types of networks, and the distinction between arborescence and rhizomes to
understand the difference between networks and hierarchies. Hence, networks are
divided into the affinity-network form (basically the active network form) and the
reactive network form. The distinction between active and reactive is expressed in these
terms in Nietzsche and Philosophy (2006), and in Rolando Perez’s reading of Deleuze
(1990); it appears in Anti-Oedipus under the slightly different names of “schizophrenic”
versus “paranoiac” desire, and lurks in the background of various other concepts (being-
becoming, molecular-molar, etc).

In our mapping of social forces, we usually treat arborescence and reactivity as separate
dimensions or ‘variables’, yielding different sets of forces (hence, the arborescent pole is
divided between addition and subtraction of axioms, and the network pole between active
and reactive networks). At a deeper level, however, Deleuzian theory suggests that
arborescence is itself an outgrowth of reactive desire. Deleuze and Guattari explain the
rise of reactive desire historically by the rise of the despotic state and the despotic
signifier (1983: 214-15); it reaches its full form in being ‘turned back against itself’ in
Oedipus (1983: 217). Reactive desire takes at least three different forms, as external
limitation of active desire, internal ‘repression’ of such desire, and desire itself when
disempowered by repression (2006: 61). In this work, we are thinking mainly of the
latter two kinds, combined in an assemblage.

Active forces involve a direct connection to the world, to exteriority (in terms of flows,
assemblages, etc), whereas reactive forces are turned against themselves, containing both
a repressed and a repressive content, and hence mediated and indirect. Reactive desire is
connected to the Nietzschean concept of ressentiment (2006: 45), which distinguishes
morality (in which the evil precedes the good) from ethics (in which the bad is defined
simply as what stands against a prior good) (Patton 2000: 60). Perez argues that a
reactive or ‘slave’ morality is one in which a paranoiac machine inscribes its fears onto
the Body without Organs (the space of immanence), trying to make it a ‘space of laws’,
‘neat and orderly’ (Perez 1990: 18-19). It operates through sexual, emotional and bodily
repression. Hence, Deleuze and Guattari insist that sexual repression survives supposed
sexual ‘liberation’ for as long as Oedipus continues to operate, confining pleasures within

In contrast, active forces are associated with difference and transformation; ‘only active
force asserts itself, it affirms its difference and makes its difference an object of
affirmation’ (1983: 55-6). Active forces are connected to affirmative desire, and reactive
forces to nihilistic desire; affirmation and negation are ‘becoming-active’ and ‘becoming-reactive’ respectively (2006: 54). The potential for transformation, including self-transformation, is crucial to active forces (2006: 42). They express above all a principle of differentiation, a valuing of difference and of ‘singularity’, the irreducibility of anything (person, assemblage, flow, desire) to a totalising category or representation. The two poles can thus be distinguished radically, identified respectively with the enslavement of desire by sovereignty and its inverse, the overthrow of power (1983: 366).

Deleuze portrays the two forces as at once Manichean, pitted in a conflict which is basic (2006: 40) and at the same time unequal, since the future transformation is viewed as overcoming the reactive (2006: 71-2). They are locked in combat today as two poles between which society vacillates (1983: 260). For Deleuze, active forces are primary; without them, reactive forces could not be forces (2006: 41). Active forces are superior or dominant, reactive forces inferior or dominated (2006: 40). Reactive force sometimes dominates active force, but not by becoming active – rather, by separating active force from what it can do, in other words by alienating and disempowering (2006: 57). All desires infuse the social field, but divide into two types of ‘delirium’ or psychological complex, the ‘fascisizing [fascisant]’ type which disinvests every ‘free’ figure of desire and invests central sovereignty, and the ‘schizorevolutionary type or pole that follows the lines of escape of desire; breaches the wall and causes flows to move; assembles its machines and its groups-in-fusion in the enclaves or at the periphery’, producing an inverse effect (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 277).

According to Deleuze, there are two models of contingency: the creative power of the poet, and the politician’s denial of difference so as to prolong an established order. It is for the latter that negation (lack) is primary, ‘as if it were necessary to pass through the misfortunes of rift and division in order to be able to say yes’. For the poet, on the other hand, difference is ‘light, aerial and affirmative’. ‘There is a false profundity in conflict, but underneath conflict, the play of differences’, differences which should be affirmed as positive and not overcoded by negativity (1994: 50-4). Being must be viewed both as differentiated and affirmative, against the false choice between being as negative (Difference) or being as affirmative but undiffereniciated and fully present (1994: 268). Hence Deleuze has an ‘ethical doctrine’ which ‘favours those forms of interaction associated with productive, affirmative modes of interaction at the expense of restrictive, negative modes’ (2000: 31). Real revolutions have the atmosphere of fetes (1994: 268). ‘A revolutionary machine is nothing if it does not acquire at least as much force as [the] coercive machines have for producing breaks and mobilizing flows’ – but the coercive machines (bureaucracies, fascist movements, financial and judicial systems etc) operate ‘through a restriction, a blockage, a reduction’ so as to repress flows and contain them in narrow categories (1983: 293). It therefore follows that in a liberated person, active forces would have primacy over reactive forces, which would exist only as secondary expressions if at all (whereas in the ‘neurosis’ and ‘paranoia’ of the dominant forms of subjectivity today, the reactive forces gain a false and destructive primacy).
Active desire subordinates social production to desiring-production, while reactive desire does the opposite. Social production refers both to the social construction of meaning, and to production in an economic sense. Desiring-production refers to the productive flows of desire at a molecular level, in which networks of connections are formed. Desire is something which is ‘produced’ by connections, and produces intensities, singularities and other such figures of Deleuzian theory. Deleuze and Guattari deny any fundamental distinction between social and desiring-production. Social production is desiring-production itself under determinate conditions (1983: 29). They are ‘the same machines’. There is, however, a difference in regime between the two (1983: 31). There are various differences between them, such that social machines break down more fundamentally, and contain the potential for worse kinds of repression (1983: 31-2). The social investments of desire are more-or-less molar, whereas desire is molecular (1983: 291). Hence, the social machine typically seeks to codify, channel and regulate the flows of desire (1983: 33). Even the most repressive social forms are produced by desire, though their social repression reacts back on it (1983: 29-30).

The overwhelming ethical impetus of Deleuzian theory is to put desiring-production at the basis of action. It is by subordinating social production to desiring-production that one brings something new into the world at the social level. Hence, the positive tasks of analysis are constructed in terms of favouring the ‘overthrow of power’ by desiring-production. The molecular multiplicities should come to treat the large aggregates as ‘useful materials for their own elaborations’ (1983: 366-7). A subject-group (affinity-network) necessarily ‘subordinates the socius or the form of power to desiring-production’, whereas a subjugated group subordinates itself to the socius and internalises the repression of desire (1983 348). Struggles at the level of axioms are important, but as an expression of underlying forces of another order – the difference between positing one’s own demands and the axiomatic which cannot tolerate this (1987: 470-1).

By thinking differently, one can use thought or language as a war-machine, by being a foreigner in one’s own tongue (using language in minoritarian ways), ‘in order to draw speech to oneself and “bring something incomprehensible into the world”’ (1987: 378). Their critique of psychoanalysis is that it performs a territorializing function, mapping desire onto rigid schemas in ways which restrict it (e.g. 1983: 307-8, 312, 354). The task of ‘schizoanalysis’ (the name Deleuze and Guattari give to their approach in Anti-Oedipus) is to undermine reactive rigidities so as to release repressed desires, ‘causing the desiring-machines to start up again’ (1983: 339). This is not to uncover (make present) a repressed (representable) content, but rather, to uncover the possibility of flows beyond representation.

**Rhizomes and arborescence**

Our treatment of networks and hierarchies follows from the distinction between arborescent (tree-like) and rhizomatic (networked) structures. In Deleuze and Guattari’s work, a rhizome has the characteristics of connection and heterogeneity: any point of a network of rhizomes can be connected to anything else in the network, and must form such connections. This is very different from the tree or root, which plots a point and
fixes an order. The linguistic tree on the Chomskian model still begins at a point S and proceeds by dichotomy. On the contrary, Deleuze and Guattari assert that not every trait in a rhizome is necessarily linked to a linguistic feature; semiotic chains of every nature are connected to very diverse modes of coding (biological, political, economic, etc.) that bring into play not only different regimes of signs but also states of things of differing status. There the subject is no longer a subject, but a rhizome, a Body without Organs. In other words, what these writers argue is that a rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains and organisations of power (1987: 6-7).

Multiplicities cease to have any relation to the One as subject or object, natural or spiritual entity; rather, they are rhizomatic, they are flat, a plane of consistency of multiplicities, defined by the outside:

by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connect with other multiplicities. The line of flight marks: the reality of a finite number of dimensions that the multiplicity effectively fills; the impossibility of a supplementary dimension, unless the multiplicity is transformed by the line of flight; the possibility and necessity of flattening all of the multiplicities on a single place of consistency or exteriority, regardless of their number of dimensions (1987: 9).

In contrast, arborescent systems are hierarchical systems with centres of significance and subjectification, controlled by central automata like organised memories. An element only receives information from a higher unit, and only receives a subjective affection along preestablished paths. Deleuze and Guattari point to problems in information and computer science, when these sciences grant all power to a memory or central organ. The writers cite Pierre Rosenstiehl and Jean Petitot: ‘accepting the primacy of hierarchical structures amounts to giving arborescent structures privileged status…In a hierarchical system an individual has only one neighbor, his or her hierarchical superior… The channels of transmission are preestablished: the arborescent system preexists the individual, who is integrated into it at an alloted place’ (Rosenstiehl and Petitot 1974, cited in Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 16). (Rhizome and arborescence are figures of speech, and should not necessarily be taken to suggest that trees actually operate in an ‘arborescent’ way).

Thus, in a rhizomatic social field, the hierarchic system’s coherence is not the final word. In the system’s own construction, all the various instances of desire, identity, belief, etc are constructed as if they were elements within a single totality, “arborescent” in Deleuze’s terms, like the branches coming from the main trunk of a tree. However, such an apparatus is necessarily haunted by the possible emergence of “lines of flight” which take its elements outside the framework it constitutes. The elements which escape the structure have a different structure – less hierarchical than rhizomatic, emerging through underground networks connected horizontally and lacking a hierarchic centre. The system’s resort to violence is an attempt to crush various rhizomatic and quasi-rhizomatic elements, which tend to escape it. A hierarchical structure necessarily has a ‘trunk’ or despotic signifier which operates as its core, drawing it into the field of lack and scarcity (see below).
Dominatory power (not to be confused with power in the creative, Foucauldian sense) arises from a reactive distortion or entrapment of desire, but also tends to operate on desire as if from outside. The operations whereby ‘power’ as fixity can operate on ‘desire’ as flows and underlying fields made up of singularities are several. One can hence distinguish at least four kinds of dominatory power: *repression*, in which desire is kept immobile or forced to bounce around inside a confined or ‘cramped’ space; *alienation*, in which a cluster of desire is kept separate from other clusters, rendered unable to form links by a field gridded in a segmentary way, by separations; *exclusion*, in which desire is kept separate from the capacity to act or flow in a space dominated by a dominant frame, hence prevented from forming connections within this space; and *exploitation*, in which desire is put to work in ways which are subordinate to dominant categories and powers.

In contrast to these centred systems, the authors set forth acentred systems, finite networks of automata, in which communication runs from any neighbor to any other, channels do not preexist, and individuals are interchangeable, defined only by their state at a given moment; local operations are coordinated and the final, global result synchronised without a central agency (1987: 17). That is also what happens when ‘mass’ movements or molecular flows are constantly escaping, inventing connections that jump from tree to tree and uproot them: a whole smoothing of space, which in turn reacts back upon striated space (1987: 506). Or as Hardt and Negri put it, ‘a world that knows no outside. It knows only an inside, a vital and ineluctable participation in the set of social structures, with no possibility of transcending them. This inside is the productive cooperation of mass intellectuality and affective networks, the productivity of postmodern biopolitics’ (2000: 413).

An activist text makes clear how rhizomes differ from tree-like structures.

‘The tree exists in a hierarchical order of a central trunk with larger and smaller branches. The trunk forms the connection between all parts, thus in a way limiting connections. A rhizome, on the contrary, can be connected with any other at any point. A tree can be cut down, whereas rhizomes are much less subject to destruction. Rhizomes can grow again along another line if broken at some point. Rhizomes are abundant; if weeded out in one place, they will definitely show up somewhere else. Rhizomes are endless, as are desire and the imagination.’

(Do or Die, n.d.)

An orientation to rhizomes leads to political approaches emphasizing diversity, the liberation of desire and freedom to live in different ways. Hence, Hakim Bey argues that ‘the decay of political systems will lead to a decentralized proliferation of experiments in living’, a world of islands arranged in a net. This profusion opposes the dominant alienating structures. Capitalism is organised to prevent genuine coming-together, favouring either separation or arrangement in functional groups. This pressure away from autonomy is for Bey ‘the single most oppressive reality we face’. Even to succeed in meeting in spite of these pressures is already a victory of sorts. Attain the face-to-face
unrecuperated setting and creativity will come automatically - the purpose of the group is almost an afterthought, even if it seems to be the purpose (Bey, 1994). Similarly, Rosi Braidotti argues that the point is not to proclaim identities or counter-identities ‘but to open up identity to different connections able to produce multiple belongings that in turn precipitate a non-unitary vision of a subject… This requires the desire, ability and courage to sustain multiple belongings in a context that predominantly celebrates and rewards unified identities’ (Braidotti, 2006: 85). Where activist appropriations of Deleuze often differ from those of critical scholars such as Braidotti is that the former are more interested in the autonomy of social spaces and forces, whereas the latter are more interested in decentring and undermining the ‘subject’, ‘essentialism’, and other such categories of western reason. While the former is arguably more necessary for a transformative project, both are important components of a thoroughgoing overcoming of arborescence.

Confusion should here be avoided. Arguments for networked forms of life to replace hierarchies are not arguments for networked capitalism, nor for reactive networks. This is why the various critiques which associate Deleuze and Guattari either with the ‘cultural logic of late capitalism’ or with the proliferation of ‘fundamentalisms’ miss the point completely. Indeed, we see in such critiques less of a critical response than a resistance in the psychoanalytic sense, an attempt to domesticate or suppress the breakthrough Deleuze and Guattari have made. It seems there are always those who denounce network models, but one has to question how much of this is down to analytical problems and how much to the fact that opponents ‘resist’ for rather different reasons – most often, in the name of their own trunk (the defence of which is aided by identifying capitalism with anarchy, networks and trunklessness).

There is considerable overlap between the rhizomes-hierarchies binary in Deleuze and Guattari and the ideas of ‘society against the state’ found in autonomist and anarchist texts. For instance, autonomist philosopher Giorgio Agamben argues that ‘[t]he novelty of the coming politics is that it will no longer be a struggle for the conquest or control of the State, but a struggle between the State and the non-State (humanity), an insurmountable disjunction between whatever singularity and the State organization’ (1993: 85). The state can incorporate any identity – what it cannot tolerate ‘is that singularities form a community without affirming an identity, that humans co-belong without any representable condition of belonging’ (1993: 86). ‘A being radically devoid of any representable identity would be absolutely irrelevant to the State’ (1993: 86).

Similarly, Martin Buber argues that there is no form of social activity which cannot, on some side or at some moment, become political: ‘we must realize that social forms on the one hand and State institutions on the other are crystallisations of the two principles. But it is most essential that we recognise the structural difference between the two spheres in regard to the relationship between unity and multiformity’ (1993: 11). From early Negri to Kropotkin, Colin Ward, and Hakim Bey, similar figures appear.

These concepts are also related to the distinction between smooth and striated space. Smooth space refers to a figure of a desert or plateau on which flows move freely, forming a patchwork or a web of rhizomes, whereas striated space is crisscrossed with
lines which make movement across it difficult, confining flows to particular parts of the space. Striated space ‘closes a surface, divides it up at determinate intervals, establishes breaks, whereas a smooth space involves distribution across a surface, by frequency or along paths’ (cited Patton 2000: 112). Smooth space is vectorial, projective or topological, whereas striated space is metric (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 361-2). Striated space can be parcelled out in closed units, whereas smooth space involves open, indefinite distributions (1987: 380). People are distributed (passively) in striated space, whereas they distribute themselves (actively) in smooth space (Deleuze 1994: 36). Against distribution of spaces and resources, and its associated mechanisms of segregation, seeking the ‘best’ distribution, Deleuze counterposes distribution in space. ‘To fill a space, to be distributed within it, is very different from distributing the space’; it makes of space a ‘space of play’ and an unlimited, or imprecisely limited, open space (1994: 36). This space of ‘crowned anarchy’ is disruptive of hierarchy, introduces a subversive difference, and correlates to a power taken to its utmost (1994: 37).

Transversality

Whereas arborescent systems form connections by means of segmentary lines, like a grided map, rhizomatic structures are constructed through transversal connections. The concept of transversality has two broad connotations. One is in phrases such as "transversal lines and connections" refers to lines which cut across grids, similar to the idea in A Thousand Plateaus of lines which have priority over points rather than being limited by them (so a transversal line would be roughly equivalent to a smooth line or a rhizomatic connection). Hence, transversality is cross-cutting-ness, horizontality. ‘With Foucault and Deleuze, horizontalness - a certain transversality accompanied by a new principle of contiguity-discontinuity - is presented in opposition to the traditional vertical stance of thought’ (Genosko ed., 1996: 174). Segmentary structures create rigidities or ‘blinkers’ between sites, which prevent communication across their borders. ‘Transversality’ is the opposite of ‘blinkeredness’, arising when lines cut across such borders. The less blinkered one is, the more transversal one is; transversality ‘tends to be achieved when there is maximum communication among different levels and, above all, in different meanings’ (1996: 17-18). It is thus similar to the idea of horizontal connections among peripheral sites in world-systems analysis, and the idea of heteroglossia in Bakhtin.

The term is also sometimes glossed as ‘transitory + universal’, referring to something which constructs an impermanent, situated connection. Hence, desire being capable of multiple attachments, hence of breaking and forming new attachments all the time, and 'transversality' is its ability to do this, as opposed to becoming fixated on one object (1996: 63). Guattari suggests that the concept, in this sense, means context-specificity and is derived from Foucault (1996: 176). In this sense, it is close to ideas such as ‘diversality’ and ‘transmodernity’ in postcolonial theory.

Social logics in the contemporary world-system
So, what social logics are at work in the field of power, conflict and resistance in the contemporary world? Guattari establishes a three-way divide between the elite, the serialized included-but-exploited, and the uninsured or excluded (2005: 61). We would expand on this to some extent, without losing the basic structure. Without ruling out the operation of other forces (for instance, the persistence of tributary logics), we would suggest that there are six main forces operating in this field: capital, the state, the included stratum, the masses, reactive networks and affinity networks. Each of these also varies between different instances – reactive networks for instance form around different identities, and can be identified as a force only on a formal level (one would not expect, for instance, a Hindu and a Muslim reactive network to work together, except as a system of recurring antagonism). Each of these forces is discussed in more detail below – affinity networks in chapter 3, reactive networks in chapter 4, capitalism, the state and the masses briefly below. Each has its own distinct social logic – hence for example, the capitalist drive for profit is not the same as the state logic of endocolonialism or the ‘political principle’ (see below).

The stratum of the included, which does not appear extensively here, consists of a range of groups which form attachments to the dominant system through the logic of addition of axioms (see below). It forms the field in which ideas such as liberalism, socialism, human rights, ‘civil society’, ‘cosmopolitanism’, ‘global civil society’ and the ‘humanising’ of the dominant system are formed. All the groups within it are groups which would otherwise be excluded were it not for their addition of axioms, so their relation to the system is ambiguous – while they have a clear interest, and usually also a desire, in preserving their own inclusion, and this can (but does not always) extend into a desire to increase inclusion and the ‘addition of axioms’ more broadly, they also pick up from their alienated social roles a degree of identification with the logics of hierarchy and arborescence, and a resultant antagonism with networks. They often form what might be called the ‘soft state’ of welfare institutions and formal representative structures, as distinct from the ‘deep state’ which expresses the logic of the state properly speaking.

When theorizing autonomously, those linked to this stratum produce highly inclusive reformulations of the dominant system which, if applied, would curb many of its more vicious aspects, but without overcoming its basically hierarchical and alienated construction, and often while also displaying a persistent anxiety about social networks, the excluded and the risk of ‘violence’ and ‘breakdown’ they ostensibly bear. Often, however, the included experience a pull to identify with the state-logic itself, so as to ward off the anxiety of the marginality and arbitrariness of their own inclusion. The ‘organic ideologies’ of the included stratum, ranging on a spectrum from the most inclusive to the most statist, are overrepresented in academia, largely because academics as a group tend to belong to this stratum. Authors such as Held (1995), Barber (1996) and Giddens (1990) stand out as eloquent articulators of this standpoint. It is a mistake to assume (as radical critics often do) that the logics and ideologies of the included are simply an extension or expression of capitalism or the dominant system. If rendered consistent and stripped of its ‘deep state’ contaminations, it would amount to a distinct project (for a society based entirely on addition of axioms, alienated but not reactive).
irreducible to the capitalist drive for profit and the statist drive for control (albeit inseparable from the structural condition of alienation).

Despite the importance of this social logic in a wide range of academic literatures, we consider it to be rather marginal to global struggles, because those who take this standpoint lack the constitutive power to act as agents of actualization of a distinct project. Their structural importance is declining because the dominant system has been articulated mainly by the subtraction of axioms since the 1980s. They are forced to rely either on social movements and hence on the excluded stratum and the affinity-network form (as in the attempts to stop the Iraq war), or to fall back on capital or (more commonly) the state as an imaginary agent of their own project (for instance, the various projects for reconstituting social democracy or realizing global equality through the EU, the UN, etc). Hence for instance, human rights can be actualized, but not by the included stratum; they are either actualized by the state, in which case they are distorted into rights given by decree, or else are turned into actively-posed rights by autonomous social movements. The main function of the included stratum in practice has been to use their residual power within the state to curb the excesses of authoritarianism. This exercise of power has been intermittent and usually unsuccessful.

Since the masses are passive and not really an agent (see below), this leaves four social forces with agency in global struggles: capital, the state, affinity-networks and reactive networks. The first two are often fused, and rightly so: although their underlying logics are distinct, they have formed a series of persistent assemblages together. The third is typically neglected, or dismissed as a ‘fringe’ force, both in international relations and in social movement studies. In fact we maintain that this force is crucial, both because of its special status of offering the possibility of a ‘new world’, and in its structural power, its ability to achieve effects, to construct other forms of life and to disrupt the dominant system (see below). Reactive networks are more widely posited as an existing (though undesirable) alternative; in fact it is questionable whether they are a distinct logic or a syncretism between the affinity-network and hierarchical forms. We treat them for now as a distinct social logic, since they certainly operate as a distinct type of social force. Many existing schemas consist of simplified versions of this kind of systemic model, usually reduced to two or three forces (or to two real forces plus a utopia of the included stratum). For instance, Barber’s (1996) triad of ‘Jihad’, ‘McWorld’ or humanised capitalism translates as three poles of reactive networks, capital and the included stratum (the state and affinity-networks are elided).

Surin argues that the stability of social assemblages has been reduced by the deterritorialising power of capital. As the boundaries between public and private, inside and outside, before and after, political left and political right, blur, accordingly the narratives and images, which sustain or attach to them weaken, as does the ‘transcendental’ accords, which they constitute. Thus, Surin argues ‘We maybe living in worlds that are no longer predicate on any real need to secure and maintain accords, worlds characterised by sheer variation and multiplicity (but still functioning according to an axiomatics – for example capital –that ensures their fundamental isomorphism in the face of this uncontrollable diversity)’ (Surin 2006: 67). In terms of social logics, this can
be seen in the sharpening of antagonisms between the different social forces. While the state has become increasingly ‘integralist’ in its pursuit of dominance over society, and capital has become more unconditional in its pursuit of profit, so too are the forces of opposition pushed into increasingly antagonistic stances, generating ‘autonomous social movements’ as distinct assemblages (as opposed to the earlier corporatist axiomatisations).

If the further premise is accepted that hierarchies are in decline and are being eclipsed by networks, this would seem to put the state-form in a position of terminal decline, in which its current authoritarianism would be a kind of integralist acting-out. The future would then be a field of contestation between a recomposed network capitalism (maybe fused with ‘rhizome-states’ and global cities), affinity-networks and reactivenetworks. We shall return to this question in the conclusion.

**Anti-systemic movements and the included stratum**

The networks theorization missing from world-systems analysis is needed to address Pieterse’s (2004) containment politics, socialization, integration, isolation and the hierarchical dimensions of these policies in relation to global inequality. We have in mind a particular type of network politics, which we term the affinity-network form. Network theorization in global politics follow various logics: networks are used by states and corporations to achieve lean government, strong executives and arbitrary “governance” without principles, limits to sustain the transnational elites through permanent war, and to promote globalised social darwinism through the development-security nexus (neoconservatism, neoliberalism, counterterrorism); but they can also be used by autonomous movements to exceed the state and parochial attachments to ethnoreligiicultural fixed identities and violent exclusionary state practices (anti-globalization, anti-war and anti-corporate movements); to defeat American and G8 hegemony and assert local, regional, national or global communities of a specific ethnic, religious or cultural nature (e.g. anti-systemic movements with variant levels of militancy).

Currently, none of these network applications and political practices are proving successful. Global totalitarianism as Pieterse argues, fails because it is excessive over actual needs, which tend to be low-tech and local. Moreover, it aims for dominance in symmetrical contexts, when the actual situation is asymmetrical and chaotic, and when it involves infinite, non-linear and dynamic networks, which are able to propagate, recruit, mobilize and spread in far greater speeds through new ICTs. Through multinationals and the ‘war on terror inc.’ and the privatization of war, states are embarrassingly unable produce peace and development and due to the global media transformation unable to control and censor images of their incapacity. The second grouping taking advantage of the network logic to exceed hierarchical forms of organization with various ideologically disparate groups aligning together horizontally is not successful either. Although through ICTs it is able to globalize local issues, it is unable to localize a global message and has
tended not to successfully mobilise the working class, civil society and other relatively included groups, which are formulating in some cases concrete proposals for political change. The imaginary for these movements of ‘Another world is possible’ is indeed successful, but the policies and solutions to problems are more rarely agreed upon due to the leaderless and ideologically disparate character of the movement of movements. The third grouping utilising the network logic is anti-systemic movements of the militant kind and global terrorist groups. They are failing as well to engage on a political level, as their actions are framed by the mainstream global media as criminal and in the public sphere inhumane, thus impossible to identify with, even if the cause of the reactive movement is easily understood.

The current global system is existing in the edge of chaos, unable to negotiate and harness the immense energy unleashed by networks, with manifestations of this including the global financial crisis, permanent conflict and pressure for reform and revolution by networked movements. The edge of chaos in terms of complexity theory can be a positive, dynamic and transformative moment. Nevertheless, this energy fails to be harnessed by all these actors and groupings. The question remains: why does the network logic fail to transform the global system for the better? A possible answer is that there are underlying social logics based on capitalism, the state, and global order that enable rapid superficial, but also significant structural changes in the system in attempting to preserve it.

So why has there not been a fusion of networks with projects of global reform emanating from the included stratum? The terrain of proposed global ‘reform’ of this system has been extensively mapped by Patrick Bond and Walden Bello (Bond 200, Bello 2002). I will merely note here, by way of summarizing the topic, three rather differing ‘reformist’ responses from groups that have particular global resonance. The first group focuses on the social distemper (Arrighi’s ‘systemic chaos’) that this failed system has produced on the ‘periphery’ – the fundamentalisms and xenophobias, the internal chaos and occasionally unpredictable dictators, that haunt such countries – and casts the resultant problem principally in terms of ‘security concerns’ (and especially the security concerns of the American state) (Saul, 2004: 231).

A second group of ‘reformers’, perhaps best described as being, at least in the first instance denizens of the world ‘Empire’ rather than ‘empire’ (although needless to say, they are also strongly inflected in their policies by pressures from the American state and the interests behind), are more polite and less inclined to favour the overt use of force (Saul, 2004: 232). From within the camp of ‘Empire’ there is however, a third group, one which advances a more sweeping vision of possible reform – albeit a vision that, like the much more saccharine offerings of the World Bank, is primarily cast in economistic rather than security terms. For they wonder out loud whether policies flowing from this consensus can really hope to maximize the system’s drive to realize itself as transformative (and in the long term, ever more profitable) engine of expanded production (ibid 233). However, even assuming for the moment the abstract potential of the model of disciplined capitalism that seems to drive such thinkers/practitioners, what is the likelihood of their calls for latter day quasi-Keynesianism being heeded either
nationally in the global South or more globally? (ibid. 233). Saul quotes Trevor Ngwane that fighting global capitalism can be an excuse for reformers not to fight their own national bourgeoisie (236). Panitch and Gindin go even further, arguing that the way out of global capitalism and American empire will not be found in a return to a reformist model on the post-war order. The fact that the globalization of capitalism has left virtually no national bourgeoisies for labour to ally with, and few divisions to exploit between finance and industry, helps make the case for struggles at the level of the national state that are anti-capitalist as well as anti-imperial (Panitch and Gindin 2005: 75).

Saul also urges his readers to resist the temptation deriving from authors such as Laclau to conceive opposition entirely in terms of systemic concepts such as democracy, as such an emphasis blurs opposition to capitalism, exploitation, commodification, imperialism and militarism (Saul 2004: 238). As Myers argues, movements for liberation must be directed against capitalism. ‘For all but a handful, capitalism has failed. For the rest of us, anti-capitalism remains our only hope’ (J.C Myers 2000: 34, Starr 2000). Friedman has similarly argued that radicals should be careful with discourses of hybridity, creolization and the ‘trans-x discourse’, which he portrays as emanating from an ‘emergent cosmopolitan identity within the world-system… Cosmopolitan identity emerges at the same time as indigenizing identities emerge at the lower end of declining hegemonic zone of the global arena. Thus cosmopolitan hybridity is countered by nationalist or localist identity that opposes itself to everything cosmopolitan’ (Friedman 2005: 93). We would argue that critical transversalities are also possible, but it is certainly important to be aware of such dangers.

**Forms of hierarchical structure: from alienation to capitalism**

Effective power apparatuses operate through their ability to territorialise (or in Marxist terms, subsume) social processes, identities and differentiations occurring in everyday life, a process which can involve axiomatisation and/or overcoding. A power-holding group which is able to articulate widespread beliefs, desires and identities to its worldview and project is able to establish itself in epochal terms as a leading force. This process of subsumption is often violent – Marx (Capital) discusses the Highland clearances as an example of real subsumption (Marx 1976: 1034-5).– and its net effect is to produce a system in which external elements are reduced to the status of elements internal to the system. In this sense, the system can construct itself as all-controlling, through re-constructing external elements as internal moments of its own functioning.

The constant retrerritorialisation of outside as inside, of an excess tending to escape as a “peripheral” or “marginal” element within the system, is the condition for the system’s existence as an overarching totality. Territorialisation occurs when desire is fixed to certain reference-points, and also when physical spaces are subordinated to the mappings imposed by the powerful. It involves the internalisation of lack or debt (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 190-1). Against territorialisation, Deleuze and Guattari call for “detterritorialisation”, the breaking-down of existing repressive connections and inscriptions in such a way as to release energies and forces which are trapped in these
assemblages and construct new, creative kinds of assemblages (e.g. Guattari 2005: 10). Absolute deterritorialisation occurs when the deterritorialised forces do not form new territories but rather, operate in a smooth space. It is associated with an almost New Age vision of a world brought back into the Cosmos which echoes aspects of indigenous epistemologies (2005: 510-11).

There are a number of types of territorial regime which reterritorialise escaping flows. Deleuze and Guattari refer most frequently to two of these: overcoding and axiomatisation. Overcoding occurs when the excess in meaning and desire is eliminated through representation, so that social segments lose their ability to ‘bud’, or connect in new directions. It is the typical operational form of the state, which ‘makes desire into the property of the sovereign’ (1983: 199). The sovereign operates as a ‘despotic signifier’ uniting the field of meaning through a constitutive exclusion (1983: 208-9), and creating a ‘gigantic enterprise of antiproduction’ blocking flows of desire (1983: 235).

Axiomatisation, or the creation of axioms, is a more subtle process associated with capitalism, defined in opposition to codes (1983: 250), in which numbers, names and values are mapped onto existing flows so as to bring them into a countable, representable schema – for instance, by creating niche markets, minority representations and so on (1987: 462). It invents codes for decoded flows (1983: 221), and instead of blocking desire, tries to master its flows by adding new axioms for them (1987: 462, 1983: 246). Capitalism operates mainly by adding axioms (1983: 253). Despite its affinities with emancipatory deterritorialisation, the capitalist deterritorialisation through axioms is not the same; capitalism requires that the flows remain ‘in a bound state’, that the non-salable be excluded, and that flows be flattened and put in the service of an overall social order (1983: 246). Hence, axiomatisation functions as the “radicle” reinscription of escaping rhizomes as the systems of roots and branches of an arborescent system (1987: 13-14).

Despotic signification

Arborescent systems should also be considered in terms of the Lacanian theory of the ‘master-signifier’. Although we do not share Lacan’s insistence that all meaningful social phenomena necessarily take this form, we recognise the importance of this analysis in understanding the internal operation of hierarchical social forms. Indeed, we would suggest that a dominatory or alienated system, a system based on ‘representation’ in Deleuze’s sense, necessarily involves such a signifier. The master-signifier has been defined as ‘the signifier of symbolic authority founded only in itself -in its own act of enunciation’ (Mouffe, 2000: 137). This empty symbolic gesture grounds the entire hierarchy in a founding violence which elides the contingency and historicity of its construction, retrospectively reconstructing contingency as necessity and the process of subsumption of elements as an unstoppable unfolding of an internal dynamic.

If hierarchic systems are to be conceived on the metaphor of a tree (while keeping in mind that actual trees may not be so hierarchic), then the master-signifier forms the trunk of the tree, with the peripheral and marginal aspects subsumed as the branches, leaves, and roots. Another necessary structural effect of the master-signifier is the construction of
at least one element as excluded other, standing for the elided contingency and instability threatening the social order – in Lacanian terms, a repressed “Real” which is unsymbolisable in the framework of the existing system and through which the system’s instability “returns”. Žižek has coined the term ‘social symptom’ to refer to those groups excluded by such social processes – refugees, the urban poor, and so on – ‘the part which, although inherent to the existing universal order, has no ’proper place’ within it’ (Žižek, 1999: 224). Homologous to the psychoanalytic “symptom”, these groups express the inherent deadlock of the system in the form of an excluded element “extimate” – external yet simultaneously intimate, supplementary – to it.

Scarcity

Deleuze and Guattari are fiercely critical of the Lacanian hypothesis of ‘constitutive lack’ and the Freudian ‘death drive’, and with good reason. Like many ecological theorists, they sense that capitalism depends on scarcity as an existential condition. Representation is founded on scarcity, as a constitutive rather than contingent aspect of its mode of relating to the world. It is necessary to representation because despotic signification requires an excluded Other. The critique of Lacanian theory, which one of us has pursued in detail (Robinson 2005), is thus merely a small corner of a much bigger critique of the underpinnings of alienated society. ‘Without a boss, no factory; without lack, no desire’ (see Guattari 1995: 151-62).

More empirically, it is necessary because alienated social forms are not based on active desire; therefore, they require that activity be forced or coerced in some way – they are systems of ‘work’ in the sense of forced labour. Without the compulsion of scarcity, people cannot be induced to ‘work’ in this sense (they may be productively active, but in ludic and subsistence ways). A division thus emerges between what Marshall Sahlins terms ‘primitive abundance’ (2004) and the existential scarcity which underpins capitalism. The crucial insight Deleuze and Guattari share with eco-anarchists is that scarcity has to be actively produced by alienated assemblages, by suppressing or warding off excesses and any recreation of (existential/psychological) abundance, a process sometimes termed ‘antiproduction’. Repression of desire is intimately connected to this production of scarcity. Guattari argues that capitalism’s ‘death instinct’, its insistence on scarcity, ensures that capitalism is, for all its decodings, infinitely further from molecular desire and far more repressive than indigenous or tributary societies (Genosko ed., 1996: 89-90). Repression is an active process of anti-production (1984: 34). This idea of anti-production is close to the autonomist idea of class decomposition, but extended beyond the categories of class analysis to the entire social and ecological field.

Systems of constituted power such as capitalism and the state function through control of resources which are used to reward and punish, but they only control these resources to begin with as a result of processes of expropriation. It is a myth that this comes from some organisational advantage of the system – its ability to generate resources as if from thin air, to combine them more efficiently, etc – because such advantages only become apparent once the organisation is established, and are only comprehensible once its peculiar set of produced resources are already culturally valorised. In any case, one is
dealing mainly with phenomena – classified as “resources” – which are widespread everywhere, such as the possibility of human productive activity, the existence of fertile land, etc – or are infinitely reproducible, such as ideas and techniques. Neither capital nor the state brings any crucial resource to the process which was not already there. This leaves advocates of either required to make the argument that people are somehow incapable of assembling things through their own networks, usually because of some systemic irrationality or counter-finality (such as the free rider problem).

In fact this makes little sense for two reasons – firstly the same problem would also prevent state or market formation (as opposed to continuation), and secondly the cultural diversity of humanity precludes these kinds of generic deductions of what is or is not possible based on people’s systems of meanings. It is quite possible to argue that people would not want refrigerators aside from an alienated society, or that they only perform the demeaning task of manufacturing them because of a totally repressive coercion (two arguments an eco-anarchist is likely to advance), but it is absurd to argue that, assuming they want refrigerators and that the labour involved is of a kind they could perform voluntarily or in response to customary obligations, they could not find a way to make them without state or capital involvement. It makes more sense to claim that resources emerge at another level – they are natural or arise from horizontal social relations – and then are either expropriated for distribution or prevented from flowing along other connections.

In the article ‘Why the pyramids were built’, eco-anarchist Savage (n.d.) argues that ‘civilisation’ (alienated society) tends to produce monoculture; it is constructed against primitive abundance and in particular, gift economies as an alternative. Different ‘civilised’ societies (command versus market for instance) are different ways of organising and distributing scarcity. Savage dismisses the view that existential scarcity arose from material scarcity; rather, the switch from primitive abundance to scarcity seems to always be coerced by a minority. But alienated systems end up in crisis as their success tends to reproduce abundance at a different level. ‘[A]bundance is the enemy of any system that relies on control of the people within it’. When a civilisation becomes efficient enough to create abundance, it goes into crisis – the worse-off start to benefit from the system and no longer need to work, so the system has to take action to recreate scarcity. Often it does this through costly projects such as the pyramids, nuclear weapons, costly wars and so on. Today, consumerism – the construction of open-ended, insatiable desires for commodities which never satiate – is becoming a new strategy of reproducing existential scarcity.

In Situationism, the division between existential scarcity and existential abundance is expressed in a binary between ‘survival’ and ‘life’. For Situationists, alienated society is a kind of perpetual immiseration through suppression of the forces of life. Due to its basis in an idea of scarcity, capitalism cannot actually provide happiness, only ‘force-feeding survival to satiation point’ (Vaneigem 1967: 98). Similarly, Baudrillard argues that scarcity in actuality arises from the religion of necessity, beginning as a psychological phenomenon. Its basis is the choice to view nature as an enemy to be conquered (1975: 58). Richard Day similarly discusses domination as congealed power,
pitted against live power (Day 2005: 169-70), a reconstruction which echoes various theories of constituting and constituted power (Negri 1999), instituting and instituted imaginaries (Castoriadis 1987), power-to and power-over (Holloway 2002), and so on (see below, affinity-networks, chapter 3).

One can clearly see the structural reproduction of scarcity behind and beneath many of the most glaring irrationalities of capitalist and state actions: the phenomenon of ‘built-in obsolescence’, attempts to patent and restrict ‘goods and services’ (music, films, software, knowledge) which are capable of indefinite reproduction, the cash-sinks of the military and the police-prison-repression machine, the glaring disparity between empirical plenty (enough food, basic medicines, water) and distributive scarcity (starvation, disease, drought). The idea of ‘planned scarcity’ finds practical significance in empirical studies of the ways in which global planners induce material shortages in the global periphery (George, 1976: Chapter 6).

Scarcity thus establishes the field in which alienated social forms come into being (c.f. Sartre, 1960; Robinson, 2008). Its ‘anti-production’ is a perpetual process of social decomposition which actively reproduces division so as to render necessary the reconnections offered by the dominant system. ‘Industrial society thus secures unconscious control of our fate by its need – satisfying from the point of view of the death instinct – to disjunct every consumer/producer in such a way that ultimately humanity would find itself becoming a great fragmented body held together only as the supreme God of the Economy shall decree’ (Guattari 1984: 20). Capitalism and the state produce dependence on markets and state distributions by attacking the networks of affinity and subsistence which otherwise produce localised social and ecological compositions in the field of active desire. Beneath its social production, scarcity is ‘chosen’ at an existential level, as ‘slave morality’ and reactive desire.

*The logic of alienation*

One should logically distinguish *alienation* as a social logic from *capital* as a social force, and both from the *dominant system* as an assemblage. Those who wish to replace ‘capitalism’ with the ‘megamachine’, ‘civilisation’ or ‘industrial society’ as the main object of revolt have already spotted that alienation (particularly in its ecological and psychological dimensions) is considerably wider than capitalism. Alienated social forms exist wherever the representational logic has interposed itself between desires, constructing a social field mediated by representations. These alienated forms do not, however, necessarily form a single system. They are formally similar, and so tend to link together and interrelate more easily than they do with affinity-network and other forms, but capital, the state and other alienated entities should not be conflated *a priori*, nor should every alienated entity be assumed to be part of the dominant system. A tributary system for instance may be outside both the capitalist market and the modern state, without thereby being non-alienated. At an extreme, a micro-unit – a religious cult or a political sect for example – could be extremely alienated in spite of cutting itself off from the overall system entirely. This qualification aside, alienation and capitalism are very closely related. Our approach here is thus similar to, but subtly different from, the
various autonomists, Situationists and open Marxists who treat all alienated forms as ‘forms of capital’. A Deleuzian approach does not necessarily share the inference of systematicity to such forms, or the last-instance reduction to capital in particular (rather than, say, the state-form), but it shares the view that there is a similar formal problem with all alienated social forms, and a single generative logic (of representation or alienation) which reappears in each of these forms.

It is perhaps the open Marxists who have gone furthest in drawing out the significance of Marx’s critique of alienation. Hence, for Bonefeld, ‘[c]apital is capital only in and through the constitution of human social practice as a perverted practice, as an object-less practice’ (2000: 49). The positing of the means of production as ‘capital’ is based on the existence of labour as objectless labour under the command of capital (2000: 48). ‘Objectless’ here means without project or intentionality (in the phenomenological sense), without immanent force of its own, non-self-valorising; the self-valorisation of labour is a line of flight towards autonomy, as Negri has shown. Alienation can thus be analysed as the theft of the project and hence of desire, so that the project and the desire determining labour’s action is capital’s. Similarly, Holloway argues, echoing Negri and Baudrillard, that the reproduction of capital does not only depend on exploitation of labour, ‘but on the constantly renewed transformation of social practice into subordinate labour, the constantly renewed metamorphosis of human creativity into exploited labour, the constantly renewed subjection of creativity to the demands of valorization’ (Holloway 2000: 181).

Why, then, do we not simply subsume Deleuzian theory into Marxism? The answer is that a deeper critique of alienation is needed than Marxism can provide. In The Mirror of Production, Baudrillard mounts a powerful critique of the limits of Marxist theories of alienation, based mainly on the latter’s failure to problematise the initial capitalist construction of desire and agency as ‘labour’ and ‘production’, and hence the frame of scarcity. He goes as far as to allege that Marxism aids capitalism by arguing that people are alienated by the sale of labour-power instead of being alienated as labour-power (1975: 31). According to Baudrillard, the system no longer requires all to produce, only to conform, as it stifles most people’s production forces – only a few are really given prolonged personal development (ibid.132). Production poses as an ‘objective finality opposing itself to the radicality of desire’ (ibid.155). Labour is defined in terms of the disinvestment of the body, symbolic exchange and abundance (ibid.46). The production of social relations may be determined by reproduction of this code as an ‘in-depth imperialism’, colonizing everyday life (ibid.142).

And yet, this capitalist endocolonialism is unstable. Capitalism reduces the expression of human potentials to the form of ‘production’; it is incapable of liberating human potentials otherwise. In particular, its suppression of symbolic exchange makes it ultimately unable to attain the meaning it seeks, leading to its symbolic disintegration (ibid.145). In turn, without symbolic exchange, real redistribution of wealth from North to South and of power from elite to the rest is impossible (ibid.145). The system’s attempts at redistribution only produce repressive desublimation. It is unable to produce ‘participation’, commitment (ibid.143). Rather than exploitation, the system now
functions by coded markings and exclusions, with the key divide running between conformity inside and subversion outside (ibid. 138). The exclusions based on imposition of the code are as central to capitalism as its internal class divisions, and are framed around excluding ‘symbolic power’ (a Baudrillardian concept similar to Deleuzian active desire) from representational discourse (ibid.137).

According to Baudrillard, Marxism is metaphysical in viewing concepts not as interpretive hypotheses but as translation of a universal movement (ibid. 47). For him, the Marxist emphasis on the economy, like any other analysis which treats a part of the system as autonomous, is ideological, covering up the totality of the system. It is not the economic which is the primary contradiction but separation itself (ibid.149-50). The proletariat does not really escape from the capitalist code because it defines itself inside production (ibid.157). The truly radical class struggle is, rather, the struggle against being enclosed as a class (ibid.158). It is thus a matter of radical difference, of the kind which Marxism fails to see in indigenous societies and symbolic exchange (ibid.14). Indigeneity could lead to a radical external perspective on (not internal critique of) western culture (ibid. 89). The Marxist claim of revealing history retrospectively, in contrast, is a western pretention to privilege of being closest to the universal, which doom western society to imagine and live itself as superior (ibid. 113). Baudrillard instead calls for a utopia which is totally immanent in its revolt, ‘always already present’ and in ‘radical antagonism’ with the dominant system (ibid.162-5). Revolt, therefore, emerges not at the point of exploitation, but at the point of exclusion, below the bar of meaning and at marginal points (ibid.133-4). Bonanno (1998) has similarly argued that the division between included and excluded has replaced the division between exploiter and exploited as the central antagonism of the current world.

Marxists have gone some way to recognising broader issues of alienation. Hence, David Harvey for example argues that as well as labour and regional conflicts, capitalism also generates conflicts over the embedding into capitalist circuits of things capitalism didn’t create, including nature, labour, culture and the body (2006: 112-13). Where Marxism goes wrong, and slips into an almost theocratic modality, is in its assumption that the other of alienation is a particular knowable type of entity or essence, which can be identified with labour and progress. Hence, while Marxists rarely assert this essence explicitly, and sometimes even disavow it (while continuing to behave ‘as if’ it still operates), certain of its characteristics can be easily deduced – for example, that it will be based on ‘labour’ in some sense, that it will be industrial and scientific, and that it will be highly collective. The attributes of this image of alternative sociality form something like a rival ‘trunk’ pitted against capitalism, repeating the dangers of representationalism and ‘substitutionism’. We would not rule out the possibility that Marxism could reconstruct itself in a manner which takes account of Baudrillard’s critique. Indeed, in autonomism it had already begun to do so. We feel, however, that a Deleuzian toolkit is more effective at this point in engaging with hierarchy and alienation at an underlying level.

Alienation can arise when the relations people are actually in are experienced by mediation of myths in the Barthesian sense, or ‘capitalist phantasy’ in Guattari’s terms. In Barthesian theory, myths introduce a transcendent element or ‘second-order’ meaning
into signs in such a way as to operate outside of immanence, projecting an additional sphere of essential meaning. Hence, paradoxically, it is often what things ‘really are’ in terms of their usual discursive inscription which is mythical, as opposed to how they ‘appear’, their immanent relationality. Barthesian myths are the usual generative structure of reactive forms of social life, operating as a means whereby unconscious reactive forces can find expression.

Alienation also arises when the relations themselves are dominitary or commandist. Indeed, for the early Negri, there is a close relationship between mythology and command, connected to the reduction of the law of value to tautology in the era of real subsumption. In this society, the loss of the boundary between capitalism and the society it exploits, creates a problem for value because there is no outside standpoint from which to measure. Today’s crisis is that ‘value cannot be reduced to an objective measure’ because of real subsumption, which eliminates capitalism’s dependence on a social Other (Negri 1996:151-2). Real subsumption is the realisation of the law of value, but also passes beyond it into mere tautology (Negri 2003: 27.). The condition of immeasurability means that real subsumption is a permanent crisis of capitalism (Negri 1998b: 221). The capitalism of real subsumption and command is in crisis due to its non-separation from society and its loss of consent. It deals with the first problem by simulating society:

[Conflict is] deflected… through the automatic micro-functioning of ideology through information systems. This is the normal, ‘everyday’ fascism, whose most noticeable feature is how unnoticeable it is (Negri 1998a: 190.).

Legitimation is replaced by information, technocracy and a simulation of participation (Negri 2003: 90, 111.). The mystification of society is sustained by command (Negri 2005: 78-80.).

**Fields of alienation: social, ecological, psychological**

Alienation occurs in a number of different spheres. Social alienation occurs when links between desires are contained by the boundaries between people or social groups, and is especially closely linked to capitalism. Ecological alienation occurs when flows of desire are unable to make connections across boundaries between humans and other species or entities. Psychological alienation occurs when desire is internally split, and arranged into rigid structures which impede its connection to the world (social and ecological) and to other desires internal to a body. Often this means that consciousness is split from desire and that one group of desires are repressed by another. All three kinds of alienation are crucial to understanding hierarchical systems. Although they occur in different ‘quantities’ or intensities at different points in the system, they tend to reinforce and even require one another: psychological repression is an inner response to authoritarian social relations, and reproduces them; social alienation depends on ecological alienation for many of its binaries (its enmity to ‘animal’ desires), and to render people dependent on scarcity; ecological alienation is possible only through the psychological construction of scarcity.
Social alienation

The site of the imposition of alienation and the struggle against it is everyday life. It is in everyday life that social relations are produced and reproduced (Lefebvre 1994: 31). Except when it is controlled by alienated or reactive forces, everyday life is a space where experiments in living and affirmative social forms can come into being, as is shown for instance in Colin Ward’s work (1982, 1992). And yet, ‘there are powers, colossal and despicable, that swoop down on everyday life and pursue their prey in its evasions and functions’ (Lebevbvre 1994: 65). As Debord (1983) argues, real possibilities and desires are focused in everyday life, not in the distractions provided by the spectacle.

Since alienation is actively produced – and must be actively reproduced at every moment – it is not so much a matter of primordial scarcity turned into passable welfare by the system, as primordial abundance of relations and desires turned into poverty by a process of systemic simplification. In Scott’s account of domination, the Hobbesian narrative is turned upside down. Left to itself, everyday life is productive of connections, of social composition. Systems of domination, however, pursue a vast simplification of everyday life, imagining it in dyadic terms, with the relation between master and slave (or serf, etc) taken as the only social link in the society, and social connections between subordinates prohibited in various ways (1990: 62-3). It is, paradoxically, if elite attempts at surveillance and atomisation succeed that people enter a Hobbesian relation of mutual antagonism (1990: 128-9). Similarly, for Baudrillard, the dominant system liquidates personal links and social relations, and then systematically produces non-spontaneous relations which it offers up for consumption in a simulation of society (Baudrillard 1998: 198-9). Hence one reaches the point noted by Hakim Bey, where simply coming together independently of the system’s logic is already an act of resistance (Bey 1994). There are clear echoes here of Kropotkin’s ‘social principle’ and its various aliases (see below).

We must remember, however, that what is suppressed is a capacity to form connections, a process of active-desiring and affirmative social construction, and not an essence or a specific form of life which people would otherwise ‘naturally’ hold.

Ecological alienation

To think of alienation in ecological terms, it is necessary to make the leap from the view of ‘nature’ or the ‘environment’ as external (whether as entity or as set of ‘resources’), and instead view ecology as a set of relations which are immanent and horizontal. Hence, a person who is in affinity-network relations of an ecological kind will relate to non-human entities (particularly those of ‘wild’ nature, but also human-made objects, as in psychogeography and Benjaminian ‘redemption’ of objects) in a manner which is intense, horizontal, immanent, and irreducible to instrumental and hierarchical relations. Ecological affinity-relations are particularly likely to be found in indigenous societies, but also sometimes arise in autonomous social movements, especially those with explicit ecological concerns. This approach echoes with Bruno Latour’s ‘actor-network theory’ (1996) in which ecological entities other than humans are assigned the status of agents in a network of actors. In many ways, Latour’s theory is an extension of social
constructivism beyond its own limits, into an ecological constructivism. Deleuze and Guattari have not gone as far as they might in radicalising the ecological aspects of their theory, largely because of their concern to ensure that alternative uses of dominant systemic technologies are recognised. Their theory does, however, involve an extensive challenge to anthropocentrism, through ideas such as ‘becoming-animal’. Indeed, they argue that humanity’s only special advantage over animals is not really an advantage at all, but simply a greater capacity for repressive overcoding and the construction of systems which subordinate lines to points (in other words, striation). Processes of becoming are processes of reassertion of the power of nature (1987: 309).

The ecological position is a ‘third option’ to the usual choice of materialism or social constructivism. Materialists typically make the mistake of turning ecology into ‘objects’ and giving these objects fixed attributes which place limits on or determine agency. Hence, they end up reproducing reification, however radical their objectives. Social constructivists, in their emphasis on distinctly human ways of relating such as language, conscious intentionality and linguistically inflected meaning, tend to minimise the importance of non-human entities, insisting that they (or at least their meanings) are entirely socially constructed. The solution to the dilemma is to expand the relations of constructivism to include ecological entities as meaning-producing beings (rather than objects). This also throws a different light on ecological problems such as global warming. Not only is it necessary to get beyond the anthropocentric reduction of such issues to the question of human survival, but it is also necessary to recognise that they are not simply ‘single issues’ needing single solutions (by problem-solving scientists) but rather, expressions of the underlying problem of ecological alienation. Because people are separated from one another and from the environment, human activity is ecologically unresponsive and generates recurring crises. A sustainable relation to ecological entities is a relation which seeks dialogism, existential abundance and coexistence (rather than war) with ecological becomings. Robyn Eckersley (1992:91) calls for such relations in her demand for ‘emancipation writ large’, expanded freedom applied to all living things, ‘the maximization of the freedom of all entities to unfold or develop in their own ways’.

Kieran Suckling’s discussion of biological and linguistic diversity demonstrates the close interconnection of social with ecological alienation. Suckling starts from the relationality of biology and (indigenous) language. Nature as well as language is differential – each species has a distinct niche, and exists relationally. Hence, ‘diversity is not so much a characteristic of ecosystems and species, it is the condition of their possibility of existence’ (2001: 60), and linguistic diversity also comes from ecological diversity, with animals and ecological entities used as metaphors. Indigenous cultures, unlike metropolitan cultures, are constantly reminded of the partiality of their language because of the diverse network of other cultures and species they interact with; in contrast, a few metropolitan cultures no longer recognise any limit to their beliefs or claims because they no longer encounter diversity (2001: 60). Hence, there is a problem of the spread of global monoculture in language and in nature. ‘Just as “first world” societies replace diverse plant communities with monoculture crops, they are replacing a tremendous and ancient linguistic diversity with vast mono-languages’ (2001: 60). This critique of ecological destruction resonates strongly with Deleuzian ideas of the defence of
singularity and multiplicity, and the defence of network forms against monocultural ‘trunks’.

Ecological connections are also a necessary aspect of processes of becoming-autonomous. Without ecological connections to sustain them, people become dependent on the market and the state, hence on alienated life. Giving a rather subversive inflection to Hardt and Negri’s idea of Empire, Rob los Ricos argues against the usual view that resistance emerges as passing-through empire. ‘Resistance must come from without, which means, primarily, creating human identities that emphasize our relationships with the biosystems we inhabit rather than with commodities, economics, the state or nationalities’ (McMarvill and Los Ricos, n.d.). It is a misreading of Hardt and Negri, but a productive misreading: this kind of ecological ‘outside’ is precisely what is needed to create a world beyond the control of the dominant system.

This may be an opportune moment to add a qualification regarding our relationship to Hardt and Negri’s project. In many respects, Hardt and Negri’s ethics is still modernist and productivist as they deny value to non-human entities and even support GM crops (2004:183-4), seek life entirely in common (ibid. 188), and see humans at best as productive capacity (ibid.153). Their mistakes are firstly to confine the ethical sphere to humans, secondly to assume that the essence of humans is production, and thirdly to posit common activity as a normative goal. Networks render sovereignty superfluous (ibid. 340). As networks are seen as the answer to all problems, they emphasise “democracy” and “collaboration” as abstract goals, instead of subordination of production to desire, which may well be diffuse and centrifugal.

Psychological alienation

Scarcity as an existential phenomenon is actualised (rather than rooted) in material deprivation; its persistence is constructed through its psychological role. Brian McMarvill and Rob los Ricos argue that capitalism is sustained by fear, and this fear is almost inescapable today – within the system it becomes fear of losing subsistence if one is poor or losing property and status if one is less poor, and outside it becomes fear of state repression and violence (n.d.: 15). Negri has argued that separation has first to be endured as alienation before it is lived and overturned as radical antagonism (2003: 79). This is a little too reductionist; in indigenous movements, and where someone has not been effectively axiomatised, it is experienced as radical antagonism from the start. Nevertheless, it is true that the fear induced by systemic violence can be a source of resistance or of submission. How one manages this fear will determine whether one remains autonomous or becomes sucked into the web of psychological alienation which begins with the renunciation of autonomous desire. As is clear in the case of La Ruta Pacifica (see below, chapter 3) and of anarchist therapies such as Soma, the construction of emotional connections (‘affects’ in Deleuze-speak) is connected to the construction or different forms of life, of affinity-networks or hierarchies. People are not in fact powerless, but are made to feel powerless by the pervasiveness of the dominant social fantasy and of separation. This yields a temptation to fall back on the power of ‘the powerful’, those who gain a kind of distorted agency through alienation. But
powerlessness and constituted power are both effects of alienation which can be broken down by creating affinity-network forms of life.

Wilhelm Reich has produced a sophisticated theory of psychological alienation, arguing that alienation becomes internalised as neurotic character-armour. As a result, the ‘slave mentality’ has become ‘deeply rooted in the body itself’ and tends to recur across generations (Reich 1972: 252). This provides the underpinning in structures of desire for the persistence of hierarchical and alienated assemblages. Neurosis arises historically from the switch from voluntary to compulsory work (Reich, 1970) and hence provides the underlying structure of existential scarcity. Reich also suggests that this kind of ‘affect-blocking’ or psychological alienation is a layer built on top of aggression (reactive desire) which in turn is built as a layer over anxiety arising from cramped space (Reich 1980: 347). Reich’s theory is a precursor of schizoanalysis and a major influence on Guattari. He has the right basic insight, the need to release trapped energies of desire, but is held back somewhat by a trunk-like model of what liberated desire should look like. In Deleuze and Guattari, the ‘other’ of repressed desire is not a specific model such as Reich’s ‘genital personality’, but rather, a schizoid explosion of polymorphous possibilities.

Character-armour is an attitude of avoidance which strengthens the ego at the expense of ‘limitation of action and mobility’ (1980: 185). It emerges to bind dammed-up and free-floating anxiety which arises from a hostile context (1980: 48). Faced with a hostile world, desire withdraws into itself, creating a shell which reduces both negative and positive intensities. ‘The ego, the exposed part of the personality, under the continued influence of the conflict between libidinal need and threatening outer world, acquires a certain rigidity, chronic, automatically functioning mode… a rigid shell on which the knocks from the outer world as well as the inner demands rebound’ (1980: 342). Anxiety becomes attached to desires which have been repressed, and to rebellious thoughts and actions, while desire and conscience become repugnant to one another (Brinton 1974: 25-6).

Reich argues that character-armour creates a barrier between the psyche (and the body) on the one hand and the world on the other, preventing intense contact between the two (1980: 317-18). It creates a barrier between inner and external expressions (1980: 44, 330) which can provide the basis for rigid characteristic responses and hence for social roles and conformity. Ways of reacting become ‘chronic and rigid’ (1980: 145). Character-armour impedes activity in the world; one comes to ‘function like an automobile with the emergency brake on’ (1980: 385). Neurosis sucks energy into the process of constantly warding off emotional disturbance (Brinton 1974: 27). Simultaneously, psychoanalysis and social relations are prevented from having any effect on the underlying psychological structure, because the emotional connection to the world is so minimal (Reich 1980: 126).

Politically, the effect is to encourage authoritarianism. Psychological repression ‘paralyzes the rebellious forces because any rebellion is laden with anxiety’, and produces ‘a general inhibition of thinking and of critical faculties’ (Brinton 1974: 29).
Beneath the armour, everything seems tolerable despite the misery of everyday life; the system ceases to horrify because its emotional impact is curbed. On the other hand, with anxiety repressed into the unconscious, the triggering of ‘touchy nodal points’ risks releasing latent pressures. Repression causes people to feel threatened by difference and to seek to impose (not simply defend) their own way of life and to censor views which risk disclosing their irrational motives (Reich 1980: 251). Authoritarianism leads to arousal of desire without ever providing gratification. It is a circular process which prohibits satisfaction, which in turn produces a brutalised reality, which in turn justifies the authoritarian reaction itself (Reich 1972: 168-9). Authoritarianism cannot solve problems – it merely hides them, so they return more forcefully later (1972: 269).

It would be a mistake to imagine that the (partial) sexual revolution of the 1960s (in the core countries only) amounts to a disruption of the underlying structure discovered by Reich. Sexual repression does not have the centrality it once had, but anxiety has been diffused across the social field, displaced onto a thousand scapegoats, and the previous restriction of sexual enjoyment has been extended to enjoyment and intense commitment in general. Situationism extends Reich’s critique into the age of consumer society, targeting consumerist alienation as much as authoritarian repression, while Baudrillard extends the critique after the 1960s watershed. Vaneigem insists that there has been a continuation of inner alienation. ‘Oppression reigns because men are divided, not only among themselves but also inside themselves’ (Vaneigem 1967: 95). ‘This is enforced by character-armour, a ‘screen that separates me from myself under the pretence of protecting me’ (1967: 94). It is built on a refusal of immediacy. ‘Our everyday renunciations – no matter how trivial – lend fuel to our enemy, who wants nothing short of our total death’ (Vaneigem 1967: 189). He argues that capitalism does not bring together, it endlessly separates. ‘All we have in common is the illusion of being together’ (Vaneigem 1967: 38). Alienation creates something distinct from reactive structures as ‘the inhumanity of disembodied power tends towards infinity’ (ibid. 209), even beyond reactive and sadistic desire (ibid.210). Against such alienation, Vaneigem calls for the recovery of intensity and immediacy. He views active passions as being at the root of forms of agency which are subsequently connected (axiomatised in Deleuze-speak) into alienated forms (ibid.236). He follows through this critique in a comprehensive denunciation of social roles, sacrifice, external causes and the entire web of false binaries sustained by consumer society.

Baudrillard argues that generalised fatigue becomes built into the body in consumer society (1998: 183-4). Although now intermingled with hedonism, repression persists as isolation and de-intensification, an intricate control removing desire from the body by turning it into a sign (Baudrillard 1998: 141-2). It operates today mainly via alienation in fantasies and the function of signs, removing intensities by turning everything into a sign or a detached function (ibid. 148-50). Far from opening up new possibilities of communication, the rise of immaterial affective labour has intensified interpersonal alienation, reproducing the ‘non-communication, opacity and atrocity’ of the mode of production, as a network of consumption of human relations in the form of services which in fact consumes only signs of human relations (ibid.161-2). Hence, while the system reorganises its hegemony, switching between sex and violence, communism and
terrorism as its antagonist, it could not break with underlying alienation without collapsing and giving way to the affinity-network form.

**Capitalism**

Given the pervasiveness of a certain misinterpretation of Deleuze and Guattari, let us start this section by saying what capitalism is *not*. We wish to distance ourselves from the view, promoted by Zizek and to some degree by Hardt and Negri, that capitalism in Deleuzian theory is a ‘network’ system. Deleuze and Guattari insist that, while capitalism is deterritorialising and decoding in relation to statist and despot systems, it also rests on representation (in the form of axiomatisation) and requires reterritorialisation. Hence, they are very determined to assert that capitalism is *not* schizophrenic in their sense (1983: 238). It uses a ‘weaker’, more supple kind of trunk than does the despot logic of the state, but it is nevertheless basically arborescent. It employs networks in a ‘radicle’ way (see below), but cannot itself become networked. In Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of capitalism, everything has to be encoded in the system to be recognised, even if only by being given its own category. Capitalism relies on the equivalence of exchange and the related phenomena of reduction of people to workers/consumers and things to commodities/resources as its persistent trunk. It also retains some relation to statist arborescence as a means to maintain command in society. Reconfigurations in spatial arrangements (such as the move from nation-states to global cities) do not at all affect the basic systemic arrangement, the equivalential ‘trunk’.

Deleuze and Guattari object to capitalism because it is repressive, not because it liberates flows; critics such as Zizek often slip into a ‘reactionary’ or ‘conservative’ critique of capitalism in which its disruptive force in relation to despot coded fixities is taken to be what is ‘wrong’ with it. The idea of capitalism as a network system is worrying because it raises the spectre of a more unified, totalitarian system being raised against it (a spectre explicit in Zizek’s neo-Leninism, and implicit in Hardt and Negri’s insistence on collective unity). It also mistakes capitalist ideology for capitalist structure. Amin (2004) maintains that network society is an instance of ‘lyrical outbursts’ in capitalist ideology, whereas what is really happening is a global apartheid connected to the idea of “clash of civilisations”. Capital annuls the very possibility of a network society, which its technology makes possible (2004: 26-7).

So what *is* capitalism, and in particular, how is it different from other kinds of hierarchical logics? The answer is partly that it attempts to turn alienation into a total social logic, not simply an aspect of a particular local relation. Ellen Wood distinguishes pre-capitalist markets from capitalism in that, while the former provide opportunities for market exchange, capitalism provides an imperative to produce for the market, effectively compelling people to produce. Capitalism thus requires the separation of politics from economics and the suppression of subsistence forms of life (cited Lacher 2006: 68-9). Similarly, Polanyi argues that what makes capitalism different from earlier markets is that it disembeds the market from its social context (cited Robinson 1996: 352-3).
The ‘free’ market is actually a reified market, ‘freed’ from the distractions and clutter of its actual social content (Watkins 1998: 5). Hence, Guattari argues that capitalism tends to ‘steamroller’ out of existence ways of life which have social depth at the level of group fantasy, including some which have existed for thousands of years (1984: 40). This tendency has intensified with ‘Toyotism’ and ‘just in time’ production. As Guattari argues, capitalism is intolerant of everyday life as ‘noise’:

‘Whether you are happy, whether you stutter, whether you are afraid of death or old age – all this counts for nothing. That is modern capitalism: desire, madness, gratuitousness – all this counts for nothing! On the contrary, it inconveniences. It makes too much “noise” in the sense of information theory’ (Genosko ed 1996: 137)

Hence, from an alienated standpoint, everyday life seems noisy, messy, and impure, whereas from the affinity-network standpoint, it appears as meaningful. Poststructuralist authors such as Spivak, Chatterjee and Critchley at least permit the everyday into their theory, as a rejection of ‘purism’ and opening to ‘messiness’. But, perhaps, they have not gone far enough, in that they continue to see the everyday as ‘noise’. From a ‘reversal of perspective’, the matter is not so much a matter of ‘mess’ as of a different structural logic, which itself seeks autonomy from the ‘mess’ of capitalism.

Another line of analysis treats capitalism in terms of an unconditional, irrational drive. For instance, Saskia Sassen defines capitalism as ‘producing more in order to produce more’ (2006: 103), while Hannes Lacher describes it as ‘inherently totalitarian’, tending to subsume ‘all social relations, all cultural creations, and even nature itself under its manic logic’ (2006: 103). This is also the kind of image suggested by the early Negri and other autonomist authors, despite their conflation of capitalism with alienation. Similarly, Wallerstein suggests that capitalism only exists where there is endless accumulation, and where the system gives primacy to such accumulation and hence penalises or destroys other modes of living (2004: 24). The image of capitalism as ‘irrational drive’, while rather unfair to the schizoid and ‘manic’ drives it takes as metaphors (remembering that the capitalist subject is neurotic and not psychotic), draws out clearly its existence as a social logic and not simply an assemblage. One can also clearly see in such portrayals the operation of capitalism as an arborescent model: the one drive of producing or accumulating is taken as subordinating everything else, as operating like a trunk.

Guattari theorises capitalist subjectivity as operating through equivalence and the standardisation of fantasy (Genosko ed 1996: 58). It is continuous with Oedipus, hence with character-armouring and neurosis. Whereas overcoding seeks to repress desire, capitalism does not itself repress or capture desire (though it may require overcoding apparatuses as supplements). Instead, capitalism forces desire into representational forms, into representation in the axiomatic, and hence into images as ‘dead’ expressions of the life of desire (1983: 337). Capitalism distorts desires into alienated forms by recomposing them as ‘interests’, connected to a particular fantasmatic construct of the
rational individual. As a result, capitalism can absorb explosions of interest, but not of desire (1983: 379).

The result is that people are able to find an interest in capitalism if they look for one; there is always some partial reward, such as a wage, which could constitute the grounds for a self-identity as included (1983: 346). This is, however, not really a matter of free-flowing desires, but rather, of the expansion of a massive machine of alienation. Overall, capitalism in its current phase replaces exploitation (the form of formal subsumption one might suggest) with machinic enslavement, in which everything included in the system, even if non-productive, furnishes surplus-value (1987: 492). This is similar to the post-autonomist view, popularised by Hardt and Negri’s idea of biopolitics and expresses also in Agamben’s view that where capitalism once exploited via a master-signifier, it now exploits the whole of linguistic productivity (1993: 82-3). We would, however, add the qualifier: only that which speaks in an arborescent or alienated modality can be ‘exploited’.

We would also add another qualification. With fewer people employed in the formal section, and large parts of the world forcibly ‘delinked’ from the formal economy, capitalism becomes increasingly selective about the kinds of people it will exploit directly, and the decommodification it will allow to be funded from its surplus to maintain those whom it will not. Phoebe Moore’s work (2006, 2008) shows the growing importance of discourses of ‘employability’ and ‘flexibility’ as providing selection criteria for inclusion in global capitalism. An ‘employable’ worker is someone who conforms to a particular template of conformist pro-capitalist behaviour, and constitutes a political choice of who is to be allowed into the formal economy. Evan Watkins similarly argues that the current stage of technocracy, so-called ‘information society’, gives the state a more proactive role than ever in creating ‘human capital’, i.e. turning diverse people into a homogeneous type of capitalist subject (Watkins 1998: 170-1). Hence, citizenship is displaced to corporate selection practices, economic inclusion is synonymous with political inclusion, and management of diversity is reduced to the political management of citizenship (2006: 182). Harvey similarly refers to a ‘geography of common sense’ in which capitalism rewards those regions which exhibit the most pro-capitalist everyday beliefs (2006: 85).

Capitalism tends to operate almost thoughtlessly (quite literally when its effects come about from competition and abstract effects in conditions of seriality), and nobody inside the system stops to ask whether the changes it brings about are creating liveable spaces or unliveable spaces. Its inner dynamic is circular, tautological and mythological. People act, not on what their ‘interests’ are, but on their desires, which in the case of neurotic personalities, means on the basis of what they fantasise, how their myths (in the Barthesian sense) are projected onto the world. Hence, outcomes of market processes (and more indirectly, of state policies) express the working-out of the dominant fantasy-structure or structures among the included, the strata with income, and especially of the capitalists, those who own or invest large amounts of money, and of agents in the state. The fantasies of the included stratum are relevant to some degree, but the desires of those who have ‘need’ but not market ‘demand’ are of no internal relevance at all.
Capitalism tends to bring about ‘hell-on-earth’, miserable social conditions, very explicitly in the South through impoverishment, and more quietly in the North through the spread of apparent powerlessness and creeping conformity. If it manages to retain its force of attraction for many, this is because it rewards some with what it has plundered from others, and hides from the excluded and the marginal both the misery of the apparently happy included and the processes by which the wealth of the included comes not from their productivity but from exploitation of the margins. Capitalism is sustained by a gap between its ‘utopia’ or fantasy, the image of inclusive consumption, and its actuality, a structure of dominance and hierarchy.

The mistake made by those who view capitalism as ‘schizoid’ and desire-affirmative is that they fail to distinguish desires from interests. This distinction is, however, clearly articulated in capitalist subjectivity. The theme of ‘taming’ the ‘passions’ runs through pro-capitalist theorists from Hobbes to Rawls. Albert Hirschman has analysed in detail how ‘interests’ were classically constructed in terms of the alienation of ‘passions’, as a psychological regulation turning ‘wild’ forces into something regulated and therefore industrious (1997). Thomas Hall’s study of the American Southwest contains quotes from officials seeking to use commerce to ‘bind’ and ‘narrow’ desire in the case of indigenous peoples (Hall 1989: 115). Carrier’s anthropological study of the meanings of ‘the market’ in western culture similarly shows that the basic assumption of ‘the market’ is the idea of a world of free individuals who are instrumentally rational and relate only as buyers and sellers (1997). This reductiveness about the nature of the subject, the insistence on what Deleuze and Guattari term a ‘molar self’, places capitalism very close to the Scottian model of dyadic domination (see above) and Kropotkin’s political principle (see below). In all these cases, the key aspect of social alienation is the simplification of social relations to a single systemic form.

Readers of Baudrillard and the Situationists will be well aware that the image of capitalism as providing satisfaction and enjoyment is fantasmatic. In Baudrillard for instance, capitalism is theorised not as a situation of enjoyment and satisfaction but rather, as a system of needs which produces needs as system-elements and hence denies the relation of satisfaction (1998: 75). Far from being enjoyed, capitalism is ‘endured as a process of adaptation’ (1998: 82). Deleuze and Guattari refer to alienation as a kind of ‘death drive’ (see above), and this carries over into capitalism. That capitalism is metaphorically vampiric or anthropophagic, sucking out life-energies in a predatory way, is suggested in the work of Marx (Panichas, 1981) and repeated in everyday figures of speech in Malaysia (Scott, 1985) and Africa (Bayart et al 1999).

Arif Dirlik’s discussion of guerrilla marketing, the most networked kind of capitalist marketing, shows the persistence of representationalism. Guerrilla marketers more-or-less openly proclaim themselves as micro-managers of desire, seeking to map the world market into hundreds of zones and niches, computer-modelling the distribution of desire and converting desires into images which can be sold. This is not liberation of desire, but its representational doubling, its reproduction as a system of mapping and management. As Dirlik also makes clear, the system is also still centralised – like a Communist Party...
waging a guerrilla war, the cells have extensive autonomy but are ultimately accountable to the Central Committee; strategic flexibility does not undermine long-term goals. And the goals are still very much arborescent. ‘The guiding vision of the contemporary transnational corporation is to homogenize the world under its guidance’ (1994: 54-5).

Capitalism is ultimately an equivalential system; difference is admitted only on condition that it is reduced to something denumerable and recordable, a part of the axiom. Money as the ‘universal equivalent’ thus functions in capitalism as a kind of ‘trunk’ or despotic signifier: on the one hand, it gives systemic meaning to everything else, turning simple entities into commodities; on the other, without it, one is excluded, part of the “Real”. Jean-Joseph Goux’s work “Symbolic Economics” (1990) demonstrates the strong structural homology between the Lacanian phallus (similar to the master-signifier) and money in capitalism. The effect of this phenomenon of existence of a capitalist ‘trunk’ is that capitalism is an arborescent apparatus. However much it might generate or incorporate networks as its roots and branches, it can never be a fully ‘networked’ system; the Deleuzian capitalism of Zizek and of Hardt and Negri is an impossibility. Of course, it also leaves global capitalism open to instability as the different currencies and commodities compete for the status of ‘trunk’.

A range of scholars have discussed the homogenising and (aspirationally) totalising tendencies of capitalism, countering the image that it is networked, reflexive and inclusive. World-systems theorists generally reject the image of global capitalism as a smooth space, instead stressing the unevenness of North-South segmentarities. Samir Amin for instance emphasises that capitalism involves standardisation and homogenisation, counterposed to the idea of multiple development paths (1989: 138). Negri in his early works argued that the ‘state bloc’, meaning the set of forces aligned with capitalism, ‘must take apart every potentially hostile social aggregation and reassemble it according to capital’s overall, planned schema of functioning’ (2005: 141). Capitalist ‘time’ as a social logic seeks to dissolve everything so as to reconstruct it as a circular function of command, ‘destroying any productivity of the system that is not reproduction of command and of the possibility of terror’ (2003: 75). Hannes Lacher argues that capitalism falls back on violence whenever its subsumption is incomplete, leading to the current division of the world into zones of peace and zones of turmoil (2006: 110-11).

For Lefebvre, the present system seeks to entrap desire in a closed circuit (production-consumption-production) in which ‘desires are run to earth’ and demands are produced and foreseen (2994: 72). Similarly, Richard Day argues that capitalism simulates a total lifeworld which is not possible because it rests on exploitation (Day 2005: 204). Baudrillard views capitalism as operating today primarily through the processes of reproduction of the ‘code’ (representation) as a circular system; if anything, it now uses the economic to distract from the power of the code (1975: 138-9, 142). Beatrice Hibou, from a more empirical angle, shows that neoliberal ‘adjustment’ (gleichschaltung would be a better word) includes a goal of bringing parallel and informal networks and markets into the formal sector (Bayart et al 1999: 70).
Where Marxists often go wrong is in assuming that, because capitalism is a totalising logic, therefore it is also a totality with no outside. In fact its totalising logic is always one social logic in a social field containing other logics. It can appear as a totality only when the other logics capitalism relies on (the state, subsistence, various partial inscriptions) are imagined to be outgrowths of capitalism itself. Capitalism may seek to totalise itself in the social field, but it is questionable whether it will ever be able to do so. Contemporary capitalism has come closer than ever to realising the total incorporation of all aspects of mainstream society, at least in the core. This is explored in Negri’s early writings and other autonomist texts. Real subsumption throws into crisis the parameters of capitalist command because measure becomes self-referential due to the loss of an outside (2003: 40). As a result, equivalence becomes simply an effect of coercion (2003: 28). What also emerges starkly from these texts, however, is how in its moment of apparent triumph capitalism must fall back once more on the state logic of command to ground its flows. Similarly, capitalism on a global scale has never ceased relying on other logics; as Spivak’s analysis of the ‘expanded form of value’ also shows (Spivak 1999), capitalism constantly relies on an ‘outside’ as something to exploit. In its early, predatory phases, capitalism incorporated indigenous peoples by means of raiding for captives – enslaving people directly, or trading for captives with local populations. Capitalist raiding of out-groups for captives has never really ended; today it increasingly takes the disguised form of prison labour.

Capitalism’s relation to its ‘outside’ is therefore constantly pursued in a predatory and violent way. David Harvey has theorised this aptly as ‘accumulation by dispossession’, which he defines as a process ‘under which pre-existing assets are assembled… and put into circulation as capital’ (2006: 75). Related to Marx’s idea of ‘primitive accumulation’ but reproduced through constant activity, this process is for Harvey necessary for the survival of capitalism (2006: 91, 93). This consists very often in attempts to seize so-called ‘resources’ from areas which are not inserted or only marginally inserted in capitalism, arranging them into combinations which are more ‘productive’ for the system. This includes an ongoing process of land and resource grabs around the world, which Midnight Notes have referred to as the ‘new enclosures’ (Midnight Notes 1992). Slater similarly discusses in terms of American history, an ongoing logic of creating boundaries while breaking down others to allow unfettered expansion (Slater 2004: 31-2). Bonefeld similarly points to the historical continuities of the capitalist system. ‘The enforcement of debt through the transformation of subsistence economies and relations of communal production into relations of capitalist exchange characterizes not only the period of the “industrial revolution”; it characterizes the contemporary politics of global capital’ (2000: 48). Accumulation-by-dispossession is capitalist deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation at its most explicit, removing entities from their existential territories, having a disruptive effect on existing orders (even on earlier forms of capitalism), but doing so for the purpose of bringing them more harshly into the current capitalist territory.

We would add to Harvey’s theory the point that accumulation-by-dispossession is not simply about exploitation but about the more primordial process discussed by Baudrillard, in which ecological and human entities which precede capitalism are
included in its flows. It is not that productive ‘assets’ or ‘resources’ are simply out there to be grabbed; they need first to be constructed as ‘assets’ and ‘resources’, and this itself is accumulation-by-dispossession at the level of power-knowledge. In addition, the process is not about inside and outside as fixed areas, and is not cumulative in the way which is usually portrayed. As we discuss below in terms of ‘affirmative entropy’, the ‘outside’ tends constantly to recompose itself the moment the degree of control is lessened or warded off. It is not therefore a matter of capitalism reaching a ‘limit’ at which everything is ‘inside’, because new ‘outsides’ constantly come into being.

Another mistake should also here be addressed. Capitalism does not, as often asserted, express or realise or expand the productive forces of humanity. It is not an epiphenomenon of an underlying logic of history. Rather, it is a social logic in its own terms. Everything capitalism generates, it generates for its own functioning. Technology, for example, is developed for purposes of control. If capitalism sometimes makes things which are open to other uses, this is not because capitalism expresses progress or development in general; it is because there are limits to how far entities, including produced entities, can be ‘territorialised’ to one particular use. The same qualification applies to the entities produced by any and all social systems. While it is true that capitalism (or often, the state) puts in motion technological flows which exceed its control capacities for a time at least (e.g. the Internet), it does so for reasons of its own, and the ‘counter-finalities’ it unleashes are fortuitous, not systematic. At the same time, it destroys or threatens to destroy other knowledges connected to other forms of life, such as ecological techniques developed by indigenous peoples, techniques of subsistence and survival, ways of releasing and expressing intense desires, ‘shamanic’ and ‘sorcerous’ techniques of social weaving, and an entire repertoire of counter-knowledges developed by movements of resistance.

As well as reterritorialising, capitalism is a constant emptying of existential territories in terms of intensities of desire. Echoing Auge’s (1995) analysis of ‘non-space’, Ritzer (2004) contrasts ‘grobalisation’, which imposes the western model but creates non-spaces as a result, with ‘glocalisation’, which deepens localities by localising insertions. The latter constitutes a reconstruction of spaces into spaces of ‘nothing’, whereas the latter retains the ‘something’ of distinct local spaces. This said, ‘capitalists are most likely to be drawn to that which is already nothing or transform something progressively into nothing’ (2004: 90). ‘Nothing’ in this context refers to the socially insubstantial, the monoculture which is everywhere but nowhere, what Deleuze and Guattari would term an absence of intensities and Baudrillard would term a lack of symbolic exchange, a simulacrum as opposed to the density of everyday life.

The overthrow of capitalism should not, be posited in terms of a replacement with another hierarchical system (whether reformist or revolutionary), but rather, in terms of the emancipation of the forces of difference which are repressed and alienated beneath capitalist structures. Lefebvre, like Deleuze and Guattari, argues that revolutionary subjectivity stems from the irreducibility of desire (1994: 67). Irreducible desires ‘intervene and hinder the closing of the circuit’ which capitalism performs (1994: 75). The early Negri similarly argued that, at the present stage, resistance to capitalism is
necessarily based on insurrection, which should be expanded into a basis for insurrection against the command-form itself (2005: 33). A radical antagonism appears between capitalist temporality as the reduction of complexity (in Deleuzian terms, the subtraction of axioms) and the plurality and complexity of other heterogeneous temporalities (2003: 59). As a result, the current activity of capitalism and the state is an ‘activity of negation of an irrepressible antagonism’ (2003: 90). The reason for this radical antagonism is that capitalism cannot coexist with complexity (ibid.99). This leads to a clash between centripetal and centrifugal time-space relations (ibid.98), and the ‘proletarian’ (we would say minoritarian or nomadic) constitution is the abolition of the state (and hierarchy) and its temporal paradigm (ibid.124). This line of analysis, while dropped by the later Negri, has been continued by authors such as Bonanno, and provides a highly relevant approach to capitalism today. In any case, it is likely to come from somewhere other than ‘workers’ as a relatively included group. If the overthrow of capitalism emerges from the workers’ desire to become richer, its successor would have to reproduce mechanisms such as accumulation-by-dispossession, simply distributing the resultant ‘resources’ differently. The crucial resistances to capitalism arise, rather, when people who situate themselves as ‘outside’, who are excluded, or who aspire to be ‘outside’, try to defend various entities (themselves, the environment, the land, etc) as decommodified and as located in networked relations. This challenge, which occurs especially at the most peripheral points of the system and on its borders, breaks more fundamentally with the logic of capitalism than do strategies generated from within the stratum of the included.

Addition and subtraction, North and South

As we have seen, capitalism relies on both addition and subtraction of axioms, which operate as competing drives within its overall logic. This is also connected to the global stratification of the world-system into North and South. While both aspects occur in both regions, the subtraction of axioms, ‘accumulation by dispossession’, is concentrated in the global South and the addition of axioms in the global North. Hence, analyses of capitalism which concentrate on the North tend to overemphasise the addition of axioms at the expense of subtraction. This is highlighted by Spivak, who stresses that, while consumption (a major variety of addition of axioms) is encouraged in the North, attempts are made to prevent the spread of consumerist demand to the South (Spivak 1995).

The two approaches also clash in different development strategies and political positions. They basically generate the possibility of polyarchic systems within capitalism. In the core, the ‘party of order’ (conservatives, nationalists, Republicans) tends to emphasise subtraction of axioms whereas the ‘party of progress’ (social-democrats, liberals, Democrats) tends to emphasise addition, although with the rise of the ‘Third Way’, this has increasingly been reduced to more and less symbolically inclusive versions of a strategy of subtraction of axioms, in which case the result is a kind of contentless ‘low-intensity democracy’ similar to that promoted by the dominant system in the periphery. The division between addition and subtraction is not necessarily a matter of ‘better’ and ‘worse’, as capitalism tends to become harsher the more axioms it includes (1983: 373), though struggles for the addition of an axiom are implicitly emancipatory. There are also
exceptions, where particular groups achieve addition through insertions in rightist politics.

In the periphery, the situation is complicated by the extensive persistence of other social logics, so different parties often express different coalitions of social groups defined along other divisions or segmentarities (urban-rural, ethnic groups, patronage insiders and outsiders, regions, castes, sub-nationalities and so on). Deleuze and Guattari view the periphery as deterritorialised compared to the core, but incorporated as an inner periphery of capitalism (1983: 374). In the periphery, deterritorialisation is mainly an outside phenomenon, brought on by the core (as accumulation-by-dispossession), whereas reterritorialisation occurs through local states, including local despots (1983: 258). But the periphery can also be a site of deterritorialising flows (1983: 378).

The South, more than the North, is a field of persistent excess generative of value, which is, however, captured and exported primarily to the North by means of rent-extraction on signs and technological control. According to Spivak, the South is a space of the ‘expanded’ form of value, where capitalism exploits a wide array of different assemblages, as opposed to the restricted form of the core in which exploitation occurs through wage-labour (Spivak 1999). The idea of Southern debt as a form of capture has also arisen in the literature, combined with a suggestion that it involves a kind of existential claim that the South is permanently guilty or ‘owing’ the North, bearing a weight of responsibility which is not reciprocated. This is similar to Fanon’s idea of the ‘civilised’ world as a club Southern peoples are urged to join, but which they cannot ever be admitted to because to admit them would destroy they club. Dos Santos (1998: 62) views debt in terms of dependency theory, as capture of a surplus.

Postcolonial theorists and commentators on the global South typically reject the idea of a smooth capitalism functioning everywhere, arguing instead that global capitalism involves persistent hierarchical divisions. Bhabha (2004) for instance insists that colonialism and its successor-system are based on discrimination as a rigidly stratified system, and not on smooth relations. Nakarada (1994) looked at analyses of globalisation and argues that there is a sharp asymmetry between coverage in North and South, with the former emphasising positive aspects such as increased speed, whereas the latter referred to negative effects, recolonisation and global apartheid. Young (1995) and Williams (1999 both cited Harrison 2002: 19) argue that relations between Africa and the North have been structured historically by the Northern imposition of liberal individualism on embedded societies. Research by Prince has shown that Haitian sweatshop workers are as productive as Northern workers, thus proving that inequality is a matter of segmentary discrimination and not simply productivity differences (Prince, 1985: 48, 72, cited Robinson 1996: 427).

Insertions of capitalism in the South can also be unpredictably hybrid. Knauft (1997) for example has shown that in Amazonia and Melanesia, the introduction of capitalism has led to increased association of male agency with trade and money, which in turn has led to the commodification of female sexuality, transforming traditional sexual openness into a relation of purchase (cited Gledhill 2000: 31). Galvan has shown how local ideas have
persisted in market relations; for instance, the traditional role of young men making rope has transmuted into an insistence that rope be bought by young men, rather than disappearing entirely (2004). This hybridity is part and parcel of the ‘expanded form of value’, and was also typical of the North until the homogenisation of mass society kicked in (and still, wherever this homogenisation is incomplete or breaks down).

*Machines and overdevelopment*

While ‘machinic enslavement’ is mainly a figurative term (the enslavement of desiring-machines), it also has a literal element, subordination to machines. In *Logic of Sense*, Deleuze portrays revolutionary potential as working in the gap between technological change and the social system, with the technocrat acting as the ally of the dictator, bridging the gap between the state’s desires and what is possible (cited Roy 2003: 169). Adas has argued that machines have become the ‘measure of men’ (and women) in modernity, moving ever further from tools for use to something which dominates the user. Similarly, Arrighi and Silver theorise mechanisation, and its competitive advantage, in terms of its attempt to ‘cage’ workers and impose discipline (1999: 118). Negri argues that machines are accumulated time, and hence, predisposed for command (2003: 66). Eco-anarchists have gone even further in viewing the Industrial Revolution as a process of cumulative domestication in which resistance was outflanked by mechanisms of technological control (Roc n.d.).

The advantage that machines give to the powerful is that they are concentrations of energy and materials, and hence are available mainly to the rich, in proportion to their wealth. (This advantage is lost when a machine becomes easily available or easy to duplicate or obtain; it is as *concentration of resources* that machines aid command, not as particular combinations of ‘resources’). Through machines, the state/capitalist capacity to act increases relative to the concentrations of controlled or domesticated energy and ‘resources’. Hence, the power to plunder is transmuted into constituted power to dominate. Today’s neo-totalitarian regimes, such as Britain and America, and the worst excesses of historical totalitarianism, including the Holocaust, are expressions of the worst potentials of technology turned into a form of control. The internal coerced ‘calm’ (in fact, anxiety bouncing around in a cramped space) of such societies is a phenomenon which could not be reproduced globally, as it is made possible by the concentration of (mostly plundered) ‘resources’. As is clear from the response to London Mayday – a state-imposed shutdown which cost businesses more money than the minor damage caused in earlier protests, not to mention the huge financial cost to the state – the purpose of repression is not simply accumulation. It is to make people feel disempowered, to replace ‘power-to’ with ‘power-over’. Technology also has a hegemonic role, creating an appearance of potency. Glissant (1989: 76) argues that it is only technical hegemony, hypnotising power of ability to subjugate nature, which preserves western global sovereignty.

‘Overdevelopment’ occurs when social relations are replaced by relations mediated and determined by machines (not to be confused with ‘virtual’ relations in which machines are used as tools within relations). Aronson uses the term to refer to the displacement of
social conflict onto technology (cited Spivak 1990: 26), while dependency theorist Furtado terms it ‘the survival of the system beyond its own limits’ (in Emmanuel et al 1982: 160). In contrast to ‘underdevelopment’, where capitalist power is incomplete, in ‘overdevelopment’ capitalism silences social life but at the expense of emptiness which resounds back upon it.

Pieterse views the idea of a technological cure-all as typical of America and as part of its ‘rigid posture of cultural alienation from the rest of the world’, its neglect of the density of social and global life (2004: 57). Today, this is expressed in ideas such as ‘full spectrum dominance’ and the ‘revolution in military affairs’, which have failed completely to prevent American defeat or stalemate in Iraq and Afghanistan. Already in Vietnam, Chomsky documents fantasies of the RMA type, such as the idea of scanning equipment which can map an entire battlefield (2004: 72-3). Indeed, he terms Vietnam a ‘war of machines against people’ (1987: 286). Jacques Decornoy after leaving Laos refers to ‘the scientific destruction of the areas held by the enemy’ (cited Chomsky 2004: 76). And yet, argues Chomsky, machines fail from their imprecision, proving unable to kill enemies except as part of a scorched-earth policy which killed everyone and everything else as well (1987: 274). Today, overdevelopment reaches new extremes in policies of ‘zero tolerance’, surveillance and biometric control. These express the same fantasy of the technical cure-all. ‘If we had had national ID cards two weeks ago, it would not have thwarted the terrorists,’ said Barry Steinhardt, the associate director of the ACLU, discussing proposals for draconian biometric ID cards following the 911 attacks. ‘(The terrorists) were in the country lawfully and had identification documents on them. The instinct is that we can solve all these problems with technology. That instinct is wrong’ (cited Scheeres 2001).

Capitalism and the state: two or one?

The ‘state debate’ among Marxists has generally been between those – such as the Open Marxists, regulation theorists and autonomists – who maintain that the state is a part or ‘form’ of capital, that state and market are ‘forms of the relation which constitutes them’ (Bonefeld 2000: 39-40, Burnham 2000: 10-11), and those such as the neo-Gramscians, Harvey, and historically-attuned scholars such as Lacher and Wood – who maintain that they are distinct social entities. Lacher for instance argues that the state system is not internal to capitalism but rather, internalised by capitalism, and that this leads to a rupture at the global level between the state and capitalist systems (2006: 60, 117). Many of those who reject the view that the state is reducible to capital also claim that the state is a ‘field’ of struggle in which different classes contend.

There is some truth in both positions – the state and capital are outgrowths of alienation, and hence have a certain identity at the most basic level, but they also have distinct (alienated) social logics. The Deleuzian position is a third position, viewing the state neither as an outgrowth of capital nor a field of contestation but rather, as a distinct social logic. Interpreting Deleuze and Guattari, Surin argues that the state and capital have a reciprocal relation. Capitalism is an ‘independent, worldwide axiomatic’, a global megalopolis or megamachine (1987: 453). Under capitalism the state serves ‘to
moderate the superior deterritorialization of capital and to provide the latter with compensatory reterritorializations’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 455). Hence, the state operates as ‘a field for the effectuation of capital… by reharnessing and reorganizing flows which capital brings together and decomposes’ (Surin 2006: 64).

This position is closer to the Open Marxists than it is to their rivals, because it views the state as a distinct social force and not a field; it is not something in which non-alienated social forces can comfortably operate, and it cannot be turned against alienation in general (though, in cases where the included stratum are partly internal to the state’s assemblages, it can be pushed towards addition instead of subtraction of axioms). In Deleuze and Guattari this is expressed in the distinction between overcoding and despotic signification, which are state practices, and axiomatisation, which is capitalist. One could also add, referring to a debate in world systems analysis (Frank and Gills 1993), that overcoding goes back 5000 years, axiomatisation 500. One Marxist who seems to partly agree with Deleuze and Guattari’s view is David Harvey. From the perspective of spatial insertions, Harvey draws a distinction between the territorial logic, of states seeking to grab power, and the capitalist logic, involving flows of economic power through continuous space. The two logics are ‘intertwined’ but still ‘rather different’, including having different motives (2006: 107). Marxism is right to emphasise the relationality of the state, but often makes the mistake of deducing from the relationality of the state (to capital and labour) a number of other conclusions which do not follow. For instance, one finds arguments that the state has no logic of its own as a class force (unlike the bourgeoisie or proletariat); that it is reducible to relations between these other groups; that it can be used or altered by these groups or the balance of forces between them; that it is a functional entity defined by its role (which actually is a mystification of the state’s peculiar rationality as rationality per se, and state control as administration). Yet the fact of relationality equally applies to each social class, and a Marxist would not talk about alternatively altering the bourgeoisie.

That capitalism and the state are distinct social logics does not necessarily require the view that capitalism does not need the state. We would contend that capitalism does need either the state or some other external logic, to fill crucial gaps in its functioning (namely, its incapacity to perform ‘subtraction of axioms’ by itself, and its incapacity to insert itself into socially meaningful structures and to provide itself with the ‘ground’ which as an arborescent system, it needs). Capitalism is not institutionally self-sufficient, and relies on an ‘outside’ to exist. The state is the logical choice for capital because of its similarity as an alienated, hierarchical logic. Capitalism thus tends to bring along with it the state as a separate “class-like” force, not because the state’s logics are internal to capitalism, but because they are external but structurally necessary to it.

That the state and capital are analytically separate social logics (though similar as arborescent, hierarchical, alienated social logics, and closely allied in the current neoliberal and several previous global assemblages) can be demonstrated in a number of ways.
1) that states existed in pre-capitalist societies based on the tributary mode, without taking on capitalist attributes. Indeed, according to Lacher (2006), the state created capitalism in much of Europe rather than the other way around. The same would apply to most of the global South.

2) that state control without capital (without the law of value, market-led price setting, competition between capitalists, ‘free’ wage-labour or other common attributes of a capitalist society) was able to exist in the Stalinist and post-Stalinist ‘command economies’. Aside from being alienated and hierarchical, it is unclear why these societies would be viewed as capitalist; and since they are alienated and hierarchical, it is inconceivable to view them as a revolutionary post-capitalist form.

3) that capital and the state sometimes come into conflict and into external coercive relations as social forces. States interfere with aspects of capitalist accumulation, for reasons such as ‘stability’, ‘national security’ and so on. For instance, they extract rents as conditions of capitalist accumulation, criminalize capitalist trade in certain sectors (such as drugs), and pass laws placing restrictions on capitalists. To interpret these activities as simply regulation of individual capitalists on behalf of capital as a whole is unduly reductionist; it is not clear what mechanism ‘capital as a whole’ would have to influence the state into acting on its behalf. States may resort to repression in an attempt to coerce capital to submit to the state logic, and in contrast, capital sometimes resorts to external measures, such as ‘strikes of capital’, to assert its own logic against the state. This strategic field suggests potentially antagonistic state-capital relations in which the two sides vie for advantage. One finds, for instance, discussion of new forms of business agencies ‘that are ever more dependent on, but also ever more subversive of, the power of the hegemonic state’ (Arrighi and Silver 1999: 98).

4) pro-capitalist political theorists – liberals and libertarians such as Locke, Mill, Spencer, Sumner, Hayek and Nozick – tend to be very concerned with limiting the state, whether in terms of individual liberties (for property-owners at least), checks and balances or electoral accountability. This suggests that the ‘organic intellectuals’ of capitalism recognize in the state an entity which is other to a certain degree, and which while possibly necessary or beneficial for the project, is also potentially dangerous to them and must be constrained lest it exceed its usefulness.

5) that ‘anarcho-capitalism’, or capitalism without the state, is possible ideologically (even if not in practice). Somalia has been cited by advocates of capitalism without the state as an example of their approach (Tabarrok 2004, Davis 2007), and suggests that on closer inspection, capitalism remains dependent on other logics, in this case insertions in a petty commodity economy connected to lineage, village and local allegiances. A rather different case emerges in examples such as Sierra Leone, where capitalism becomes dependent on locally inserted gangs (Richards, 1996). Hence, capitalism can do without the state, but only by relying on other, potentially more risky local insertions.

Recalling the distinction between logics and assemblages, it should be remembered that the independence of social logics does not preclude syncretisms and hybrid forms. Social
logics at level of abstract machines nevertheless often form assemblages, which are syncretic and hybrid at a concrete level. This view is not unknown in world-systems analysis. For instance, Taylor views the world-system as a capitalist-state hybrid (2003: 138). Nevertheless, the logics remain distinct. The totalitarian logic (Kropotkin’s political principle) is inherent to the state, not capital (capitalism has its own ‘totalitarian’ logic of inscribed flows instead); but because capital insists on the state, it can easily promote the state totalitarian logic too. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the minimal state of capitalism is identical to the totalitarian state, because both are based on the restriction of the number of axioms (hence mainly on subtraction not addition of axioms) and are linked mainly to the external rather than domestic market (1987: 462). The danger with denying the autonomy of the state logic is that the state tends to be instrumentalised which in effect mystifies its basic logic. The state is only instrumental for capital when subject to certain quite specific constraints or ‘checks’.

**State**

The classical definition of the state in Lenin and Weber is that it is a special body of armed people (usually men) set up against society. Similarly, Tilly defines states as coercion-wielding organisations separate from kinship and claiming priority in some spheres (cited Sassen 2006: 79), while Migdal’s definition includes three elements: a power-regime involving violence, an image of a coherent representative organisation, and an actual assemblage which varies from case to case (Migdal 2001: 15-16). The state logic as such, what one might term the ‘deep state’, is fundamentally an antiproduct assemblage for the subtraction of axioms. The addition of axioms also becomes a state task to the extent that the included stratum is appended to the state. The ‘state logic’ refers to the former, whereas the latter is a syncretic assemblage. The state goes back 5000 years, and features of its basic logic have persisted from its earliest form to the present (Massumi and Dean 1992).

The state, like capital, is fundamentally an alienated social logic. Colin Ward suggests that the state operates as if individual power has been allowed to be stolen by the state (1982: 23). Gilles Dauvé (2000: 28) argues that ‘the substance of the state resides not in institutional forms, but in its unifying function. The state ensures the tie which human beings cannot and dare not create among themselves, and creates a web of services both parasitic and real’. Similarly, Agnoli argues that the state is an expression of alienation. ‘The principle of representation obtains as a mediated form of mass participation, a form which keeps mass democratic participation to a minimum and which excludes the dependent masses from the exercise of power’ (2000: 202).

The origins of the state are lost in the mists of time, but archaeologists, and sociologists of the state such as Michael Mann (1995), are agreed that it is an exceptional process in early human history and in stateless societies, not a common evolution waiting to happen (Gledhill 2000: 30). It has been speculated that social hierarchy may emerge out of the “big man” system where power over followers is based on feast-giving and exchange (Keesing 1975: 142-3), though this does not explain the transition to scarcity (see above).
Although the state is a longstanding entity, the modern state, with a fusion of state and technology, is of recent origin. Virilio, Harvey and Giddens have separately advanced theories attributing the rise of the modern state to the industrialisation of war (Gledhill 2000: 55-6; Virilio 1990).

The state logic (or ‘deep state’) must be distinguished from specific states as assemblages (within which it is the driving but not always the only force). State institutions and statist actors can be viewed along a continuum between the deep state and civic logics, depending on their functions (acts as well as views) in relation to the addition/subtraction of axioms poles. The “deep state” is not necessarily the visible state – indeed, is rarely so – nor necessarily a powerful group inside it; it also includes the apparatchiks of governmentality, to the extent that they act on the state role by subtracting rather than adding axioms. The position of formal rules, procedures and laws is ambiguous between the two – the deep state operates on the basis of the “exception”, of law-founding violence, while the addition of axioms implies the malleability of laws and their subordination to exterior rights. State assemblages – perhaps better referred to as specific institutions or agencies (there is often little difference between the state, parastatal and non-governmental incarnations of the logic of the included) – often involve a syncretism, alliance, or vying for power between the deep state and the included. The deep state performs solely reactive and repressive functions, whereas the included tend to transmute agencies into entities of ‘service provision’ or functionality. It should be remembered, however, that without the deep-state logic there could be no state (and probably no capital either). The deep-state logic frequently uses its foundational status within state agencies as a means to claim an exceptional status, a kernel of suspension of other social logics, from which it periodically emerges to corrode the restrictions placed on it by means of the construction of a permanent emergency (c.f. Agamben, 2000, 2005).

States and war-machines are probably the best-known pairing of contrasting group-forms in Deleuze and Guattari’s work, expressing as concrete forms such key ideas as smooth and striated, rhizome and arborescence, and molecular and molar. The state is identified with the Urstaat or state-form, or Mumford’s megamachine. It is a regime of overcoding, the despotic signifier, and machinic enslavement (1987: 428). It ‘operates by stratification’, forming a ‘vertical, hierarchized aggregate’ (1987: 433). It is a ‘global (not local) integration’ which cuts off or reduces the density of horizontal connections (1987: 433). States are simultaneously formally identical, formed out of a single model, and yet distinct in their specific functioning. On the one hand, ‘States always have the same composition… [E]very State carries within itself the essential moments of its existence’ (1987: 385). On the other, states are ‘isomorphic’ (similar in structure and function) but not necessarily homogeneous (1987: 464). Hence, there are two poles the state can pursue, social-democratic (adding axioms) or totalitarian (subtracting axioms), which have the same function in relation to capitalism but are quite different in other regards.

Deleuze and Guattari theorise the state primarily as a repressive, ‘antiproductive’ force. The state seeks to regulate speed, erecting barriers in the way of migratory packs (1987: 386). State violence is ‘a violence that posits itself as preaccomplished, even though it is
reactivated every day’ (1987: 447). The state is based on the ‘magician-king’ or ‘jurist-priest’ (1987: 351-2). In capitalism, machinic enslavement tends to be replaced by social subjection, but this is not a humanising change (1987: 456-7). Deleuze maintains that the current situation is tending towards a ‘total and global’ control regime, in which repression (including in education) becomes more widespread and teachers, psychiatrists and other professionals get drawn into exercising policing functions (Deleuze and Foucault, 1977: 212). ‘The State machine and the machine of repression produce anti-production, that is to say signifiers that exist to block and prevent the emergence of any subjective process on the part of the group’, not statically but as a process (1984: 34). Old institutions such as socialist parties can also operate as machines of anti-production (1984: 199). The other of the state is the ‘war-machine’ or machine of metamorphosis, associated especially with nomads and with Clastres’ model of indigenous society. We shall return to the war-machine when we discuss indigenous movements (below).

Representation is connected in Deleuzian theory to the dominance of the state over society, by means of the ‘despotic signifier’. The despotic signifier is a Deleuzian rendering of the Lacanian master-signifier as a product of a specific social formation. The despotic signifier arises from despotic power. Despotic power is a paranoiac (reactive) formation, based on breaking filiations and horizontal connections to impose a new series of connections focused on the despot (1983: 192-3). The despot places himself at the centre of the connections, outside horizontal networks, in a deterritorialised knowledge connecting him directly to God and the people, substituting for the earth as the body of society, installing himself symbolically as the cause of all production (1983: 194). Hence all the signifiers – which had previously been polyvocal and detachable – are conceived as emanating from the despotic signifier, the meaning of which takes over from use and efficacy as concerns in language-use (1983: 206). The despotic signifier destroys chains, turns them into lines and uses them as immobile building units (1983: 40). Language henceforth becomes infected with transcendentalism, carrying ‘the signifying master or “the master signifier”’ even as it is deployed for contingent purposes (1983: 206-7). The signifier thus becomes ‘the repressing representation’ (ibid.209), and the despotic signifier distributes lack to all the elements in the chain which comprises the system, forming ‘the bar that delivers over all the depressive subjects to the great paranoiac king’ (ibid.208), ‘a repressive machine that always moves us away from the desiring-machines’ (ibid.214). As DeLanda argues, representational unity depends on an empty supplemental dimension in contrast to ‘flat’ multiplicities (DeLanda 2002: 132). Hence, as Negri argues, the constitutional thought of the capitalist state does not start from the individual as is usually assumed. Rather, it starts from the general will or obligation, from the state’s drive to occupy in advance the whole of social space so as to measure it (2003: 51).

The state is in many ways sustained by illusion, being a social formation which actualizes the representational image. For instance, Klare argues that ‘the law as legitimating ideology makes the historically contingent appear necessary. In this sense legal discourse keeps us from considering new modes of democratic self-government’ (cited Sassen 2006: 201). Gledhill similarly argues, citing Abéles, that the autonomy of the political is an illusion even in modern societies and power rests on everyday relations (2000: 20-1).
The state persists because people continue acting in conformist ways. As Colin War (1982) argues, in an arborescent system, those at the bottom either keep it running on tacit knowledge in spite of those in charge, or sabotage it (1982: 43). This does not prevent the state from seeking to maintain the illusion of its status as the origin of society by waging a constant social war against difference. The state hates autonomy and will attack autonomous spaces for the sake of it. The police, admits their leader, stage raids into autonomous Christiania commune in Denmark ‘to show the inhabitants that we can come in anytime’ and take people away, despite that it is ‘impossible’ to meet their goals (Hayes 2009).

When the state acts at its worst, the result is genocidal war and the recurrence of the ‘camp’ model. As Scott argues, the state sometimes attempts to crush the rhizomes of the hidden transcript by banning any site where they can flourish, or more broadly, by eliminating autonomous sites of popular culture (1990: 125-6). In Guatemala, the state sought (unsuccessfully) to smash indigenous economies and proletarianise indigenous peoples for Export Processing Zones (EPZ’s) by means of forced displacements and imprisonment in ‘model villages’ (Gledhill 2000: 123-4). In Colombia, rural populations in areas under military occupation have been locked in camps, dyed with indelible ink and subjected to a regime ‘to restrict their movements, their purchase of food, and, in general, their total ability to survive’ (Colorado 2003).

The state as a social logic has its own organic ideologies. To believe in unconditional legitimacy of state or its violence, based solely on internal features or without specification, and especially to elevate the state to the position of source of legitimate power, violence, right or rights - is to fully embrace the state as particular social logic. To accept the state’s existence/violence (and especially the latter) only conditionally, when the conditions are either external (such as respect for rights held by other groups) or internal (such as insistence that the state perform a role or adopt a goal defined in relation to the good of another group, e.g. that state legitimacy is dependent on its providing a productive environment for capital or guaranteeing the primacy of certain reactive networks/identities) is to syncretise it in a field with other social forces. To reject the state’s “special position” is in many ways to reject its existence – though its apparatuses can also take on existence as, say, civic organisations. To consistently express any of the other social logics means in the last instance to reject the state’s special position and especially its propensity to violence (only strategically could one accept even a conditional state).

The importance of the network form is that it allows the construction of relations which do not rely on a hierarchic moment. In order for a hierarchy to be constructed, there needs to be an authority or totality to which all the incorporated people or elements submit – an overarching leader, cause, organisation, idea, or some other “spook” around which organisation is articulated. This is equally the case for reactive moralities, in which the self-deadening “shoulds” of self-abasing belief are grounded in some moment of authority. Networks, however, do not require any such moment of authority. They operate like a swarm, without leaders or guiding principles, and they can incorporate people and other beings in ways which bring them together in spite of, or even because of
their differences. Deleuze and Guattari contrast the network (or “rhizome”) model to the “arborescent” model, structured like a traditional image of a tree (though in fact trees do not follow this model very closely). Whereas in an arborescent model, everything stems from a central trunk, and the branches are given their status by their relation to this trunk, in a network there is no integrating element, only a series of non-reductive and infinitely expansive horizontal connections. For this reason, networks are inherently dangerous to all systems of hierarchical power.

Already in the work of Kropotkin, a dividing-line is drawn between “society”, by which he largely means network logics, and the “state”, referring to hierarchic forms of integration. Kropotkin counterposes the social logic of networks and voluntary associations to the hierarchic political logic of statism, in which people are fragmented and controlled. While networks are bubbling with life, states bring with them death and decay, for the state has to destroy horizontal relations wherever it goes, to arrogate social power to itself and stand in for the community which no longer exists (one of the paradoxes being that the state needs to create the scarcity and competition which then act as the legitimization of its existence). The difference between states and networks is also expressed in binaries such as Kropotkin’s social and political principles (also applied by Buber, Landauer and Ward) and Day’s distinction between affinity and hegemony (Day 2005: 213). The state as a logic in its own right tends to dominate others; its representationalism is ideological and not an actual relation of accountability to others. Hence, ‘the modern state… protects its continued existence regardless of the wishes of individual citizens or a national people’ (Gurr and Harff 1994: 145). According to Kropotkin, the first act of the state wherever it was established was to break down horizontal networks and pillage the societies they formed. ‘But while the State was condoning and organizing this pillage, could it respect the institution of the commune as the organ of local affairs? Obviously, it could not. For to admit that some citizens should constitute a federation which takes over some of the functions of the State would have been a contradiction of first principles. The State demands from its subjects a direct, personal submission without intermediaries; it demands equality in slavery; it cannot admit of a ‘State within a State’. Thus as soon as the State began to be constituted in the sixteenth century, it sought to destroy all the links which existed among the citizens both in the towns and in the villages’ (Kropotkin 1897). In Migdal’s terms, the state aims to generate an intense (reactive) affect of ingroup identity through social solidarity channelled through the state itself (2001: 154).

The state principle is a principle which destroys everything. The irony of a recent British law which defines gathering together in a public place as “anti-social behaviour” would not have been lost on Kropotkin. It stands in a long tradition of state bans and attacks on horizontal association. For statists, people can only relate through the intermediary of the state; to remove this mediation is inherently threatening to it. ‘Either the State for ever, crushing individual and local life, taking over in all fields of human activity, bringing with it all its wars and domestic struggles for power, its palace revolutions which only replace one tyrant by another, and inevitably at the end of this development there is ... death! Or the destruction of States, and new life starting again in thousands of centres on the principles of the lively initiative of the individual and groups and that of free
agreement.’ (Kropotkin 1897). This thesis was provided with further empirical backing by Clastres, who argues that non-state societies construct mechanisms to prevent the emergence of systematically stratified relations (Clastres 1989).

As the (misidentified) guarantor of meaning, production and flows, the despot gains a kind of Schmittian or Hobbesian sovereignty. Everyone is viewed as being in debt to the despot; while all must repay, the despot may choose whether to ‘lend’ (1983: 197-8). It forms the law as a formal unity, not an immanent totality (ibid.198) with the despot as exception and the system of repression and representation extended massively (ibid.201-2). It fragments the ‘parts’ from each other to create a formal and empty unity (212), and crushes the interplay of action, expelling quantities of freedom from the world (ibid.213). The social machine hovers over desire as if unstuck from the desiring-machines, and forbids escape. ‘Better not a sole survivor than for a single organ to slip outside this apparatus’ (ibid.213). This is a kind of historic disaster, leading to the state as ‘megamachine’, ‘a functional pyramid that has the despot at its apex’ (ibid.194). Hence the state is not ‘primeval’, but is the originator of abstract essentialism, the idea of a ‘transcendent higher unity (ibid.196). As well as its own parts such as bureaucracies, it reintegrates the existing social segments as ‘organs of production’ (1983: 198), appropriating reality into its own system (1983: 210). Hence is fears decoded desires and overcodes everything, forcing flows into a ‘bottleneck’, making desire ‘the property of the sovereign, even though he be the death instinct itself’ (ibid.199); desire no longer dares to desire, having become desire for the despot’s desire (ibid.206). With all the organs of subjects connected to the body of the despot via representation, the danger of escape comes to haunt despotism, with the detachment of organs threatening to return the despot to a state of abjection. However, despotism leaves large regions of refuge unincorporated provided they are unthreatening (ibid.211).

The despotic-signifier and the “Urstaat” (the state form) do not vanish with capitalism, even though it escapes them in its own flows; rather, they function as its means to suppress whatever escapes capitalism itself. Law evolves to supposedly explain and constrain despotism, at a later stage, but with the despotic signifier firmly buried at its base (1983: 212-13). The vanished despot still functions in modern imperialism via transcendentalism in language (1983: 207). The state as desire to code and control seems to appear fully-formed, as an ‘abstraction to be realised’, operating as a guiding principle of specific states in different conditions (ibid.220). Eventually the state can only maintain coding by inventing new codes for deterritorialising flows, hence fusing with class structures (ibid.218). The decoded flows overwhelm the state, leading to capitalism, but capitalism turns back to the state to ward off its own destruction. ‘The State, its police, and its army form a gigantic enterprise of antiproduction, but at the heart of production itself’ (ibid.235); ‘[c]apitalism has reawakened the Urstaat, and given it new strength’ (1987: 460). What is deterritorialised with one hand is reterritorialised with the other (257); a major function of the state ‘consists in reterritorializing, so as to prevent the decoded flows from breaking loose at the edges of the social axiomatic’ (258). Hence the Urstaat does not die out. ‘The paradox is that capitalism makes use of the Urstaat for effecting its reterritorializations’ (1983: 261). Increasingly, ‘modern capitalist and socialist States take on the characteristic features of the primordial despotic
State’ (1983: 220). Societies, like people, end up torn between the two poles of active and reactive – the deterritorialising flows and the Urstaat (260). These poles parallel what elsewhere are portrayed as the two poles of desire, the schizorevolutionary and microfascist, or active and reactive poles. The political purpose of schizoanalysis is to liberate the former at the expense of the latter, hence to oppose despotic signification and the Urstaat. The state is a way of handling excess by reintroducing lack (and stupidity) into the social order (1983: 235-6). One of the ways the state does this is by absorbing war-machines (1987: 450). It is a machine for overdetermining, blocking and subjugating social relations via violence (Genosko ed, 1996: 254-5). It is fundamentally tied up with reactive desire. Hence, people can disarticulate and dismantle the state by abolishing reactive energies (ibid.256). On the other hand, the state always has a reactive, or microfascist, content. ‘A military machine as such, regardless of the political regime of the country in which it operates, is always a crystallization of fascist desire’ (Guattari 1984: 229). In many ways, the state is on the far side of a grid to the network form: while capitalism and the included stratum are alienated, and reactive networks are reactive, the state is both alienated and reactive, contrasting sharply with affinity-networks which are neither alienated nor reactive.

Virilio discusses the deep-state logic in terms of the idea of the military and war. According to Virilio, civilian populations were historically able to defend themselves, but have become dependent on an imposed military racket. Expanding in external colonialism, this has reacted back on western states in the form of ‘endocolonialism’ or internal colonisation of society by the state. The result is ‘the logic of colonialism applied to every space inside a society’ (Hoh 2002). The military class has ambitions independent from its instrumental goals, seeking to actualize its ‘essence’, or what we would term its social logic (Virilio 1990: 13). It struggles against the ‘badly-defined collection of freedoms, risks and uncertainties’ of spontaneity in an environment (1990: 14), seeking to eliminate chance and contingency from social relations (ibid.18-19). War is the origin of totalitarianism because it has become an attempt deny others dialogue, the chance to rework perspectives, instead seeking to control the adversary by redefining their space (ibid.17). The point of war is increasingly to sap active energy from the enemy rather than actually to fight, tending to become cyberwar as technologies such as television take over.

War thus becomes a specific case of what Deleuze and Guattari term antiproduction (see above). From the military pursuit of avoidance of uncertainty through control and disempowerment comes the logic of security exposed by Race (1972). This type of analysis echoes with concerns about the supposed ‘liberation’ of societies through armed struggle expressed by nonviolent anarchists, who argue that such ‘liberation’ often ends up with rule by military dictatorships and hierarchies (Anon., 2002). While not necessarily covering the type of conflict associated with autonomism and indigenous war (see below), this certainly throws doubt on other types of conflict. Chomsky suggests that the military logic, faced with people’s war, becomes genocidal. The only military logic of American tactics against the ‘people’s war’ is to destroy the people either by killing them, destroying their society or forcing them into controlled urban sites (2004: 196). Virilio also suggests that the statist or military gaze is expanded through
representational entertainment technologies such as cinema. This is a ‘colonization of leisure time by military technologies’ (Wilbur 1994). It is certainly the case that people who are structurally outside the (deep) state are constantly submerged into state logics through particular discourses and ways of seeing, often linked to representational (for instance, the widespread “we should” or “they should” of social authoritarianism – “we should” lock them all up, ban such-and-such, etc).

The state is a source of constant social conflict, but blames this conflict on others. Ward summarises this as: people try to do their own thing, the state intervenes, then blames the people for the resultant fight (1982: 137). ‘Modern sovereignty… does not put an end to violence and fear but rather puts an end to civil war by organizing violence and fear into a coherent and stable political order’ (Hardt and Negri 2004: 239). The current wave of anti-‘crime’ hysteria is an expression of a typically statist mode of thought: the reduction of social problems, which are horizontal conflicts requiring social responses and dialogism, to a paranoiac reaction against difference in defence of the exclusivity of privilege, by means of silencing of and violence against the other. Problem-solving theory and research, which Deleuze and Guattari term ‘royal science’, is in many ways an expression of the statist gaze, aiming to bring the world under the control of a technocratic apparatus by means of prediction, simplification and mapping. The result is a worldview with the appearance of science but a tautological or closed frame. Chomsky shows how mainstream planners often use an entrenched frame which takes false claims for granted and classifies ethical critique as irrational (Chomsky 1987: 245, 279, 455). Furthermore, as an assemblage permanently arranged for violence, the state clearly cannot have a principled objection to terrorism. It simply uses fear of non-state terrorism as one among many signifiers of anxiety and otherness, focusing on the ‘retail terrorism’ of small opposition groups while continuing the ‘wholesale terrorism’ of state violence (Herman and Peterson 2008).

The state as external force has been well-documented in Northern contexts such as America. Poole and Renique’s study of the LAPD suggests that it is an agency of internal pacification, an endocolonial force in Virilio’s sense, living in segregated communities outside the city and dividing the world into ‘normal’ people and ‘assholes’, the latter being a target of constant social war (cited Gledhill 2000: 169). Stephen M Nagler refers to a situation around the late 1960s uprisings in American cities which involved a ‘a major breakdown in communication between lawmaking and administration… and social reality’ (Stephen M Nagler, 1969: 220-1), with order deemed too sacrosanct to admit reality (ibid. 225). In addition, the state tends to reproduce itself through cycles of social conflict. A number of authors such as Hall (1989: 218, 228) and Richani (2002) have argued that the military often cause cycles of violence and local insertions which prolong the very conflicts they were sent to end.

States as assemblages are also heterogeneous, but this should not be used as an excuse for denying the existence of a deep-state logic. It has, indeed, been shown that states are heterogeneous and by no means all-powerful. For instance, Migdal discusses a social field in which states contest with other powerful groups and often fuse into broader forms of social power (2001: 10, 12, 49, 54). Hence, Migdal opposes the idea of ‘state against
society’ popularised by authors such as Clastres and Kropotkin (and largely embraced by us). Instead, he argues, the state is in society (2001: 63). Models such as Migdal’s can easily let the state ‘off the hook’, implying that, as something which forms heterogeneous assemblages, it has no single logic to oppose. In contrast, a recognition of the contingency of state forms implies a recognition also of their danger, given the state’s pretence at being one actor among others. From the conclusion “the state is just another social actor” follows the conclusion that the state is particularly socially dangerous. Hence, Migdal admits that, even though states enter into a balance of relations with other social forces where they are often tamed or defeated, in this balance of relations the state seeks to penetrate society to effect ‘far-reaching domination… Even the most benign states have made extraordinary demands upon those they have claimed as their subjects’ (2001: 126). State leaders nearly always aim to make the state dominate all of society, despite often failing in this aim (2001: 144). All social forces (for instance, capital) are heterogeneous, so there is no reason the heterogeneity of states should make the concept of a single state logic ‘essentialist’ or ‘reductionist’, any more than it would for the other social logics. Hence, the state is ‘in’ society in some contexts as an assemblage, but the state social logic is radically ‘against’ society.

The special problems of the state logic in the periphery

While premodern tributary states have arisen in a number of contexts, the current state-formations in most of the world arise from the colonial period. For instance, Bruce E Stanley refers to ‘the imperial imposition of the modern state form in [the Middle East] post-1860s’ (2003: 159), while Saskia Sassen refers to the ‘export of capitalist legal systems through colonization and military domination’ and through the norm of modernisation (2006: 137). What was imported was not in any case a complete Northern state, but a pared-down model suited to resource extraction. Guha (1989) argues that the colonial state differs fundamentally from the core state, focusing from the start on social control through coercion and governmentality rather than on hegemony. With states being imported rather than emerging locally, there are serious issues of local hegemony, with states often more closely connected to the world-system than to ‘their own’ societies. For instance, Graham Harrison argues that the sovereignty of African states is primarily external, coming from their recognition in the state-system (2002: 7) and Béatrice Hibou similarly refers to the ‘supremacy of external over internal legitimacy’ of states and govts (1999: 97).

This leads to a phenomenon where the modern state, having been imported (or imposed) from outside, wrestles with problems of insertion into an often hostile society. Badie (2000) has devoted an entire book to the subject, while Basil Davidson (1994: chapter 28) similarly argues that the ‘imported model’ has been problematic. In contrast, Béatrice Hibou argues that Africa is not haunted by a weak, imported or foreign state; rather, has locally reconfigured ‘rhizome’ or ‘shadow’ states (in Bayart et al 1999: 88). Bayart partially concurs, arguing that African states are like rhizomes with tangled webs of bureaucracy, influence and clientelism (in Bayart et al 1999: 47). Similarly, Chatterjee (1993) argues that Indian social groups have found their own ways of engaging with the state, while Benedict Anderson (Imagined Communities 1991: 75-6) argues that
indigenous bureaucrats identified with the nationalist unit in a manner identified with the highest centres of power they could reach. Hence a binary emerges between the ‘imported state’ model and the ‘local hybrid state’ model. There is some truth in both positions. The state is imported and imposed (even in the core, it is an impositional model directed against autonomous social movements), and it retains aspects of the ‘political principle’ in all its manifestations. However, it tends to ‘become organic’ in some of its contexts by syncretising with other social logics. In a few cases, the ‘shadow state’ of informal concentrated power might even colonise the state and render the state’s logic inoperative.

According to Talal Asad, repressive (authoritarian) Southern regimes share the pretensions of modern Northern states to intervene profoundly in everyday life but not the power to do so which has been formed in the North. This is the reason for their repressiveness: they resort to violence as substitute for subtle surveillance (cited Gledhill 2000: 19). In effect, this is a form of acting-out, showing a lack of internal hegemony (see below). Similarly, Geschiere (1988: 35) argues that the postcolonial state is both overdeveloped and soft, strongly authoritarian but unable to avert crisis, while Bayart (1986: 113) argues that state weakness reflects the limits of state hegemony over a recalcitrant civil society. Anderson argues that Latin American governments are limited not by constitutions in the usual sense, but by limits to the resources at their disposal and by the power of other social institutions (cited Migdal 2001: 227-8).

The mixture of social powerlessness of states with a project of total control produces hybrid formations and outbursts of violence. Frequently, the military becomes the core of the state, displacing governments in coups and taking over sections of the economy. While Latin America has mostly moved on from the army-state model, there are still large swathes of the planet, from Turkey to Pakistan, caught up in this form of rule. In Algeria for instance, the army-state has managed to survive the transition to polyarchy by reconstituting itself in terms of a ‘military democracy’ (Isikal 2003). In some peripheral societies such as Haiti, Costa Rica and Grenada, governments of various persuasions have actually gone as far as abolishing the army in an attempt to root out a potentially disruptive deep state.

Other combinations involve the articulation of state repression with local development agendas. In the East Asian and Chinese contexts, states have deployed ‘modern’ disciplinary power so as to play the global market and consumerist game, while appearing to say no to the west (Aihwa Ong 1996, 1999). Ferguson (1990) refers to development as the ‘anti-politics machine’ for the way it reinforces authoritarianism in the global South. In India, Chatterjee refers to development as a way for the state bureaucracy to assert itself as the universal class, dismissing other social logics as secondary ‘particular’ interests (1993: 204-5). Claiming to stand for a ‘development’ project above and beyond democratic representation, the state thus took on authoritarian tendencies (ibid.203-4), seeking ‘to obliterate the fuzziness of communities’ via ‘mechanisms of normalization’ (ibid.227). Politics, however, ‘returns’ from where it has been disavowed, as problems of ‘plan implementation’ and political failure (ibid.206-8). Similarly in Lesotho, Brown argues that development projects are a means whereby
‘natural resources become reorganized for the benefit of the state’ (Brown 2006: 161). By commodifying locals and their traditional land and sources of subsistence, such projects mean that the poor end up subsidising the state by absorbing the costs of its projects (ibid. 166). April Biccum has further argued that development discourse is an extension of colonial discourse (Biccum 2005), suggesting that it is an extension of the imported state and the insertion of colonial dominance in everyday life.

However, the peripheral state, more spectacularly than the core state, is disintegrating under the pressures of global change and movements from below. In an Arab context, Rami G. Khouri argues that state power is ‘fraying or dissipating’, with ‘the central power and authority of national governments… gradually withdrawing from many urban quarters of the Arab world’, being replaced by local Islamist, tribal or commercial networks (Khour 2008). So far, only a handful of states (in the most marginal African regions) have actually collapsed. This may, however, be the beginning of a process of decline. What Simone (2004) says of Sudan – majoritarianism is dead, urban life can no longer sustain majoritarian fantasies, but majoritarians are prepared to commit much violence before they recognise it, prolonging the death-agony of the myths of modernity – is also true of most of the world, including the North. The result of this split between state violence and its social context is a situation global social war between the state and the excluded – where the “anti-social” fuse with the dissidents, and one ends up with MEND, banlieue unrest, autonomism, the Iraqi and Afghan insurgencies, etc
Chapter 2 World System Theory

This chapter explains the world system perspective and provides theories on global development and structural crisis. This refers to structural crisis in the world system, and in the periphery. The chapter also discusses the state in terms of failure, transformation, capitalism and the state, and the transnational capitalist state. It includes problems of state power versus market and the state’s role in global development. Another section explores the promotion of polyarchy, the imperial executive, ambiguities of media hegemony and the state as a war machine. The final section looks at structural cycles in the world system, American and British hegemony, Empire and hegemonic transition, and attempting to theorise the system’s future.

Explaining world-systems analysis

World-systems analysis is constructed as a long-term type of thinking in antagonism with ‘royal science’. Wallerstein argues that thinking in world system terms requires ‘unthinking’ much of what one has learnt from the educational system and media (2004: xii). Historical knowledge as episteme has been written with or without the history of peoples and with or without the presence of archives (ibid. 5). Any other history describing the Other, for example Orientalism and anthropology are viewed as about particularities (ibid. 9). History was written under a western lens, developed to incorporate the Other into the narrative of western history.

For Wallerstein, world system theory is based on a macro-perspectival understanding of history. It understands the system as an hierarchical apparatus, with a core of ‘advanced’ countries exploiting scarce technologies or patents to secure a systematic advantage, a semi-periphery of industrialised countries specialising in manufacturing, and a periphery – containing most of the global South. In a classic assertion, Cardoso similarly argued that corporations seek to maintain export of profits not only through technological monopolies but also ‘through the payment of licenses, patents, royalties and related items’ (Cardoso, 1979: 91). Similarly, Samir Amin has recently argued that ‘in the new conditions of the system’s evolution the opposition is between the beneficiaries of the centers’ new monopolies (technology, access to natural resources, communications, weapons of mass destruction) and peripheries that are industrialized, but still subordinated by means of these monopolies’ (2004: 23). Pieterse similarly views the world system as a hierarchy. ‘The interacting policies of developmental and financial discipline, marginalization, and containment may be viewed as part of a process of hierarchical integration, which has turbulence built in’ (2004: vii).

Jeanne Curran links Gunder Frank’s thesis to the density of networks and connections, suggesting that insertion in the world system requires strong local networks and strong links to extralocal actors. The networks created by core insertions create very limited networks with limited local and transversal insertions, limiting connections to those between core and periphery. The roads in Guatemala for example would not run between small villages, but between the central United Fruit farm and the port only, so when United Fruit left, there were no local links for creating new economies (Curran nd).
Slater (2004) summarises a range of Latin American sources on dependency. Eduardo Galeano (1973) argues that in Latin America, everything is transmuted into American or European capital and accumulated in distant centres; each area is assigned a function for the benefit of the metropolis. Stavenhagen (1968) argued that developed areas of peripheral countries operate like a pumping mechanism, sucking resources from the surrounding areas. Cuban artist Mosquera (1994) argues that globalisation mistakenly invokes images of a global ‘web-like network’, when in fact, ‘connections occur inside a radial and hegemonic pattern around the centres of power’, with few links between peripheral countries (cited Slater 2004: 171). Chatterjee similarly argues that ‘globalization is not some great carnival of capital, technology, and goods where we are all free to walk away with what we want. What one gets and how much, where [and whether] one finds a place in the global network of exchanges… depends on several economic and political conditions’ (2004: 85-6). Similarly, Ania Loomba argues that, whatever direction people and materials travel in an imperial system, profits always flow to the core, in a constant process of extraction (1998: 9).

The crucial point about the world-system is that it is a strongly arborescent assemblage in which surplus is extracted from more peripheral points to more core points, in a chain-like relation, creating a situation where the world is arranged like a pyramid in which capital and resources flow from the periphery to the core whereas (constituted) power and cultural and ideological hegemony flow from core to periphery. Deleuze and Guattari accept the argument of world-systems analysis that capitalism requires a core-periphery division and unequal exchange, also applying it within nation-states in terms of the emarginati as internal periphery (2004: 468-9). The flow of value travels from peripheral to core products in a relation of unequal exchange, with core products occupying a quasi-monopoly status (ibid.28). The function of the semi-periphery is in providing more competitive outlets for products which are losing their monopoly status. For example, if manufacturing moves to semi-peripheral countries then they become more competitive against the core. Here an important example is China.

The operation of the world-system as a hierarchically integrated system of exploitation is central to the world-systems analysis. In Frank’s classic account of underdevelopment in Chile, he argues that ‘external monopoly has always resulted in the expropriation (and consequent unavailability to Chile) of a significant part of the economic surplus produced in Chile and its appropriation by another part of the world capitalist system’ (Frank, 1969: 31). This occurs as part of a chain-like process in which each node is connected via a series of connections to the most core points; ‘it is this exploitation relation which in chain-like fashion extends the capitalist link between the capitalist world and national metropolises to the regional centres (part of whose surplus they appropriate), and from these to local centres, and so on to large landowners or merchants who expropriate surplus from small peasants or tenants’ (ibid. 31-2).

Authors such as Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein use the images of core and periphery or metropolis and satellite to represent a particular arborescent-striated organisation of global economic space. From a macro-historical perspective, control by the core states, and by the United States as the core of the core, produced phenomena of
subordination, dependency and underdevelopment in peripheral areas (Frank 1969, Wallerstein, 1974). In her definition of colonialism, Ania Loomba notes that under the colonial system, ‘in whichever direction human beings and materials travelled, the profits always flowed back into the so-called “mother country”’ (1998). The metropole extracting resources from the periphery is used as a framework for understanding imperialism and the capitalist world system. It is possible to understand the world system, not simply as homologous to the arborescent apparatuses of Deleuzian theory, but as a specific instantiation of this type of apparatus.

More precisely, the world system is an overcoding apparatus, as is clearly demonstrated in the case-studies drawn together by Evan Watkins (1998). Everyday economic practices are drawn into and/or excluded from the ‘world economy’ in such a way as to suck resources into the core and to make incorporation into the world system a precondition for international recognition. And when the economics of a country are good and ‘everyday exchanges’ with the core are productive, then the country’s political credentials are not in question. Survival in a peripheral context often depends, however, on escaping this context of subordination, and the studies of ‘underdeveloped’ countries often demonstrate the existence of elaborate, more or less rhizomatic networks constructed outside official channels (Hecht and Simone, 1994; Chatterjee, 1993; Scott 1990). Consequently, the threat is always present that such rhizomes will operate as the basis for a fundamental challenge to the world system itself, causing the system to fall back on violence in an attempt to destroy what Chomsky calls ‘the threat of a good example’ (1993): the possibility of an escape from the global system which could trigger the end for this system’s illusory inevitability.

The main engine of the current world system is capitalism. However, the state is needed as supplementary role of states to create the quasi-monopolies (such as patents), which sustain capitalism (Wallerstein, 2004: 26). However, the world system also incorporates non-capitalist forms of life because of the system’s preference for cheaper, semi-proletarian workers who are subsidised by other economies (such as subsistence) over proletarians whose reproduction costs have to be funded directly (ibid. 35). Colonies ‘simply the weakest kind of state in the interstate system’ (ibid. 56). There is also a tension between capitalism and the interstate system; while capitalism requires the latter, there are countervailing drives to uphold each of the separate systems (ibid. 56).

Samir Amin (1989) argues that Eurocentrism does not only propose a vision of the world. It is also a political project on a global scale, a process of homogenization through imitation and catching up. Despite this homogenisation, it is not actually a smoothing of global space. ‘The global expansion of capitalism has never made it its task to homogenize the planet. On the contrary, this expansion created a new polarization, subjecting social forms prior to capitalism at the periphery of the system to the demands of the reproduction of capital in the central formations... The demand for a reexamination of capitalism, as was the case in the past for the tributary social forms, is expressed more intensely at the peripheries of the capitalist system than at its advanced centers’ (Amin, 1989: 122). The core-periphery contradiction is crucial, the primary contradiction no less, but it is not a binary opposition, operating instead via layers of
mediation. It is a system of integration combined with asymmetry, in which resources flow from periphery to core and power from core to periphery (ibid. 141). In this context, global power becomes an expression of a function of systemic dominance. ‘Obedience to the logic of the world economy demands in effect that a police force assume the responsibility for repressing the revolts of the peoples of the periphery, victims of the system… a function that cannot be filled by anyone other than the United States’ (ibid. 150).

World-systems analysis does not necessarily involve the dubious hypothesis that there is ‘no outside’ to global capitalism, though it does tend to incorporate growing regions at least in marginal ways. Aguirre Beltran (1979) argues that the system enforces the stagnation of peripheral areas of marginal importance, and that these areas become buffered from the wider economy, usually by a local elite and at considerable cost to the local state. Hall (1989: 164) argues that regions of refuge are never fully incorporated even as peripheries, and become sites for the survival of pre-capitalist social forms and older, bypassed forms of capitalism. He argues that a region is not simply incorporated or not; there are degrees of world-system insertion, ranging from weak to strong (1989: 19). In addition to regions of refuge, there are ‘contact peripheries’ which are not or are barely incorporated, ‘marginal peripheries’ which produce marginal goods with little role in the wider economy, and ‘dependent peripheries’ which fit the classical model of peripherality, producing crucial goods in dependent relations (1989: 19).

According to Wallerstein, the world-system is normally ruled by a hegemon which exercises a leading role, diffusing its development model and integrating the system as a whole. The hegemon, as core of the core, operates like a hegemon in Laclauian theory, standing in for the unity of the system as such. Hegemonic decline leads to loss of economic advantage and political influence, where the hegemon is forced to actually use military power, which both shows and exacerbates weakness and uses up political and economic resources (2004: 58-9). There are two paths out of hegemonic crisis, chaos in period of crisis, where small acts have big effects, or recomposition around a new hegemon (ibid. 76-7). Hegemonic crisis could also entail a prolonged crisis of capitalism, which Wallerstein contends we have reached (ibid. 77). This crisis is due to reaching the upper limit of three dynamics: relocation of production to new semi-rural sites, ignoring ecological costs, and using up resources (ibid. 80-2); increasing infrastructure costs due to privatisation (ibid. 82) and raising taxes (ibid. 83). The role of a hegemon is connected to different stages in which there is a different leading technological sector (e.g. steam, electricity, electronics), a different development model (e.g. free trade, Keynesianism) and a different corporate organisational model (e.g. family firms, multinational corporations, trade networks). Adding class composition into the picture, one could add that each phase also seems to have a different type of figure of the worker, depending on scale and degree of subsumption; world-systems cycles correlate with the early Negri’s idea of the transition from professional to mass to socialised worker.

On the micro-level, Wallerstein argues that that the coexistence of universalism and discrimination is central to the functioning of the world system (ibid. 41). Universalism
(anti-discrimination) is an ideology of the middle classes (our included stratum), whereas discrimination is linked to what we term reactive networks, constructed through the Oedipal or socialising role of the family and various status-group categories such as ethnicity (ibid. 40). Another aspect of global inequality is ecological, with ecological problems caused by core consumption shifted to the periphery (see essays in Jorgenson and Kick, 2006). For instance, Gilbert (2006) argues that neoliberalism marginalises nature discursively while relying on its exploitation. Indonesian economic growth depended on the use and abuse of forests and a development discourse which falsely contrasts ‘general’ gains to ‘local’ losses of indigenous peoples (2006: 177, 179, 183).

From a postcolonial perspective, Zemach-Bersin (2007) suggests that global citizenship discourse and overseas voluntary work extend the role of exploiting other countries to the sphere of culture and knowledge. ‘Through study abroad, global citizens enact a similar colonial process by harvesting the resource of international knowledge to strengthen and benefit America… Knowledge acquired by global citizens makes the world beyond U.S. borders legible, readable, knowable and therefore both consumable and controllable’.

At a world level, America is viewed as the current enforcer of insertion in the world system. Ahmad terms the new structure of postcolonial imperialism unable to sustain colonies ‘a structural imperative of the current composition of global capital itself’, which requires movement to be as unimpeded as possible and the enforcement of ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ in conditions specific to each territorial unit (Ahmad 2004: 45), while Pieterse argues that the core aspects of Americanization are monopoly rents for US firms, their institutionalisation through hyperpower leverage, and permanent war (2004: 133).

American imperialism, for all its problems, is an extension of this logic – for instance, disciplining Afghanistan for the Taleban’s refusal to cooperate with American designs for Central Asian oil. Niaz Naik, the dean of Pakistan’s diplomatic corps, said on the BBC that he had been told by the Americans during the summer of 2001 that invasion would begin in October. The events of 11th September came between the making of the design and its execution (Ahmad, 2004:58). Chomsky has similarly argued that America uses its global power to try to prevent countries developing outside the world-system, and uses its power and rhetoric against any country, which becomes too autonomous (1987: 251). For instance, Pentagon papers suggested Vietnam was ‘cheap’ because it will ‘set a high price’ on insurgency, keeping the South stable (ibid. 270). Hence, the criterion of keeping everyone inside the world system is a good criterion for when America intervenes (ibid. 250). As we shall see below, it is also often attributed other historical functions which it increasingly fails to perform. For instance, Arrighi and Silver refer supportively to ‘Polanyi’ s contention that world markets can yield positive rather than disastrously negative results only if they are governed, and that the very existence of world markets for any length of time requires some kind of world governance’ (Arrighi and Silver, 2005: 169, Arrighi 1994).

Survival in a peripheral context often depends, however, on escaping this context of subordination, and the studies of ‘underdeveloped’ countries often demonstrate the existence of elaborate, more or less rhizomatic networks constructed outside official
channels (e.g. Hecht and Simone, 1994; Chatterjee, 2008; Scott, 1990). Consequently, the threat is always present that such rhizomes will operate as the basis for a fundamental challenge to the world system itself, causing the system to fall back on violence in an attempt to destroy what Chomsky calls “the threat of a good example” (1993): the possibility of an escape from the global system which could trigger the end for this system’s illusory inevitability. The construction of official discourse – for instance, the ‘axis of evil’, the reactive misrepresentation of attacks on civil liberties as the ‘protection’ of liberty – is built around precisely this kind of valuation of closure. The only factor uniting the ‘axis of evil’ (two of which were at war twenty years ago) is the incompleteness of their subsumption into the world system. At the same time, one finds in official discourse a process of metonymical slippage between different instances of elements escaping control, linking terrorism, immigration, crime, protest, cultural otherness and the myriad resistances to “globalisation” (Burton, 1997). As Deleuze and Guattari (following Virilio) remark, ‘this war machine no longer needs a qualified enemy but… operates against the “unspecified enemy”, domestic or foreign’, and thereby constructs a situation of ‘organized insecurity’ and ‘programmed catastrophe’ (1987: 467). Ideological beliefs and values are a fall back position when there are unresolved problems in social relationships. Ideology need not be an issue when there is a searching analysis of relationship problems.

Against the threats to centralised control, one finds a tendency to seek reassurance from anxiety by pursuing ever-greater closure of space. Openness is seen as space for the enemy, and any open space is indeed a space in which rhizomes can flourish. On the other hand, closure is seen as safety. The system itself does not need openness because its values are taken to be fixed and obvious. In such official discourse one finds the repetition of themes widespread in the various movements Guattari terms “microfascist”, and all the core features of a reactionary and liberticidal ideology (1984: 218-229). Closure of space, however, makes the systemic incorporation of particularities problematic, as dissenters and cultural nonconformists find themselves increasingly stripped of the open space needed to flourish, and as entire categories of people (Muslims, environmentalists, peace protesters, people who take photographs…) are reconstructed as “other” and as “dangerous”. Through such closure, the logic of “with us or against us” gradually transmutes into “with or without you”, which, as Slavoj Žižek argues, is a typical gesture of forced choice, the imposition of a master-signifier. ‘The logic is thus clearly formulated: even the pretense of neutral international law is abandoned, since, when the USA perceives a potential threat, it formally asks its allies for support, but the allies’ agreement is actually optional. The underlying message is always “We will do it with or without you” (in short, you are free to agree with us, but not free to disagree). The old paradox of the forced choice is reproduced here: the freedom to make a choice on condition that one makes the right choice’ (Žižek, 2004: 14). This is what Michael Mastanduno was predicting in 1999:

First, we should expect, as the centrepiece of US grand strategy, an effort to prolong the unipolar moment. Second, we should anticipate that the United States will adopt policies of reassurance toward status quo states, policies of
confrontation toward revisionist states, and policies of engagement or integration toward undecided states…

(Mastaduno, 1999: 149)

**Problems of world-systems analysis**

There are limitations to world systems analysis. The first is that the current *transversality*, we are witnessing, exceeds the systemic grid of the world system, as it does not follow usual core-periphery lines or usual directions along these lines. This can include migration/remittances, global solidarities and border-crossing. As a result, ultimately some of the insights offered by world system theory have to be in a sense ‘updated’ to reflect this change. Fuchs (2007) has argued that statistics showing massive foreign dominance of key peripheral markets do not suffice to demonstrate political power, instead suggesting that instrumental, structural and discursive power must be studied in detail. While this does not necessarily undermine the hierarchical image of the world-system, it does suggest a need for awareness of complexities.

Another problem is that world-systems analysts often *assume something like the systemic logic to be universal*, and so reproduce it (and the need for alienation) in their proposed transformations and utopias. For instance, Wallerstein assumes that the current world system will be replaced by ‘successor system (or systems)’ (2004: 89), which implies the inevitability of state and money – ‘Taxes are a basic element in social organization. There have always been and always will be taxes of one sort or another’ (ibid. 82).

Thirdly, since world-systems analysis retains the framework of political economy, it is often *at risk of slipping across into progressivist visions of modernisation* which unite it with its ‘royal science’ rivals. Emmanuel (****) provides an extreme example of this, using a world-systems model to argue for standard modernisation strategies. Even in the more typical world-systems analysts such as Wallerstein, the problem persists. For instance, Wallerstein maintains that weak state capacity leads to the impossibility of ordinary accumulation, which renders the state itself as the focus of accumulation via kleptocracy (ibid.53). In a way, Wallerstein makes a problematic slippage into modernization theory here, as kleptocracy is not due to lack but to specific structures of power within certain peripheral states (Bayart et al ****). It is not so much that capitalism requires a strong state to operate as that it constructs a strong state – and at other times a kleptocratic state – as an agent of *gleichschaltung* and social control.

Another problem is the *failure of epistemological delinking*, a tendency to assume that the power-knowledge regime of the world-system applies universally through history, and to downplay the degree of difference in indigenous and autonomous societies. For instance, the argument of Chase-Dunn and Hall for an (otherwise plausible) hypothesis of ecological degradation due to world-system expansion (2006: 231) relies on the dubious assumption that the search for ‘resources’ motivates history, even for nomads and indigenous populations (232, 249), that all societies degrade the environment (237-8), as well as the equally doubtful assumption that capitalist and statist logics introduce
growing complexity (231, 239) and that stateless societies are the lowest level of human society (239) since complex systems favour the development of hierarchy (240). This leads to a deterministic metanarrative of history which cannot account, for instance, for the reversions to indigenous forms of life documented by Clastres (1989). In this account, the capitalist logic in which problems are overcome by a recurring technological fix or expansion of scale only to recur at a ‘higher’ level (a hypothesis they have borrowed from Harvey), is taken to be universal for all societies and the driving force for human history as such (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 2006: 231, 243). One could counter, for instance, that the state and capitalism in many ways reduce complexity, as Scott (1998) and Negri (2003) argue; that hierarchies are inherently less able to handle complexity than networks; and that capitalist expansion is not about spontaneously expanding, but rather, about capturing complexity in a widening sphere through more sophisticated or merely more destructive technologies of control. Hence, what is needed is not a new expansion of the world-system, but a recovery of ecological connectedness, ‘rewilding’ and horizontalism.

Similarly, Samir Amin’s model involves a desire for a systemic breakdown which is temporary only, and is followed by a new universalism paralleling the rise of capitalism (1989: 144-5). He sees this taking a statist socialist form in which state-centred populisms are taken as progressive (ibid.142-3) and the goal is to do what ‘modernity requires’ (ibid.132). There is ‘no other choice than that which has been the key to these so-called socialist revolutions’ (ibid.144), and ‘for the people of the periphery the inevitable choice is between a national popular democratic advance or a backward-looking centralist impasse’ (ibid.148). In particular, the ‘right to difference’ should be abandoned in favour of a ‘universalist ambition’ with ‘concepts of progress, reason, law and justice’ (ibid.146, 150). This is basically a failure to delink from the world-system and its geoculture on an epistemological level. Amin offers a choice between two variants of the colonially imported patronage-state machine, inside the world-system or outside it. Ultimately the goal remains that of ‘royal science’, a drive to systematisation and order, and the agent of the goal remains the state, with networks of resistance marginalised and mapped onto their reactive variant as reactionary phenomena. Without epistemological delinking and transversal connections between movements of resistance, economic delinking is simply a form of marginalisation within the world-system, not an escape from it.

**Global Development and Structural Crisis**

*Impoverishment as persistent crisis, and recurring crises of capitalism*

In considering the problems of the world system, it is important to remember the big picture of massive global inequalities. Pieterse in his *Globalization or Empire* argues that discrepancies in income and wealth are now vast to the point of being grotesque and they are so large that they are without historical precedent and without conceivable justification, economic, moral, or otherwise (Pieterse, 2004: 62). Two thirds of total world wealth is controlled by 18 nations that contain only 12 percent of the world’s people (Dunaway 2003: 7). The policy to address these discrepancies focus on global
poverty rather than global inequality, resulting in a fundamental policy incoherence between neoliberal policies that widen global inequality on the one hand, and attempts to reduce global poverty on the other. Discussing poverty instead of inequality eliminates the discussion of power relations (Pieterse, 2004: 66). In the bigger picture, the growth and density of networks on a global scale generate demands for reform or revolution, however the power structures and institutions in the global system are tied with neoliberal policy frameworks. While America proclaimed its new ‘war on terrorism’, most of the world’s people continued to fight more urgent battles against hunger, disease and poverty, with a quarter of people lacking safe drinking water and half of the children of the global South dying before the age of ten (Dunaway 2003: 8). David Harvey refers to neoliberal globalisation as ‘the production of fragmentation, insecurity, and ephemeral uneven development within a highly unified global space economy of capital flows’ (1989: 296).

Global poverty is, however, an increasingly complex phenomenon, with inequalities sharpening within Northern and Southern regions, and the emergence of the East Asian ‘tigers’, the collapse of the Soviet empire and the rise of oil-rent wealth complicating the picture. Indeed, so much less straightforward is a North/South mapping of inequality now said to be that a leading development theorist like Hoogvelt can suggest global inequality to be now much more ‘social’ than ‘geographical’ in its coordinates; ‘The familiar pyramid of the core-periphery hierarchy is not longer a geographical but a social division of the world economy’ she writes (Hoogvelt 2001: xiv, Saul, 2004: 221). While this makes the picture more complex, it also means that poverty is no longer something which can be confined to marginal sites. The result of inequality is ‘a lot of unemployed and angry young people’ able to disrupt societies in the core (ibid.68-9). For instance, in the midst of ‘credit crunch’ and global recession, in December 2008, beginning with the most serious social unrest in recent Greek history, protests occurred in countries in the supposed ‘advanced economic core’ throughout the European Union. In the UK, workers held banners with the government’s slogan ‘British jobs for British people’, asking for a new clause in Europe to protect employment for British nationals. With poverty-related problems being such a global issue, the apparent inability to address the problem is somewhat paradoxical.

Pieterse explains this inability as due to the commitments of core countries separately or as a group (2004: 76). Meanwhile, United Nations and World Bank poverty documents ‘seem to address a parallel universe in which there are no major powers – transnational corporations, banks, Western governments, international trade barriers and institutions – that produce and reinforce poverty and inequality’ (ibid. 74). Indeed, with the world-system based on systematic exploitation of the periphery which leads to the problem of poverty, Amin (2004) argues that we should speak of ‘impoverishment’ as a process and relation, rather than ‘poverty’ as a descriptive state. Booth similarly argues that global poverty is not an existential condition but rather, an outcome of specific policy choices (2007: 14). One could argue that the existential attachment to scarcity is actualised through the projection of indebtedness onto the other, the enforcement of this indebtedness as global exploitation, and the resultant production, through global exploitation, of extreme material scarcities.
Responses to poverty by states and groups of states are grouped by Thomas Row (cited Pieterse 2004: 77) into four main groups: socialisation of the deprived into conformity, integration of poor countries into the global order, isolation through voluntary delinking, or isolation of the poor from without, through containment in marginal sites and ghettos. The first and fourth of these are favoured strategies of the core and of cooperative states in the periphery, with the former expressed in ‘employability’ agendas (2006) and mainstream development policies based on conditional aid to poor countries, the latter in immigration ‘controls’, global stratifications and various approaches to contain conflict, disease, revolution, ‘terrorism’ and so on. The second and third arise as resistance strategies by peripheral states, regions or peoples, taking diverse forms such as the demand for a New International Economic order, the creation of regional economic initiatives such as those in Latin America and Southeast Asia, delinking by individual states, and local separatist and ‘fundamentalist’ projects.

Integration and isolation processes, which include developmental policies, financial discipline and marginalization, are practiced simultaneously and they have inherent problems of contradiction. Integration is on a hierarchically level and is exercised through various socio-political and economic policies through what is widely called globalization. ‘Together, these policies could be viewed as different modalities of a single process of conditional, asymmetric integration’ (ibid. 79). These policies of hierarchical integration have turbulence built in, as the isolation of the deprived can emerge from within – as delinking, localism or traditionalism – or from without, as attempts to confine the poor to the global margins or ghettos. Constant surveillance and repression of periphery (via financial and development regimes and interventions), ghettos (via zero tolerance) and migration flows (via humiliation and repression) are linked to ‘fear of falling’ by core states and multinationals and trying to keep the world’s problems contained beyond a border, what Zizek (2001) terms living in a bubble, beyond the ‘desert of the Real’, and Wallerstein (in Dunaway 1999) calls a ‘fool’s paradise’ of the core.

This contradiction between borderlessness within the core areas and borders without leads to a situation where ‘conflict… takes place at or beyond this dividing line’– a ‘new politics of containment’ (Pieterse 2004: 87-88). Containment politics arguably sustain conflict, as they tend to produce totalitarian control and rent-seeking in contained areas, border-testing and crime (ibid.100). New technologies are used in this process both for a ‘borderless world’ and border policing (ibid. 86). This view is reinforced by Shoshana Zuboff’s study of corporate uses of information technology: while some companies use information technology as a mechanism of control, an ‘information panopticon’, others use it to provide better mechanisms of feedback and control (Zuboff 1988). One can similarly argue that networks in politics can go two ways: towards a replacement of hierarchies with networks, or towards an increasingly arbitrary form of rule based on elite networks and arbitrary ‘governance’. Much depends on whether networks are embraced as part of an addition or a subtraction of axioms.
In more classically Marxist terms, Clarke (1989: 142) counterposes something similar to the Deleuzian dilemma of de- and reterritorialisation: a contradiction between the tendency to unlimited development of productive forces and a need to confine accumulation, and hence development, within the limits of the relations of production. Harvey (1998) argues that recurring bouts of ‘time-space compression’ are an expression of the recurrence of capitalist crises at expanded scales. Trichur (2003: 50) views time-space compression as particularly crucial to the current bout of crises. Spivak argues that the status of aid and debt reduction as ‘crisis management’ is obvious from official documents, but not news reports (1990: 97-8). She views the postcolonial situation as a situation of permanent crisis, in which crisis management is used to maintain foreclosures of opposition and of the system’s own basis.

**Contemporary capitalist crisis**

Hence, the persisting systemic situation amounts to a kind of permanent crisis, rendering global activities even in periods of stability as ‘crisis management’. The world-system is also, however, at a period of particular structural crisis which has been brewing since the 1980s and has found its latest, most explosive manifestation in the ‘credit crunch’. Wallerstein (1999) contends that there are four major structural and ideological contradictions of the present system which are creating a situation of structural crisis from which world capitalism cannot be rescued, at least with the existing range of policies available. These are the rising costs of labour and ecological entropy which threaten capital accumulation, and the declining role of the nation-state and growth of antisystemic resistance which push the system towards global chaos (Dunaway 2003: 3-4 cited Wallerstein 2000b; 2001). America has turned since the 1980s to credit and finance as a way out of the problems of the industrial economy, but this is a false solution which simply reproduces the problems in the medium-term. According to Bonefeld, there is a risk that credit, in making a potentially worthless claim on future surplus-value, will render capital meaningless – the less it relies on actual exploitation, the more it risks losing a grip on its base (2000: 56). Credit is an attempt by capital to exist without labour (and implicitly, without an outside), but its divorce from other social forces is more ideal than real (ibid. 56) This process of capital leaving behind reality causes a contemporary crisis of accumulation (ibid. 57). Ultimately it is dependent on the tautologies of finance being converted into capitalist command, and the ‘failure to turn credit into effective command over labour turns debt into bad debt’ (ibid. 57). In the current credit crunch, much of the fictional capital created from this expansion of imaginary productivity is simply disappearing, as confidence in the capitalist fantasy declines.

World systems analysts and Marxist geographers such as Arrighi, Wallerstein and Harvey view the present situation as a kind of downturn or depression period. However, capitalist depressions do not lead to capitalist collapse, because capitalism is cyclical. It undergoes an upturn when a new hegemonic sector, usually in a new core country, leads to innovative combinations of productive "resources" (labour, capital, land, energy, etc). For a while, the expansion of this new economic logic drives a relative boom, as leading countries gain economically and others also gain trying to catch up. But at a certain point, the entry of new competitors into the new sector destroys its advantage. At this
point the rate of profit falls, capitalists scramble for resources and competition becomes intense. Usually the core/leading capitalists and connected states manage to revive themselves briefly through accumulation-by-dispossession and by misusing their leading position. But capital looks for a "spatial fix", reinvesting in areas which are comparatively "underdeveloped" by capitalist standards and where new forms can take root. The cycle starts again in these new spaces. This theory is based on Schumpeter (1994).

In turn, Wallerstein (1999) contends that four structural and ideological contradictions of the existing system are generating a major structural crisis from which world capitalism cannot be rescued with the kinds of policies that have worked in the past: structural contradictions that are cutting into profit levels, thereby threatening accumulation of capital by the system—(1) rising costs of labor and (2) ecological entropy; structural contradictions that are pushing the system toward chaos and turmoil—(3) the declining role of the nation-state, accompanied by (4) increasing levels of anti-systemic resistance (Dunaway 2003: 3-4 quotes Wallerstein 2000b, 2001). Wallerstein in 1999 predicted the demise of the capitalist world-system within the first-half of the 21st century. He views the world system in a critical bifurcation point, a short period that will be characterized by a sudden shift in the long-term structural trends that have created and sustained the world as we know it (Dunaway 2003: 6). “We are in a systemic bifurcation, which means that very small actions by groups here and there may shift the institutional forms in radically different directions” (Dunaway, 1999: 304). Sassen similarly contends that there is a difference between dominance and prevalence in global systems; capitalism at the time of the Agricultural Revolution was dominant but not prevalent, as is denationalisation today (2006: 12). One can also argue that global networks, or maybe something akin to Hardt and Negri’s Empire, is prevalent today but not dominant, leading to a bifurcation. Networks are new “organizing logic” but while their capabilities are developing, the “tipping point” has not been reached (cf Sassen 2006: 420-1).

Trichur understands the contemporary situation, as resembling previous bouts of time-space-compression, during which the there is a large-scale reconstellation of policies toward the periphery. What he sees as new however, lies in both the abandonment of the ‘development project’ (the promise that the South would be aided in reaching the levels of wealth attained by the North), as well as the enforced conversion of the South into a site for renewed primitive accumulation (Trichur 2003citing Arrighi and Silver 2001).

First, it is a crisis of capital accumulation arising out of an exhaustion of returns from undertaking global investments in productive capital that laid out the tracks of a U.S.-led developmental path. Second, neoliberalism represents a concomitant “expansion” of finance and speculation and the extension of this expansion to the periphery in ways that are constitutive of a crisis of labor. The crisis of labor in turn needs to be understood in the context of both industrial labor and in the context of the livelihood of people struggling against the invasion of the agricultural periphery. Third, it is a crisis of representation (Greenfield 2000) of the oppressed by trade unions, by students, by intellectuals. These three crisis are directly related to the crisisof forms of governance in the South where the withdrawl of the state from developmental efforts has created the
space for a new round of “original accumulation”. The outcome of this crisis will be determined by the force of the resistance of antisystemic movements in the North and in the South (all Trichur, 2003: 58).

The preferred method of addressing the crisis of accumulation involves Harvey’s ‘spatial fix’ along with the uneven incorporation of different territories and social formations into the capitalist world market and it is ‘this spatial fix that lies behind the globalization project, and the compliance of neoliberal regimes in the South will facilitate its realization’ (Trichur, 2003: 51). Trichur views the explosive growth of international private finance, and the delinking of this private finance from the interstate system, as the most dramatic aspect of the ongoing process of globalization (ibid.)

**Crisis of hegemony**

Bifurcation occurs when there is a kind of dual power between a decaying established order and a new world in the process of formation. Gramsci suggests that a crisis ‘consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid systems appear’ (Gramsci 1971: 276). In normal periods, a leading system is characterised by hegemony.

Conceived in Gramscian terms, hegemony refers to a relation in which a leading or “directive” group is able to influence others to adopt its conception of the world by means such as cultural influence. In contrast, a relation of domination exists when a ruling group is able to maintain control only by suppressing the intellectual and ethico-political development of subordinates (either through transformist control or through violence). Transformism (trasformismo) is a system of control through the incorporation of leaders of opposition movements into the existing power/patronage apparatus, thus “beheading” social movements. Gramsci differentiates transformismo from hegemony, in which the leading group achieve active support. Robert Cox, for instance, suggests that American hegemony enters into crisis in the 1970s, and that the result is an increasing reliance on coercion (Cox 1983: 170-1).

Arrighi defines hegemony as the ‘capacity to mobilize consent and cooperation internationally’ by acting in a way to make it plausible to claim that one is acting in the general interest (Arrighi 2005a: 33). Scott views hegemony as the ability to define what is realistic or possible (1985: 326), while Guha defines it as “’power inflation’ that ensues from the capacity of dominant groups to present their rule as credibly serving not just their interests but those of subordinate groups as well’ (1989: 231-2). Mann defines it as routinised power which appears legitimate (Mann 2005: 81). Panitch and Leys define it as the ability to frame a situation so as to impose one’s will (2001). Robert Cox defines hegemony in terms of a cooperative world order, as opposed to imperialism as a dominatory and competitive world order (in Cox and Sinclair 1996: 103, 106). One also finds hegemony conflated with rule by persuasion instead of violence, performing an
organizing function which others accept because it is in their interests, rule by soft instead of hard power, and so on.

All of these definitions indicate aspects of global power, though they are some distance from Gramsci’s distinction between domination and hegemony read strictly (see Robinson 2005). What they share with Gramsci is the view that a hegemon needs to perform whatever role is needed to obtain support. The definition of what role is needed varies with assumptions about agency and social ontology. These differences over what constitutes hegemony may depend on different ideas of what is necessary to obtain fully committed, active support or legitimacy. For Gramsci, hegemony requires that a hegemon ‘leads’ by providing ideas which mobilize active energies, akin to desiring-production in Deleuze. The other approaches tend to assume that it only needs to meet ‘interests’ or fill a structural desire for order, which simplifies desire into alienated forms in the first case or reactive forms in the second. For instance, ‘interests’ do not directly determine social action; ‘interests’ are a special kind of socially-programmed desire arising from alienation (see above). Nevertheless, these approaches capture what is necessary for hegemony among alienated or reactive groups. We would claim that in relation to all the three main kinds of groups – active affinity-networks which would require an active hegemon in Gramsci’s sense to be hegemonised, reactive networks which would require an ordering force to be hegemonised, and alienated social groups which would require a plausible appeal to their interests to be hegemonised – America is currently falling short of the capacity for hegemony. This is in contrast to the post-war period, when America was able to achieve partial hegemony through for example developmentalism and proxy patronage systems.

Admittedly, America’s hegemony has always been problematic and fragmentary, with local appropriations of American symbolism creating hybrid forms which undermine official US goals See for instance (Hecht and Simone, 1994; Chatterjee 1993). As Robert Tucker comments, the greatest difficulty of contemporary US foreign policy is the ‘contradiction between the persisting desire to remain the premier global power and an ever deepening aversion to bear[ing] the costs of this position’ (Tucker, 1996: 20, as cited in Mastanduno, 1999: 169) As a result of this desire, the American state has attempted repeatedly to assert its control by means of direct domination. Paradoxically, such methods have been effective only in further undermining attempts to build hegemony.

There is a tendency in some strands of international relations scholarship to identify global influence strongly with military power. In fact this has been a constant complaint from various schools of International Relations and, as Ruggie puts it, ‘[t]he long and short of it is, then, that we are not very good as a discipline at studying the possibility of fundamental discontinuity in the international system; that is, at addressing the question of whether the modern system of states may be yielding in some instances to postmodern forms of configuring political space’ (1993).

To conceive a relation of suppression through brute force as if it were a form of substantial influence is mistaken. The resort to brute force signifies the breakdown of communicative power and the replacement of effective subsumption with violent
subordination. As Zizek puts it in a similar context, ‘recall the logic of paternal authority: the moment a father takes control and displays his full power….we necessarily perceive this display of impotent rage - an index of its very opposite’ Slavoj Žižek, ‘Identity and its Vicissitudes’, The Making of Political Identities, ed. Ernesto Laclau (London: Verso 1994), **** p. 69. Foucault similarly argues that the moment when a regime becomes merely destructive, when it loses its ability to circulate power as a productive force, is the moment when it ceases to govern, and in a sense, ceases to hold power (Foucault, 1982: 208-16). Wallerstein says it more bluntly. ‘Dictatorial behaviour by state authorities is more often a sign of weakness than of strength’ (Wallerstein 2004: 52).

Likewise, America displays its “total” power only as an index of its underlying weakness, its inability to control the suppressed groups held down within the system it controls. This makes sense if the state is conceived partly in psychoanalytic terms, as a type of libidinal attachment (an emotional or passionate commitment) which constructs identities in a particular way. Friedrich Nietzsche suggests that one perform a thought-experiment: imagine a state which is so powerful that it does not feel the need to punish – not because it has stamped out all deviance, but because it feels so secure that it can afford to be magnanimous towards those who defy it (Nietzsche 1887). If such a state is impossible to imagine, this is because the strength of states as agents of domination is precisely founded on their libidinal/identitarian weakness. States are in a certain sense dependent on their own weakness for their very existence. They conceal their own inability to express the universality they claim by excluding others and performing a ritualistic violence of acting-out.

In fact, hegemony of the world-system at a popular level has always been rather problematic. Polanyi puts forward a theory of class leadership with some analogies with Gramsci’s conceptualization of hegemony, but questioning the view that capitalism relied on hegemony rather than domination. (Polanyi 1944). In Polanyi’s formulation, the “challenge” represented by the extension of the market economy is to “society as a whole”. And because “different cross sections of the population [are] threatened by the market, persons belonging to various economic strata unconsciously [join] forces to meet the danger” (Polanyi 1944, Arrighi and Silver 2005:155). For Polanyi, while the agents of the movement toward the market economy ranged from the local and national to the global (haute finance), the agents of the counter-movement (“groups, sections, classes”) were largely local and national (although their actions—e.g., protectionism, colonial conquest, anti-imperialist revolt—often had transnational implications). Moreover, these agents of the countermovement aimed at protecting local or national interests (interests, broadly defined). For Polanyi, the “society” that is protecting itself in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries is largely a national society (Arrighi and Silver 2005: 156).

For Gramsci, hegemony or “intellectual and moral leadership” is one side of the process through which a particular group rules; the other side of the process is the “domination” of “antagonistic groups, which tend to ‘liquidate’ or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force” (Gramsci 1971). In periods of crisis and in areas not fully subsumed into the system (as well as in contexts where elites are unable to secure hegemony and resort to
passive revolution), domination tends to move from a supplementary to a central role. The nature of the old order of American hegemony and the capitalist world-system is obvious, but there is some debate over the question of ‘what next’, of what new world is coming into being. As to the decline of the former, it is not only an economic crisis but also a ‘crisis of hegemony’ precipitated by the outcome of the war in Vietnam and the subsequent unravelling of the post 1945 international order (Arrighi 1982). Insofar as the crisis is a continuing one, it is also a ‘crisis of transition’ (Wallerstein 1982).

The world-systems model of hegemony is built partly on an understanding of the role of previous powers such as Britain, Holland and the Italian cities. According to Arrighi and Silver, a power such as Britain adopted a hegemonic role by setting rules for the entire world, such as free trade. Underneath this rhetoric, however, ‘lay the understanding that Britain would greatly benefit from practicing unilateral free trade, because this practice was essential to strengthening Britain’s role as the central entrepot of world commerce and finance, and because its world-encompassing overseas empire, especially its empire in India provided Britain with the resources needed to minimize the domestic costs and dislocations of free trade’ (Arrighi and Silver 1999: 163). One can refer to a partial hegemony of American-style capitalism until relatively recently. It was only the force of anti-imperialist revolts—interacting with the escalating inter-imperialist rivalries and warfare among the major powers themselves—that eventually awakened the leading “groups, sectors, classes” of world society to the dangers implied by the extension of market economy to the Third World. This “sense” of danger was kept alive in the 1950s and 1960s by both continued anti-imperialist struggles in the South and the active Cold War between East and West. It is in this context that in the U.S. used its global power to promote some form of developmentalist and labor-capital social contracts in its sphere of the world in the 1950s and 1960s, and thus qualified, not just as a dominant world power, but also, as a hegemonic world power (Arrighi and Silver: 157, Silver 2003  **** Forces of Labor: Worker’s Movements and Globalization Since 1870, Cambridge/1 Cambridge University Press 2003)

Arrighi has an unusual theory of hegemony, which fuses geopolitical and economic elements. The leading state is hegemonic in the sense of obtaining consent based on interests, primarily over other dominant groups and states, and mainly in terms of offering military protection, which is viewed as real defence rather than extortion (2007: 150); it is hence distinct from the Gramscian conception. However, a hegemon is also supposed to be an economic leading force, providing new combinations which dynamise the world economy, preventing equilibrium and stagnation (ibid. 89-91), providing a development path for the world, and pioneering a leading model of economic organisation (in America’s case, the multinational corporation) which gives it a distinct market advantage. America has been hegemon since about the 1930s (ibid. 118).

The crisis in the periphery

The position of the periphery is debated in world-systems analysis. In macro-historical terms, According to Gills and Frank, a theory of peripheries must largely account for their decline over time. They argue that each ‘civilisation’ has expanded continually
since its origins, except in cases of regional setbacks or civilisational collapse. It expands by conquering, colonising and assimilating peripheral peoples and territories. Hence, they argue that civilisations do not rise and fall (they rarely fall), nor are they menaced by barbarians. Rather, they tend to menace and ‘overwhelm’ neighbouring societies (Gills and Frank 1996: 232). This leads to questions such as whether an ‘all-core global society’ (similar to Hardt and Negri’s Empire) can exist, whether it would require a system of states and whether it is coming into being (233). In Hardt and Negri’s view, such a global power has already tendentially come into being, in which the main role of military force is guaranteeing global division of labour and power (2004: 177) and geopolitics, the politics of borders, is no longer relevant to what have become questions of internal systemic regulation (ibid. 323). In this model, war turns into an extension of the state logic, and ‘the existence of new pressures and possibilities… are answered by the sovereign power with war. War acts as a mechanism of containment’ (ibid. 341). Nations are ‘accidental’ in their specifics, but ‘absolutely necessary as elements of global order and security’ (ibid. 23).

Despite this long-term view, it is more widely argued that the world-system requires the retention of both cores and peripheries, as in the classic arguments by Frank and Cardoso. (It may well be that ‘civilisations’ tend to incorporate marginal or refuge areas as peripheries, at least in periods of growth, though today, large areas of the world seem to be re-peripheralising or even slipping outside the world-system – the disappearance of large swathes of Africa from the formal economy for example. In a more recent restatement of this position, Trichur has argued that the Southern nation-state has less room for manoeuvre than its Northern equivalent, dealing with a smaller number of multinational corporations and being pressured to make more concessions to attract their investments. This process is asserted by the core to be irreversible and uncontrollable, but such claims need to be challenged in the name of democracy in the periphery (Trichur 2003: 53). Core claims about the irreversibility and uncontrollability of such changes need to be questioned and examined critically, especially since a defense of democracy and democratic institutions is at stake in the periphery (Trichur, 2003: 53). In addition to increasingly harsh terms for inclusion, the core is harming large areas of the globe through forced exclusion. Thus, Trichur argues that Africa ‘is being ravaged by the geopolitics of neglect and delinking from the world supply networks… [and] displacement and marginalization from the networks of global accumulation (Trichur, 2003: 56).

Seeking to address non-integration of certain countries into capitalism is the goal of MLA development strategy (Soederberg 2006: 156). This involves ‘pre-emptive development’, the coercive seizure or accumulation-by-dispossession of resources (ibid. 156–7). Although marketed as a post-911 policy, it seems 911 has not changed the underlying policy goals at all; it is simply used to obfuscate and legitimise means to pursue existing goals (ibid. 156), such as embedding neoliberalism in everyday life (ibid. 162). The idea of state failure is mobilised to attack states with limited territorial control or which fail to impose neoliberal measures. Such states are viewed as convenient for terrorists, impediments to development, and opponents of the rule of law and capitalist economic control (ibid. 168). This discursive construction renders the other as powerless and
invalidates any discourse coming from ‘excluded’ states (ibid. 173-4) thus reinforcing ‘the construction of a favourite American myth: the equation that the universal good coincided with American values’ (ibid. 165). America has used these values to support war, and to attempt to ensure domination through globalization and monitored, staged conditional grants which increase surveillance and control over recipient states (ibid.169). In an earlier paper, Soederberg portrayed structural adjustment as reperipheralisation (Soederberg 2001).

Similarly, Saskia Sassen points to attacks on basic needs spending and development in the Global South as showing an increasingly harsh regime of insertion (2006: 200). Rather than poverty alleviation and growth, the goals of development policy in the neoliberal era become things like contract guarantees, intellectual property, rights of firms and ‘neutral’ legal criteria (ibid. 201). Worse, many southern countries can’t implement IMF programmes due to a lack of legal, accounting and technical financial capabilities and resources. A lack of legal specialists leads to being shafted over global rules (quotes Eichengreen, ibid. 200). This means that, as in earlier periods, the global ‘game’ is rigged heavily against the South.

Robert Biel argues that neoliberalism is a system in which policy has been down graded merely to a ‘question of “adapting” a country in the South to fit into the system by creating local conditions (for example, reducing interference from local bureaucrats) so that capital could find its way without hindrance to the most promising sectors’ (Saul 2004: 235). Even in the semi-periphery and core, pressure is used to ensure conformity to neoliberalism; for instance, Sassen interprets the Asian and Japanese crises of the 1990s as disciplining and punishment for resisting systemic trends, and describes the subsequent process of economic change as ‘forced systemic adjustment’ (2006: 227). However, neoliberalism is not a hegemonic system. In the South especially, neoliberal restructuring has supported global accumulation but has not led to coherent patterns of internal development (Panitch and Gindin 2005: 74).

The decline of resources available to Southern states due to structural adjustment and neoliberalism has undermined the dominant system of social control and hegemony through patronage politics. Panitch and Gindin argue that the crisis of American imperialism occurs mainly outside the core, due to the incomplete extension of American power, economic crises and the failure of structural adjustment (Panitch and Gindin 2006: 37). This can be thought of as a crisis of patronage systems through which localities are articulated into the world-system. For instance, Chatterjee documents how the Indian party system relies on ‘patron-client relationships that were… mediated by charitable organisations and even proto-unions’ (2008: 132). These were classic reactive networks, primarily integrated around ethnicity, through dense networks of neighbourhood associations (ibid. 133). These connections were later challenged by what Chatterjee terms ‘political society’, in which such insertions are used to demand rights rather than to secure deference. Today, however, it is more noticeable that political society is under attack from neoliberalism. Since the 1990s, a wave of demands from the ‘proper citizens’ of ‘civil society’ (the included, composed around neoliberal demands) have corroded the gains made by ‘political society’, movements of the poor focused on
welfare – through a campaign to “take back” the city from “encroachers” such as squatters and market traders (ibid. 140). The project involves clearing squats, slums and pavement stalls to make way for the building of segregated, rigorously policed residential and office areas (ibid. 146). This is due to a new global imaginary of the information-age city (ibid. 142-3). In this context, the business elite tends to become a separate community, ‘a spatially bound, interpersonally networked subculture’ (ibid. 144), cut off from the wider city. This renders the poor surplus to the city, leading to either a new negotiation of disparities or new resistance (ibid. 145). This poses ‘formidable challenges’ for movements of local resistance (ibid. 146).

In India, internal attachments to the global system have partly stabilised such transitions. Harrison argues that structural adjustment consolidated the power of the state class in Africa by promoting authoritarianism, depoliticising state decisions and allowing accumulation by speculation (2002: 72-3). However, it has strengthened dominance at the expense of hegemony. In countries such as Mozambique, it creates a situation where social movements are pitted against the state (Pitcher 2002). In the most peripheral countries, it has destabilised the dominant forms of state power, putting at risk the state itself. In Zambia, Rakner has observed that, paradoxically, interest-groups have lost influence in the transition from a patronage dictatorship to a neoliberal democracy (2003: 178). In Cameroon, the longstanding patronage-based Biya dictatorship faced its biggest revolt since the early 1990s, following inflation in food and fuel prices in early 2008. Led by informal sector taxi-motorbike drivers, the protests showed how ‘soaring oil and food prices on global markets are threatening the patronage systems propping up some of Africa’s longest-serving leaders’ (Green 2008). Biya survived, but some of his neighbours have not. In countries such as Somalia, Sierra Leone and DR Congo, the decline of patronage power has led to the replacement of patronage states with the concentrated informal power of ‘warlords’ and resource extractors and/or with localised diffuse power.

The result, in turn, is destabilisation of American power. Stiglitz has argued that structural adjustment is thus counterproductive: adjustment programs lead to disturbances which in turn undermine the investment which the adjustment was meant to attract (cited Mann 2005:68). Similarly, George and Sabelli (1994) show that states which invest in large-scale development tend to become indebted and to be forced into further restructuring. This seems to be a vicious circle undermining hegemony at the same time it intensifies domination. Saull claims that during the Cold War, American empire was ‘mediated’ by local actors on whom it was dependent and who subverted outcomes sought by America (Saull 2006: 84). Today, as increasingly unmediated imperialism is attempted, local insertions are endangered.

**Transformation of the State**

Neoliberalism has involved a reformulation of the world-system in terms of a reconstruction of the roles of capital and the state. It has often been seen as a loss of power by capital to the state, and there is a certain truth to this with regard to the growth of deregulated financial agencies. The globalisation debate of the 1980s-90s focused not
on whether capitalism had become free-flowing but on how free-flowing it had become, whether it was still dependent on the state and whether its global scope was a new phenomenon (relative for instance to the late nineteenth century). Globalisation theorists such as Susan Strange and Kenichi Ohmae presented a picture of a borderless world with a vastly reduced role for the state and a new prevalence of capital flows, while authors such as Panitch, Hirsch and Thompson argued that globalisation was relative, not a new phenomenon, and that the state retained a substantial role. A further group of authors such as Giddens and Held sought to use the state to humanise capitalism.

Overall, the debate concluded with most authors accepting an intermediate position. There have been fundamental changes from the immediately post-war period, with the state taking on a changed role. However, it is wrong to conclude that the state has overall been weakened, as it has also been assigned new regulatory and ‘command’ roles. Leo Panitch has emphasized the role of the state, criticizing much globalization literature for its ‘tendency to ignore the extent to which today’s globalization both is authored by states and is primarily about reorganizing, rather than by-passing states’ (cited Saul, 2004: 224). He analyses the relationship between states and capital in relation to Poulantzas’ theory of the state. On this model, when multinational capital penetrates a host social formation, it acts as a ‘transformative force’ which decomposes the national bourgeoisie. In contrast, the host state is given responsibility for taking charge of relations between global capital and the local bourgeoisie (Panitch 2000: 8, quoting Poulantzas 1975). On this model, American imperialism is non-territorial, not even neo-colonial, but rather, involves the ‘induced reproduction of the form of the dominant imperialist power within each national formation and its state’ (Panitch 2000: 9).

According to Leo Panitch, Poulantzas was above all concerned to trace the contours of a new epoch of American global dominance, entailing a new type of non-territorial imperialism, implanted and maintained not through direct rule by the metropolis, nor even through political subordination of a neo-colonial type, but rather through the ‘induced reproduction of the form of the dominant imperialist power within each national formation and its state’ (Panitch 2000: 9). The process of globalization, far from dwarfing states, has been constituted through and even by them (ibid. 2000: 14). States look to each other, rather than any supranational or multinational entity, to legislate and enforce any agreements that have been collectively reached. The central concern of the US state has increasingly been to secure what Saskia Sassen appropriately calls the Americanization not only of international but also domestic legal standards for regulating financial systems and reporting information (Panitch, 2000: 15, quotes Sassen 1996: 18). The state has also taken charge of rendering social spaces ‘spiky’ or otherwise unfriendly to antisystemic forces and excluded groups (Flusty 2004). Hence, now more than ever, the Marxist view of the nation-state as a capitalist territorialisation of space sustained by an international division of labour is accurate (Burnham 2000: 37).

Burnham argues that the current phase is a response to earlier stages of labour-capital antagonisms relating to the dysfunctionality of full employment to capitalism (2000: 10, 19-20). This echoes Offe’s (1985) thesis that the welfare state leads to partial decommodification, and the activist idea of ‘dole autonomy’ (Aufheben 1999), and
echoes the idea that the system needs scarcity as a means to coerce labour (see above). For Burnham, the main recent change has been the switch from ‘discretion’ to ‘rules’ in state economic management, and the use of a reified language of ‘external commitments’ and ‘globalization’ to legitimate the recomposition of capital-labour relations under the guise of global competitiveness (2000: 19). The rules-based model delegates economic responsibility to non-governmental bodies (either autonomous central banks or international agencies) so as to institutionalise counter-inflationary pressures and, implicitly, to limit the state’s ability to decommodify (ibid. 22). By placing economic decisions ‘at one remove [from] the political character of decision making’, this means that states can depoliticise social issues, often retaining control while benefiting from the appearance of neutrality of external institutions and the ability to distance the state from unpopular decisions by blaming outside agencies (ibid. 20-22). Far from weakening the state, this has strengthened its power, particularly against the working-class – as for instance in the wave of anti-union laws in Britain and the recomposition of public services (ibid. 21, 23). Robert Cox (2002) has argued even more forcefully that the state has become a ‘transmission belt’ for ‘perceived exigencies’ of capitalism, while Lacher argues that globalisation involves a hollowing-out of state sovereignty (2006: 109).

Hence, in the era of ‘globalisation’, the state has grown rather than shrunk. There is an anomaly, however, as it has also been outstripped by networks of various kinds – capitalist networks, affinity-networks, reactive networks. With networks reclaiming functions previously arrogated by the state from local societies, the state finds itself at risk of decomposition and marginalisation, as has already happened to some of its peripheral manifestations. Its response, like the Catholic Church faced by a similar marginalisation at the end of the Middle Ages (Gramsci 1971), has resorted to ‘integralism’, the aggressive assertion of its own exclusive, self-established social primacy.

**The Transnational Capitalist State**

Everything from commodity markets to movements of finance has been so thoroughly globalized that the rise of a global state, with demonstrably globalized military capability, is considered by some authors to be an objective requirement of the system itself, quite aside from the national ambitions of the US rules, so as to impose structures and disciplines over this whole complex with its tremendous potential for fissures and breakdowns (Ahmad, 2004: 44). What we are witnessing today, according to Aijaz Ahmad, is the making of an imperial sovereignty claimed for itself by a state which is at once a state of a nation as well as a globalized state of contemporary capitalism. The US arrogates to itself limitless sovereignty which is arbitrary in nature, and can only exist in so far as its might is so superior to that of all others that its action would necessarily go unchallenged by other components of the global system however resentful they might be otherwise (ibid.51). The American state depends on other states to develop popular backing for its imperial role, and this is becoming increasingly difficult for those states to secure. The economic costs of empire at home are correspondingly higher as popular forces abroad limit the ability of other states to share the military, economic and rhetorical burdens of empire (Panitch and Gindin 2005: 74).
The state’s role has changed drastically in neoliberalism, from expansion and protection of the national economy but establishing “competitiveness” (Arrighi et al 1989: 26-7). Both the “stateness” of states and the “capitalist” nature of capitalism are rapidly growing at present (1989: 51). In the South, the two are intertwined as debt makes a state’s “stateness” dependent on conformity to austerity (1989: 73). Indeed, this subordinate status of Southern states is a persistent long-term phenomenon. Political systems in the periphery ‘have… been penetrated and influenced, if not entirely controlled, by the core… modern colonialism created political systems outright or transformed existing ones, which then gained newfound autonomy following decolonisation’ (Robinson 1996: 19). The change in neoliberalism is an expansion of real as opposed to formal subsumption. ‘Under globalisation, capitalist production relations are displacing, rather than merely becoming articulated with, all residual pre-capitalist relations’ (ibid. 20) as ‘transnational capital comes to penetrate, disrupt and incorporate into its structures sectors previously outside of (or enjoying a certain autonomy vis-à-vis) the global economy’ (ibid. 247). This reflects a shift in the world economy from the use of semi- or pre-capitalist relations to more intensive production in the periphery (ibid. 31-2). This brings about a renewed ‘tendency towards uniformity’ in civil and political society (ibid.32). Formerly, transnational relations allowed autonomy conditional on inclusion in the world system (ibid. 40). We would add that the insistence on full subsumption of incorporated parts leads paradoxically to large swathes of the periphery slipping into marginal or excluded positions, even while others become inserted more deeply.

One central role of neoliberal states is marketing populations to make them seem attractive to capitalists. This leads, of course, to authoritarian social relations (374). This leads to disastrous effects, for instance the mass murder or ‘social cleansing’ of homeless people, mainly children, in Brazil, Haiti and Colombia (ibid. 426), and a broader pattern of ‘social apartheid’ such as gated communities (ibid. 377). Neoliberalism creates a hierarchical authoritarian relation ‘permeating every aspect of life’ (ibid. 376). Hence, William Robinson writes of an ‘ever-widening gap’ between formal polyarchy and ‘authoritarianism in everyday life deriving from the increasing powerlessness of people to control… the conditions of social life’ (ibid. 376). He also refers to a new stratum of ‘supernumeraries’ in countries like Haiti, who are completely marginalised from production (ibid. 342). The ‘supernumeraries’ have no direct use to capitalism and pose a constant threat of revolt (ibid. 378).

Saskia Sassen provides an astute analysis of the relationship between market and state forces. For Sassen, ‘the rise of private authority is not simply an external force that constrains the state. It is partly endogenous to the state’ (223). For instance, privatisation is usually a national policy, even though it changes the meaning of the national and expresses insertions of global forces in the state (228), and privatised, denationalised power-centres are often intergovernmental (270). There is not a weakening of the state, but rather, a change in the role of state capabilities and its insertion into the system of global elements (227). Hence, the organising logic of the global system (the relative strengths of different social forces) changes with globalisation, but capabilities of states remain largely the same (228). Old capabilities are transferred into new organising logics.
Historical changes such as globalisation occur when capabilities ‘jump tracks’ between overall assemblages or ‘organising logics’, a process Sassen puts down to the ‘multivalence’ of capabilities, their ability to operate in several different assemblages (8-9). What starts out as an element of decomposition can become a capability once embedded in a new logic (28). Structural discontinuities underlie surface continuities and vice-versa (12). This is similar to Cox’s argument that strong states act as midwives, not victims of internationalisation (Cox 1987:204).

The transformation of the state is constitutive of the new organising logic and is a strategic site for its organisation (229). In an earlier work (Sassen 1992), she argued that state participation in implementing global economy redistributes power inside state, strengthening certain financial agencies (cf 2006: 171). ‘One aspect neglected… has to do with the type of administrative capability represented by the state and the differential weight of particular state components in the process of globalization’ (2006: 169).

Global markets and firms institute their needs inside particular state components such as central banks and ministries of finance, causing shifts in power and structures inside the state (ibid. 170). Global capital markets, which not only have raw power but also a conception of criteria for “proper” economic policy widely accepted by elites, and certain policy objectives, have the power to ‘elect’ certain government economic policies, a power they have arrogated from populations through means such as structural adjustment policies (ibid. 248). This does not come from the mere existence of global markets, but from their separate accumulation of disciplinary power over economic policies, such as the deregulation of monetary controls and the negative impact of derivatives on state control of interest rates (ibid. 259-60).

Sassen argues that the changes linked to globalisation have led to the strengthening of state executives in America and globally, at the expense of societies and of other parts of the state (2006: 163). Varied legal scholars such as Aman, Ackerman and Kagan all document a growing power of the executive (2006: 170). Power might also have passed to the judiciary as Rittich and Rajagopal argue (ibid. 170). Sassen traces the growth of executive power in America from Reagan’s deregulation and quangoisation (171-2) to Bush’s reliance on data mining, secrecy, prolonged extrajudicial detention and executive orders (ibid. 176-83). An especially extreme case, the Patriot Act ‘inverts a foundational aspect of liberal democracy’, personal rather than govt privacy (ibid. 181), involving ‘expanded authority of the executive over citizens’ (ibid. 185). ‘Ample literature exists to make clear the serious t[h]reat an unchecked executive – and hence the serious damage of balance of power – is to a free society’ (ibid. 210). Another change has been the strengthening of economists within the state. For instance, Dezalay and Garth (2002a, cited Sassen 2006: 170) document a shift in power in Latin American states from lawyers to economists.

Sassen links the imperial executive to the declining reliance of states on the included. The state may no longer need loyal citizens very much, due to the decline and the simultaneous technologisation and professionalisation of warfare (ibid. 283). She argues that the current age cannot incorporate the liberal state, because the liberal state cannot accommodate key features of the current global age, namely economic globalisation and
global war (ibid. 410), and possibly also a global speed-up (ibid. 384). The ‘renationalizing of membership politics’ is hence a kind of purified, extreme, last-gasp reassertion of dying dynamics (ibid. 414).

Similarly, Harvey argues that the neo-liberal state is ‘profundely anti-democratic’, based on quangos and unelected institutions, elite rule, executive orders and judicial decisions (2006: 27). Agnoli also questions whether liberal-democracy can persist in neoliberalism (202). Panitch and Gindin argue that neoliberalism has led to a state in which ‘coercive apparatuses flourished’ both at home – ‘as welfare offices emptied out, prisons filled up’ – and globally, in ‘the enhancement of the coercive apparatus the imperial state needs to police… the world’ (2006: 38). Pieterse similarly refers to a ‘shift from social and entrepreneurial government to law and order government’ in America (2004: 150).

The early Negri argues that capitalist command and state terror were growing aspects of social life as neoliberalism rendered democracy obsolete. The state and capitalism have become an increasingly irrational and despotic violence of command (2005: 5, 32-3, 87, 266). ‘State restructuring increasingly becomes an indiscriminate succession of acts of control, a precise technical apparatus which has lost all measure, all internal reference points, all coherent internal logic’ (ibid. 245). Opposition forces are allowed onto the bargaining table only if they are conformist (1988: 182). ‘Command becomes ever more fascistic in form, ever more anchored in the simple reproduction of itself, ever more emptied of any rationale other than the reproduction of its own effectiveness’ (1988: 190). Day similarly argues that neoliberalism promises security through global gleichschaltung (2005: 67-8), while Henry Giroux (2004) outlines a pattern of authoritarianism in America which preceded 911 and can be traced back to the drug war. Harvey has similarly noted that ‘[t]he democratic deficit in nominally “democratic” countries such as the US is now enormous’ (2006: 68).

The core has of course become more fascistic in the last few decades, particularly America, Britain, the other Anglophone countries (Robinson 2007). This could be several things. Harvey suggests that it involves imitation of the Chinese and East Asian models of capitalism, which do not seem to require democracy or civil liberties. Arrighi suggests it is a terminal reaction of the declining core, an attempt by countries which have lost their hegemony to retain power through dominance based on militarisation. The early Negri saw it as a symptom of a new neoliberal kind of economic governance, an attempt to control the labour of the entire society as a way of reconstructing the economy. Sassen similarly links it to the new mode of exploitation based on global cities. William Robinson argues that it goes hand in hand with what is taken as democratisation - the idea of a limited role of the state, linked to defending capital - hence to an increasingly uncompromising agenda of global rule. In any case, it seems to be closely linked to the systemic insertions of these countries, and not simply to domestic politics.

**Promoting polyarchy**
Our general view, therefore, is that the current phase leads to authoritarian state-formations linked to the power of global capital and to American global imperialism. How, then, do we account for the rise of ‘democracy promotion’ and ‘regime change’ in American foreign policy, in distinction from the earlier policy of supporting pro-American tyrants? Part of the argument is that America still supports overtly undemocratic regimes in many contexts, from the Karimov dictatorship in Uzbekistan to the military regime in Haiti. Another part is provided by William Robinson’s analysis of American global promotion of ‘polyarchy’, a particular type of elite-led, low-intensity quasi-democracy compatible with social authoritarianism, a low level of popular power and a lack of choices between the main parties.

Robinson argues that polyarchy is promoted on certain conditions: that the economic sphere be placed outside the democratic process, that anti-system dissent, mass action and protests are viciously suppressed, that NGO’s and social movements are subject to gleichschaltung, and that anti-system movements and parties are unable to take state power. In this context, multi-party polyarchy is in capitalism’s interests because it reduces the capacity of the political class for rent extraction (via ‘crony capitalism’ and related phenomena); in peripheral countries, it also allows indirect US leverage by means such as economic disruption and threat, funding and other support for one party over the others, manipulation of social movements and propaganda via the media (i.e. it can use concentrated informal sanctions in spheres where it possesses extensive informal, or at least non-state, resources). Outside this context, American support for democracy is problematic to say the least – America is prone to support the overthrow of democratically elected governments (Chile, Venezuela, Haiti, Grenada), destabilisation to ensure particular election outcomes (Nicaragua), pseudo-democracy (Egypt, Azerbaijan, Central America in the 1980s) and outright dictatorships (Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia).

Polyarchy is a core American goal in the periphery ‘so as to secure the underlying objective of maintaining essentially undemocratic societies inserted into an unjust international system’ (Robinson, 1996: 6). Promoting polyarchy is about preventing or limiting popular democratisation in contexts of pro-democracy revolt (ibid. 63). It usually means keeping intact the military and authoritarian structures left over from periods of dictatorship (ibid. 64). The aim is to produce ‘an exact replica of the structure of power in the United States’. The means by which this is achieved includes an attempt to penetrate civil society in peripheral countries so as to turn civil societal organisations into US allies or organic intellectuals of transnational power (ibid. 29), effectively subsuming (formal) society under the state. These organisations then head off or compete with autonomous social movements (ibid. 105). ‘US political operatives are able to foment and control a vertically organized nationwide structure for political intervention’, sometimes using ‘lines of patronage’ (ibid. 106). In Chile for instance, there was a big US effort to ‘educate’ shanty-town dwellers on ‘rights and responsibilities’ so as to encourage an individualist ‘self-help’ discourse and fragment existing community solidarity (ibid.188-9). Robinson argues that polyarchy is a distinct form of elite rule performing the function of legitimating existing inequalities, and does so more effectively than authoritarianism (ibid. 51). This involves a move from coercion to consent (ibid. 6-7). In effect, ‘When scholars speak of the “breakdown of democracy”
and a “redemocratization”… what they really mean are cycles in the breakdown and restoration of consensual mechanisms of domination’ (ibid. 147).

Robinson’s argument could be taken even further. American-style ‘democratisation’ is a move from formal to real subsumption, but still involves coercion as a primary element, as Robinson himself sometimes admits. For instance, America persists in using threats to keep radicals out of elections, blocking peace talks with guerrillas, maintaining the threat of coups and even forcing the transformation of police in more repressive directions (ibid. 142, 194-5, 250). Further, direct repression ‘remains a subterranean but permanent feature of “capitalist democracies” around the world’ (ibid. 354). It remains ‘in the background’ or ‘latent’, to be reactivated when ‘consent’ (or indirect social control) breaks down (ibid. 359). Hence, polyarchy remains very similar to authoritarianism, especially in terms of the state-society relation; it lacks the constraints on state power which create a space for ‘tolerated’ dissent. In other words, polyarchy constructs a police state in everyday life while maintaining competition at the elite level. When the contradiction between electoral stabilisation and neoliberal destabilisation reaches a crisis-point, there is a tendency to revert to full-scale authoritarianism and dictatorship (ibid. 344, 294).

Polyarchy can remove forms of incorporation via patronage which previously ensured greater popular insertion in the system. Hence, Robinson is wrong to view polyarchy as ‘hegemonic’; it would better be termed passive revolution or trasformismo, a type of domination based on the use of mechanisms of incorporation to render social movements passive. ‘Recuperation’ or ‘axiomatisation’ would here be a better term than ‘consent’ or ‘hegemony’. People are made to feel disempowered, unable to choose for or against the dominant system, as opposed to actively choosing it. In the African context, Mkandawire (1999) argues that states have become ‘choiceless democracies’ while Samir Amin terms polyarchic systems low-intensity democracy (2004: 68). Satoshi Ikeda similarly argues that the structurally adjusted state simply operates to sell its population as workers, police its borders against emigration and collect taxes to pay off the IMF (2003 169), while Stockton has referred to a ‘creeping coup’ model of development where the military arrogate the functions of intervention and management in place of development agencies (Stockton cited Pieterse 2004: 112). Dunaway, however, qualifies this view with the claim that the ‘very democratization that is ideologically favored by the core spawns social movements that seek to protect their societies against cultural genocide. Since the world system has reached a bifurcation point, that growing antisystemic resistance takes on new significance’ (Dunaway, 2003: 10).

According to Robinson, there are several reasons for the switch to polyarchy promotion. Firstly, dictatorship has become unsustainable due to the growth of international flows, such as the communications revolution (1996: 37-8). Secondly, dictatorships tend to pursue ‘corporate privileges’ and rent-extraction which is ‘an unproductive drain on resources’ for transnational capital (ibid. 66). In the Philippines, Haiti and Nicaragua, dictatorship led to ‘crony capitalism’ which was bad for neoliberalism (ibid. 122). Thirdly, dictatorship generates popular unrest, creating pressure on states which polyarchy helps to relieve (ibid. 66-7). Hence, the aims of American development policy
have not changed much from the days modernisation theory to today; the end (stability for capital) has stayed the same, but the means have changed. Polyarchy is now viewed as a safer bet for stability than dictatorship. Form instance, William P Douglas argues for polyarchies which do ‘the same things as dictatorships to overcome centrifugal social forces’, including the suppression of revolt by riot police or soldiers (ibid. 84). In the case of Chile, America deliberately destabilised an elected regime which posed no threat except to international asymmetries, and backed democratisation only after the Pinochet dictatorship’s decimation of social movements was accomplished (ibid. 160-2).

Like many others, William Robinson’s work is limited from our perspective. He uses an elite/popular and polyarchy/popular-democracy binary which elides differences within both of his categories, in particular eliding the question of reactive networks and the resultant possibility of anti-democratic popular movements. He assumes that constituted power is real power, and as a result, adopts an economistic position - ‘alas, we cannot simply demand that historical processes be halted to conform to our wishes’ (ibid. 383) – which he applies to excuse neoliberal measures by left-leaning regimes (ibid. 218, 301-2). He also insists that oppositional projects take a statist form with a single, implicitly arborescent, counterhegemonic project (ibid. 257, 312, 314-15). This is strange given that his case-study of Haiti seems to show that popular control of the state is impossible and to support a ‘state versus society’ model. In our view, this grouping of positions reproduces the alienated basis of the contemporary world even while partially challenging it.

Robinson makes an important point, however, about the discontinuity between capitalism and democracy in the periphery. For Robinson, there is a contradiction between capitalism and democracy, which polyarchy handles by rejecting the democratic ideal, reducing democracy to an operational system and replacing democratic legitimation with authoritarian/populist legitimation (ibid. 348-9). Other authors working on Africa and India argue that the establishment of democratic institutions preceded or went along with the rise of the nation-state and the bourgeoisie (Davidson 1992, Chatterjee 1993, Patnaik 2000). Citing these authors, Trichur argues that this has led to the contemporary crisis of the ruling class in much of the periphery

It is this contradictions that largely explains the contemporary crisis of the ruling class. On the one hand, it has been unable to consolidate its power in the wake of powerful social forces…On the other hand, its has almost completely capitulated to the dictates of multinational capital and private international finance…In short, the globalization project targets the “rolling back” of democracy as a task of great urgency in peripheral social formations (Trichur, 2003: 57).

**The ambiguities of cultural hegemony**

American hegemony at its peak relied on the appeal of a fantasy of consumer participation which was promoted through iconography such as ‘Marlboro Man’ and
Coca-Cola as the ‘taste of freedom’ (Kroes 1999, Wagnleitner 2002). This has led to critiques accusing America of cultural imperialism (Dorffmann et al 1975), though today it is more common to emphasise the hybridity, transversality and irony of media flows and readings.

American cultural hegemony has declined in part through its success. Part of the appeal of American popular culture arose from its having channelled rebellious and minority dissent; paradoxically, what was promoted abroad as the culture of freedom had often survived repression at home (Wagnleitner 2002: 517, 520). Furthermore, American products have been absorbed into an increasingly worldwide, nationally undifferentiated symbolic and advertising culture which has few specifically American hallmarks, or in which American tropes are taken on by non-American companies (Kroes, 1999: 467-70). Kroes argues that such tropes may have an American cultural ‘deep structure’ but also have a global appeal which relies on ‘cultural bricolage’ (ibid. 471). As people surrounded by images reproduce them in conversation, mimicry, language and humour, international repertoires are de-nationalised and commercial messages are decommodified (ibid. 474).

Kroes argues that such tropes may have an American cultural ‘deep structure’ but also have a global appeal which relies on ‘cultural bricolage’ (ibid. 471). As people surrounded by images reproduce them in conversation, mimicry, language and humour, international repertoires are de-nationalised and commercial messages are decommodified (ibid. 474). It is, perhaps, a cultural example of ‘affirmative entropy’ (see below). The cost of hegemony, of representing the totality, is that particularity is lost – the symbols of the hegemon are reclaimed and rearticulated by others, and emptied of their particular content. America’s national symbols and myths have been translated into an international iconographic language, a visual lingua franca. They have been turned into free-floating signifiers, internationally understood, free for everyone to use (Kroes 1999: 470). Hence, American commercial imagery has become a lingua franca, and as is a lingua franca’s tendency, ‘it moves in a realm of free creolization, where the controlling authority of a mother culture no longer holds’. The language may be American, but what is said with it is not (1999: 477).

One can thus refer, in honour of Ien Ang’s classic study of reader responses to Dallas (1995), that there is a kind of ‘Ang effect’ in cultural hegemony, where hybridisation in reception corrodes the power of hegemony, creating transversal connections. One can even refer to an “Ang effect” within the state, according to authors such as Scott and Migdal, where processes may be redefined or altered at lower levels, and ultimately, as in the Zapatista story, the hybridising power of the everyday corroding or rotting power into non-existence (Marcos et al 2001). Hence, the global power of a hegemon tends over time to drift from the ‘progressive’ hegemonic appeal of its free-flowing images to a ‘reactionary’ role of trying to pin down the images it has unleashed, seeking to keep its rent-extraction on these images intact by preventing their free-flowing duplication and diffusion.

It is important not to exaggerate the ‘Ang effect’, however. In the state sphere especially, states try to do with violence what they cannot achieve with simple insertion; Migdal’s model of the ambiguous state would apply even to classical totalitarianism, but does not negate its horrors. Similarly with culture, hegemony can persist in a ‘fetishistic’ way, where it retains its pull in spite of the readers’ ironic relation. Kroes may be right that youths who buy T-shirts of baseball caps with Nike or Coke logos are not ‘unpaid peddlers of American merchandise’ but rather, reassigning such symbols catachrestically
to a global youth culture of ‘pleasure and freedom’ (1999: 475). Yet still, the rent-extraction on the sign-value continues, and with it, so does accumulation by the companies concerned. Also continuing are the oppressive logics of the corporations in question (Coca-Cola’s practices in Colombia and Plachimada for example), the ecological effects, the division between those who can afford to buy and those who can’t, and beneath it all, the structure of alienation by sign-value, in which it is wrongly assumed that freedom or identity can be bought with a commodity. A step further – removing the dependence on buying commodities, like the cottage industry of counterfeit designer clothes which ensures that even homeless people in DR Congo are likely to have a designer suit (Hecht and Simone, 1994), or consciously subverting capitalist meanings as in Situationism, CrimethInc, auto-redaction and sub-verse, and then one enters a sphere of self-created meanings and self-activity in which capitalist power is negated. It is very much contingent whether resistenz and reader-response culminates in the rusting-away of the state and of cultural imperialism, or simply generates “noise” it can ignore; as necessary as the ingenuity of everyday resistance is for anti-state and anti-capitalist projects, it should not at all be assumed that its mere existence makes either more safe.

In any case, America’s once overwhelming cultural dominance is being corroded, as American cultural exports become both less popular and increasingly ideologically empty. Mann describes Hollywood and exported American TV as ‘getting ideologically thinner’, mainly apolitical or consumerist, and becoming less popular around the world (Incoherent Empire 104-5). More broadly, difficulties in getting visas have led to the redirection of East Asian flows of migration, student exchange and tourism towards China (2005: 77), while the power of American media has been undermined by a wave of rival news channels such as al-Jazeera, France 24 and Telesur. Walden Bello has also argued that capitalism’s loss of its leading ideologues to the opposition – people like Soros, Sachs, Stiglitz and Bhagwati – shows that it is in a crisis of legitimacy (2004: 12-13).

Asymmetrical war as systemic crisis

The situation of global ‘war’, or perhaps Baudrillarian non-war, expresses another aspect of the crisis: the incapacity of the state to dominate in terms of military power. In an age of media and information flows, wars are as much about the production of images as the direct confrontation of adversaries. While the goals of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the ‘war on terror’ are in continuity with the older aims of wars such as Vietnam, the approach taken is of more recent vintage. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan largely follow the model of non-war outlined in Baudrillard’s analysis of the first Gulf War and further extended by Ignatieff (2000). Non-wars differ from wars in various ways. Rather than being collisions of two powers located symmetrically within a single discourse, they involve the feints and counterfeints of two sides separated by radical discursive difference. America and its allies were in both cases attempting to impose a discourse of control embodying a logic of deterrence. As General Wesley Clark said of the bombing of Yugoslavia, ‘this was not, strictly speaking, a war’ (cited Ignatieff 2000: 3). America and its allies were in Iraq and Afghanistan attempting to impose a discourse
of control embodying a logic of deterrence. This is a logic where everything is already decided and where overwhelming force is the guarantor of ultimate meaning. Their opponents, however, adopted tactics which involved anything but direct confrontation; in this way, they slipped away from the logic of deterrence; the war is over, yet still American troops were being killed. Baudrillard argues that, because media images are now the continuation of war by other means, war, the most concentrated form of violence, has become cinematographic and televsional, just like the mechanically produced image.

The true belligerents are those who thrive on the ideology of the truth of this war, despite the fact that the war itself exerts its ravages on another level, through faking, through hyper reality, the simulacrum, through all these strategies of psychological deterrence that make play with facts and images, with the precession of the virtual over the real, virtual time over real time, and the inexorable confusion between the two (Baudrillard 1995: 177).

Deleuze and Guattari make a similar point, while insisting that the “total peace” of deterrence through non-war, ‘the peace of Terror or Survival’, is every bit as barbaric and authoritarian as the wars it replaces. ‘Total war is surpassed, toward a form of peace more terrifying still. The war machine has taken control of the aim, worldwide order, and the States are no more than objects or means adapted to that machine’ (1987: 421). The war machine, taking global order as its aim, comes to reign over the axiomatics of the world system, so that ‘the absolute peace of survival succeeded where total war had failed’, in constructing the world as a single deteritorialising-reterritorialising space (1987: 467).

Baudrillard’s analysis of terrorism throws also light on the current situation. For Baudrillard, terrorism, resonating through the society of the spectacle, threatens the white magic of subtle control via the black magic of an arbitrary act (1995: 51). Cut off from the masses but similar to them, aims at the masses in their ‘silence mesmerised by information’ (ibid. 51). It is a non-representative act accompanying the non-representable reality of the masses, sharing radical denial of representation (ibid. 52) ‘Undoubtedly something very substantial passes between them (the masses and terrorism) which we would seek in vain in… representative systems’ (ibid. 52-3), an ‘energy… of social dispersal’, of ‘absorption and annulment of the political’ (ibid. 53). Terrorists strike blindly, reproducing the system’s lack of differentiation. Terrorism strikes at the abstract individual for the crime of being nothing (ibid. 56). The terrorist is similar to the masses in being disempowered by the web of control; but unlike the masses, the terrorist strike drastically in spite of it and in such a way as to negate it by death. If reality here is associated with fixity and certainty, terrorism is symbolically absolute uncertainty, beyond deterrence and surveillance. There is an inherent fascination of the unknowable and unpreventable/uncontrollable, rendering terrorism a kind of ‘black hole’ in discourse, distorting what approaches it (today we might say, regarding whether ‘al-Qaeda’ is an organisation, a loose network, or a way of doing things; whether Iraq and Afghanistan are ‘won’ or ‘lost’; which acts are terrorist atrocities and which are ‘black ops’, and so on).
The system tries to counter terrorism with an immoral union around the production of truth (ibid. 123)

Since state control (or state terrorism) depends on fixing truth and meaning, terrorism as tendentially meaningless nullifies the political order by making an event (ibid. 113), rendering it ‘the purest symbolic form of challenge’ (ibid. 114) which seeks to ‘make the system collapse under an excess of reality’ (ibid. 120), to make the real and the violence of power implode (ibid. 119). For Baudrillard, this is a liberating potential. Implosion is inevitable in social relations, for all that the current system resists it, and it need not be catastrophic in all societies (indigenous societies are able to render it functional) (ibid. 58-61). Hence, Baudrillard calls for ‘catastrophic revolution’ (ibid. 106), opening up the possibility of emotional experiences beyond the system, rediscovering or forming anew different kinds of connections. Baudrillard’s analysis has been reinforced by others. For example, Susan Willis argues that ‘terrorism’ comes to stand in for the Lacanian Real in America (Willis 2005). Political geographer Colin Flint and discourse analyst Michael Innes have shown that the geopolitical imagination is haunted by the dissonance between the world of states and the threat of ‘deterritorialised, transnational social networks that overlay them’ (Innes 2008). Robert Jervis has also argued that modern societies ‘may be uniquely vulnerable psychologically’ to terrorism, with psychological effects extending to economics and social life. With people unaccustomed to violent death, linked through long-range networks and experiencing instant communication, a terror attack ‘stands out’ spectacularly, in excess over its scale (Jervis 2005:39). ‘People cancel flights so that they can drive, at a greatly increased chance of dying; the fear of anthrax is much greater than concern about influenza, although the latter will kill thousands of times more Americans’ (2005: 39).

Against terrorism as the implosion of meaning, the world-system pits the ‘state war-machine’ as a hybrid, recuperated form of otherness. In Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari argue that total war comes from appropriation of war-machine by state. When this appropriation happens, a result is that the war-machine defines war as its object and becomes linked to capitalist machinic investments and demographics (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 421). Returning from their wars against war-machines, states unleash a worldwide war machine, which “reissues” from states, and in which states become simply parts. Fascism arises from a state-appropriated war-machine, which constructs an “unspecified enemy” (ibid. 422). Fascism mobilises molecular level, penetrates every cell of society (ibid. 214-15). It is a war-machine which takes over the state (ibid. 230), ‘a war machine that no longer had anything but war as its object’ (ibid. 231). This is the reactive, ‘dark side’ of networks and war is an object (ibid.169). The very elements making total war possible also destabilise, and make risk amorphous by multiplying minorities. As capitalism and the state war-machine seek to grab more resources, minoritarian forces will re-form to resist this (ibid. 472).

Baudrillard in The Gulf War Did Not Happen, notes that the critical intellectual is vanishing via a fear of the real and of action and that same fear is spreading even to the military (1995: 34). War has transmuted into ‘non-war’ in a context of global policing by the US. The attempt to become the world’s police leads to operationalist depoliticisation
which leads to a ‘spiral of unconditional repression’ (ibid. 53-4). The media has become a prerequisite for any event (ibid. 75): ‘the ultimate end of politics, carefully marked elsewhere by the effects of democracy, is to maintain control of one’s own people by any means, including terror’ (ibid. 71). The aim of war today, as an extension of such politics, is that ‘[a]ll that is singular and irreducible must be reduced and absorbed’ (ibid. 86). Wars are waged to liquidate or domesticate various grassroots and symbolic challenges to the spectacle (85-6). The content of media information is secondary to the goal of providing a flattened de-intensified consensus (ibid. 68). Hence, the goal of war is to reproduce internal control. ‘Abolish any intelligence of the event. The result is a suffocating atmosphere of deception and stupidity’ (ibid.). This reactive stupidity is a kind of ‘mental deterrence’, a deterrence of thought which unconsciously feeds unreality (ibid. 67). When strong enough, it no longer needs real war (ibid. 84). Zizek similarly argues of the more recent Iraq war that it was premised on the closure of the future – treating the future as having already happened, hence pre-empting it (2004b: 14-15). These analyses also echo Virilio’s (1990) analysis of deterrence as a totalitarian closure of the future.

In this situation, the aim of war is to align everyone with ‘consensus’ (Baudrillard 1995: 84). With radical difference elided, America end up fighting their own shadow; ‘the Americans can only imagine and combat an enemy in their own image’ (ibid. 36). They are invulnerable to symbolic violence against themselves due to pragmatism and masochism (ibid. 39), while they constantly evade seeing or meeting with the enemy. The humiliation by disarming and neutralising impersonally (ibid. 40) and the ‘foreclosure of the enemy’, guarantee a ‘suffocating and machinic performance’ (ibid. 64). ‘In electronic war there is no longer any enemy, there is only a refractory element which must be neutralised and consensualised’ (ibid. 84) ‘Precision is a way of not recognising the enemy as such, just as lobotomy is a way of not recognising madness as such’ (ibid. 43). The Gulf War is theorised as a ‘de-intensified’ war (ibid.26), where America attempts to show ‘infallibility of their machine’ to deter friends and foes (ibid. 55). The result is a clash of radical otherness: while Americans were fighting a war which is ‘nothing personal’ and refusing to bargain, Saddam played a game of symbolic exchange (ibid. 54-5).

This situation of ‘non-war’ makes victory difficult to achieve. Non-wars can fail because the enemies miss each other: there is not enough communication to reach an enemy who does not share the US mode of action; ‘each plays in his own space and misses the other’. America is fighting a fictive enemy on screen, while Saddam, the designated enemy, refuses to fight (ibid. 65-6). On the other side, the US resist Saddam’s ruses with ‘their character-armour and their armoured tanks’ (ibid. 54). Meanwhile, the public consents to be ‘gently terrorised’ while retaining its profound indifference and nonparticipation (ibid. 50). Events remain unintelligible to media consumers because information leaves it unintelligible, mediated by images (ibid.10-11). The result is a permanent situation of war against a non-specific enemy, which basically precludes victory. Hardt and Negri argue that a ‘war against terror’ is unwinnable, constantly repeated, ‘must involve the continuous and uninterrupted exercise of power’, ‘has no definite spatial or temporal boundaries’ and ‘becomes virtually indistinguishable from police activity’ (2004: 14).
Echoing Baudrillard’s concerns in a more mainstream language, Bromley argues that deterrence is breaking down because it assumes a symmetrical relation among potential combatants. Asymmetrical conflict is hard, maybe impossible, to deter, and deterrence is also incompatible with absolute antagonism and with situations where the adversary (such as a suicide bomber) is not concerned about survival (Bromley 2006: 58). In a sense, the problems of deterrence echo those in psychology (Brehm and Brehm 1981) and sociology (e.g. Lemert 1972), in which deterrence has been shown to be ineffective at an individual level – on the one hand, prohibition induces a desire to do whatever is prohibited; on the other, labelling tends to amplify rather than reduce deviance. It is possible that a similar dynamic operates in international relations, with use of ‘hard’ power deflating ‘soft’ power and ultimately defeating itself, though the issue is complicated as the motives of states and armed opposition movements, and the dynamics of their composition, do not necessarily involve the unconscious and autonomous components of interpersonal agency. Deterrence in international relations is in any case more about making people feel powerless, creating an illusion of omnipotence of ‘constituted power, than about scaring people with the threat of punishment (the same can be said for new technologies of social control). However, empirical studies have confirmed that violent counterinsurgency methods increase rather than decrease the strength of all but the weakest insurgencies (Findley and Young 2007), suggesting that this is not enough to overcome the problems with deterrence. Mann has argued that hard power is deflationary (2005: 83-4) and Pieterse has argued of America under Bush that ‘[n]ever has so much soft power been squandered in so short a time’ (2006: 188). Mann also claims that the motive of Palestinian suicide bombers is to disprove Israeli security theory (2005: 109), suggesting a clearcut ‘reactance’ effect.

On a distinct but related point, underlying the structure of global war is a patriarchal logic which distorts the status of combatants by reducing them to singular male entities, what feminists in international relations term the ‘unitary masculine actor problem’. By portraying complex forces as a single enemy as if in a sporting match, fistfight or vendetta, leaders (and media) lock out of their frame many strategies, including those which involve effective peacemaking (e.g. Enloe 2000). Zizek similarly analyses global war in terms of the production of figures of a demonised Real which is simultaneously despised and feared. In figures such as the Nazi’s Jew and America’s Saddam, portrayals oscillate between larger-than-life monstrous Evil and impotent scum – hence the role of rituals of humiliation (2004b: 64). This fallback on demonisation undermines the claims to ethical superiority of the in-group, setting in motion the process of resort to exception analysed by Agamben. ‘Our warriors on terror are ready to wreck their own democratic world out of hatred for the Muslim other’ (2004b: 34). We endorse this view of Zizek’s, which expresses his broader contention that reactive ethnoreligious and nationalist phenomena arise psychologically through self-other categories expressing the ‘repressed Real’ and resultant neurotic jouissance of neurotic subjects. We are rather less enthusiastic, however, about Zizek’s assertion: ‘the USA as global policeman – why not? The post-Cold War situation did, in effect, call for some global power to fill the void’ (2004b: 19).
Structural cycles in the world system

Hegemonic decline

Hegemonic decline is dealt by world-systems theorists as a systemic phenomenon, and theorised as such, to illuminate counterhegemonic resistances and military adventurism as a desperate attempt to prolong or renew hegemony. Simultaneously, it serves as a corrective to notions of globalization described as a new phenomenon transcending the nation-state and expanding human freedom (Friedman and Chase-Dunn, 2005:1). In what has been described as the pulsating nature of historical world systems, ‘a process leading from declining hegemony to attempted empire and then to collapse or rapid decline, accompanied by a longer-term shift in hegemony’ occurs in the trajectories of global systems and is closely related to the cycle of centralization and decentralization of wealth accumulation (Friedman, 2005:94). The cycles of accumulation of wealth, according to Friedman, are crucial to understanding the dynamics of these systems, whether this is led by military-based primitive accumulation or by a larger market engaging a significant portion of the population. Within these smaller global systems there is an extensive movement of people, the formation of transnational classes, and the complex development of systems of renumeration using abstract systems of wealth, at least for the purposes of calculation. In certain phases of competition there is also a tendency to empire formation, often the result of failure to maintain hegemony.

(ibid.)

Friedman uses the Hellenistic hegemony as an example to argue that ‘hegemony is marked by a period of turbulence, military expansion, and empire formation that immediately fragments into a number of smaller territorial states’, also reflected in the Roman period, and it seems to express a ‘cycle of integrative expansion followed by disintegrative contraction. Declining hegemony is accompanied by political and cultural fragmentation’ (ibid.). Globalization occurred in the ancient period as well, and Friedman argues, its emergence in the decline of classical Greece is ‘astonishingly like the contemporary period, a contradictory process of elite cosmopolitanization and class polarization, or elite identification with the larger world arena and neotraditionalist movements for the reestablishment of local/national orders or even a noncapitalist social order’ (ibid. 111).

Friedman outlines seven characteristics of hegemonic decline in ancient Greece: state financial difficulties, fragmentation of polities, increasing cultural politics, ‘barbarian’ invasions from the semi-periphery, increasing internal conflict (class, ethnic, intradynastic and inter-state), the disintegration of the dominant religion and corresponding rise of new ‘cults’, and the diffusion of new philosophies, including some
(Cynicism and Epicureanism) similar to ‘postmodernist relativism’, and others (such as Stoicism) which inspired new state-formations.

Following from the idea of bifurcation (see above), Booth see the current situation rather as an ‘interregnum’, ‘not a power vacuum, but a period of struggle between the power of the old and the new, materially and ideationally, but there is an impasse’ (Booth, 2007: 12 in footnote). It is most often argued in world-systems analysis that American power is in sharp hegemonic decline, and has been since the crisis of the 1970s (Wallerstein 2003; Arrighi, 2005a, 2005b; Frank, 1998).

Perhaps the most systematic statement of this view has been put forward by Arrighi (2005a). He argues that that the neo-conservative imperial project undermines instead of revives US hegemony (2005a: 27). Drawing on David Harvey’s model, he theorises hegemony in terms of the arrangement of the capitalist logic to sustain a hegemon (Arrighi 2005a: 27, Harvey 2005: 33-4). According to Harvey, hegemony is constructed or retained through a ‘spatio-temporal fix’ (Deleuze and Guattari might say, a de/re-territorialisation), bringing resources into new combinations (2005 155). Bunker uses a similar concept of ‘expanded technical economies of scale’ (2006: 196). A spatio-temporal fix should lead to reduced reliance on accumulation-by-dispossession and an easing of overaccumulation. In a hegemonic regime, the hegemon should benefit at the same time as leading subaltern states on a particular development path (2005: 151-2). Arrighi argues that America is no longer able to do this for several reasons. Firstly, because of a huge current account deficit, America is borrowing rather than lending capital on a huge scale, becoming increasingly dependent on foreign capital as a result. Rather than easing the crisis of overaccumulation, this increases reliance on accumulation by dispossession (2005: 47). The association between spatial fixes and hegemonic shifts thus strengthens the Catch 22 that always confronts incumbent leading centres of capitalist development because of the repetition of problems at the increased spatio-temporal scale (Arrighi 2005a: 39). When such credibility is lacking or wanes, hegemony deflates into sheer domination, or what Ranajit Guha has called dominance without hegemony’ (Arrighi, 2005a:32 quotes Guha 1992: 231-2).

An equally indispensable foundation of hegemony in the period before the 1970s crisis was the US capacity to mobilize consent and cooperation internationally (at least from elites and leading powers), by acting in such a way as to make at least plausible to others the claim that Washington was acting in the general interest, even when it was really putting narrow American interests first (Arrighi, 2005a: 33). The ‘war on terror’ is partly a way of making such a claim, targeting or even creating oppositional forces which threaten all major powers and from which America can claim to be a protector. Peter Gowan has gone as far as to suggest that America has provoked the Islamic world as a deliberate tactic to create a cleavage in order to reinforce American ‘primacy’ (dominance). The aim is to make other major powers dependent on American protection so as to create a global disciplinary regime (Gowan 2006: 133, 146-7).

But even with this territorial logic of power, the Project for a New American Century and its promoters’ fixation on Iraq and West Asia constituted a high-risk approach to
sustaining US domination (Arrighi, 2005a :31). The invasion was inscribed in a broader political project of US global domination that explicitly emphasized distributive rather than collective aspects of power and hence was unattractive to potential allies (Arrighi, 2005a: 34). The neoconservative project amounted to a rejection of hegemony through consent and moral leadership in favour of domination through coercion. Worse still, the likely failure of the neoconservative project to conjure an acceptable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or to turn Iraq into a model of democracy and prosperity, meant that opposition to the project would be strongest in the Arab world, the region where success mattered most (Arrighi, 2005a: 49). Further, the American state has to draw on domestic resources which are in scarce supply and put at risk its own composition to wage imperial campaigns. This contrasts with the British empire, which shielded itself from the impact of crisis by relying on financial and military tribute from its colonies. Hence for instance, as late as the 1920s, 87% of troops used to put down an Iraqi insurgency were Indian (Arrighi 2007: 136-7).

Arrighi in his Hegemony Unravelling sketches the basic facts of US ‘domination without hegemony’ as it has emerged in the wake of the invasion of Iraq (Arrighi, 2005a: 51). The main reason American failure is so disastrous is according to Arrighi, not dependence to oil, but that Iraq is not Vietnam, and 2003 is not 1968. In purely military terms, the Iraqi insurgents, ‘unlike the Vietnamese, do not field heavily-armoured vehicles, nor do they have long experience of guerrilla warfare in a favourable natural environment, or enjoy the support of a superpower like the USSR’ (Arrighi, 2005a: 56). Clinton’s Kosovo War was meant to demonstrate, among other things, that UN support for US police actions backed by NATO was dispensable. Bush’s Iraq War was now meant to demonstrate that even NATO was dispensable (Arrighi, 2005a: 58). However, it proved the exact opposite: that America is dependent on European and especially Asian creditors (2005a: 63, 67). In the medium term, this built up the problems which culminated in the current credit crunch. In retrospect, laments Friedman, the United States ‘followed the dot-com bubble with the 9/11 bubble…….The first was financed by reckless investors, and the second by a reckless Administration and Congress (Arrighi, 2005a: 67). In fact, as Bonefeld has argued, there have been a whole series of crises during the current phase, from the European currency crisis of 1992-3, through the Mexican crisis of 1994, the Asian crisis of 1997, to Brazil in 1999 and Argentina in 2001 (Bonefeld 2003: 24).

In contrast to the Cold War, America now has financial power stacked against it. ‘Should US abuses of seigniorage privileges once again result in a dollar rout, European and East Asian governments are in far better position than they were 25 years ago to create viable alternatives to the dollar standard’ (Arrighi, 2005a: 73). Elsewhere, Arrighi et al have argued that capital concentration harms militarism in the core because the energy absorbed in peripheral wars leads to decreasing returns (Arrighi et al 1989: 109-10). The same processes also strengthen labour against capital, weakens dominant status-groups and weakens the state against protest and resistance (1989: 110). What is more, when America needed its capital for the Vietnam War, this capital fled abroad to offshore markets, leading to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the fiscal crisis of the American government (Arrighi and Silver 1999: 146).
On Arrighi’s analysis, American hegemony, like its Venetian, Dutch and British predecessors is now coming to an end, after around a hundred years (Arrighi, 2007: 231). Each cycle ends when the existing hegemon’s market becomes too small to absorb accumulation without falling profitability (ibid. 86). Each ends with a spatial fix in which the core is displaced to a larger-scale space (ibid. 87). Always a rather ineffective hegemon, alternating between cooperation and competition (ibid. 144), America has gone into hegemonic crisis because of the failure of its development model for the global south (ibid. 155, 132).

In each cycle, after the signal crisis (in this case, the 1970s shocks), the leading power undergoes a recovery or belle époque, involving accumulation by dispossession (ibid. 232-3). This for America was the Reagan years, when America aggressively competed for investment and pushed neoliberal policies abroad. However, the apparent recovery covers a shift in economic power. There has been a bifurcation of economic and military power between East Asia and America (ibid. 7). American consumption and military expenditure are financed primarily by the global South, especially East Asia (ibid. 191). This income has been attained primarily by exploiting the dollar’s privilege as international currency and by effectively defaulting by depreciating the currency (ibid.196-8). America has been unable to shield itself the way Britain did at the end of its period of hegemony because it has been unable to repeat the British trick of extracting financial and military tribute to make its empire self-perpetuating (ibid. 136-7). According to Arrighi, the so-called war on terror ‘has already precipitated the terminal crisis of US hegemony’ (ibid. 62).

Samir Amin supports this argument. He argues that the US economy is not the most productive – only in (government-funded) armaments does it have a competitive lead – and that it thus depends on draining resources from the rest of the world (104-6). The project of global military control is a way of compensating for economic deficiencies (2004: 106). America is driven by religious fundamentalism, a sense of Americans as chosen people or ‘herrenvölk’, ‘[a]nd this is why American imperialism has to be more barbaric than its predecessors’ (ibid. 64). This ‘herrenvölk’ conquers the space it needs for its way of life, with everyone else reduced to a right to exist conditional on non-obstruction (ibid. 77). The US tries to change economic and social relations to the benefit of the ‘chosen people’ (ibid. 81). The American ruling class has a cynicism and hypocrisy obvious to outsiders but invisible to most Americans, and the threat of extreme violence hangs over American social movements. From time to time the ruling class ‘reinvigorates’ American politics by identifying an ‘enemy’ (ibid. 75). America is characterised by, and globally promotes, low-intensity democracy – a total separation of economic and political systems, with a resultant loss of the radical potential of democratic politics (ibid. 68). Amin insists the American empire isn’t “empire” in Hardt and Negri’s sense – the US doesn’t seek to integrate a single system, it imposes the ‘law of the market’ and pillages (ibid. 78). However, core imperialisms have been unified due to economic links and world-level competition (ibid. 103-4). Hence, the situation involves a split (a variant of the bifurcation hypothesis) between a unified economy, similar to Hardt and Negri’s Empire, and a political world still dominated by one state,
where core countries have different interests. He advocates the containment of America in nation-state terms, including rearmament and a new non-aligned front (ibid. 82), delinking and ‘autocentred’ development to ‘serve social progress’ (ibid. 101), and an alliance of powerful states including France, Germany, Russia and China (ibid. 94-5).

Similarly, David Harvey argues that America has ‘given up on hegemony through consent and resort more and more to domination through coercion’ (Harvey 2005: 201). This is partly because of its broader economic agenda. ‘In the international arena the competitive volatility of neo-liberalism threatens the stability and status of hegemonic power’ (2006: 29).

In relation to hegemonic decline, it is instructive to compare American and British imperial experiences. Polanyi’s ‘double movement’, the contradictory impulse towards free trade and protectionism in capitalist hegemonies, operates in ways which are both similar and different. Similarities can be detected primarily in the fact that since about 1980 the United States has been both the main propagator of the utopian belief in a self-regulating market and the main beneficiary of the actual spread of that belief. The main difference is that, while Britain largely practiced what it preached, America combines a prescription of open markets for others with its own protectionist measures (Arrighi and Silver 2005: 166). Arrighi and Silver argue that, while Britain’s free trade policies were highly beneficial for its role as a commercial and financial entrepôt, America by contrast is ‘only partially integrated into the world system, with which it is also partly competitive’ (Arrighi and Silver 2005, citing Elliot 1955). Even during its Cold War heights, therefore, America had little room for a British-style double movement, and gave only limited powers to the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions. America’s exceptional position after World War 2 enabled it to exercise world-governmental functions for about twenty years (Arrighi and Silver 1999: 169, Arrighi 1994). Arrighi and Silver complement this analysis with the view that the switch from hegemony to coercive dominance is a sign and cause of system breakdown (Arrighi and Silver 1999: 288).

Bergensen and Lizardo argue that America’s imperial behaviour is a product of hegemonic decline, not strength. ‘Hegemonic decline then generates the empire-like behavior of the hegemon that, because of the earlier economic hegemony, has the global military reach, but that now with complete dominance a thing of the past, and a blakanizing world, is left with only the military reach, which appears to many as “empire”’ (Bergensen and Lizardo 2005: 232). ‘It is the present condition of military predominance in the absence of a clear economic predominance that creates the idea of empire’ (Bergensen and Lizardo 2005: 232). It is as if America has been pared back from hegemony to a ‘naked apparatus of coercion and domination’ (Bergensen and Lizardo 2005).

According to these authors, current patterns suggest that East Asia in the short-term and Europe in the long-term could emerge as new hegemon. It is the extant hegemon that intervenes around the world while the hegemon-in-waiting (East Asia) concentrates on economic expansion, not military overheads (Bergensen and Lizardo, 2005: 232-3). Britain had a global empire similar to America’s today, at the time when British
hegemony was in decline. ‘In sum, empire talk is a manifestation of decline, ironically not realized by the Left or the Right who now speak in these terms.’ (Bergensen and Lizardo 2005). An additional argument emerges from comparing America’s current leading company, WalMart, to its former leading company, GM. WalMart is to neoliberalism what GM was to Fordism. Yet while GM was the pioneer of Fordism, typical of its era and globally leading, WalMart is based on channelling cheap foreign imports, is atypical (excessively centralised in relation to other major companies and without the usual outsourcing), and is a model for opprobrium rather than imitation (Lichtenstein ed. 2005).

Scholars from outside world-systems analysis have made similar arguments about America’s global status. Mann in *Incoherent Empire* argues that America does not have the global power to sustain an ongoing empire. America has decided that their hegemony is good for others, basing their decision in terms of the Huntington apologia that without US primacy there would be more violence and disorder, less democracy and less economic growth (2005: 10). Naturalising the “rules of the game” depends on ruling power obeying them, which America is unprepared to do (ibid.12). With the rise of moral fundamentalists in the Bush administration, there was no goal of permanent occupation, but occupation until goals were met (ibid. 6-7). American empire, Mann argues, is very loosely inserted. In contrast to European empires, Americans do not live or rule among the locals; instead have ‘isolated bases away from the local population’, often even defended from local attack, in countries such as Qatar (ibid. 21). Again in contrast to Britain, these bases destabilise host regimes (ibid.22). In addition, populations have not been subjectified for colonial wars (ibid. 27). Overall, America does not have the capacity to sustain a global empire. Similar arguments have been put forward by French international relations scholars Emmanuel Todd (2003) and Alain Joxe (2002).

Pieterse analyses the shift to global empire as partly a result of earlier systemic failings and the loss of influence of the neoliberal ‘Washington consensus’. With IMF, World Bank and WTO failings exposed after Seattle, ‘[a]rguably there is no more Washington consensus; what remains is a disparate set of ad hoc Washington agendas… The decomposition of the neoliberal order sheds light on the subsequent American turn to “permanent war”’ (2004). This effectively replaces incorporation with dominance. In contrast to neoliberal globalisation, neoliberal empire does not even attempt ‘institutional envelopment’ (ibid. 59). Instead, ‘what remains is rule by force. This is not just empire but naked empire and global authoritarianism’ (ibid. 60). This in turn destroys many of the institutions which lock in American hegemony, ironically giving others an exit option even while insisting they are ‘with us or against us’ (ibid. 60). A ‘profound reordering’ of the world economy is ‘on the cards’ given US weakness, but difficult given interconnectedness (ibid. 151). Petras (2002) similarly argues that it was the failure of American multilateral hegemony in the 1990s, shown in the failure to isolate ‘rogue states’ and declining influence over Europe, which motivated the switch to ‘hard power’. Para Khanna offers a similar argument. ‘Many saw the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as the symbols of a global American imperialism; in fact, they were signs of imperial overstretch. Every expenditure has weakened America's armed forces, and each assertion of power has awakened resistance in the form of terrorist networks, insurgent groups and
"asymmetric" weapons like suicide bombers. America was never all powerful only because of its military dominance; strategic leverage must have an economic basis’ (Khanna 2008).

Hence, the thesis of declining American hegemony is nearly consensual among leading world-systems analysts. Nevertheless, the debate on whether American hegemony is in decline is alive and kicking, with some Marxists disputing this account. For example, Panitch and Gindin following Seabrooke, argue that the ‘US’s ability to constantly re-finance its debt obligations is not a sign of weakness but evidence of its great structural power in financial relations’ (Panitch and Gindin, 2005: 62 quote Seabrooke, US power, p.105). They believe that it is a mistake to think as Arrighi does that because the holders of American Treasury bills are now primarily in Asia, we are therefore witnessing a shift in the regional balance of power. They see this as confusing distribution of assets with the distribution of power (Panitch and Gindin, 2005: 73).

Panitch similarly argue that financialisation is not a symptom of decline as it has ‘included the Americanization of finance (Panitch 47). The post-1950s American state was not simply a hegemon but ‘a qualitatively different kind of state’ (Panitch and Gindin 54). In the post-war period, America avoided the appearance of hegemony and reconceived regulation to emphasise managing rather than preventing financial volatility (2005: 65). ‘The deepening of financial markets has played a directly imperial role. It has made it possible for the American economy to attract global savings that would otherwise not be available to it’ (2005: 69). It has also stimulated new sectors such as the rise of information technologies, and enforced neoliberal restructuring, hence both promoting and imposing a development model (ibid. 68-9; c.f. Klein et al 2003). A truly global system ‘based on the deregulation and internalization of the US financial system’, as John Grahl has put it, ‘is neither a myth not even an alarming tendency, but a reality’. (Panitch and Gindin, 2005: 66, quotes Grahl 2001: 43-4). Though financialisation has led to funding from Asia and Europe, these new investors have become anxious to prevent the dollar’s collapse, as devaluation would hit their reserves (2000: 72). Finally, Panitch (2000:13), suggests that America has retained a capacity to manage the radical restructuring of global capitalism in forms that reproduced their imperial dominance:

‘The decline of US hegemony is a myth – powerful, no doubt, but still a myth. In every important aspect the United States still has the predominant power to shape frameworks and thus to influence outcomes. This implies that it can draw the limits within which others choose from a restricted list of options, the restrictions being in large part a result of US decisions’.

(Panitch and Gindin 2000: 13).

Similarly, Panitch and Gindin conclude that ‘the resolution of the crisis of the 1970s… reinforced the capacity of the American state to revive global capitalism’ (Panitch and Gindin, 2005: 63). However, they do suggest that America depends on other states to secure popular backing for its imperial role, which has become increasingly difficult to secure. ‘The economic costs of empire at home are correspondingly higher as popular
forces abroad limit the ability of other states to share the military, economic and rhetorical burdens of empire’ (2005: 74).

Other authors have supported this view. Sassen, despite presenting global cities as a persuasive alternative to American empire, has also described the decline of American hegemony as ‘a myth’ and argued that ‘the United States still has the predominant power to shape frameworks and thus to influence outcomes’ (1996: 18). Satoshi Ikeda (in Dunaway vol 2) similarly argues that American power is shown in the fact that America was able to initiate the switch from a growth to a distribution regime in the 1980s (168), repeating the argument of Cumings (1999).

While we appreciate the import of Panitch and Gindin’s response, and these other views, we would suggest that it does not show that America is a hegemon in the full sense, suggesting rather that it retains some forms of systemic dominance. This is consistent with the thesis of bifurcation. While America has retained the ability to dominate certain areas such as finance flows, and resultantly to coerce others through disciplinary mechanisms, it has been unable to construct and consolidate an alliance of leading states or elites, to address the economic crisis in terms which reinforce its power, to enact a spatio-temporal fix, to establish an attractive development model, to rally global sentiments in its support, to provide new leading sectors, or to convert its economic and military power into ‘soft power’ or influence.

It remains to be seen if the new Obama administration can repair the damage to America’s global status which has been done by Bush. His campaign triggered hope among marginal groups in America, attracting overwhelming support from those – such as black people, Latina/os, feminists, young people and the Democratic Party left – who are usually marginalised from America’s political elite. It also attracted an outpouring of hope around the world that America would reverse its policies on everything from the Kyoto accords to Southern debt and the Palestine crisis. Yet these hopes were triggered by Obama’s charisma, the emptiness of his campaign and the ways his structural position mapped onto others’ hopes. In many ways, Obama functioned as an empty signifier, allowing others to project their desires and demands onto him without promising anything particularly concrete. Yet once in power, a new president with a limited social base, in a country which has not overcome its ‘paranoid style’ or addressed the poverty of its civic structures, may well become more slave than master of the machine he purportedly controls.

The difficulty is that deep structural forces will raise strong pressures against any moves by Obama or his officials to alter America’s global role. ‘For the United States the real burden of the superpower arms race was its growing path dependence on the military-industrial complex’, which has become a ‘functionally autonomous logic’ now afflicted by an ‘enemy deficit’ (Pieterse 2004: 9). In many ways, Obama could turn out to be America’s Khatami, a moderate reformer who is held back from actualising the agenda of his own supporters by the entrenched power of the ‘deep state’. The alternative is that he could be America’s Chavez, a charismatic leader who mobilises excluded groups and in turn becomes dependent on them, who becomes radicalised over time as is social base
deepens. But the early signs are not good. Obama remained quiet during the massive Israeli onslaught on Gaza in January 2009, has put back his timetable to close Guantanamo Bay and withdraw from Iraq, has pledged additional troops for Afghanistan and kept up bombings (without local permission) of targets in Pakistan. In relation to sites such as the Bagram prison, regime officials continue to use excuses of ‘enemy combatant’ status to evade judicial oversight, to the disgust of human rights campaigners. Despite a Democratic majority in Congress, Obama has not taken rapid steps to repeal the Patriot Act and the rest of the judicial infrastructure of neoconservative authoritarianism. It seems that, barring a massive popular upsurge forcing a change of course, this will be ‘neoconservatism with a human face’, a continuation of most of the Bush regime’s policies combined with symbolic gestures to supporters and a more internationally acceptable mode of presentation.

Where now? The question of China

Faced with the collapse of American hegemony, there are three options of where the world could go from here. There could be an American-led global empire or world state based on the extraction of tribute; an East Asian-led world market society; or global chaos. The first of these options has been eliminated by American failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (Arrighi 2007: 7; 164). Arrighi argues that America has made an attempt to block the spatial fix towards China by taking the financial flows away from emerging centres and trying to end the cycle of spatial fixes by creating a world government (ibid. 221-2, 226, 228). But with army morale collapsing, soft power at drastically low levels and the US forced to step back from further unilateral actions and adopt conciliatory positions towards China, the days of American rule even by mere domination are numbered; America has failed to convert military power into economic dominance (ibid. 182, 203-4, 273, 284). With the American option eliminated, avoiding ‘chaos’ depends on the capacity of China, India and other southern states to find an equitable and ecologically viable developmental model (ibid. 10). The US crisis provides opportunity to escape vicious circle of north-south relations, an escape pioneered by China (ibid. 95). Arrighi seeks a ‘new global leadership’ in East Asia to provide ‘system-level solutions to the problems left behind by US hegemony’ (ibid. 165).

So why is China in particular put forward as a potential new hegemon? First, China is the best hope for spatial fix, given its size and population; this is happening already. Arrighi argues, via infrastructure investments (ibid. 220). Second, unlike the other East Asian powers, China is not a US vassal or a city-state, and it depends less on America than America depends on China (ibid. 8). Third, China is the pioneer of a new model of economic organisation. The rise of network production and smaller businesses had led to a shift of economic power to East Asia as hybridisation of tradition of marked-based non-capitalist development with western capitalism (ibid. 145, 171). Finally, and most crucially, he argues that China offers a distinct development path to lead the world out of capitalism.
Suggesting that the character of a society as capitalist depends on the expropriation of direct producers (ibid. 23-4), the formation of a specifically capitalist class (as opposed to market social relations) (ibid. 369) and the subordination of the state to capital (ibid. 332), Arrighi suggests that China might become a non-capitalist market economy (ibid. 8), building on an Asian tradition of non-capitalist market economies (ibid. 329). Admitting there has been some accumulation-by-dispossession in China, Arrighi nevertheless argues that it has been curbed by the state to avoid unrest, to a sufficient extent to prevent a capitalist class from forming (ibid. 369).

Alongside the European Industrial Revolution, Arrighi (following Sugihara) suggests that there was an East Asian Industrious Revolution which pursued development by absorbing rather than displacing workers, made use of ‘sideline’ household labour, and was labour-intensive and energy-saving – hence more egalitarian and ecological than the European path (ibid. 34, 37, 39). In international relations, this East Asian path led to cooperation and trade; only the European path led to war, imperialism and expansionism (ibid. 313, 315-16). The European path was not generally superior (it was inapplicable in China), but it led to global dominance because of a sole contingent advantage: its emphasis on accumulation from foreign trade created a vast military (not economic) advantage when modern warfare became expensive (67-8, 94). Europe then overwhelmed Asia simply by military force; in fact, this was the only way Europe found to enter the Chinese market (ibid. 77). The European model was then normalised; China and Japan internalised the western arms race after the Opium War (ibid. 341-2). But for Arrighi, this did not mean the end of the alternative development path. Although it was suspended for a century, Arrighi argues that the Industrious Revolution path came to fruition after 1945, when Asia (led at this point by Japan and the Chinese diaspora) was able to gain access to outside resources and markets (ibid. 35, 346-7). China’s growth today, and future as global hegemon, is the culmination of this process. Europe’s transition to capitalism comes to appear as a short-lived historical anomaly.

While recognising that critics such as He Qinglan, and most Marxists, view the effects of post-Mao reforms as increasing inequality and corruption, Arrighi is more sympathetic to the view that China retains aspects of socialism based on egalitarian land distribution (ibid. 15-16). He claims that the tradition of the Chinese Communist Party continues to be based on a distinctly Chinese form of Marxism-Leninism (373) which is ‘democratic’, deliberative and peasant-based (ibid. 373-4, 376). He contends that China may aspire to socialism but has to play the capitalist game (ibid. 372). He argues that China has refused to follow neoliberal prescriptions, avoiding unemployment and implementing reforms gradually instead of by “shock therapy”, emphasising a national interest in stability (ibid. 14, 354-5).

Instead of doctrinaire neoliberalism, Chinese policies emerge from a ‘pragmatic approach to problems of governance’ (ibid. 368). The Chinese approach is also credited with being ecologically aware, though not yet sufficiently so (388-9). The approach is egalitarian and decentred, based on Township and Village Enterprises (TVE’s) which have encouraged local development and which are a continuation of the Maoist heritage of the Cultural Revolution, building on a backdrop of rural infrastructure, education and land
reform. TVE’s have allowed China to avoid dispossessing the peasantry and hence kept up the Industrious Revolution model of a non-capitalist market (ibid. 361-4, 370-1, 375). Furthermore, the basis of Chinese success is not simply cheap labour, but the quality of labour, a success story for communist education (ibid. 351). China’s advantage is due to ‘low-price, high-quality labour’ (ibid. 365).

He admits that workers have undergone hyperexploitation and hardships, but claims these are offset by policies which are now leading to a labour shortage (ibid. 360-1). He admits the likelihood of massive urbanisation (ibid. 388) and the fact of ‘huge increase in income inequality within and between urban and rural areas’ and between classes, strata and provinces (ibid. 375), but minimises the importance of such phenomena for the structural nature of Chinese society. He also admits that capitalistic policies and ecological destruction have triggered a wave of protest and unrest, paradoxically taking this unrest as a sign of the progressiveness of the Chinese system, such that the subaltern strata remain combative and able to affect policy (ibid. 377). He argues that there is a possibility of contestation from within socialist tradition which effectively empowers the poor (ibid. 368).

Arrighi almost idealises Chinese model, likening it to Smith’s idea of a market harnessed and constrained to serve the national interest (ibid. 358-9). He claims it provides a new development path attractive to other nations (ibid. 379). Hence, the rise of China could lead to a ‘new Bandung’ which ‘can do what the old one could not’ (ibid. 384), creating a ‘commonwealth of civilisations’ on an economic basis (ibid. 384). The ‘ruling groups of the global South’, especially China and India, could ‘open up a path capable of emancipating… the entire world’ from western dominance (ibid. 385). Arrighi suggests that, to solve the current problems, this new development path would have to be based on the Industrious Revolution and be egalitarian and ecologically sustainable, including the de-development of the west (ibid. 388).

The ‘war on terror’ may even have strengthened rival powers such as China by deflecting American interest elsewhere (74-5). Chinese global trade has risen spectacularly during the ‘war on terror’, rising nearly 50% in 2003 alone. China has also forged links with Europe, Latin America and Africa (Arrighi 2005: 78). There is even talk of a Chinese-European alliance to constrain America (Arrighi, 2005: 79 cites Shambaugh 2004).

Arrighi is not alone in making this kind of argument that a new hegemon is emerging to replace America. Bergensen and Lizardo disagree with claims that present economic trends suggest that East Asia will be the next hegemonic center (Bergensen & Sonnett 2000), but also disagree with the idea that a permanent division of labour between military power in the United States and economic strength in Asia will yield a heretofore never-seen bifurcation of economic and military power (Arrighi and Silver 1999) or something like a new “empire” of global capital/capitalists free from the constraints of being situated in hegemonic states (Robinson 2001, Bergensen and Lizardo 2005: 231). Instead, they contend that this is the picture only when looking at data in the short term. Data on global distribution of the 500 largest firms today would support the ‘empire’ hypothesis of a tripartite division between America, Europe and East Asia; the same
distribution discussed over time would support the idea of a transfer of power to East Asia (Bergesen and Lizardo 2005). Ultimately, they argue that while East Asia might take over hegemony in the short-term, Europe is the strongest long-term candidate. Andre Gunder Frank’s last work concurs with Arrighi’s view that China is the rising hegemon, suggesting that the world-system is resorting to its Asian core after a brief European blip (1998). Para Khanna (2008a, 2008b) argues that American power is being lost to a growing semi-periphery. Perry Anderson sees the situation leading to ‘a modern equivalent of the Concert of Powers after the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars’, involving jockeying among leading powers without serious discord (Anderson 2007). The argument regarding China as a rising hegemon had previously been made about Germany and Japan, before they went into system-induced crisis (Albert 1993). We are taking Arrighi as representative of theories suggesting a new hegemon will emerge, but there are subtle differences between them.

We would suggest that this type of theory, and Arrighi’s narrative in particular, is deeply problematic, overestimating the extent to which quantitative growth and expanded power amount to a capacity to make the qualitative leap to systemic hegemony. In Arrighi’s case, there is a deep asymmetry of method between the discussions of America and China. While the discussion of America is deeply critical, the reading of China is reminiscent of realist and problem-solving methodologies. While America is appreciated at a structural level, with its various problems stemming from its underlying logic, China is conceptualised as a set of distinct facts and problems some of which can be relativised, others excused, and still others used predictively. In other words, Arrighi treats China exactly as his liberal and realist opponents would treat America. We would suggest that this is symptomatic of an approach to China based partly on wish-fulfilment.

Modelled on China’s potential rather than its current status, Arrighi’s discussion cannot but be a speculative gamble. Arrighi largely takes for granted that China’s current dramatic GDP growth (from a very low starting-point) is the beginning of a rise to economic pre-eminence. There is a big question of the sustainability of Chinese growth which Arrighi does not address. It is no secret that capitalism rewards countries which deny workers’ rights, prioritise growth over welfare, and organise education and society on a technocratic basis. Arrighi’s account relies on Chinese economic growth being converted into a persistently rising standard of living, welfare increase, and all-round human development. But such a conversion would destroy China’s advantages of low-cost labour and skills-focused infrastructure. It would repeat the pattern which saw Indonesia’s spectacular growth reversed after its transition to democracy. Similarly regarding rural dispossession, the prediction of massive urbanisation, which Arrighi endorses, suggests that this is indeed happening, just at a slower rate than if full-scale neoliberal policies had been adopted. It is, perhaps, a drip-drip dispossession like that undergone by the French peasantry over two centuries, and the outcome may be no less capitalist than the France of today. In fact, a lot of the infrastructure-based growth (itself speculative, and hardly sustainable) is premised on a prediction of massive urbanisation in the near future. And if rural displacement does happen, it could create further questions of sustainability – for instance, whether even the most remarkable GDP growth rates could absorb a growing urban population on the scale of hundreds of millions.
A reader could be induced to think that Arrighi is idealising the situation in China, presenting an overly rosy picture of localised, egalitarian, ecological development which ignores important counter-examples. The Chinese development strategy also includes a range of strategies – massive development projects such as the Three Gorges Dam, large-scale urbanisation, the concentration of economic activities in coastal “global cities” and export processing zones – which go against any idea of egalitarian, ecological, energy-light, socially inclusive development. It is especially unclear that China breaks with the unresponsiveness to locality and the core-periphery arrangement of connections and flows which are built into the world system. Indeed, the disparities within China, and its conformity to the model of global cities and rural hinterlands, suggests the reproduction of such structures within Chinese society itself.

And this is before one even considers the political context in China, and a state attitude to self-valorisation by workers and peasants which may even overshadow America. One of the world’s most brutal state-market complexes, the Chinese one-party regime is typified by social authoritarianism, the repression of national minorities, prohibition of independent associations such as free trade unions, abuses of civil and human rights including one of the world’s most vicious regimes of biopolitics (from forced abortions and organ sales to an almost routine use of the death penalty), censorship of transgressive flows from Falun Gong to the Internet, moral and cultural policing (such as the activities of local civil wardens in extorting payments and harassing people for petty deviance), the almost total sidelining of non-economic values and the prioritising of stability and economics over freedom and welfare, and in general an extremely limited space for self-assertion by the oppressed. In comparison, say, with India, or most of Latin America, the Chinese poor are faced with far greater risks should they wish to squat unused land, or form associations to lobby for reform, or engage in informal economies, or promote indigenous ways of life in peripheral regions.

Aside from its desirability, it is not clear that Chinese hegemony is even possible at this point. Despite a few concentrations of high-tech industry and the globalisation of some coastal regions, in many respects China remains a firmly peripheral country within the world system. Arrighi’s showcase example of China’s distinct model, the TVE’s, is in many respects typical of peripheral countries, which maintain cheap labour by linking low-paid infrastructure to non-capitalist rural economies which subsidise low wages by meeting reproduction costs. It is not clear how China today has anything like a leading sector which would give it a persistent market advantage. Granted, it has economic networks, but hardly the exclusive claim to these which America had to multinationals in its early years, and the products they are making are very much at the peripheral end of the world trade system. China has inherited much of the semi-peripheral industrial production which formerly migrated to, then from, Southeast Asia in pursuit of low wages.

The Industrious Revolution development path might have existed once, but has it really survived several centuries of colonialism, imitative westernisation, and state “modernisation” intact? The contemporary Chinese state is a product of a century of
western-style geopolitics, imported ideologies of nationalism and Marxism, and competition in a western-dominated world system. Expecting this postcolonial product of western power and local syncretisms to revert to a pre-colonial trajectory of non-capitalist market development is a bit like expecting a new Aztec empire to challenge America from the south, or the Mongol hordes to sack New York. Arrighi does not make a systematic case for the persistence of the Asian development path from its historic to its modern phase; he relies on analogies and suggestive similarities, and does not account for the resilience of this path or its subterranean survival across the intervening decades and centuries.

This is not the only case where interpretation of evidence often seems more convenient than systematic. In relation to social unrest, Arrighi tries to have it both ways: China delivers for its people, this proves the progressiveness of its system; China fails to deliver, provoking revolts, and this also proves the progressiveness of the system, its contestability on socialist grounds. Contrary to this argument, it makes more sense to suggest that worker, peasant and minority revolts show that the Chinese regime is an elite regime alienated from the population, and that emancipatory forces arise from outside, not inside, the current regime. As to whether China is a capitalist country, the criteria Arrighi sets for whether a society is capitalist are very rigid, sufficiently so that most peripheral countries, and much of Europe for most of the industrial period, would not conform to it. To return to nineteenth-century France as an example, it would be hard to argue that there was a definite capitalist class in Arrighi’s sense, i.e. that a distinct group had appropriated by dispossession while being distinct from state and mercantile elites; still less that such a class had control of the levers of the state from the successive monarchic, republican and Bonapartist bureaucracies and the contending “petty-bourgeois” parties and factions.

One can indeed concede that the Chinese state is prone to restrict capitalistic processes to preserve stability. This is not, however, something unusually socialist. It is not unknown for states of all kinds to act in this way, whether by backing down in the face of revolt, conceding popular demands to head off possible unrest, pursuing cronyism and patronage as means of integration, or subordinating the economy to state development goals (the developmentalist state is hardly a new phenomenon). All states, even the most neoliberal, claim in principle that the “national interest” comes before capitalism. This is not at all a matter of progressive anti-capitalism; it is simply a preference of the state elite itself for its own preservation over that of its capitalist allies, an obsession with order and control at any cost – what we referred to above as the social logic of the deep state. Provided popular opposition can be sufficiently decomposed, this statist disposition is entirely compatible with neo-liberalism, and in fact, neo-liberalism often fuses an intensified state command and obsession with “order” with the defence of capitalist property (see above). This “national interest” is a fantasmatic rendering of the state’s social logic. In this context, claims to ‘socialism’ are principally rhetorical.

The concept of scale used in Arrighi’s theory of spatial fixes and economic cycles is somewhat ambiguous. Does it refer to population size, geographical size, market size, investment opportunities, or some mixture of these? Whatever is the case, it is clear that
each transition is supposed to not merely be to a larger unit, but to a unit of a qualitatively greater scale. In this sense, it is not entirely clear that the US continental “scale” is actually larger, as opposed to more compact, than the British empire at its peak. It is even less clear that China is a qualitative step up in terms of scale. At one point, Arrighi admits the British empire contained greater resources than the US, but that only its integration was less (2007: 248), and that its failure was due to the revolt against western imperialism reducing benefits and increasing costs (ibid. 193, 272). This admission throws into doubt the argument that each transition involves an increase in scale, rather than simply a sideways shift. In any case, since the US is already a continental state, it would seem that the only possible higher scale would be global.

A final problem is that Arrighi’s perspective offers too little to antisystemic movements, calling for hope to be placed in a variant on the alienated state-capitalist approach. It is all very well to predict different trajectories in the world system, but what is missing from such a perspective is transformative agency. And while a peaceful transition to a new hegemony might be preferable to a long drawn-out swansong of American empire, the point is surely not to side with either, but to construct a way to break out of the cycles of capitalism entirely. Even supposing there will be a new hegemon in the form of a state, there is no particular reason this hegemon would have to be egalitarian or ecologically friendly. The assumption that it will, is wishful thinking on Arrighi’s part. Granted, it would have to be these things to solve the problems inherited from the previous hegemons. But which hegemon has ever in fact solved these problems? One must surely look beyond the system for transformative alternatives to it.

Global Cities

Another contender for hegemonic global status is the global cities model, associated especially with Saskia Sassen. Sassen criticises Wallerstein for teleology, reading capitalist dynamics backwards into earlier world systems. She offers a more Foucauldian reading of ‘contingency and openness of the process of restructuring’ (2006: 75). She views global cities and high-tech districts as ‘partially denationalized strategic territorializations with considerable regulatory autonomy through the ascendance of private governance regimes’ (ibid. 54-5), and argues that the global city has emerged as ‘a strategic site for innovations and transformations in multiple institutional domains’ (ibid. 69-70). However, this has paradoxically led to a concentration of trading in a few financial centres (ibid. 259). The necessary digitations connecting financial centres have to be produced, and are dependent on identities formed outside the digital space. It therefore is embedded in non-digital space but can react back on it (ibid. 344).

In Sassen’s understanding, the global digital economy requires massive concentrations of physical resources through their being turned into liquid and mobile or hypermobile forms (ibid. 345). ‘Global cities are strategic sites for the combination of resources necessary for the production of these central functions’ in system integration (ibid. 347). These financial centres are sites for developing norms as to what is acceptable risk and acceptable variability in predictive modelling (ibid. 355-6). ‘The global economy needs to be implemented, reproduced, serviced, and financed’ (ibid. 382). Hence it relies on
‘vast concentrations of material and not so mobile facilities and infrastructures’ for its hypermobility (ibid. 382). This in effect sees the mergence of different temporaliies in different economic sectors (ibid. 391), which creates a culture of financial centres very much localised to these centres, even though the centres are themselves cross-border (ibid. 394-5). And more importantly, the new kind of segmentation entails a kind of inequality cutting across scales and spaces (ibid. 421). Sassen assumes (wrongly in our view) these are not kinds of core-periphery inequality (ibid. 421) and assumes (partly wrongly) that the globalised order is centrifugal (ibid. 422).

The global cities model is a stronger contender for hegemonic status than is China, and it is clearly being imitated across the periphery (Stanley 2001, Chatterjee 2008). Global cities might not offer a spatial expansion (they reduce the hinterlands of their nation-states to an almost semi-peripheral status), but they offer possibilities of an expanded global scale of connections via nodes connecting the cities, and meet the criteria for a ‘spatio-temporal fix’ because the temporal aspect, increased speed, is clearly enabled by dense connections between global cities. They arguably offer new economic forms (networked companies, ‘just in time’ production, information technology) situating them at the forefront of changing global economics.

But they cannot be a hegemon in a classic sense. Firstly, they lack the capacity to politically integrate their peripheries, or in many cases, to politically integrate themselves. Secondly, they (as opposed to the states in which some of them are based) lack military power. Even in the unlikely event that they became city-states, their strategic position would be considerably weaker than the surrounding hinterlands, where guerrilla and asymmetrical movements could flourish. As we shall see below, global cities and isolated resource nodes are especially vulnerable to tactics, whether military or social-movement, which disrupt the lines running between them or slow down the flows to and from them.

There are also anomalies inherent in global cities, for instance what can be termed ‘reverse colonization’, where the city becomes a ‘colony’ of the periphery. There is the phenomenon of the ethnic or regional-based shanty-town community which is imagined as an extension of, or even a ‘colony’ of, a rural community elsewhere, from which its migrants originated and to which they remain (for a generation or so at least) connected (they may even return to the rural ‘core’ when it needs them, for harvests for example). Obviously this is the opposite of the world-systemic structure where the city is the ‘metropolis’ of its surrounding ‘periphery’ (and which is the reason why migrants move to the city and not to, say, another rural area: resources, work and power are concentrated in the city. It is not clear what this means about the city as ‘scalar’ or ‘striated’ space. Maybe this would be an instance of the phenomenon of a ‘city subordinate to the countryside’ which would be a ‘smooth’ relation overall. But the situation is complex – how does one assign relative importance to the migrant’s frame (rural as core – city as periphery) and to the structural distribution which causes them to move to the city (city as core – rural as periphery)?
The migrant’s strategy is an attempt to use an overall striated space for smooth purposes, so as to set in motion reverse or transversal flows. Hence, global cities and their ‘megalropolis’ imitators also include, alongside their core-like nodes, a varied and usually large, growing and unstable population. There are industrial working-class or ex-working-class groups left-over from the earlier stage when most of the cities were industrial capitals. There are also internal and international migrants – homeless people, activists, foreign dissidents, communities of displaced people – pulled in by the concentration of resources, ‘jobs’, and the glitzy image and visibility of the cities, and their accessibility (culturally – as cosmopolitanism – and physically). The city thus becomes a contested space, with one group seeking to striate and another to smooth it (cf Flusty 2004).

Another anomaly is evident in that the electoral base of neoliberalism and neoconservatism is predominantly rural and small-town; the majority in urban areas, in the global cities which are at the heart of how neoliberalism operates, are typically anti-neoliberal. When Thatcher was implementing neoliberalism in Britain, London and Liverpool returned councils of the dissident left; in America, Republicans and the Democrat right have their main basis in rural areas; in France, Sarkozy lost the recent election overwhelmingly in Paris, despite his victory overall. Hence, the elites who run global cities or the states which contain them typically cannot win electoral majorities in these cities except by incorporating hinterlands (nation-states, suburbs or surrounding rural areas) as ways to gather conservative votes. This is doubly anomalous because the support-base for implementers of neoliberalism consists of people who have neither an interest in it nor a commitment to it – they are adversely affected by the rise of global cities and the resultant impoverishment of surrounding areas within nation-states, and in subjective terms they are usually anti-neoliberal in reactive, anti-cosmopolitan term (for example, anti-EU and anti-NAFTA). Hence, neoliberalism makes itself compatible with polyarchy only on the condition of ‘combined and uneven development’, and the ability of neoliberalism to mobilize the ‘underdeveloped’ areas against the ‘developed’, in defiance of both objective and subjective logics (if Paris, London, New York and California were city-states, neoliberalism could not remain in power by means of elections).

The short-circuit happens by way of the mobilizing of rural networks (which are always more-or-less “alive”) through reactive ethno-religious and patronage forms (the role of Evangelical churches in America for example), and a meconnaissance based no doubt on unawareness of the subtleties of the urban politics on which elections are basically a referendum (mediated by the “national” i.e. urban media, rural and small-town populations are voting not on what is happening in their own lives, but on indirect, fantasmatic or mythological images of the urban “other”). In fact neoliberal city-states do exist today (Singapore, Dubai), and as this account might predict, are highly authoritarian not only socially (as also are New York and London) but in terms of elections. In other words, the viability of global cities as political entities depends on the media mobilisation of reactive networks which are substantially ‘other’.
This raises a possible alternative that Arrighi does not consider in his mapping of possible futures – the possible emergence of the kind of global network society theorised, in rather different ways, by authors such as Antonio Negri and William Robinson. If the degree of integration, rather than geographical scale, is what increases with each transition, it is arguable that a model of this kind, focused on global cities which are networked to one another by intense flows, would arguably integrate more of the world than any system focused on a single state. This network option may indeed approximate ‘global chaos’ in a structural sense, in the sense of a ‘chaotic’ molecular assemblage without molar structure, but it would not be the kind of warlike, multipolar global chaos Arrighi assumes.

Another alternative is the idea of a smoothly distributed global network capitalism which becomes a kind of smoothed-out hegemon across the entire world. It is doubtful both if such a situation is possible and if it could be hegemonic. The model of a ‘smooth’ global capitalism is contradicted by the persistence of sharp North-South and inter-regional divisions. Indeed, Hardt and Negri occasionally recognise that the world market regiments differences as well as multiplying them (2000: 151-2). In addition, Hardt and Negri are leaping ahead of the current geopolitical situation in assuming that America is forced to act on behalf of ‘empire’ as a whole (ibid. 181). This view might indeed express the systemic tendency to seek such a general enforcer, but is contradicted by post-911 unilateralism. Chatterjee endorses Hardt and Negri’s account of a new empire where empire itself, not a state, rules (2008: 98); American and other imperialist forces operate as police not warriors (ibid. 99), and Empire today is about ‘control, not occupation or appropriation’ (ibid. 101). He denies, however, that such a system could ever be hegemonic. ‘The more empire takes the shape of an unchallenged sovereign hegemony, the more the world resists’ (ibid. 104).

Transversality in terms of connections which overflow the world system means that the world system has specific directions of flows and conduits for flows (some things flow from core to periphery and others from periphery to core), and a transversal flow is one which doesn’t go along these lines. In cities one might think not only of the “reverse colonization” phenomenon but also other kinds of unregulated and “illegal” immigration, connections and solidarities on an urban scale between movements segmented as separate within the city, penetration of the core by networks (such as organized crime groups) based in the periphery, horizontal solidarities enabled by global communications flows, the formation of niche communities of particular groups (gay men, subcultures such as punks or Goths, ‘extreme’ political factions, immigrant and religious communities with small numbers) who would otherwise be too small a percentage to mobilize in a locality, as well as the various phenomena of re-use of urban ‘non-places’ (subway graffiti, urban running, psychogeography, etc). One might even go so far as to portray certain neighbourhoods of Los Angeles as de facto autonomous, subject only to external ‘feudal’ interventions by a police force located outside and present by exceptional invasion. Transversality may be what makes cities useful for relatively deterritorialised types of capitalism: these connections can be turned into new niche markets, cultural commodities, etc (the success of Manchester due to the activities of the semi-Situationist Factory Records and the Hacienda club is an example).
On the other hand it is also quite dangerous for the regulation of the system when things are going on in cities other than the ‘orderly’ redirection of flows, hence attempts to turn cities into inhospitable spaces for difference. So one sees systemic violence in both directions, into and out of cities: forced urbanisation in warzones such as Colombia and (formerly) Vietnam, forced de-urbanisation in South Africa, as shanty-town “clearances” in various countries from Indonesia to Zimbabwe, and as “immigration control” (usually deporting migrants from urban sites to predominantly rural countries, not to mention “dispersal” systems within nation-states and the approach of concentrating migrants in refugee camps in remote or marginal locations, from Gaza to Woomera).

So if we are unconvinced that a new hegemon will emerge, if American hegemony is doomed, global cities cannot be hegemonic and Hardt and Negri’s networked capitalism is a long way from appearing, where do we see the world going from here? The answer is that the proliferation of networks poses a series of fundamental challenges; in the short-term, the main effect will be to disrupt centralised power, but there is a potential for the emergence of a networked world based on affinity-networks in opposition to the world-system. We this see an immanent possibility of hierarchical logics being overcome completely, although it is also possible that this force will be recuperated as it has been before. We would posit the emergence of networks as a challenge to systemic dominance on a deeper level than, for example, the emergence of a new hegemon. Today’s resistance movements, insurgencies and social movements pose fundamental problems for hierarchical power as such. At the same time, however, the current situation poses challenges for networks, in particular in terms of the pull towards reactive logics.
Chapter 3 The network form

In looking for figures of resistance, one is drawn to the space beyond hierarchical assemblages, where alternative forms of life exist or come into being. This is on the one hand, the space of the excluded, of the people and peoples deemed unincorporable or not worth incorporating by the world system, or consigned to its margins; on the other hand, it is the space of the network form as a form which contradicts, escapes and exceeds the hierarchical forms of the world system, the state and capital. This figure, the ‘social logic of the excluded’ so to speak, can be viewed from three different angles: as the excluded, defined in negation of the dominant system; as the logic of indigenous or non-state society, defined as a specific type of social form directed against the state and capital; and as the affinity-network form, a specific social form distinct from the hierarchical forms of state and capital.

The term ‘network’ has, of course, been used a lot more widely (e.g. Granovetter 1973; Castells, 2000; Barabasi 2003), and not always with the same transformative undertones. Not all networks are entirely part of the logic of the excluded. Indeed, Hillary Wainwright has argued that the left has been behind capitalist managers in realising ‘the creativity of chaos’ and knowledge networks and creative agents; horizontal networks as source of strength of new movement (Wainwright 25 May 2005). We maintain that the world system, capital and the state all require hierarchies, and that none of them can become entirely networked (see above). However, each of them can – and does – incorporate variously ‘domesticated’ networks as part of its internal structure, as roots and branches from its trunk. These are what Deleuze and Guattari (1987), and later Day (2005), term ‘radicle’ as opposed to ‘radical’ networks. Some of these will be explored below, as reactive networks, patronage networks and exclusive networks. Others can be mentioned briefly, as the forms which have lured the gullible into interpreting the system itself as no longer hierarchical: the adoption of decentred networks as a strategy of transnational corporations, complete with anti-hierarchical strategies such as outsourcing and guerrilla marketing; the operation of the network form among different fractions of the (hierarchically constructed) elite, as business networking or as networks of global cities; the emergence of the networked or ‘rhizome state’ as a syncretic form whereby states in marginal locations fuse with diffuse, shadowy power-holders in society; and the model of networked warfare associated with authors such as Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1997), whereby states seek to deploy networks as the only effective way to fight networks. All of these hybrid expressions of the network form contain some aspects of the affinity-network as abstract machine, combined with elements of other abstract machines such as the state and capital. We would maintain that they constitute apparatuses of capture, in that the affinity-network form remains subordinate to a dominant hierarchical element or ‘trunk’.

A further qualification is needed regarding the relationship between the affinity-network as abstract machine and the variety of types of concrete networks. An alert reader will notice that we sometimes discuss the affinity-network form entirely in terms of autonomous movements, which predominantly express this logic, and sometimes also
include other kinds of networks such as reactive networks. This is because of the tension between levels of analysis. While the transformative potential of the network form resides in the affinity-network as a specific abstract logic, and not for instance in the reactive networks which restore aspects of a trunk, the latter also mobilise as concrete assemblages some of the techniques of the affinity-form, and enjoy some of its advantages. The successes of reactive networks can therefore be indicative of the advantages of the network-form, even though it is only one of the components in a reactive network assemblage.

Discussion of network social forms has suddenly become rather fashionable. Most of the discussion focuses on contemporary, high-tech social movements, which rely heavily on computer networks and other high-tech communication networks such as mobile phones. Recent studies by the Rand Corporation for instance have emphasised the growing importance of “netwar” – struggles between or against social networks (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001). Theorists sympathetic to social resistance such as Graeme Chesters make similar claims, attributing the ability of anti-capitalist protesters to mobilise effectively without leadership to a “swarm logic” based on distributed network forms of power (Chesters 2006). The technological aspect of this view is taken furthest by leftists such as Hardt and Negri (2004), who view the network form of protest movements as an outgrowth of changes in production, of the primacy of “immaterial” labour and the rise of a new kind of capitalism based on network organisation.

Where this leftist reading goes wrong, however, is in linking the network form primarily to high-tech or ‘advanced’ capitalist conditions. It is certainly the case that high-tech protest groups and countercultural movements use network forms, and that technologies allowing network construction are used in this construction. Hackers, open-source programmers and online protest campaigns are examples of network social forms. It is also the case, however, that similar non-hierarchical horizontal networks arise in almost every situation where people try to mobilise or cooperate outside the framework of the state and of domination. Hunter-gatherers and other indigenous societies, peasant movements, and the urban poor of the shanty-towns and ghettos are among the most obvious examples.

In relation to indigenous societies, Rohrlich-Leavitt noted that ‘gatherer-hunters are generally nonterritorial and bilocal; reject group aggression and competition; share their resources freely; value egalitarianism and personal autonomy in the context of group cooperation; and are indulgent and loving with children’ (Zerzan, 1994). Where distinct groups exist, they often relate in a networked way – the gift networks of the Trobriand Islands and the extended kinship networks of the Lakota “nation” being two examples. One characteristic of such societies is the non-exclusive nature of attachments and affinities, and hence the absence of an overarching identity. Even in the strongest kinds of segmentary lineage systems which come closest to fixed group identity, the existence of extra-familial affinities operates as a restriction on ingroup-outgroup patterns, ensuring some degree of social openness (Barclay, 1992).
Larissa Lomnitz (1977) studies survival and mutual aid networks in Latin American shanty-towns, revealing that kinship and neighbourhood relations form an entire informal economy enabling a layer of excluded people to survive on the periphery of major cities by means of horizontal relations. Partha Chatterjee (1993) shows how the formation of Indian national identity leaves a trail of ‘fragments’ – identities based on class, caste, ethnicity, region, religion, and so on – which provide the basis for entire areas of social life organised beyond the reach of the state, in private associations and homes. The power of the state is thus very much partial, constrained by and always at risk from the subcultures and countercultures emerging from the space beyond its reach.

Hecht and Simone (1994) provide a series of examples from African societies of horizontal social forms which operate invisibly to inflect, undermine, and sometimes overthrow states and formal institutions. ‘Rather than defining particular structures, the term civil society has come to indicate myriad invisible threads that weave the fabric of African societies together when nothing else appears to be holding them together… [such as] so-called “popular neighbourhoods”… usually controlled through ethnic, religious, or sectarian affiliation. They produce informal, and often illegal, associations, alliances, strategies and practice, that provide an infrastructure for the community and a measure of functional autonomy’ (Hecht and Simone, 1994: 14-15). The uncontrollability and unpredictability of these movements is the source of their strength. In Senegal for instance, ‘diverse groups are doing more than developing a critical language. They are taking things into their own hands… attempting to reinvent their surroundings… asking for or demanding… taxes to finance their society independently of a larger authority… creating public protests and the occasional riot’ (ibid. 104).

Even in mass societies, everyday relations are often networked and horizontal, and thus implicitly anarchist – a point made clearly by Colin Ward, who goes as far as to portray ‘apolitical’ kinds of social affiliation such as the local music scene in Milton Keynes as anarchist due to their structure, a network of overlapping voluntary associations existing for practical purposes rather than as part of a political principle of domination (Ward 1992).

**Networks and the contemporary world situation**

How does the network form fit into our analysis of the contemporary world? The answer is multiple. Firstly, the resistance to the US state and its neo-liberal allies involves several very broad groups of challengers. Some of these are ethnoreligious movements, based on the defence of fixed identities against the spread of American power. The various political-Islamist formations which are conventionally grouped under the label ‘al-Qaeda’ are examples of this approach. While they deploy aspects of the network form, they are better understood as reactive networks (see chapter 4). Also contributing to the decline of US hegemony, there are also resistance groups mobilised to oppose the US military interventions, to oppose particular instances of oppression or even to oppose neoliberal ‘globalisation’ itself, which can be summarized as sociopolitical (as distinct from ethnoreligious) movements. These include the anti-capitalist and anti-neoliberal networks involved in summit protests, social centres and direct action in the global North,
and similar networks involved in resistance to structural adjustment and challenges to dominant regimes in the global South, including transnational offshoots such as People’s Global Action and at least the horizontalist wing of the World Social Forum. They include most of what Richard Day terms the ‘newest’ social movements, as well as a good proportion of the older ‘new social movements’. They also include a range of less visible resistances associated with phenomena such as the persistence of indigenous cultures, the formation of networks of survival and life in shanty-towns and slums, the rise of transnational communities and diasporas, everyday resistance from peasants and workers, and the rise of internet-enabled social movements. It is our contention that the network form constitutes a fundamental structural challenge to the logic of hierarchy which prefigures the possibility of a ‘world yet to come’ freed of hierarchical forms.

In contrast to the ethnoreligious movements, some of the sociopolitical opposition groups are rhizomatic in identity as well as organisational terms. Anti-capitalist and other rhizomatic groups have constructed many new forms of political action, and also new forms of communication. In contrast to the closure of space, the violence and identity divide found in ethnoreligious discourses, these movements seem to rely more on networking and grassroots organising, to a greater extent than the hierarchical structures states and their followers. Several metaphors have been used to describe a large number of groups being brought together under a common cause, groups that disperse as easily as they come together: a parallelogram of forces (Chesters, 2006) following a swarm logic like ants in an ant colony (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001), webs of creativity (Starhawk 2008), the whole of singularities and so on. The ecology of such action indicates a web of horizontal social solidarities to which power might be devolved, or even dissolved. Peter Waterman for example has referred to a new global movement ‘marked by its network form’ (Waterman, 2004: 56), while Eloise Harding (2008) has rightly noted the continuities between current movements such as the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army (CIRCA) and the Situationist theory of horizontal, deterritorialising revolt. It may be argued that because many people do not believe in power through conventional politics, they are increasingly sympathetic to direct action. This gives rise to network-based, non-hierarchical organisational forms.

The movements in question are able to take action without the need for a leader and without any individual having a privileged insight, or even being able to conceptualise the characteristics of the whole. The more radical among them define themselves in terms of ‘direct action’ or ‘do-it-yourself’, as a systematic, autonomous alternative to taking power or making demands on those in power. Across the various newer social movements, there is an emphasis upon participation, antipathy to hierarchy, alternative processes of decision-making such as consensus decision-making and direct democracy, respect for difference and an assertion of unity in diversity. The project which unites these movements is less the capture of the state apparatus and more the construction of an open and transnational public sphere and a rhizomatic extension of struggles which are linked through weak ties. These groups are able to utilise new technologies such as the Internet very effectively because of the structural similarities between such new media and the organisational forms of the groups themselves, though they also draw on and
arise partly from established traditions of network activity which are derived from persistent indigenous approaches and earlier forms of subaltern resistance.

The network forms of these groups has been variously characterised as rhizomatic, netwar, or SPIN. This SPIN concept, a precursor of the netwar concept, was proposed by Luther Gerlach and Virginia Hine in the 1960s to depict U.S. social movements. It anticipates many points about network forms of organization that are now coming into focus in the analysis not only of social movements but also some terrorist, criminal, ethno-nationalist, and fundamentalist organizations (Gerlach and Hine, 1970; Gerlach, 1987). Global activist networks have many centres or hubs, but unlike their predecessors, those hubs are less likely to be defined around prominent leaders; hence they do not constitute ‘trunks’. Movement integration has shifted from ideological integration towards more personal and fluids forms of association based on weak ties and informal connective structures.

These theoretical discussions also have pertinence in understanding the warring factions in the ‘war on terror’. When Žižek terms al-Qaeda ‘the ultimate rhizomatic machine, omnipresent, yet with no clear territorial base’ (Žižek, 2002: 35), he exaggerates a little: al-Qaeda is based on rigid categories of identity and exclusion, and also has a formal leadership hierarchy. However, his basic point is valid: its operation is effective largely because it moves outside the framework established by the global power system. Writing in Time Magazine, Phillip Bobbit makes the point very clearly. ‘Al-Qaeda is a new and profoundly dangerous kind of organisation – a “virtual state”, borderless but global in scope’ (Bobbit, 9 September 2002). Arguments like these are not new, having previously been made about social movements more broadly (Landow 1997). It may be that ‘al-Qaeda’ is a special instance of a change in the structures of global power with wide-ranging implications. While the concrete characteristics of political Islam as a reactive form complicate its position in our discussion, its capabilities partly express those of the network-form more broadly, deployed to particular, reactive ends.

This idea has been fundamental in Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s works on conflict in the information age. They basically argue that hierarchies have a difficult time fighting networks (e.g. Colombia, Algeria, the Zapatistas). It takes networks to fight networks and whoever masters the network form first and with the most success will gain major advantages (2001). What Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue is that terrorists will continue moving from hierarchical to information-age network designs and that within groups ‘great man leaderships will give way to flatter decentralised systems. This way more effort will go into building arrays of transnationally internetted groups than into building state-alone groups’ (Lesser et al. 1999). As a result, power seems to be migrating to nonstate actors, who are able to organise into ‘sprawling multi-organizational networks’, which are more flexible and responsive than hierarchies in reacting to outside developments and are better than hierarchies at using information to improve decision-making (ibid. 45).

Hashim has analysed the Iraqi resistance as an instance of this kind of ‘netwar’ organization. He distinguishes hierarchical organizations with well-defined command
chains from horizontal decentralized or networked organizations which can be described as ‘loose’ and ‘flat’, with fluid or less distinct boundaries between its various subunits. Such organizations have leadership but are weak because of cultural and environmental factors (i.e. kinship or traditional ties within the leadership) or to the lack of any particular skills that identify one person over another as designated leader. In Iraq, some of the early insurgent groups or groups were made up of family members of neighbour friends. Decentralized insurgent groups are characterized by the fluidity and lack of constancy in membership (Hashim, 2006: 152-4). Although Hashim suggests that an entirely decentralized insurgency would not be sustainable, and that the Iraqi insurgents have exhibited both organizational types (2006: 155), he leaves a general impression that the network form has become predominant. The situation in Iraq might be called a ‘low-intensity, localized and decentralized insurgency’, with large numbers of decentralized insurgent groups engaging in violence to disrupt and remove US presence’ (Hashim 2006).

The power of networks: weapons of the weak

On the eve of the Iraq war, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan famously remarked that there are now two superpowers, America and ‘public opinion’. This statement is open to a variety of interpretations. Most probably, ‘public opinion’ connotes the supposed power of the included stratum. But more seriously, one might suggest that any global power will be pitted against a second superpower in the form of the power of the excluded, organised in networks, to disrupt, frustrate and defeat top-down control – the centrifugal power of networks of resistance.

Deleuze and Guattari argue that there is a basic conflict between denumerable and nondenumerable sets, and the power of minorities is the power to ‘bring to bear the force of the nondenumerable sets, however small they may be, against the denumerable sets’ (1987: 471). This is not a power of the same type as that of the dominant forces, but puts in motion a different kind of resistant and transformative force. As Saskia Sassen argues, powerlessness is complex because the excluded can make history (2006: 321).

Networks have certain strengths, which it is hard for hierarchical organisations to counter. As Arrighi has argued, ‘the shift of the confrontation between systemic and antisystemic forces onto non-conventional terrain was strengthening the latter and hampering/paralyzing the former’ in the Vietnam era and after, leading to the growth of new, non-centralised and non-statist antisystemic movements (Arrighi, 1989: 36). In the future, this may lead to the breakdown of the power of hierarchies entirely. At present, hierarchies retain some advantages arising from technology and sheer destructive capability. They are, however, largely dependent on networks (or on the recuperation of networks) for their ability to produce positive results, as distinct from simply devastation. Therefore, as Mann has argued, resistance may not prevent conquest, but it can prevent ‘pacification’ and hence achievement of imperial objectives (Mann, 2005).

It appears at present that the state is resurgent, but this could be a swansong as the state reacts against network forms with increasing aggression. In a long-term perspective, the
state as a social form seems to be in decline from its heyday, no longer appearing as
effective as in the post-1945 period. The state, Sassen argues, is much slower than
digitized transactions and networks, and it may never be able to catch up (Sassen 2006: 327). In this sense, the present may be an interregnum where the state is in the process of
dying but is still preventing networks (of various kinds) from taking its place. If
networks come to proliferate, and the (mainly military) advantages of state power are
mitigated (perhaps by means of better defence against air power), the state project will be
the big loser from the current conjuncture. Spaces will then come under the control of
whoever or whichever force can influence local networks. This will lead to contestation
between the four remaining forces – affinity networks, ethnoreligious networks, a newlt
networked capitalism of world cities, and the logic of the included.

*The classic account: James Scott’s ‘arts of resistance’*

The power of networks in everyday life has been formulated in the classic accounts of
James Scott (1990). Scott analyses in peasant societies and various other settings a range
of ‘arts of resistance’ which retain relevance across a range of social sectors. He views
dominatory societies as operating in terms of a constant, invisible struggle or
‘infrapolitics’, where both sides – dominator and dominated – seek to expand the space of
their power. ‘Infrapolitics is… real politics… conducted in more earnest, for higher
stakes, and against greater odds’ than formal politics. ‘Real ground is lost and gained.
Armies are undone and revolutions facilitated… De facto property rights are established
and challenged. States confront fiscal crises or crises of accumulation… Resistant
subcultures of dignity and vengeful dreams are nurtured’ (Scott, 1990: 200).

Scott portrays infrapolitical conflict as a kind of permanent antagonism between
contending social groups or logics. The poor make a never-ending attempt to locate and
force acceptance of a margin allowing the poor a territory (Scott, 1985: 255), while the
dominant try to put boundaries against resistance beyond a certain point by using fear of
repression (Scott, 1985: 275-7). Everyday resistance constantly tests limits of the system
and stretches its resources (Scott, 1990:194-5) – presses like water against a dam (ibid.
195). Indeed, Scott portrays the conflict as not only infrapolitics but low-intensity war,
usually kept “cold” because of risk, but constantly subject to “war news” of feints,
counterfeints, threats, small skirmishes and propaganda (Scott, 1985: 22). With both
sides seeking to maximise space, ‘any ground left undefended is likely to be ground lost’
(Scott, 1990: 195). The dominated seek to minimise or even overcome domination by
‘setting a course at the very perimeter of what the authorities are obliged to permit or
unable to prevent’ (Scott, 1990: 138-9).

Scott typically discusses resistance by the dominated in terms of the mobilisation of
informal networks similar to our concept of the affinity-network form. He argues for
instance that everyday resistance is well-suited to avoid surveillance because of its
reliance on informal networks (1990: 200), and that peasant action, usually leaderless,
tends to avoid cooption but is better suited to attrition than confrontation (Scott, 1985:
297). These network relations, opaque to those in power, can generate anonymous action
by crowds (Scott, 1990:151). In this context, peasant action comes to seem a Deleuzian
war-machine. Scott suggests that hidden transcripts often have nomadic carriers (storytellers etc) and separate organisations (guilds, sects) which rely on the dominated for income (Scott, 1990: 124).

The various modalities of resistance discussed in Scott’s numerous works, as well as related texts such as those of the Subaltern Studies school (Guha 1999), are too numerous to list here. To explain briefly, resistance is taken by Scott to express a ‘hidden transcript’ or alternative account of social events which constructs a dissident worldview among the oppressed. The ‘hidden transcript’ of the dominated it kept alive in concealed spaces, in ambiguous and contestable public performances which are decontested ‘offstage’, and in spaces of suspension such as carnival. Hidden transcripts require spaces outside control (not ‘power-laden’ by elite power), which are deterritorialised and become distinct existential territories (Scott 1985: 328). Scott suggests peasants prefer to disguise resistance, resorting to dramatic measures only when disguised ones fail or when subsistence is threatened (Scott, 1990: 86). Insurrections happen when either the ‘dam wall’ is weakened or the force of popular pressure increases (ibid. 219); it also requires overcoming a sense of inevitability of the dominant system (ibid. 220). The switch from everyday resistance to revolution ‘is usually a sign of great desperation’ (Scott, 1985: xvi). Strategies of resistance can involve a front which appears as a discourse of inclusion; demands for rights, even if deferential, often include a hidden “or else” (ibid. 95-6). In his fieldwork in Malaysia, he came across examples such as a conflict over fixed versus subsistence-responsive rents and nighttime anonymous sabotage of combine harvesters (Scott, 1985:152-3, 248-9).

Scott’s work has been largely confirmed by other accounts of peasant activity, which further reinforce the (partial) connection of such activity to the affinity-network form. Partha Chatterjee for instance has argued that peasant action is opposite of systemic or bourgeois politics. ‘These solidarities do not grow because individuals feel they can come together with others on the basis of their common individual interests: on the contrary, individuals are enjoined to act within a collectivity because, it is believed, bonds of solidarity that tie them together already exist’ (1993:163). Peasants do not appeal to contracts or interests, but to brotherhood (ibid.165). Peasant politics – and politics wherever the state meets popular political discourse – is not a matter of group interests and alliances but of networks of kinship (real or imagined), solidarity and love (ibid. 225). Similarly, Graham Harrison argues that peasants resist by sabotage and subterfuge aimed to render a project defunct without making clear the origin of the failure in peasant action (2002: 46). Historians of everyday life have discovered similar phenomena in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Nazi Germany (Kotkin, 1992; Fitzpatrick, 1994; Peukert 1987; Broszat 1982; Echikson 1989). Keesing (1992) has found similar phenomena as part of indigenous strategies of cultural survival, while a Zapatista short story (Marcos et al, 2001) mobilises visibly Scottian themes. Hecht and Simone (1994) have documented similar phenomena in urban shanty-towns, while Lomnitz (1988) has shown the pervasiveness and centrality of reciprocity networks to urban survival. Scott’s own sources for Domination and the Arts of Resistance range from studies of tsarist Russia and peasants in Andalucia to scholarship on experiences of African slavery in the Americas. The similarities between peasants and other oppressed groups – slaves, serfs,
workers, prisoners, subjects of totalitarian societies – across a wide range of settings suggest that Scott has discovered a type of political struggle which arises wherever people build up a repertoire of tactics and knowledges in a context of oppression, providing a kind of ‘how-to’ of networked resistance, a nomad science of counter-power.

Scott’s account is sometimes criticized for exaggerating the extent to which peasants offer an alternative to the dominant system. Their syncretic readings do not dispense with hierarchy and may reproduce it, in the form of the “good” king or messiah, even after a successful insurrection. Scott’s accounts tend to ignore reactive aspects of the hidden transcript. In his fieldwork in *Weapons of the Weak*, for instance, everyday resistance dovetails with support for the opposition party PAS, a populist party associated with anti-Chinese racism. Scott also largely ignores the position of women in the village he studies. Chatterjee has argued, contrary to Scott’s view, that there is a layering in popular beliefs of simultaneous acceptance and rejection of domination (Chatterjee 1993: 183-4). Accounts of experiences of racial subalternity in Fanon (1967) and Gordon (1964) similarly suggest more ambiguity in relation to dominant conceptions than Scott allows, suggesting that one has to work through identification with dominant categories to thoroughly reject oppression. One may therefore be dealing more often than Scott allows with issues of ‘common sense’ versus ‘good sense’, of divisions within the agency of the oppressed, and not simply with social antagonisms. This problem can be overcome by reading Scott as discussing resistance as ‘abstract machine’, whereas actual resistances might be ‘contaminated’ by the logic of ‘common sense’ as well. At the same time, one should take seriously Scott’s conclusion that the oppressed are on some level already angry but have learned to ‘swallow’ their anger, and his argument that subaltern groups generally do not accept their ‘inferior’ or degraded status (1985: 279, 329).

A more worrying problem is that the account explicitly excludes certain kinds of contemporary society. Scott rather arbitrarily limits his account to explicit cases of domination, ignoring the extent to which the same techniques of control are operative in the dominant system in the west as well. One can see in autonomist social movements, which push the boundaries of surveillance and control and periodically produce insurrectionary outbursts in western societies, a phenomenon very similar to Scott’s examples of resistance, down to certain of the modalities (such as crowd anonymity and carnivalesque). David Matza (1964) and Colin Ward (1978) have found similar phenomena in relation to youth deviance in western societies, while Goffman (1960) has documented similar phenomena in carceral institutions. There are also similarities with the strategies of working-class resistance documented by the Italian autonomists (e.g. Alquati (n.d.), Bologna (1977) and others such as Fantasia (1982)), while Scottian public performances are echoed in the subvertisements and détournements of Situationism. In other words, the relevance of Scott’s ‘arts of resistance’ is not at all limited to those parts of the world where peasant communities are still prevalent.

There is an appearance that ostensibly democratic societies should not require hidden transcripts since there are no formal, generic prohibitions on subversive ideas of the kind existing in the societies studied by Scott. In some ways, however, the controls, while often more subtle, are actually more extreme. To begin with, in mass societies, there is a
risk of the hidden transcript being coopted in alienated form by the system and sold back to the dominated as signs. Another danger is that the degree of surveillance and control undermines the emergence of sites. Les Hearn has documented the centrality of opaque sites to working-class resistance; the loss or taming of these sites has been central to the domestication of the working class (cited Scott, 1985: 300). Finally, it is still rather dangerous to express overtly insurrectionary ideas in a great many of the ostensibly free western societies, as cases such as the imprisonment of Antonio Negri, the GANDALF trial and various ‘anti-terror’ thought-crime laws demonstrate. The extension of Scott’s research to the study of the excluded and marginalised in the contemporary west is overdue.

**Generic advantages of networks**

While it is common for statists to extol the strengths of centralised organisation and bemoan the weaknesses of networks, the growing adoption of network forms even by hierarchical organisations such as states and corporations is suggestive of distinct strategic advantages to the network form. Their relative social density, invisibility, impermeability and non-dependence on any single node are central to these advantages. One characteristic of recent networks – both affinity networks such as those of summit protests, ‘Black Blocs’ and groups like the ELF, and reactive networks such as ‘al-Qaeda’ and far-right instances of ‘leaderless resistance’, is that they have defining principles which make someone an affiliate by simply acting on them – principles as opposed to a leadership. This has several effects even beyond those of the traditional cell structure. These movements cannot be ‘beheaded’ by targeting their leaders. They cannot be recuperated through negotiations with the leadership. This means they tend to survive both addition and subtraction of axioms intact.

This is not only true at the ‘high’ end of armed conflict, but also the ‘low’ end of everyday resistance. The strength of informal networks and multiple channels in avoiding state control has been noted by Scott (1990: 200, 1985: 297) and Harrison (2004: 45). Other advantages of everyday resistance over formal organisation have been discussed in detail by Piven and Cloward (1978). An effective strategy of resistance does not therefore lie along the course of greater formal organisation, but rather in terms of multiplying and increasing the power of attraction of multiple alternatives and strategies outside the system.

**The loss of military advantage by states**

A third situation which has tipped the global balance towards networks is that, while states still have a terrifying destructive potential, their ability to win consistently in local battles over wide terrain has been seriously compromised by the emergence of guerrilla warfare and the proliferation of small-arms. This has prevented the state from deterring conflict. Mann has argued that a ‘second revolution in military affairs (RMA)’ has threatened military power because weaker and smaller states and armed opposition groups are strong in war. This is because expensive technological armies are still vulnerable to cheap small-arms such as AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades, and
because of tactics such as suicide bombing and cheap weapons of mass destruction (2005: 40-3). All these weapons work best ‘where lightly networked guerrillas challenge failing states’ (ibid. 44). Pieterse similarly argues that states can no longer guarantee their power with force of arms due to spread of small arms (2004: 97). Bromley argues that asymmetrical conflict is hard, maybe impossible to deter; deterrence also can’t operate when an enemy is not concerned for survival or when antagonism is absolute (Bromley, 2006: 58).

This particular instance of the loss of state power is a mixed blessing for social networks. While it certainly helps groups such as the Zapatistas, it has been of greater benefit to reactive networks and capitalist-linked extraction gangs. In addition, the weapons in question retain a statist inscription, being most effective in organised armies and relying on a technological backdrop of dependence on arms manufacturers. As offensive weapons, they also tend to increase the offensive, arborescent power of armed groups over unarmed populations (Mann 2005: 44). In addition to the literal weapons, however, state military power has been undermined by the spread of other tactics of resistance, ranging from sabotage and the low-technology of Molotov cocktails, white overalls and street armour to the various types of non-violent direct action which have become increasingly widespread since their relatively recent emergence. If the emergence of new techniques of resistance increases at the rate it has in the last century or so, states could easily find their expensive military and policing machines paralysed by the next wave of low-cost items – one might speculate about such things as the growth of cheap robotics, the emergence of electronics-jamming, the use of remote-control devices to avoid detection, and so on.

Migration, exodus and the subversion of borders

The situation of prevalent global flows creates instability in relation to borders, decreasing the ability of states to block cross-border flows. This produces new possibilities for networks. Sassen has argued that the decline of the nation-state leads to exit options for the disadvantaged (2006: 422). ‘Immigration is one of the constitutive processes of globalization today’ even though rarely recognised as such (ibid. 315). Specifics of transboundary networks and formations bring “global civil society” into ‘the daily spaces of people rather than on some global stage’, including of the poor who cannot travel; in the global city, even the disadvantaged develop global strategies (ibid. 318). This leads to the possibility of transversal networks operating across the system’s boundaries. ‘Undocumented immigrants develop informal, covert, often extra-statal strategies and networks connecting them with communities in their native countries’ (ibid. 296). Similarly, Watkins argues that economic migration is a political response to conditions created by TNC mobility, a kind of resistance (Watkins 1998: 92). The importance for the struggle against statism of affirming the corrosion of borders has not been lost on activists in networks such as ‘No Borders’. An anarchist author on the topic suggests that immigration is mainly motivated by capitalist control over southern economies, denying basic freedom. Immigrants seek more control over their lives by migrating, and this is disliked by the state because it is a loss of control, especially given the social density of migrant communities (Anon, 2003).
In addition to literal border-crossing, the current situation also seems particularly fruitful for forms of hybridity which undermine dominant categories. This can be recuperated by official doctrines of multiculturalism and mestizaje, but it can also lead to openings to difference and transversality. For instance, Hernandez analyses aspects of the Chicano/a movement as indigenista, or becoming-indigenous, counterposed to conservative forms of cultural nationalism (2007:128-9). Uri Gordon makes a similar point about joint action in Palestine: ‘while the creation and fostering of spaces which facilitate mutual aid between Palestinians and Israelis is indeed required, only such spaces which are ones of rebellion and struggle can honestly stand up to the charge of false normalisation and ‘coexistence’… Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in militant but non-violent action is inherently powerful because it enacts a dramatic, 90-degree flip of perspective: the ‘horizontal’ imagery of conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is displaced by the ‘vertical’ one of struggle between people and government’ (2007: 161).

Virtual networks and cyber-activism

Another new advantage available to networks is the parallel network form of new technologies, particularly the Internet. Arrighi has argued that electronification undermines spatial regulation (1989:114). Particularly relevant is how the structure of the internet itself (a global network with no central authority) has offered another experience of governance (no governance), time and space (compression), ideology (freedom of information and access to it), identity (multiplicity) and fundamentally an opposition to surveillance and control, boundaries and hierarchic apparatuses (Karatzogianni 2006). The Internet, as a facility for inter-networking, an open institution in Illich’s sense, is ethically contrary to impulses towards regulation and governance (Mueller 1998). In the final analysis, new information-age ideologies could be easily arguing for a transfer of virtual social and political structures to the real-life world, reversing for once the existing process of imitating real life in cyberspace. There is the possibility of a threshold effect in cyber-activism of constituting transboundary publics and imaginaries and instituting a novel spatio-temporal order which is instantaneous and future-oriented (Sassen 2006: 376-8). The form of the internet itself is a message, a symbolic challenge to dominant patterns of hierarchical structures of governance. The Internet for instance is a typical rhizomatic structure and the groups using it are rhizomatic in character because they seem to have no leader, coming together for an event (for example anti-globalisation protests or hacking enemy websites) and dissolving again back to their own ceaselessly changing line of flight into the adventitious underground stems and aerial roots of the rhizome (Karatzogianni, 2006). Activists use the Internet to link campaigns, making the global into a resource for the local, and also use it to coordinate events such as summit protests (Sassen, 2006: 338-9). Kavada (2009) has analysed this process in concrete terms in relation to organising the European Social Forum. It is important to stress the impact of new communication technologies on these movements, because in several instances the internet has been responsible for the rapid cross-border diffusion of movement ideas and organisation of protest and even the globality of protest itself.
We do not wish to slip into technological determinism here. High technology always raises issues because of mediation and its dependence on systems of resource extraction. Paradoxically, cyberspace is more concrete for social movements than formal politics because less mediated (Sassen, 2006: 374). Internet openness is also under attack from ‘zoning’ (discrimination in access) (ibid. 332) as well as more conventional forms of censorship, though at present hacktivists are staying ahead of statists in fields such as deniable encryption, proxy servers and routing around national firewalls. Even in the field of unequal access, there has been ‘highly creative’ use of the Internet by some grassroots groups, such as downloading audio files to play over loudspeakers to poor illiterate people without internet access (ibid. 367-8). Arrighi has also warned that e-networks are constructed to enable power to flow outward and information inward (1989: 75). Evidence from the workplace has been mixed, with the Internet being used for regimes of hyper-surveillance as well as to enable more open structures. The point is not that the Internet is inherently ‘good’, but that it is open, in the current setting, to novel uses by social networks. The specific rationalities of social actors determine whether tech capabilities get used, underused, or not used (Sassen, 2006: 341). For instance, Sassen cites Eickelman and Anderson (2003) who found that traditional readers of the Quran make more sophisticated internet users than modern Muslim youths. Their mediating culture leads them to make better use of the capabilities of the technology (ibid. 348). Similarly in the case of the Zapatistas, the Internet contributed to their networking only because of its connections to pre-existing social networks (ibid. 368). The Internet is open to tool-like uses, but also to passive uses in line with the dominant alienated system. Nevertheless, its capabilities strengthen those of social networks.

Network weaknesses: the problem of fatigue

One persistent problem with networks should also be noted as a recurring weakness. A major difficulty of network movements based on active desires and projects is that they rely on constantly being recreated, energised and maintained; they do not simply persist as bureaucratic organisations do (or more accurately, the high level of intensity associated with visible manifestations often cannot be sustained). Small changes in the situation can disorient effective movements (notice for instance the near-dissolution of the American wing of anti-capitalist after 911). Resistance often depends on maintenance of high levels of intense active energies, so that fatigue, as something which saps these energies, is often fatal. Persistent revolts or campaigns require a constant high level of mobilisation, which is difficult to sustain, especially in the absence of victories or hope of an end. The risks of disempowerment are great. Agamben has argued that where singularities peacefully demonstrate being-in-common there is risk of Tiananmen (1993: 87).

As activism relies on bursts of intense energy, authoritarians frequently seek to simply wait out waves of activism or revolt, letting the movement use up its own energy without making concessions. This seems to have been the case for instance in Oaxaca in 2006, in France in 2005 and Greece in 2008. It has been suggested that this is the reason the coup in Chile in 1973 was able to defeat mass opposition: a series of false alarms and a constant ‘strategy of tension’ wore down the ability to respond to the real coup when it
came. Finding ways to either sustain, redistribute or reactivate energy is crucial to rendering this tactic ineffective. This is a difficult question since one is dealing with affective/emotional reactions not organisational responses (which being based in passivity, have more regularity). Movements linked to persistent communities may be more resilient than those arising from looser networks, but this insight is hard to put to political effect. The most effective way to date that has been found to keep movements going over time has been the tactic of variable intensity. Ramachandra Guha has noted in the case of Uttarakhand that resistance continues constantly, but with more and less intense periods (1989: 125). Similar observations have been made by Crabtree of Bolivian protests (Crabtree 2005), and would seem to apply to other prolonged movements such as the Manipur unrest (which went through several peaks and troughs) and the PAD mobilisation (which featured rotating occupiers).

**Affinity-networks as global alternative**

In addition to its analytical usefulness for understanding the current situation, the concept of affinity-networks provides a potential future course which would be an escape-route from the world-system. As we have seen above, world-systems analysts have often suggested three options of where the world could go from here – US-led global empire, East Asian-led world market society, or what is referred to as ‘global chaos’ (e.g. Arrighi, 2007: 7; 164), or in Chew’s model, as a collapse of civilisation (2006). With American empire in decline following the failure in Iraq, and ‘chaos’ usually associated with an excluded Real of untamed violence and horror, theorists look to the Chinese option or some other potential hegemon (Europe, a reunified South…), hence accepting the preservation of alienation and of many aspects of the world-system as a price to be paid for social peace.

One could, however, theorise the third option of ‘chaos’ in rather more affirmative terms. In authors such as Graeme Chesters (2006) and Hakim Bey (2003), the idea of ‘chaos’ is given positive overtones connected to those of Chaos Theory, as a proliferation of nondenumerable and uncontrollable affirmative forces in a situation of complexity and decentred power. This is the affirmative, active underpinning to the image of chaos or ‘anarchy’ as terrifying Real in royal science, which renders it unthinkable by identifying meaning with order and systematicity, but which also rightly perceived the threat posed by the diffusion of active forces to all the various master-signifiers and ‘trunks. The breakdown of world order could involve the diffusion of power on models similar to those in indigenous societies as theorised by Clastres. The ‘capabilities’ developed by global resistance movements could then become a new ‘organising logic’ pitted against the world system, replacing control-systems with horizontal social and ecological relations (Sassen, 2006).

One could even see ‘chaos’ in terms of an affirmative entropy whereby life returns to colonise the dead spaces of alienation whenever the level of control is lessened or breaks down. Life will expand to encroach into whatever spaces are left unattended; surveillance and repression are never final, but require an ongoing “subsumption” (ditto
We are here proposing a distinct model of social transformation – a ‘third alternative’ to old or new hegemon – which is similar to but more precise than those proposed by the various philosophies of resistance in everyday life, such as autonomism, Situationism, the Frankfurt School and authors such as Lefebvre. What these currents have in common is an enthusiasm to locate everyday life as the site both of persistent repression and of resistance, and in particular, to seek some kind of autonomous logic of ‘life’ or the ‘everyday’ or the non-alienated which resists and overcomes domination in everyday sites. To be sure, this reflects empirical awareness of how resistance in fact happens, but it leaves a lot unanswered in terms of what the site of autonomy entails. These perspectives are sometimes accused (rather unfairly) of ‘essentialism’ because it is assumed that they believe in an essence of the self, the body, the social or some such which remains untouched by domination and alienation. In addition, by failing to distinguish clearly the boundary between complicity and resistance, or by locating it only at the point of total rupture, they often end up with some mixture of the construction of non-oppression as positive pole (as in the Marxist idea of species-being), which risks creating a new ‘trunk’, a groundless taking of sides (anything of a particular oppressed group as right), which is a ‘trunk’ by default, or externalistic formalism (emphasis on democratic or community control for instance), which can lead back into the ‘included’ stratum via the addition of axioms. We would suggest that what is expressed by ideas of a subjectivity in ‘life’ and the everyday in these various theories is best conceptualised in terms of the affinity-network as an alternative form to hierarchies. This leads to a clear sense of where everyday revolution comes from – from the construction of social relations which are horizontal, rhizomatic and transversal, instead of (or to partly replace) inserting oneself into dominant systemic relations. Alternative network forms are structurally different from dominant hierarchic forms, and the society they form operates differently, by a different social logic.

Our position is similar to that of Giorgio Agamben, who argues that a new form of political subjectivity is emerging which renders the state irrelevant, and itself irrelevant to the state. ‘The novelty of the coming politics is that it will no longer be a struggle for the conquest or control of the State, but a struggle between the State and the non-State (humanity), an insurmountable disjunction between whatever singularity and the State organization’ (1993: 85). The state can incorporate any identity – what it cannot tolerate is that singularities form a community without affirming an identity, that humans co-belong without any representable condition of belonging’ (ibid. 86). Hence, the emerging society is such that it does not have any common ground with the dominant system. ‘A being radically devoid of any representable identity would be absolutely irrelevant to the State’ (ibid. 86). We would argue that this ‘coming community’ is a
society based on the affinity-network form, which is already emerging, indeed already exists, in practices of everyday resistance, autonomous social movements and indigenous societies.

There are of course a wide variety of hybrid forms of network, many of which involve the mobilisation of networks in support of hierarchies. The affinity-network form, like all abstract machines, can exist in various complex assemblages with other abstract machines, and, while this most typically involves recuperation by hierarchies, it is an empirical question in each case as to which abstract machine is dominant. For example, Leach (1954) shows that hierarchical and non-hierarchical models of local politics can coexist in unstable and oscillating combinations on the margins of hierarchic polities (cited Gledhill 2000: 38). Hecht and Simone (1994) suggest that the diffusion of everyday politics in African societies succeeds in dissolving the power of hierarchical assemblages through indeterminable hybrid forms. Hence, it sometimes seems that, at marginal sites, the network-form is already dominant, and is already ‘using’ rather than being ‘used’ by the rival hierarchical logics (though it is less clear whether it is affinity-networks or reactive networks which prevail). The question, therefore, of which element predominates in hybrid assemblages is an empirical question which should be examined carefully in each case.

The affinity-network form

Since we have defined the affinity-network as a social form, we should delineate some of its characteristics. The affinity-network form itself is based on addition, not subtraction. Since it has no trunk defining the relationship between inside and outside, it is potentially inclusive of singularities without any cut-off point. It is thus intimately connected to abundance as a way of life, and pitted against the logic of scarcity in the dominant, alienated system. It is also the standpoint of the outside of the dominant system (whether excluded or self-excluded). Hence it resonates with the idea of autonomy in autonomist works, and is antagonistic with the dominant system. To see from the standpoint of the excluded, or of one particular excluded group, including the general positions derived from minoritarianism (particularly regarding open space), leads to the active affinity form (whatever the specifics of the group). To see from the standpoint of the excluded/one excluded group but with an aspiration to majoritarian status leads to the reactive “predatory” network form. The affinity-network form is informal in the sense used by Sassen of digital networks – it cannot be captured in a legal persona, or indeed, any other representational form (Sassen 2006: 326). It is also based on affinity, not hegemony – it does not have a dominant ‘trunk’ which integrates it, but rather, each node connects to the others based on resonances and complementarities. Its localities are composed of affinity-groups in the case of social movements, or people and entities connected by relationalities such as actual and fictive kinship in the case of entire societies. Hence an affinity-network is also a rhizome, and emerges in or constructs smooth space. Affinity networks also do not have a moment of decision, defying the Schmittian paradigm. Decisions emerge in a distributed network simply as the entire configuration and disposition (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 338). In many cases they will not emerge at all.
To avoid confusion, several complications should be added. Firstly, while an affinity-network can be inclusive of everything at the level of content, it is necessarily incompatible with the hierarchical forms of state and capital. This means that, in practice, affinity-networks are often constructed as antagonistic, autonomous movements directed against definite adversaries. This is not the same, however, as the ‘constitutive exclusion’ found in reactive political forms. It is an antagonism which derives, not from an inner psycho-social need of network participants, but as a consequence of a social antagonism between ways of constructing social relations. Secondly, while affinity-networks are open-ended and inclusive, they do not construct the kind of all-encompassing, submersive holism typical of ideas of ‘community’, ‘multitude’ and so on. An affinity-network is by definition voluntary, and it functions by resonances and attractions, not forced participation. The principle of affinity is also self-limiting: while the network as a whole may encompass millions of people and entities, each node will tend to be small and intense, composed of a tightly functioning assemblage or a group of those whose resonances are especially strong. Finally, it should be added that an affinity-network is not necessarily a network only of humans, but can also refer to an ecological network composing an entire lifeworld. One can thus speak of the affinity-network form in cases (usually of indigenous peoples) where the entire lifeworld is lived as a web of connections and relations, and where the ‘object’ is eliminated from relations entirely. There may even be limit-cases where a person who appears socially disconnected is actually in intense network-relations with other types of entities, whereas the others from whom the person disconnects are highly alienated. Nevertheless, the usual model of affinity-networks suggests a deepening, intensifying and complexifying of relations to others. These are built, however, on the primacy of desiring-production over social production. ‘For others to interest me I must find in myself the energy for such an interest. What binds me to others must grow out of what binds me to the most exuberant and demanding part of my will to live – not the other way round’ (Vaneigem 1967: Chapter 4).

Rejecting hierarchical arrangements, an affinity-network constructs itself as an open-ended multiplicitly. Hence, as the Uwa Declaration puts it, ‘the coming together of many voices, hands, cries… etc., make people free from aggressors and destroyers’. ‘The key points of departure, then, are a strong sense of connectedness to the places we inhabit and one another’ (McMarvill and los Ricos, n.d.). One may take the theme of ‘dignity’, arising in Zapatista discourse and resonating with many struggles in the global South, as expressing ideas of affinity rather than community in the traditional sense. ‘Dignity’ may be other not simply of disconnection from others but of predatory and instrumental relation to others, which arise from the simplification of emotional, social and ecological relations which arise from alienation and commercialism and which can also occur at extremes of desperation or from attachments such as addiction. One must thus contest the liberal assumption that the instrumental relation is basic to interpersonal relations. This is contradicted by the way in which it has to be constructed even within liberalism as a taming of the passions (Hirschman, 1997). We would maintain, rather, that the instrumental relation is a front to the world one must get beneath for ethnographic comprehension, a product of character-armour and social impoverishment. Indeed, it is a secondary formation blocking the direct resolution of problems via networks and
abundance. It interiorises scarcity as a mindset rather than a contingency, and hence reproduces it. What is needed to overcome predatory relations is to create enabling relations in which social and emotional goods are available by non-predatory means.

One must thus radically re-theorise wealth and poverty. We believe these are less accurately expressed in western thought than in indigenous conceptions which view wealth as a greater intensity of social and ecological relations on which one can draw for survival, wellbeing and intensity, and poverty is a lesser intensity or extent of such relations (see below). On this definition, phenomena such as addiction, reification, conformity, and exclusive in-groups, impoverish the entire field of affective connections, reducing the field to one or two connections and hence reducing the chance of productive connections. In autonomist terms, one could associate the two poles with social composition and decomposition respectively (leaving aside the teleological assumptions often projected onto the former). Social composition involves the construction of a dense web or network, whereas decomposition breaks down network connections and replaces them with hierarchical dyads of powerful and powerless.

‘Community’ may be an alternative to predatory relations, but only when it is non-identitarian and open to the other, hence becoming the bearer of a general hope to overcome existential scarcity. Otherwise, ‘community’, bounded by rules and exclusions, directed against inner or outer enemies, becomes itself simply another predatory reactive molar entity. An affinity web can realise such a situation of inclusion only if it does not have constitutive (as opposed to contingent) exclusions, and does not universalise any of its attributes. It is in motion as a constant flow of energy, but this is very different from totalitarian kind of ‘mobilisation’ (vertical, atomised, segmented) and from states of submersion where the collective is ‘on top of’ people to the point of deindividuation. The other is multiple – eco as well as social, open-ended, not majoritarian and not necessarily numerous. What is crucial is that the connections formed be active and affirmative, instead of people connecting to communities based on a reactive desire to conform or the lack of any alternative.

One might take as a model the form of organisation emerging from the Open Source community. Merten has argued that the Open Source model provides an alternative to social hierarchies. ‘Not being forced anymore to compete against each other, people could take the freedom to cooperate as they please. Similarly as with GNU/Linux, parallel developments are possible, but co-operation between different people or groups of people would dominate. So, competition - and thus a permanent center of conflict - would no longer be built into the social system as it is today.’ (Merten Version 4, 12.12.2004 quoted in Karatzogianni and Michaelides 2009). Michel Bauwens has similarly argued: ‘Within the teams decision making is participative and consensual, and the global coordination is voluntarily accepted and today technically feasible. Small tribes, the victims of civilizational hierarchies, are re-enabled in the new format of affinity-based cyber-collectives’ (Bauwens 2007 quoted in Karatzogianni and Michaelides 2009). Postmonetary, postdemocratic, postcapitalist modes of value and exchange embedded or not in the system are the answer and solution to the structural crisis of contemporary capitalism (ibid. 2007).
One of us has argued previously that forms of leadership very different from formal organization have emerged in the Open Source/Free Software community, which appears as ‘not a formal organizational chart, but rather a status-based pecking order which is known to project participants and serves as a way of policing members’. (Karatzogianni and Michaelides 2009). Self-organisation viewed here as needing leadership of a sort, but it can be provided by ‘crypto-hierarchies’ without formal power, based on diffuse mechanisms of reputation. One can liken these unfixed ‘crypto-hierarchies’ to the stratifications of the wolf-pack discussed as a molecular form by Deleuze and Guattari (1987), and to the function of the chief in Clastres. Crypto-hierarchies do not necessarily involve the concentrated power of formal organisations in that leaders depend on support of base which can be withdrawn at any time leading to forks, even to the isolation of a former leader. The intensity of networking seems to increase the turnover of leaders. The crucial question for the affinity-network logic is how to avoid these kinds of differentiations hardening into full-scale hierarchies. One possibility is that branching and forking, where networks split internally into different nodes or break out to form new networks, operate to ward off the congealing of power. If hierarchy is connected to functional issues of scale and resultant coordinating functions, the diffusion instead of concentration of agency should prevent the emergence of hardened hierarchies.

Does the affinity-network form exist?

A problem should here be addressed. Most of the accounts of the forces active in the present world, from mainstream geopolitics to world-systems analysis, neglect the affinity-network form entirely. The three alternatives in Barber’s Jihad versus McWorld (1996), the three possibilities for the world in Arrighi’s various works, and other analyses of this type, typically pose an alternative between capitalism, the state and the included, or between neoliberal capitalism and a more inclusive capitalism, or between capitalism, reactive networks and the included. The kind of phenomena we understand in relation to the affinity-network category – autonomous social movements, indigenous societies, networks of the excluded – are viewed as small-scale, largely irrelevant, extremely marginal or powerless – certainly not as the beginnings of a new world. Why do we assume that these phenomena prefigure a wider alternative? Does the affinity-network form even exist?

We would respond that the invisibility of affinity-networks is a product of a perspectival distortion. Affinity networks by their very nature often pursue invisibility or are rendered invisible by the dominant frame of representation. Exercising forms of power, which are centrifugal, they are easily obscured by frames focused on the ability to exercise ‘power-over’. In addition, there are strong psychological reasons for those with attachments to the various alienated groups (even the ‘included’ stratum) to deny the anxiety-inducing power of excluded networks. And we would expect emerging logics to be less clearly articulated than dominant logics. As Negri argues, the transformative moment appears as ‘fireworks and flares’, not as a clear trajectory (2003: 47). If we adopt a long-term perspective, furthermore, the wave of popular protest (in spite of its intensity in the period following Seattle) is actually in downturn. Brand’s (1990) analysis of cycles of
protest dates in Britain, America and Germany places the peak periods of unrest at 1830-50, 1890-1910 and 1960-80. If this suggests a recurring cyclical pattern, this would locate next wave roundabout 2020-30 onwards.

Some authors have gone some way in recognising the alternative logic of networks. Hardt and Negri, for example, have typified summit protests and unrest such as in Argentina as examples of a distributed network form of organisation, ‘the most fully realized political example we have of the concept of the multitude’ (2004: 217). Similarly, anarchist scholar Grubacic has argued that anarchism cannot exist as a stable tendency over time, as this implies parties etc; instead expresses a general tendency to identify hierarchy and seek autonomy from it, and varies with cycles of struggle. It has therefore operated as an organising logic of the WSF and similar phenomena, without being adopted as a hegemonic ideology (Grubacic, 2004: 35-6). The affinity-network logic becomes more easily apparent when hybrid and syncretic concrete expressions are included. If we include the widest range of phenomena which exist somewhere on the continuum between affinity-networks and reactive networks – from indigenous societies and subsistence producers to informal economies, diasporas, groups on the margins of global cities, reciprocity networks in shanty-towns and the full range of networked insurgencies – the potential scale and power of the network logic appears as massive, as a potential earth-shattering force.

**Affinity and reactive networks and the question of scarcity**

Why do networks sometimes take an affinity form and sometimes a reactive form? Our suspicion is that the two kinds of networks exist on a continuum, with situations of abundance and scarcity tending to produce oscillations towards one pole or the other. In G. William Skinner’s study of Chinese peasants, the image of peasants as traditionalist and closed is challenged by showing that villagers’ responses to external opportunities and dangers led to changes in the normative sphere of peasant life. Whereas an open context led to openness, a hostile situation with external instability led to greater closure and normative intolerance (Skinner 1971). This suggests that a real external threat can generate or at least strengthen local reactive forces, and that a safe ‘transversal’ context opens up communities whereas a dangerous ‘globalised’ context closes them. Other contexts suggest that the adoption of affinity or reactive alignments inflects whether differences are turned into advantages or problems. To return to the previously discussed work on Open Source, the research confirms that ‘[p]olarization increases when the group defines itself by contrast to another group; … depolarization can occur if there is external shock (new members, new arguments, new information). The lesson from group polarization is that social homogeneity can be damaging to good deliberation, something proven by better knowledge exchange in communities where conflict actually occurs’ (Karatzogianni and Michaelides, 2009).

The two tendencies can be theorised as active and reactive. According to Deleuze and Guattari, all desires infuse the social field, but divide into two types of ‘delirium’ or psychological complex, the ‘fascising [fascisant]’ type which disinvests every ‘free’
figure of desire and invests central sovereignty, and the ‘schizorevolutionary type or pole that follows the lines of escape of desire; breaches the wall and causes flows to move; assembles its machines and its groups-in-fusion in the enclaves or at the periphery’, producing an inverse effect (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 277). Societies often experience extraordinary oscillations of desire between the poles (ibid.). The authors term gangs, ethnic groups and similar phenomena as ‘neoarchaisms’ – localities capitalism axiomatises from earlier periods, which form spontaneously, or which the state creates to manage flows. They argue that these social forms are capable either of freeing a revolutionary charge or nourishing fascism (ibid. 257-8). Through these ‘neoarchaisms’ one ends up with a return to indigeneity: changing areas is like changing tribes in some American cities (Guattari, 1984: 36). In our terms, the fascisizing or paranoiac pole would be considered to constitute reactive networks, the schizorevolutionary pole would be identified with active affinity-networks. Specific networks are constantly pulled between the two possibilities, with the conditions of one or the other determined by the opening or closure or relations and the orientation to abundance or scarcity.

A world based on affinity-networks would involve what Marshall Sahlins terms ‘primitive abundance’, escaping the psychological ties of scarcity so crucial to alienation. As we have seen above, scarcity is in any case usually an artificial construct which the system has to work to keep operative. Scarcity as psychological state is built into capitalism and actualised through phenomena such as dispossession, manufactured desires, escalation and self-frustrating satisfactions, sign-value, etc. Some of these practices are psychological or symbolic, whereas others also have a corporeal or distributive dimension. Against this, one can put abundance as a psychological state and as a construct within social relations. This is difficult to sustain because of the fear and anxiety engendered by capitalist competition and statist repression, but it is constructed where affinity-networks are able to take hold. A lot depends on how people go about pursuing security from the anxiety associated with scarcity. In James Scott’s theory of moral economy, reciprocity networks provide a basis for ‘security’ because when there is material relative scarcity, the networks ensure everyone within the network is taken care of to a minimum degree (1977). Similarly in Jeffrey Race’s (1973) contrasting of American and insurgent versions of ‘security’ in Vietnam, the alternative to territorial control arises through the density of everyday networks, with confidence of everyday support operating as an alternative basis of security for insurgents. One could also think about the issue in terms of ‘globalisation’ and Dirlik’s (1994) incorporated localities versus ‘mondialism’ or indigenous cosmopolitanism, and in terms of rigid systemic linkings versus transversal relinkings and local delinkings (the ‘schiz-flux’ in Deleuze’s terms).

One can similarly contrast the idea of ethnicity as it arises in relation to ethnoreligious movements with the original meaning in anthropology, in which it referred to groupings of customs and cosmologies which operate as the integrating aspects of a social web. In Isbell’s work for example, Andean villagers are identified as an ethnic community, yet Isbell is effectively recognized as part of the local ‘ethnicity’ through participation in reciprocity networks (an affinity-type structure). In contrast, the ‘ethnic’ other (the qalas
or foreigners) were defined as foreign largely because of their distance from and hostility to local cosmology (1980). Similar phenomena are noted by Kingsnorth (2004) and Clarke (1991), while the broader use of ethnicity to refer to practices constructing social density and locality (fertility rituals, drinking practices and so on) also appears in other accounts (e.g. Galvan 2004). In the American Southwest, Hall informs us that Spaniards who deserted their colonies assimilated into various local communities both nomadic and sedentary (Hall, 1989: 102), a phenomenon also found across North America (Koehnline 1994). Chatterjee has similarly argues that, before colonialism, community was neither denumerable nor exhaustive of members’ identities (1993: 223). To the extent that this kind of relation is maintained – that an open-ended reciprocity network can be expanded and form links – one is not dealing with ethnoreligious politics defined by exclusionary identities, but rather, with an exclusion which is secondary in a context of affirmative networks. Yet many of the phenomena categorized as ethnic in political studies, such as attachment to networks in shanty-towns linked to places of origin, may be of the same type – not properly ethnic but rather, at least partially affinity-based, or some hybrid of the two. Such phenomena are often open to ethnoreligious inscription, especially in competitive (scarcity-based) settings, but one might theorise ‘ethnic’ relations as initially networked. In this sense, for example, subcultures and activist ‘scenes’ have some of the characteristics of a new or revived ‘ethnos’ or people.

Hence, ethnic and other reactive identities (in the usual sense) can be seen as systemic or reactive reinscriptions of affinity networks in a reactive form. The other conceived as thief or threat, where disconnected from specific rejection of actual practices in a concrete context, implies a general ontological conception of scarcity – the in-group becomes ‘predatory’ (Appadurai, 2006) because there is not enough. In contrast, open networks are based on conceptions of abundance (e.g. Raymond, 2001; Do or Die n.d.)

One must also remain aware of complexities in inscriptions between immanent and transcendental forces. Indigenous groups typically seek self-determination, but this is not necessarily mapped in a nationalist or ‘anti-imperialist’ way; everything depends on how the locality is inscribed in the broader context. Sometimes, as in Northwest Frontier Province, different bands or villages end up on different sides of a higher-level macro-conflict owing to their local hostilities. Sometimes, as with the Miskitos and Hmong, indigenous peoples end up on the ostensibly ‘imperialist’ or ‘reactionary’ side because of the antagonistic, exclusionary actions of an ostensibly revolutionary force. Too often, observers ‘take sides’ and end up with “good” and “bad” groups (Bosnian Muslims are good and Serbs bad or vice-versa, or Tibetans and Chinese, Arabs and Kurds, etc), in line with the macro-concerns which are mapped onto local conflicts. The important ethical issue is not such mapping but self-determination at the micro level (which is sometimes pursued by taking “wrong” sides in bigger conflicts). Hence, by taking the ‘wrong’ side, a local group is not necessarily showing itself to be reactionary or reactive. Its stance is a product of the violence wreaked on local immanence by the projection of macro-conflicts, and the resultant conversion of networks into reactive rivalries. The ultimate goal should be to realise abundance and coexistence among the groups.

*The emotional impact of affinity*
The concepts of abundance and scarcity as psychological states resonate closely with the contrast between hope and fear. Fear is tendentially reactive whereas hope is tendentially active. Hence fear is a product/producer of a regime of scarcity, where the other is threat, performing a central integrative role in reactive movements, ethnoreligious identities and closed networks/hierarchies. Hope, in contrast, is connected to an aspiration or choice to perceive a world of abundance, hence to affinity networks, this choice of abundance being the concrete meaning of the small change in perspective suggested by Agamben (1993). Fear and hope would thus correlate with affinity and reactive networks. The sustainability of affinity-networks thus depends to a large degree on the ability to manage fear and anxiety, as in the praxis of Ruta Pacifica (see below). What Ruta Pacifica refer to as ‘mourning’ or ‘weaving’ involves an almost shamanic conversion of fear into hope through the construction of new social assemblages. This is not to say that feeling afraid or anxious in the face of repressive power is itself a form of alienation. Recognising oppressive agencies and contingent situations as the cause of one’s anxiety and fear is consistent with hoping for a better world, and with identifying these external agencies as antagonistic to such a world.

It has been argued in utopian studies that fear and hope form part of a continuum, expressing ‘aspects of affective ambivalence’ connected to the indeterminacy of the future (McManus 2005). This is indeed true of hope in the present, but it is important not to render hope into a metaphysical universal. What can “be missed in theories of hope is the possibility of a world which is present/immanent and yet also in becoming (so its affect would be somewhere between hope and contentment – not passive like contentment but also not tinged with lack like hope). Deleuze and Guattari use the term “absolute deterritorialisation” for this possibility. In addition, one needs to remain alert to the situational component of hope. Paolo Freire has argued that hope dissipates without struggle; there is a need to reveal opportunities for hope to survive (Santiago 2004: xvi).

The emotional impact of network mobilisations challenges the despair and powerlessness constructed by the dominant system. A recurring feature of accounts of mobilisations is the empowerment felt by participants, the sense of expanded possibility. For instance, Ariel Ogando, a participant in Argentinean highway blockades, argues that, ‘in [highway blockades], many in the micro-political social movements who have very precise grievances… express the idea that it is possible to resist and win, at least partially, for now’ (Ogando 2001: 28). It is, she argues, a movement of the excluded: ‘a population that almost does not believe in anything’ but is ‘tired of the answer “nothing is possible”’, learns to struggle, to overcome its beaten-down status, ‘outside of what had been predicted’, ‘on the margins’ (Ogando 2001: 28). James Scott recounts the effects of the emergence of hidden transcripts in public insurrection as a festive and carnivalesque atmosphere, as if ending a double life and coming up for air (Scott 1990: 211-12). Anger and hostility built up from experiences of oppression will emerge once there is an opportunity, and their emergence leads to an experience of release (ibid. 213). Trashing idols of dominant regime is not only very satisfying given previous oppression, but also signals than anything is possible (ibid. 215). It has even been confirmed by psychologists
from the University of Sussex that successful protests bring positive emotional experiences and are ‘good for you’. ‘What was also interesting was the centrality of emotion in the accounts. Empowering events were almost without exception described as joyous occasions. Participants experienced a deep sense of happiness and even euphoria in being involved in protest events. Simply recounting the events in the interview itself brought a smile to the faces of the interviewees’ (Sussex, 2002). In Deleuzian terms, one could view this kind of phenomenon as a construction of experiences of active desire, a release of trapped flows and a subordination of social production to desiring-production. As Vaneigem argues, ‘[t]o work for delight and authentic festivity is barely distinguishable from preparing for a general insurrection’ (Vaneigem 1967: 50-1). We should also remember that intensity is a property of affinity networks, and is absent from alienated social forms and considerably mediated in reactive forms. Deleuze has argued that the punishment for those who fail eternal return is simply to live an ephemeral life, as epiphenomena (Deleuze, 1994: 55). This suggests that social, ecological and emotional depth is solely a property of networks and active forces.

Changing the world without taking power

There is a close resonance between our use of the concepts of affinity versus hierarchy and the distinction between power-to and power-over, or between constituent and constituted power, arising in a number of recent post-autonomist texts (e.g. Negri, 2003; Holloway, 2005). Indeed, one even sometimes sees the network-hierarchy divide metaphorised or expressed as ideas of “power-to” versus “power-over”, with the former expressing the additive power of networks and direct social relations, the latter its encrustation or recuperation in hierarchies. One can trace such accounts to Deleuze’s reading of Foucault (1988), in which the negative power of domination is pitted against an active power which increases itself through deployment, operating with rather than over others. This also echoes earlier ideas of dialogue ‘with’ rather than ‘over’ in Paolo Freire (2004) and Mikhail Bakhtin (Holquist 1983).

Part of the structure of affinity-networks is that ‘power’ in the sense of external influence is largely replaced by what Bakhtin terms heteroglossia, the possibility of influence through multi-voiced spaces, which becomes possible once character-armour is overcome. Another part is that ‘external’ kinds of power are displaced from their current encrustation in concentrated formal sanctions into diffuse informal sanctions. The diffusion of the potential for negative power reduces its role in social relations, because of the possibility of reciprocation and because the experience even of this kind of power becomes increasingly a site for empowerment rather than domination.

In many ways this turns upside down the usual assumption of international relations, that the ordering function of the state overcomes the ‘war of all against all’ in everyday life. We would contend that this ‘war of all against all’ has never existed, that it does not reflect the reality of societies without the state, and that it is nowhere more closely approximated than in massified statist/capitalist societies. Concentrated power becomes the site for domination by mythologies in the Barthesian sense, a site for crystallisations of reactive and microfascist desires, whereas the everyday can also be a site for what Paul
Gilroy terms the ‘subversive ordinariness of... convivial cultures’ (Gilroy 2004: 166), in which the lessening of mediation leads to tolerance and diversity. Rather than politics functioning as the realistic balancing as opposed to the self-interested bias of the everyday, it is politics which is the special space for the expression of “irrational” fantasmatic and mythological forces, whereas the everyday, while ambiguous, can be a site for coexistence and “making do” with difference, as in Gilroy’s view of everyday conviviality as offsetting racism in Britain. The diffusion of power also extends to experiences of culture. As James Scott has argued, oral folk culture is thoroughly ‘writerly’, each performance being a reconstruction (1990: 160-1). This parallels Barthes’s distinction between ‘writerly’ and ‘readerly’ texts or styles of reading, the latter dictating to the reader whereas the former construct tools for active use. These correspond respectively to reactive and active assemblages.

The structural negation of command and alienation places the affinity-network form, as an abstract machine, in a relation of radical antagonism with the abstract machines of the state and capital. A range of authors have noted this in terms of a conflict between ‘society’ and the ‘state’, or between ‘social’ and ‘political principles’ (Kropotkin, 1897; Ward, 1982; Buber, 1958; Landauer, 1978; Day, 2005; Agamben, 1993). Hardt and Negri for example argue that network forces (what they term ‘democratic’ forces) are faced with war and violence as a constant state response to contain them. ‘Every exodus requires an active resistance, a rearguard war against the pursuing powers of sovereignty’, because networks, which render sovereignty superfluous, are thus inherently threatening to it (2004: 340-2). Day argues that the state fears any instance of people coming together without an identity (Day 2005: 181), while Deleuze and Guattari argue that there is a basic conflict between denumerable and nondenumerable sets, the state and the war-machine (1987: 471). This kind of perspective has been challenged by authors such as Migdal (2001) who stress that society and the state often coexist and interpenetrate as concrete assemblages. Of course it is necessary to recognise this critique, but we do not believe it challenges the fundamental insight of the society-state dichotomy: that the affinity-network and state forms are, at the level of abstract machines, in a situation of irreducible antagonism. There are all kinds of ways this antagonism can be managed through the subordination of one principle to the other, their segmentary arrangement in concrete assemblages or their coexistence in different spheres of life. This can be used by the state and capital to recuperate networks, but also allows for novel kinds of resistance. Figures such as Landauer often argue for making the state irrelevant, building alongside rather than inside existing institutions (cited in Day 2005: 123). In the last instance, however, the structural forms are incompatible and antagonistic. They can coexist but they cannot cohere. Indeed, the tensions between the dominant system and its opponents have sharpened of late, suggesting a growing centrality of the social-political antagonism. We are now in a situation similar to that in the old totalitarisms, where there is no such thing as tolerated antisystemic dissent – there are only conformists and dissidents.

The power of affinity networks is thus power, but not as we know it. It is, for one thing, a negation of command emerging as opposed and multiple tendencies (Negri, 2003: 43). It is thus a centrifugal form of power, tending to empower singularity against encrusted
hierarchies. In contrast to power-over, ‘power-to’ flows both within and across borders (Slater 2004: 18).

The arts of resistance in the age of globalisation: same weakness, new weapons

While Scott provides a classic and still-relevant account of the tactics available to oppressed groups historically and in peripheral rural contexts, his account is rather pessimistic about the strategic position of the excluded, and is geared to contexts where tributary modalities are still partly operative. Hence, Scott argues that the dominant in the Malaysian village he studied avoided open collective resistance by taking advantage of tactical mobility such as the ability to make piecemeal attacks and to destroy sites of conflict (1985: 243). This greater tactical mobility of the dominant is and was a serious problem for peasant resistance on a village level, but may partly have been mitigated by the mobilities offered to the excluded by the growing power of networks. While not eliminating the availability or usefulness of many of the established tactics, the current globalised world offers new opportunities for the excluded to take effective action. Not only are the weak becoming stronger, but the global system is creating a situation where they are more likely to try to use their power. The situation of growing relative power of the oppressed correlates with declining material welfare, which capitalism becomes less willing to offer (Arrighi 1989: 107-8).

Roadblocks and targeting of core nodes and flows

The first of these – deployed time and again with great effect – is that high-speed capitalism and state effectiveness are increasingly dependent on a small number of minimal nodes and connections such as global cities, airports, road and rail connections, special economic zones and extraction nodes, the occupation or closure of which ruptures insertion in the world system. This systemic vulnerability arises from the simplification of the global structure in which relations are between concentrated points instead of entire areas, and is compounded by a reliance on ‘just in time’ production. An increasingly small but globalised, distributed core is necessarily located amidst a very large, turbulent and discontented periphery which it no longer effectively controls via strategies of inclusion.

The result is that global networks have turned with great frequency to blockades, sabotage and occupation of key nodes and routes as a means of paralysing the dominant system. The state will often resort to violence to keep such sites operating, creating the kind of ‘PFI Martial Law’ around key sites which has been noted by activists (SchNews, 2008). Global capitalism has undergone a speed-up which ‘relies on high speed transport and communication to secure internationalised production… But this “speed-up” renders capital yet more vulnerable to disruption. As a result, the norms of liberal democracy are norms which capital can less and less afford’ (Anon, 11 January 2003, p. 7).

Nevertheless, activists can often block roads faster than state agents can clear them, particularly in the case of Southern movements with considerable support, and this kind
of activity has been effective across a wide range of contexts, from disruption of timber sales in America to protection of rural populations in India.

During the Manipur unrest of 2004, reports suggested blockades effectively paralysed the Indian state in the area. In West Bengal, farmers protesting against a land grab for a car factory effectively forced abandonment of the factory with persistent road blockades (the factory was, revealingly, moved to Gujarat, where the reactive inscription of networks is most extreme). In Peru, regional groups in the Amazon region forced the repeal of a pro-capitalist rainforest law by effectively cutting off the area. Repeated roadblocks have also featured in the recurring resource protests in Bolivia and the unemployed movement in Argentina, in the activism of the MST in Brazil, and in countless localised examples. In the Bolivian context, Crabtree has argued that blockades are effective due to there being few roads, the long distances between cities, and the capacity of communities to block roads faster than the state can clear them (Crabtree, 2005: 12). Similar tactics are a constant feature of summit protests and part of the reason for the displacement of summits to increasingly remote locations. Reactive and right-wing networks, such as the PAD in Thailand, have also made effective use of such targeting of key nodes. A recent insurrectionist text from France has indicated the targeting of key infrastructure as the most effective way to disrupt capitalism and the state (Agamben, 1993). One also sees oil pipelines and supplies targeted for sabotage or capture in areas such as Iraq, Colombia and the Niger Delta.

Ripple effects

A second strategy available to today’s networks is the ability to generate effects which ripple outwards from an initial site, creating resonance at other sites and imposing considerable costs on repression. This is a phenomenon which is only beginning to manifest itself, and is felt most strongly in the global cities, but also seen in the Muslim world. Ripples are typically generated by an international diaspora, a global solidarity effort or a worldwide news event. In the first case, one could refer for instance to the wave of Kurdish protests following the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan, the Tibetan protests during the Olympic torch procession, Burmese diaspora protests during the recent unrest in Burma, and the various Palestinian mobilisations. In the second group are examples such as the J18 Global Day of Action, solidarity protests during the Oaxaca uprising and the Greek unrest of December 2008, and the protests against the Iraq war. In the third category are events such as the waves of Muslim protests following the Danish cartoon controversy and the Quran-flushing allegation and the spread of the French banlieue unrest to Holland, Belgium and Germany. Ripple effects may be becoming more common and coordinated. Peter Waterman has argued that, while the 1968 wave of protests were parallel and inspired one another, they were not directly linked. In contrast, today’s movements are coordinated and organised globally (Waterman, 2004: 60).

These kinds of ripple effects make it hard for repression at any particular site to induce generalised despair. It places costs on repression, which is likely to produce or intensify reactions at other sites. This can help to ensure the survival of well-networked movements. For instance, Fenelon and Hall have argued that the Zapatistas not
suppressed partly out of fear of indigenous revolts elsewhere (Fenelon and Hall in Grosfoguel et al 2005: 117). If the capacity to generate ripple effects is extended further, we can expect to see outward diffusion and intensification operating as a strong barrier against repression by states and corporations themselves vulnerable through their insertion in global networks.

The political effectiveness of the arts of resistance

While the world-system has obviously not been overthrown to date, the power of networks constantly exhibits itself in everyday victories, from the corrosion of dominant power to the overthrow and transformation of political regimes. James Scott provides several examples of the effectiveness of everyday resistance. In his Malaysian case-study for instance, peasants managed to reduce official zakat, via ‘nibbling’, to 15% of its original amount – but in ways which would not appear in official documents (1990: 89). Graham Harrison provides a number of examples of popular action affecting transitions to democracy in Africa. Strikes played a role in democratization in Cameroon, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, while in some cases such as Benin, Cameroon and Niger, pan-societal Conferences were agents of democratization (Harrison 2002: 87-9). In Nigeria, oil worker unions cost dictatorship in Nigeria 25% of revenues in pro-dem protests to 1994 (ibid. 87).

Dunaway has similarly argued that democratization promoted by the core spawns antisystemic movements going against the core’s goals (Dunaway, 2003: 10). Sassen’s examples of the excluded making history include the regularisation of undocumented migrants and the extension of human rights protections, as well as historical examples of the expansion of citizenship (Sassen, 2006: 279, 292-3). Today this expansion of the political field through everyday action continues. ‘Practices and informal politics can take the institution away from questions of nationality narrowly defined and toward the enactment of a large array of particular interests, from protests against police brutality and globalization to sexual preference politics and house squatting by anarchists’, creating a new field of ‘claiming rights to the city’ (ibid. 281). Local struggles link directly to similar struggles in other localities through global networks, gaining greater reflexivity as a result, and sometimes taking claims directly to global fora (ibid. 372-3). Globalisation allows non-state groups to become more visible, aiding processes of global networking (ibid. 317-18).

A more spectacular example, capitalising on systemic vulnerabilities, is discussed by Holloway, who argues that the Zapatistas precipitated global financial crisis through chaotic knockon effects. Holloway views this effect as arising because of capital’s continuing dependence on the subordination of labour. The uprising as an instance of insubordination or non-subordination hence ruptured capital’s confidence (Holloway 2000: 181-2). ‘The Zapatista action punctured the fiction of subordination not only in Mexico but throughout the world’ (ibid. 185).

The politics of everyday resistance
The zero-degree of the affinity-network form is the politics of everyday resistance, and there are innumerable empirical examples of such activities. Following Melucci (1989), Sutton (p. 47) argues that many aspects of social movement activity are latent or ‘submerged in everyday life’, and missed in analyses of mobilisations alone. The proliferation of everyday autonomous activities and the construction of spaces beyond state power leads to a situation where state power is rendered increasingly irrelevant. Indeed, as Sassen has argued, the nation-state no longer covers most of politics (Sassen, 2006: 280). Examples of the kind of practices producing this effect can be found in nearly all regions of the globe.

A recent article from a newspaper in Papua New Guinea (The National, 2008) reveals important aspects of how the state is warded off in a densely-networked, predominantly indigenous society. The ethical position of the article is the opposite of our own, supporting statist command rather than its warding-off. Challenging the view that there is a lack of adequate laws to deal with various problems, the article maintains that the laws are ineffective because they cannot be ‘enforced without distinction’ and do not attract popular belief. ‘If a majority of citizens regard the laws as an irrelevant to daily life, then those laws will be consistently flouted and over time will become part of the huge backlog that are still on the books but are never used.’ This happens to laws in Papua New Guinea because of the wantok system of social security, which informally prohibits arrests and repression of relatives and clansmen.

Looking on a much larger scale, across the situation in Africa, Harrison refers to ‘complex and diverse networks of informal organizations within African societies, which have grown to resist state power, provide an alternative to public authority’ and exert pressure (Harrison 2004: 89). While there has not been systematic popular resistance to structural adjustment, a variety of activities have affected its terrain, including political distancing as a common response to state power. Distancing often means establishing a realm outside the state or subverting state positions for other purposes (ibid. 76, 80). Also in Africa, Chazan et al and Bayart both emphasise importance of popular political action, such as informal small-scale economic activity, absenteeism, tax evasion, popular arts and religion, refusal to vote and clandestine political activity. These can be coping mechanisms which are much about alienation/passivity as confrontation, but they can also serve as forms of political action which wear down the political fabric. They cannot be bought off via leaders or repressed systematically due to unorganised nature – may express an underlying civic consciousness (Gledhill, 2000:100-1). Azarya and Chazan (1987) have found evidence in Ghana and Guinea of social groups disengaging from contestation involving the state, instead falling back on social networks.

Deleuze and Guattari themselves refer to a study of street children in Bogotá, Colombia, which reveals deployments of diffuse mechanisms to prevent coalescence of power (1987: 358). In Bolivia, age-old indigenous traditions of reciprocity and collective action combine with newer working-class political models to create a strong civil society and a weak state (Crabtree 2005: 5-6). In discussions of Indian colonialism, Chatterjee observes that the inscription of the home as a space of the inner in anti-colonial discourse,
and of the religious as a space outside caste society, was a means to preserve a space beyond encroachment, even if at the cost of surrendering the material world to the occupiers (Chatterjee 1993: 120-1, 187). The religious sects which proliferated in this context included some which pursued Free Spirit-type doctrines rejecting alienation (ibid. 185, 194-5). In Kurdistan, despite dispersal from traditional mountain and village society, ‘[c]lan and tribal loyalties remain important for the vast majority of Kurds’ (Gurr and Harff, 2000: 35). Brenner argues that women’s movements in the South are often linked to ‘cross-household networks of mutual help’ (2004: 29). In Indonesia under Suharto ‘thousands of local protests and conflicts in the forests… suppressed by military forces’ and concealed from the world (Gellert, 2006: 183-4). In Vietnam, the expansion of social space during the market transition has led to a proliferation of associations, including ‘the emergence of hundreds of non-registered voluntary associations based on kinship and communal ties’ (Luong cited in Landau 2008). Even in somewhere as ‘metropolitan’ in the world-system as twentieth-century France, peasants have been shown to have formed jealously guarded corporative organisations with definite functions which inhibited political change (Migdal, 2001: 204). Hence, everyday resistance is a feature of social life across a very wide scope of humanity, providing an initial basis and expression of the affinity-network logic.

**Autonomous social movements and global protest**

In addition to everyday resistance, the affinity-network form generates political effects in the field of social movements, pitted as ‘war-machines’ against the constituted power of the state. Anna Scott (1990: 6) defines social movements as groups which ‘have mass mobilization, or the threat of mobilization, as their prime source of social sanction’. Hence, whatever their organisational forms, they involve a diffusion of power in relation to the state. They are, as Arrighi emphasises, relational constructs, although once created, they tend to be constantly recreated even if discontinuously (1989: 21-2). Gaining visibility mainly through spectacular protests and actions, but drawing vitality from everyday practices and resistances (Melucci, 1989), social movements are inherently difficult to observe and analyse. Social movements, argues Arrighi, are like colours on a spinning wheel. While they are visible as separate groups if the wheel spinning slowly, they appear fused if it is spinning fast (1989: 20-1). At their most intense, they form which the Zapatistas have termed an “international of hope” to oppose the neoliberal “international of terror” (Lowy, 2004: 21).

Social movement studies has long focused on a categorization of movements into ‘old’ and ‘new’, with the ‘old’ standing for working-class, organisationalist and vanguardist organizations where as the ‘new’ were associated with transformative potential across a range of social actors, autonomy from parties, demands for rights and inclusion, and lifestyle politics (see Karatzogianni, 2006: 56-78; Mayo, 2005). This line of inquiry has led to attempts to associate new social movements with the rise of a new middle class (Offe, 1985; Melucci 1989) or with the growing importance of ‘post-materialist’ concerns in rich Northern societies, in line with a hierarchy of needs (Inglehart 2000). Arrighi has argued that old antisystemic forces have been undermined by changes in the class structure; new forces come from new social locales (1989: 90). Tilman Evers (1985)
goes even further, viewing new social movements as developing fragments of a new subjectivity, not around an end-point but for initial elements of autonomous identity and overcoming some aspects of alienation. Melucci (1989) portrays new social movements as ‘nomads of the present’, deconstructing identities and social forms through a new kind of exercise of social mobility.

There has been some criticism of this kind of reading on the basis that older movements also show some characteristics of those which have been deemed new. For instance, for Polanyi, while the agents of the movement toward the market economy ranged from the local and national to the global (haute finance), the agents of the counter-movement (‘groups, sections, classes’) were largely local and national (although their actions—e.g., protectionism, colonial conquest, anti-imperialist revolt—often had transnational implications). Moreover, these agents of the countermovement aimed at protecting local or national interests (interests, broadly defined). For Polanyi, the ‘society’ that is protecting itself in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries is largely a national society (Silver and Arrighi, 2005: 156). Similarly, Philip W. Sutton argues that the new social movements are not really “new”, because phenomena such as prefiguration, activity in everyday life and formation of alternative cultures also typify earlier movements (Sutton, 2000: 34-5).

Both old and new social movements in their stereotypical forms exhibit characteristics identifying them, in our terms, as part of the politics of the included (at least aspirationally), though their concrete expressions are rather more ambiguous. We would expect to find aspects of the affinity-form in both old and new movements, although the decline of organisationalist models clearly benefits this form. In the old movements, the affinity-network form would be expressed via ideas of workers’ self-activity and to some degree workers’ councilism, and in the new movements, it would be closely associated with the rise of direct action and the emphasis on spontaneity and immediacy.

A newer literature has started to emphasise autonomous movements as a new, third phase of social movement activity. Autonomous social movements are identified as ‘beyond’ the old-new dichotomy in social movement studies because they are not focused either on ‘universal identities such as class’ or on ‘the non-material or symbolic’ or politics of demand. ‘They are immanently material and non-material, theorizing domination as a multi-layered network of disempowering and alienating social relations. They therefore theorize and practice resistance as a multi-layered process which involves challenges to ‘structures’ of power but, also, centrally the construction of alternative social relations and subjectivities ‘outside’ of these dominant ways of being and organizing social reality (Motta, 2009). Richard Day (2005) terms them the ‘newest’ social movements, a newer phase than the ‘old’ and ‘new’ social movements.

While this literature on the ‘newest’ social movements is extremely important, we would agree with Day that there are limits to the periodisation involved. Except for the relative marginality of lifestyle concerns, the old-new dichotomy has not really exhibited itself in the South. What emerged in the period of the ‘old’ in the South was not a stereotypical ‘old left’ but rather, a kind of syncretic Marxism which was more aware of wider issues
than its western equivalents. On the other hand, when the ‘new social movement’ issues (peace, ecology, gender, ethnicity, etc) became more visible, these represented more of a continuity than a break – peasant and indigenous defence of land for example had been going on for centuries. They also never became a ‘politics of demand’ separate from anti-capitalism; rather, challenging capitalism and the world-system remained central to movements articulated around the ‘new’ issues. Hence, when the movements coalesced around anti-neoliberalism from the 1980s onwards, they generated many of the social forms which originated what later became summit protests, social forums, encuentros, convergences and so on. Some of these forms came to the North via the visibility of the Zapatistas, others refracted through global solidarities. They altered somewhat in the North, becoming typical of an activist ‘scene’ which cannot rely on the density of everyday life to the degree which is possible in the South. The tripartite category of old-new-newest, therefore, comes to seem rather Eurocentric; what actually happens is more a matter of a diffusion of increasingly networked and autonomous forms appearing first at marginal points and then expanding towards the core.

It might be better to think of movements as existing on a continuum between relatively bureaucratised and relatively autonomous forms, expressing the extent to which the affinity-network form is able to gain primacy in relation to the countervailing pressures of the logic of the included and of the reactive-network form. Sartre (1960) has constructed a sophisticated typology of sociopolitical groups varying with their form of articulation, with the ‘fused group’ as his term for the rhizome or affinity form. Guattari takes this further, establishing a primary divide between subject (affinity, rhizomatic) and subjugated groups. The difference between the two is that the subject-group is involved in history whereas the subjugated group is involved in the dominant imaginary mode (Guattari, 1984: 36-7). Crucially, these are not two different sets of groups but two group functions which may coincide or slip between each other.

This does not mean, however, that there is nothing ‘new’ in autonomous movements. The changing relative position of the affinity-network logic in relation to the state and capital has strengthened the effectiveness and prevalence of autonomous movements. Sassen has argued that the current situation creates a ‘possibility for even resource-poor localized organizations to become part of a type of horizontal globality centred on localities’ (2006: 387). Hence, ‘even resource-poor localized organizations, too poor or persecuted to move internationally, can become microenvironments with global span’ – subjectively denationalised for instance (ibid.). The resultant activist globality different from capitalist globality. It is less likely to be literally denationalised, it is more subjective and interlinked, and is barely institutionalised and mostly informal (ibid.). Activists and migrants participate in globality even when largely immobile, for instance, through internet use and transnational campaigns (ibid. 302-3). One thus sees a ‘counter-geographies’ of globalisation made possible by its capabilities but not part of its logic (ibid. 370). ‘Distributed immobilities can actually come to constitute a global public’ (ibid. 366). One can thus see it as the emergence of the kind of transversal, ‘transmodern’ movement long-discussed by postcolonial theory.
Similar conclusions have been reached in relation to Southern movements specifically. Evelina Dagnino (1998) has similarly argued that there has been a coming-together of social movements because they realised that opposing authoritarianism and affirming the right to have rights, hence undermining dominant clientelist modes of inscription. A similar argument is made by Chatterjee (1993) regarding the emergence of what he terms ‘political society’. In World-Systems Analysis, Buttel and Gould have argued that new technologies are prevalent in Northern anti-summit protests, although anti-corporate protests are actually more common in the South (2006: 142-3). Analysing the wave of protests against neoliberal structural adjustment, Walton and Seddon (1994) attach central systemic significance to the rise of popular protests and revolts. They argue that these protests against neoliberalism echo historical ‘bread riots’ in being systematic political acts aimed at injustice, modifying and becoming part of the process of social transformation.

The network form and anti-colonial revolutions

If 1968 signalled the growing power of networks and forced a recomposition of power in the North, matters had already come to a head in global geopolitics, forcing decolonisation in the South. Networks had already struck major blows against the hierarchical world-system, with networks and network-hierarchy hybrids being the agents of decolonisation struggles such as those in Algeria and Vietnam. Decolonisation, like the rearrangements after 1968, was a reinscription via ‘addition of axioms’, and was soon closed down into neo-colonialism once achieved, with power falling into the hands of local elites connected to the old colonial powers, or new bureaucratic developmentalist formations. Nevertheless, it resulted from a real decline in the power of colonial states. Even the neo-colonial elites had to draw on the power of networks and constitutive power to alter the dominant structure. For instance, Partha Chatterjee has argued that a bilingual elite in Bengal created a space outside European control and inside its own “modernising project”, such as an infrastructure of printing presses, publishing houses and newspapers (1993: 7).

The defeat of classical colonialism arose because the costs of preserving empire were raised to a point the imperial powers could no longer sustain. This defeat, covering most of the globe and extending into local movements against dictatorships, is the largest social transformation of recent times. Hobsbawm has gone as far as to term the post-war ‘Third World’ a zone of revolution (cited Slater, 2004: 71-2). Slater has described the anti-colonial revolutions as disruption from outside of western acculturation (ibid. 143). It stemmed from resistance to colonialism which had persisted as its effect throughout the colonial period. As Ranajit Guha wrote of the so-called Indian Mutiny, ‘[w]hat the pillars of society fail to grasp is that the organizing principle lies in nothing other than their own dominance’ (1989: 225). The constant opposition to colonialism found a conjuncture to finally break its back with the global shift in power towards networks. A variety of tactics of everyday resistance were used across the range of anti-colonial movements, ranging from non-violent direct action in the Indian satyagraha to the assassinations and attacks of the Kenyan Mau Mau. The most usual modality where the
colonisers did not quickly withdraw was guerrilla war. This is a special kind of asymmetrical conflict based on preventing ‘pacification’ by the colonial power. Deleuze and Guattari argue that guerrilla war aims for the ‘nonbattle’, forming a kind of war-machine very different from conventional war (1987: 416). It is based on a different relationship of the war-machine to society.

Jeffrey Race (1973) has shown that the Vietnam War was waged not only between rival armies but between rival conceptions of security, rival goals which missed one another – perhaps the first modern ‘non-war’. America operated with an operationalist, functionalist goal expressing a logic of command and denumerability, emphasising the (reactive) ability to prevent an outcome (usually by closure of space) in a delimited space and time. The Vietminh in contrast had a goal which was socially organic and immanent, viewing ‘security’ as integration into the social space, with cultural and political effects more important than immediate goals. The military struggle went hand in hand with the struggle to survive of the population, with people running factories and schools in caves, and using the ‘arts of resistance’ to harvest American funds (Chomsky 2004: 55, 77). Notwithstanding the ultimately hierarchical aspects of the Vietminh, America’s defeat in Vietnam was thus a victory for the ‘nonbattle’, for the asymmetrical power of networks.

American military scholars have been trying to ward off the implications of the defeat ever since, and this process – including an opening to networks as a supplement to hierarchies, and expanded schemes of technological control – has given rise to the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ and other recent innovations. The problem does not only afflict America, but any would-be dominant power. Contrary to Samuel Huntington’s blaming of democracy for making imperial powers vulnerable to popular aversion to genocide, the new power of networks also affected dictatorial societies. The Soviet Union suffered a defeat similar to America’s in its war in Afghanistan, and the Portuguese military dictatorship was similarly brought down by unrest stemming from its prolonged engagements in colonies such as Angola and Mozambique.

The Israel-Palestine conflict might seem to be a counterpoint to the conclusion that ongoing colonial occupations are no longer tenable. In many respects, Palestine persists as a part of the anti-colonial movement, despite its reinscription in later Islamist and social justice discourses. Israel continues to behave like a classical colonial power, and has only flirted with neo-colonial forms of power, always falling back on a crude militaristic imperialism. This is, however, the exception, which proves the rule. The only reason Israel has not suffered the fate of France, America and Russia is that it is running on a false economy, sustained by massive American aid.

In any case, even Israel has suffered from the declining power of empires. The costs of colonial occupation proved dangerous by the late 1980s, with peace groups, refuseniks and social problems at ‘home’ reflecting the inability to suppress resistance on the ground in the West Bank, Gaza, and Lebanon. Since this period, Israel has been careful to avoid prolonged entanglements, keeping up a lower-intensity level of occupation with assistance from the Palestinian Authority. It is notable that all Israel’s recent invasions have only lasted about 2-3 weeks at a time. Palestinian intellectual Edward Saïd has
repeatedly argued that it is only Palestinian resistance which has led to the various peace plans such as the Oslo accords. ‘Were it not for the fact of the Palestinians’ stubborn refusal to accept that they are “a defeated people”… there would be no peace plan’ (2003a). This is the crucial point about such initiatives. ‘If we miss that truth about the power of Palestinian resistance… we miss everything’ (Said, 2003b: 295)

1968 and the global politics of desire

The actualisation of the affinity-network form is intimately connected with the emergence of a ‘politics of desire’, the subordination of social production to desiring-production as urged by Deleuze and Guattari, and the rupturing of Oedipal structures which contain and repress desire. Wallerstein argues that 1968 disrupted the global hegemonic ideology of liberalism, and capitalism lost the ‘hidden stabilizer’ of the ‘optimism of the oppressed’ (2004: 77, 84-5). We would here suggest that 1968 was an incomplete revolution in two ways, in its actualisation in the North and in its global scope. We are here taking 1968 as a figure for an entire wave of social movements occurring since the 1960s in the global North and to some degree everywhere, and continuing to the present day. This is not to deny ‘other 1968s’. In some ways the North’s 1968 was the reverberation back into the core of the peripheral ruptures, the initial explosions of desire against repression which brought the anti-colonial revolutions, the Civil Rights movement and so on. Latin America had its own 1968s, often a little earlier, but with different effects; Korea had its 1968 as late as 1980. The East’s 1968s reverberated onwards, ultimately collapsing the state-command system; unable to recuperate its dissidents, the East’s 1968 petered on into the 70s and 80s and perhaps as late as the fall of Milosevic. The rest of the global South also had its own movements of 1968 and thereabouts, but often the aspect of the politics of desire and rejection of the Oedipal or Victorian modality of repression is much abated.

Let us begin by examining how a prevalent discourse in social movement studies interprets the emergence of a new wave of concerns in the North after 1968. According to Inglehart (1977, 1990), new social movements are related to the overcoming of scarcity in the global North: people become worried about gender equality, peace and the environment when they no longer have to worry about having adequate housing or food. This analysis, which also underpins the World Value Surveys, has decidedly negative connotations about the importance of what might be called post-68 autonomous movements. The perspective is heavily slanted, and misses a lot.

Inglehart’s hypothesis seems to find some confirmation in the 1990-91 World Values Study, which ranks populations on two dimensions of traditional vs rational-legal authority and scarcity vs post-modern values. The South comes out towards the scarcity and traditional end, the old eastern bloc and East Asia towards the scarcity and rational-legal corner, and the west scattered towards the centre and top right, mostly postmodern and rational-legal (with America by far the most traditional in the west). There are, of course, systematic problems with the method: by studying national populations, it avoids the question of where indigenous societies fit in; by ranking two types of authority, it says nothing about whether authority is valued at all, and if so to what degree and how
unconditionally. For instance, Arrighi and Silver argue, that the conditionality of Indian power on dharna and danda and on a subsistence ethic rendered British rule illegitimate in local terms, and led to constant revolts averaging one a year (Arrighi and Silver, 1999: 243-4). Nevertheless it does confirm serious problems with political conceptions in the global South: the international division of labour has some impact in making people concentrate on survival instead of life.

But as a truth, it is only partial. It is questionable, indeed, whether capitalism could ever motivate ‘post-material’ concerns, since it is structurally unable to do away with scarcity (or the threat of scarcity) as its organising force. While capitalism goes into crisis when it is productive enough to eliminate the requirement to work (anom., Pyramids), and while this leads to struggles around the decommodification of certain social sectors (Offe, 1985), in general capitalism is very able to replace the satisfaction of one need or demand with new, fabricated ‘needs’ for additional commodities. So-called ‘post-material’ concerns do arise in Southern societies, and sporadically in the North before 1968 also. They are especially noticeable in indigenous movements, where the defence of the ecology of particular areas and opposition to alienating social forms are interlinked with questions of social survival and personal wellbeing. One can refer for example to protests against resource extraction in areas such as the Niger Delta and West Papua, the Chipko Andolan, movements against large dams and so on. Nevertheless, there is a certain truth to the perspective, as a way of looking at the dominant coordinates of social conformism North and South, the means of constructing an ideological assemblage in support of the world-system among the more conformist strata of the population.

We would suggest a different analysis of North-South differences. In the contradiction between the affinity-network form and the alienating logics of capital and the state, ‘material’ and ‘post-material’ concerns are inseparable. The defence of abundance as a mode of ecological relating is identical to the defence of life as affirmative value, against ecocide, militarism, discrimination and so on. The two sets of concerns can be decomposed by means of “buy-offs” through patronage, economic growth or redistribution; this is the reason they sometimes appear as separated. Particularly crucial in disarticulating the two types of concerns is the capitalist utopia, the idea of development into a consumer society advertised mainly in terms of the commodities it provides. To the extent that the World Values Survey indicates a reality, it is a global stratification, which is revealed. To the extent that capitalism enforces psychological scarcity by producing real scarcity in the periphery, it denies to certain stratified sections of the global population the ‘critical distance’ from submersion in a struggle to survive amidst the system’s debris, reproducing cultural colonisation by denying the room for critique. To reach this conclusion would, however, be unfair to Southern movements which do indeed systematically ‘see through’ capitalist fantasies, often in a deeper and wider way than movements in the North. One might better speak of different structures of incorporation and exclusion in north and south, each producing its own insights and blind-spots.

The general population in the global South may well be more likely than the minority of dissidents in the North to be attracted to the west’s ideological self-image due to not
having experienced its direct effects, and due to exposure to its mythical, fantasmatic status through the global media. They are also doubtless less submerged in capitalism’s self-image than the conformist ‘mass’ in the North, though the basis of this submersion is distinct from its appeal in the South. Capitalism presents its own version of a utopian discourse by conflating consumerism with material and psychological welfare, and where this utopian vision (and its socialist imitators) has not been falsified by the achievement of consumerism, it enables capitalism to be conflated with concrete demands such as food security and healthcare. In the west, such concrete demands are necessarily separated from and pitted against the pursuit of economic growth, hence being reinscribed as ‘post-material’. Another aspect of the capitalist fantasy is that it implies that capitalism is additive rather than negative: capitalism makes people ‘better off’ unambiguously. What it leaves invisible is the effect of capitalism in terms of corrosion of the ‘social principle’, increased dependency on hierarchical organisations and vulnerability to the control mechanisms of mass society, such as media moral panics. In general, one could say that the actualisation of the capitalist-consumerist fantasy involves in practice the loss of social and ecological connectedness, of the ‘social principle’ and its ecological correlate. Hence, while the capitalist fantasy presents an image of the ‘benefits’ of capitalism (or of overdevelopment) added to the existing society, what its actualisation delivers is the ‘benefits’ instead of the existing society. At this point the values threatened by capitalism, which may have been valued more to begin with, assert themselves as dissident values.

Hence, the persistent appeal of capitalism to people in the periphery and semiperiphery is largely fantasmatic – they don’t really want what capitalism would deliver, they want what its utopia claims to offer. While it is quite understandable that people suffering from extreme impoverishment are likely to make it their main political concern, this does not logically lead to the concerns associated with the ‘old’ politics; it does so only when conflated with capitalism’s utopian fantasies, and separated from impoverishment as a structural process of the world system. It is clear to world systems analysts, and to autonomous movements in the South, that playing the capitalist game does not abate global poverty, but the influx of Northern media images and advertising may associate the two. Hence, by keeping most of the world in poverty, capitalism retains its own appeal as an absent object.

In this interpretation, what changes in 1968 in the global North is that the rise of mass consumer society corrodes the appeal of the capitalist utopian fantasy (through the actualisation of the project of which it is an expression), and disarticulates it from concrete demands connected to social immediacy. The autonomist rejection implied in a 68 type movement is already prefigured in Southern movements – but often without the rejection of familial ideology as an explicit part, and without a fusion with youth independence. In the North, ‘1968’ was directed explicitly against micro-regulation, against the despotic paternal management of university living areas for example, against prohibitions on sexuality, against various status-based discriminations, against parental power, indeed, arguably, against ascribed or role-guaranteed status in general. Partly as a result of this, the basis for traditionalist authoritarianism collapses in the North (and in a different way, in the eastern bloc), leading to social liberalisation as a necessary process
to enable continuation of the addition of axioms as a strategy of stabilisation. The developmental or ‘civilising’ state becomes impossible in the North, and out with its social despotism go such things as sacrifice for the greater good, austerity as a virtue, explicit sexual repression and anti-pleasure morality as “civilising process”. This is not, of course, the end of the right or the ‘subtraction of axioms’, simply of a particular composition of the right. The authoritarian forces will ultimately reconfigure in an integralist form, around the project of the ‘crisis-state’ and neototalitarianism, no longer connected to increased wellbeing except in the most abstract ways.

Hence, 1968 was when the system partially recognised the overcoming of the authoritarian modality based on patronage, paternalism, conservatism and the Establishment, particularly in the spheres of sexuality and family relations (when the state and capital ceased to identify exclusively with Oedipus). The system was forced to recognise this overcoming in order to contain a revolt by the young and the marginal, which was at least partly rooted in a reaction against the Victorian formation where “character” or “morality” was to be imposed in the way explained by Reich – repression, master-signification, and identification with the oppressor. Built into this social assemblage were requirements that the young be violently curbed and repressed, that various social discriminations (against women, gay men, ethnic minorities) be kept intact, that a strict monoculture be enforced, and that the state and capital remain fused with the decaying tributary strata as an ‘Establishment’, rather than splitting from these strata as a political class and footloose capital respectively. Even without the revolts, this assemblage was rapidly becoming unsustainable. The tributary classes, already hangovers from an older era, were in sharp decline; the systems of patronage to both enable and ward off the authoritarian state were unable to deal with the consumer society they had unleashed and the mobility (social and physical) it brought. Capitalism did not and cannot dispense with hierarchical formations, so it did not really deliver ‘liberation’ either from sexual repression or from the various discriminations. Instead capitalism turned to a “narcissist” arrangement which is based on affect-blocking towards the body, combined with “surface” freedom for the resultant alienated self (the self-in-alterity of the spectacle). Capitalism adapted with niche markets and partial recognitions, in effect switching from overcoding as a way to repress difference to axiomatisation as a way to manage it.

It was an incomplete revolution because it was recuperated, turned back into the system by means of this axiomatisation. Once the immediate threat had receded, the system sought to reel back a lot of what it had conceded, opening up the constellation of the ‘crisis-state’ and the ‘permanent state of exception’, drawing on what was left of the reactive networks and attachments by reorganising them through the media (and in America, through religion). In the societies where the impact of 1968 was less thorough, or where the resistance to it was greater, new forms of terrifying micro-power were spawned: full-spectrum dominance, risk management, micro-regulations tailored to each individual (Hyland, n.d.), technological control and surveillance, and the entire constellation which one of us has elsewhere termed neo-totalitarianism. While this is every bit as bad as the old authoritarianism, it should not be viewed as a simple backlash or rollback. The old authoritarianism has remained unsustainable in the North. In the
new forms of control, traditional models metaphorised as ‘paternal’ have been restored in the imagery but not in the praxis. The old discriminations (racism, homophobia and so on) have resurfaced in disguised forms (such as immigration laws and stop-and-search), but laws against discrimination and for equality have not been reversed. Social control has, rather, been depersonalised, invested in machines rather than people, ‘security’ rather than ‘authority’, Auge’s ‘non-space’ (1995) rather than the dense social spaces of patronage politics. In schools, the ‘disobedient’ have been replaced by the ‘disruptive’; in policing, the ‘immoral’ has been replaced by the ‘anti-social’, and ‘sedition’ by ‘terrorism’. The new form is closer to the total mobilisation and thought-policing of classical totalitarianism than to the old authoritarianism.

How does the South fit into the picture? Basically, capitalism was more resistant to the same de/recomposition in the South, because the world system requires that consumption in the South be curbed, and because dependence on tributary strata was greater. The older kind of authoritarianism and patronage politics persists because it has retained its social basis (the existence of dense social networks and their imbrication in the state). Indeed, in many cases (in Latin America especially), the system fell back on direct dictatorships, strengthening the Victorian/Oedipal constellation. The situation is complicated by the colonial origins of, and resultant resistances to, the authoritarian modality in the South. The Victorian modality, and Oedipus, is a European phenomenon – it has never fully implanted elsewhere. Nevertheless, the imported state (at least in the nineteenth century colonies; Latin America has rather a different history) also brought an imported Oedipus, with its correlates – deference, authority, sexual repression, homophobia, patriarchal gender norms, the nuclear family – which it attempted to implant, even to the point of defining local ‘traditional’ culture in relation to ‘traditions’ it had imported.

Deleuze and Guattari, and Fanon, are right that the primary psychological mapping of the periphery is “racial” not Oedipal; but Oedipal ideology arises both as an aspect of the “ego-ideal” of the majoritarian “race”, and as a figure of the solidity, the “molar” form, of the anticolonial resister as majoritarian subject. Hence, 1968 did not hit in the same way in the south – the Victorian modality may have been less rooted to begin with, but it was also less shaken by revolt at this point. So the “old” modalities (which in the south are actually rather new, imported colonial modalities) have persisted in many places, in forms varying from persistent patriarchal gender norms and laws against same-sex relationships to prohibitions of criticism of the King or President, often couched in terms recognisable from Victorian Britain or Europe. The newer reactive movements such as political Islam and Hindu communalism are also highly Oedipal. In this sense, and in spite of the different histories of 1968 in the South, ‘1968’ might still be to come for much of the world – though it would have to be articulated in relation to the persistence of non-Oedipal forms and the relatively limited implantation of Oedipus.

For instance, a recent article discussing ‘India’s young and restless’ reveals that young women still face pressure from neighbours and discrimination in housing for alleged ‘indecent behaviour’, such as living with a roommate instead of a husband, staying out at night, attending concerts, or even working late. A single woman can find it almost
impossible to rent an apartment in Delhi, despite the pervasiveness of media images of single women, many imported from the North (Chakravarthy 18 July 2007). One can clearly see here exactly the kinds of everyday oppression, the blatant and explicit denial of the primacy of desiring-production over social production, which ‘1968’ was directed against.

Against the view that this ‘core’ adaptation by capital and the absence of this adaptation in many of the postcolonies is somehow Eurocentric (à la Lee Kwan Yew’s retro-Orientalist ‘Asian Values’ discourse), it should be emphasised that the Victorian modality was itself European-based, that it was utterly entangled with discourses of European superiority, that its global spread was a product of colonialism, and that the defeat of the Victorian modality went hand-in-hand with the defeat of imperialism, the withdrawal from Vietnam and Algeria, and the parallel replacement of colonial overcoding with decolonisation and the neo-colonial axiomatic on a global scale. We could also add that without ‘1968’, the global North would not care whether it was being Eurocentric or not – global solidarity, ‘anti-imperialism’ and ‘Third Worldism’ are definitely part of the post-68 constellation.

The limits of ‘1968’ also impact on the forms of autonomous social movements today. Southern autonomous movements have not gone as far as those in the North in rejecting formal institutions or in insisting on the primacy of desire in constituting community (rather than the other way round). The councilist model, expressing diffuse formal (instead of informal) sanctions, and the collectivist or communitarian idea of a molar community as the subject and object of struggle often recur as latent ‘commonsensical’ assumptions, alongside extremely radical ideas. In the case of the Zapatistas for example, this occurs in the prohibitions on drugs and alcohol and the use of forced labour and expulsion as punishments for ‘offenders’.

This kind of contamination of the affinity-network form with aspects of statism, while not negating the positive contributions of such movements, suggests certain dangers involved in the ease of the transition to resistance in a context where oppression is obvious. General impoverishment and discontent means that refusal of the present is less sharp than it is in European autonomism. The refusal is of a dominant parasitic or oppressive system, not of the organisation of social life in general. In a less hostile everyday context, rejection of socially-imposed relations in general is less necessary for resistance and hence the reflexivity found in autonomism and post-left anarchy about the repressiveness of imposed social forms and of industrial/instrumental rationalities in general, the ‘post-68’ disenchantment with consumerism, growth, and subordination to ‘the community’ will not always arise. It is to be hoped that Southern movements will find ways around this structural vulnerability. The right to difference and singularity, an affirmation of lifestyle freedom, and comprehensive rejection of the Oedipal mode of authoritarianism are crucial to overcoming the dominant system.

The main danger in the South is slippage into reactive networks based on the “community” identity, whereas the main danger in the North is slippage into alienation through recuperation of individual and lifestyle elements of opposition (though both
dangers exist in both contexts). A type of “individualism” is prominent in post-68 northern movements, rejecting conformism of the dominant society, supporting lifestyle multiplicity and insisting on personal ethical choice or responsibility. This is a response to atomisation, consumerism and bureaucratisation – the collective associated with the political principle, and the absence of an existing “community” to articulate (hence an alternative ‘community’-as-network has to be constructed by activists). The global South still sees a lot more activist of a “collectivist” type, on a “society against the state” or “state in society” kind of model. Chatterjee’s model of the Other of the system, as a community which is structured something like an authoritarian family, based on an appeal against exteriority and against secession (1993: 231-2), suggests that resistance and reactive networks are so entangled in the cases he studies as to make them nearly indistinguishable. It may be that the demand of lifestyle diversity has not (yet?) been taken up. But on the other hand, it emerges as implicit in struggles of minority or excluded groups (indigenous peoples for example) against a dominant discourse. It is not clear which is the more definitely autonomous, the Northern or Southern type of autonomous movements. The danger of the former is that isolation leads to a slippage back into a massified relation. The danger of the latter is that the orientation to the collective impedes critical distance, reflexivity and resistance to reactive appeals.

On the other hand, Southern movements often show an awareness of subtleties which is sometimes lacking in Northern movements. An article by Ichiyo on an Asian anti-militarist gathering shows that the peace movement is more complex in Asia than in the global North; while the North would discuss war as an external and simple problem, in Asia participants also had to discuss their own positions. Peace is not a return to a status quo but creating new relations (Ichiyo, 2004: 46-7), linked to demilitarising society, rejecting statist security discourse and combating exclusionary and oppressive relations (ibid.: 48). The impression often given by Northern scholars that the North has a general view of the world whereas the South is particular and local is frequently falsified in the discourse emerging from Southern autonomous social movements.

Another myth should here be laid to rest. It is commonly deduced from the broader structure of Northern privilege that it is easier to be a dissident in the North. Certainly, protesters in the periphery are at risk of being killed in violent state reactions, far more than in the north (Slater, 2004: 218), though given the wider context of impoverishment, more lives are doubtless saved by successful social movements. However, the Northern state is just as likely to react repressively. It is simply more efficient in doing so, drawing on the huge pool of different technologies which ‘overdevelopment’ offers it. Social density and state ineffectiveness offer a degree of anonymity in the South; the biggest danger is the unleashing of a ‘collectivised’ terror, which targets non-protesters as much as protesters. In the North, in contrast, micro-political retribution by the state is a huge danger. The numbers of people arrested and given draconian jail sentences following events such as the Bradford uprising are historically unprecedented. Northern states are no less violent, they are simply violent in a different, more technological way. In fact, social movements in the North are in a far weaker position than those in the South, owing to their small size, limited resonance with thoroughly incorporated populations, and the
overdeveloped techno-states against which they fight. The less capacity a state has, the easier it is to force it to back down.

*European Autonomism*

There is a large and growing literature dealing with contemporary anti-capitalist movements (Starr, 2000; Tormey, 2004; Solnit, 2006; Chesters 2006; Starhawk, 2008). This literature shows clearly the importance of the network form in this movement and its connection to the rebirth of hope. This relatively recent development has drawn attention to a wider phenomenon of longer duration: the autonomous social movements of the North, such as *autonomia* in Italy and *autonome* in Germany, and their equivalents in Holland, Greece, Denmark, Spain, France and so on. Emerging partly from the 60s counterculture, partly from the punk scene of the 1970s, and partly from the radical wing of the ‘new social movements’, European autonomism has, with a few notable exceptions (Katsiaficas, 1997; Wright, 2002), been overlooked in the literature. Its characteristics can be summarised in the following depiction of anarcho-punk, one of its components: ‘punk is best seen as a virus, one that mutates constantly and resists efforts at understanding and codification’ (Cogan 2007). A text of the movement itself goes even further, arguing that punks and New Age travellers ‘are the hunters and gatherers of contemporary wild nature: the technological megacity, which offers more than enough waste to live on’ (Do or Die, n.d.)

The conception of people involved in autonomous activism often resonates with the affinity-form. In one interview provided by a friend who works on these movements in Britain, we are told that activists ‘used to be part of a revolutionary social web, which was connected… it felt like and was to a certain degree an alternative social network, probably running within the state, rather like fungus running through the ground, certainly with a strong amount of inter-linking’; with the onset of Thatcherism, the world seems ‘further away’ as the networks dissipate and the remaining nodes become more isolated (Rhiannon Firth, interview with participant, Laurieston Hall, 22 September 2007; personal communication). The appearance of such exceptionally Deleuzian figures of speech in the everyday discourse of a social activist is indicative of the strong similarity between Deleuzian theory and the actual forms taken by autonomous movements. Autonomous activists really do experience the world in terms of webs, networks, connections and nodes, hence radically differently from the dominant molar figures of community.

When Deleuze and Guattari wrote of the becoming of a ‘new people and a new earth’, it may well have been autonomism they had in mind. European autonomism is becoming a kind of transnational band society with a distinct culture, and some of the (non-racial) attributes of an emerging ‘ethnicity’. It exists as a distinct political economy on the margins of the core, with different relations to distribution (gift vs trade), borders, and so on. It also manifests a rebirth of the logic of ‘cross-border raiding’ directed at the dominant society. Autonomists typically seek to avoid or minimise involvement in the dominant system, by means such as squatting, ‘autoreduction’ and even subsistence production. One crucial aspect of autonomism is that it involves militant responses to
any instance of state abuse or overreach – if the state pushes the boundaries of its coexistence with its other, autonomists will take over the streets, damage state and corporate resources or otherwise ‘sanction’ the state.

Autonomism in Europe takes especially antagonistic and total forms, pitting itself against the state and capital conceived as a single dominant and unitary system to be rejected in its totality. Why does it take such drastic forms? The reason is to be looked for in the pervasiveness of capitalist control in ‘overdeveloped’ Northern societies. The very difficulty of living even partly outside the system in areas where its power is so great necessitates the radical break theorised by European autonomism. It is distinctly possible that autonomous activists in the North are the equivalent of those who would opt for social density and informal life in the South, where this is a more common choice; or perhaps, that the rebellion against tradition that elsewhere would feed into the capitalist ‘addition of axioms’ becomes sharply dissident when ‘tradition’ has fused with capitalism as extensively as it has in Europe. In any case, in the radicalism of its break, European autonomism crafts a special, critical-hybrid kind of ‘beyond’ pointing out of (rather than to the margins of) capitalist modernity.

To what extent is autonomism a global possibility? We suspect that there can, and eventually will, be autonomisms everywhere, but that they will look rather different in each case. European autonomism is closely connected to the contexts (Italy, Germany) in which it emerged. Could there be, an autonomism of the barrios, or an African or Indian autonomism? Or a "post-totalitarian" autonomism in eastern Europe? What might an autonomism emerging in America or Britain have looked like? Autonomous social movements emerge pretty much everywhere, but with a different inflection in each case. Hence, it is not a matter of reading other contexts through a pre-existing theory, but of reformulating theory. An inclusive theory would have to take account of all the contexts.

Of the assumptions of autonomism, the most context-bound is the assumption of real or total subsumption, the death of mediation, and the complete eclipsing of exclusion by exploitation. On a global scale, exclusion and marginality are far more significant than exploitation. Autonomy emerges as a construction of survival, life and otherness outside and against the system, or by sucking flows back out of it. A global autonomism would therefore have to give more significance to exclusion, and learn the lessons of Baudrillard's "Mirror of Production". The "revolution" or insurrection then becomes less a passage through than a falling-apart from the outside in. We need to learn also from social movements of the South and from indigenous epistemology. Freire and Fanon are among the figures who should be looked to in reformulating autonomism. The logic of "creolisation", "mondialisation", etc which arises in postcolonial theory is a global alternative to the master-signifiers of the state and capital, and echoes on a global level the connections involved in affinity, rhizomes, etc.

**Horizontalism in the World Social Forum**

The World Social Forum defines itself as a space for dialogue and not a locus of power to be disputed (Sen et al. 2004: 67-8). It has been credited with producing active
intensities, a ‘natural high’, according to one commentator (Wolfwood, 2004: 79). The WSF charter states that its principles are ‘designed to ensure that globalisation in solidarity will prevail as a new stage in world history’ (Sen et al. 2004: 70). Grubacic has argued that anarchism has had a special influence on the WSF through its ethic of not taking state power but rather, dismantling domination and seeking to create autonomous spaces (2004: 3, 35). The WSF generally functions as an open space which enables transversal connections, although problems have been raised with aspects of its Charter which exclude militant groups such as the Zapatistas, its tensions with the pre-existing and more obviously anti-capitalist People’s Global Action, and with the unaccountability of its organisers. Some of its positions also seem to err in the direction of the logic of the included, demanding that inequalities be addressed by the state and tending to prefer state command over capitalist fluidity, raising dangers that the state could satisfy such demands while supplementing instead of challenging neoliberalism, and tending to seek to command capitalist flows rather than prevent entities from entering these flows to begin with.

There is a division within the WSF process between horizontalists and verticalists, with very different relationships to representationalism (Robinson and Tormey, 2005). Chico Whittaker articulates a horizontalist perspective which stresses the importance of horizontal articulations, and need to keep WSF as a forum not a movement (2004: 112). As a forum, the WSF can be a space which can link and generate new movements, whereas a movement cannot perform such functions (ibid. 113). For Whittaker, the main role of the WSF is in bringing down barriers (ibid. 120). A space exists to enable others, whereas a movement exists for a purpose. Whittaker views the WSF as something like a global town square, a ‘square without an owner’ (ibid. 116), shaped as a horizontal square instead of a pyramid, and operating as a ‘fair’ or ‘party’ based on ‘joy’ (ibid. 115), prefiguring an “other world” based on such joy. It is thus to be open to multiple uses. ‘Squares are generally open spaces that can be visited by all those who find any kind of interest in using it’ (ibid.113). As a space, the WSF cannot take decisions, and participation is voluntary and not binding. From this viewpoint, Whittaker is concerned that self-organised events are being overshadowed by big-name speakers and central themes (ibid. 117-18). He suggests instead that organisers need to be non-directive, working as “facilitators” (ibid. 119-20). Whittaker’s concepts of ‘space’ versus ‘movement’ are reminiscent of the difference between Guattari’s ‘subject group’ and ‘subjugated group’. Similarly, Irene Santiago has argued that the defence of the WSF as an open space must remain a prime objective. ‘Openness is both a strategy and a goal in a world increasingly constricting to the alternatives’ (Santiago, 2004: xiv-iv).

Social weaving: La Ruta Pacifica (Colombia)

Turning to Southern autonomous movements, our first example is the Colombian women’s group La Ruta Pacifica. This group stands out for its clear conceptualisation of the process of constructing social networks and of the importance of an emotional challenge to the fear constructed by the dominant system. Crucial to Ruta Pacifica’s praxis is the idea of “weaving” the social, which we might gloss as the creation of the
‘social principle’ or of social density, intensifying social networks; and ‘mourning’ as a way of managing the impact of violence, which might be considered a shamanic means of managing the negative effects of fear and anxiety produced by reactive and alienating forces.

Sometimes termed a ‘genocidal democracy’, Colombia features a situation of permanent war which has become systematised as a system of violence (Richani, 2002), not dissimilar to the outlines of the ‘war on terror’. This is a vision based on permanent conflict and scarcity. Against this, Ruta Pacifica pit a view that ‘the enemy doesn’t exist’ and that ‘Colombia can be a country that includes all of the men and women who inhabit it’ (Colorado 2003). The means of partially actualizing this conception are strikingly similar to those of autonomism, but varying in their emphasis on nonviolence. When a massacre occurs in an isolated and forgotten area of contestation, such as the Bojayá massacre, Ruta Pacifica contest the police-state regime put in place by the armed faction and the helplessness and fear it induces. In Bojayá, locals had been prohibited by the paramilitaries from using the Atrato River, and Ruta Pacifica reclaimed it by staging a protest occupation of the river. ‘This was their way of saying to the community that if they were united, they could do many things, that they must defeat their fear… From the bank of the river, the disconcerted paramilitaries watched them. The bravery of the women disconcerted them, without knowing how to respond’ (Colorado 2003). Such actions, argues Colorado, ‘simply move to a different logic’, ‘weaving together [the] diversity’ of women across Colombia (Colorado 2003).

Ruta Pacifica describe their practice as weaving: ‘we weave in order to resist the war; we weave solidarities, we weave in order to reconstruct and repair the social ties and communities, we weave love knots; we weave hope, and memory in a country where indifference and impunity wear down increasingly our dignity as human beings and our value and respect as a society.’ Drawing on the arts of poetry, exorcism, ritual and neologism, this image of weaving seeks to challenge the dominant ‘cult of violence’. It creates ‘invisible threads between beings’, disarms the armed, and has ‘restorative effects’, performing an ‘accumulated mourning’. Being ‘bound’ by social weaving helps to control fear (Colorado 2003). The fact that Ruta Pacifica manage to construct a nonviolent version of autonomism suggests that the crucial antagonism between the excluded and the system requires symbolic interruption, but that the crucial aspect of this is its disruptive effect and its persistence.

**Bolivian social movements**

Bolivian social movements in recent years have been a huge success story. Crabtree describes these movements as using a network form, a diverse and very broad alliance forming a ‘spontaneous movement’ involving coca-growers, slum dwellers, indigenous campesinos, pensioners and even nuns (Crabtree, 2005: 28). Despite constant divisions and disagreements, the movement has near-universal support (ibid. 31). The most common form of action is the bloqueo or road blockade. Launching a blockade is a community decision, which requires long dialogue in advance but is carried out in unity (ibid. 90), which may or may not indicate persistence of molar aggregative politics. The
shanty town of El Alto is particularly active. It is a highly networked area where
neighbourhoods ‘form close-knit and community-conscious units’, have a long history of
collective action and a history of local elected committees (ibid. 95-6). During massive
mobilisations over gas revenue distribution, a one-day protest was turned into an
indefinite movement in spontaneous response to military repression. Tactics such as
roadblocks and trenches were used to impede military activity in the area (ibid. 104). In
protests over water privatisation in Cochabamba, protesters were reportedly amazed at
their own success. Tactics had included mass protests and road blockades which sprang
up every few kilometres around the city (ibid. 12, 28). In rural protests by cocaleros
(coca-growers), local community groups in the Yungas and earlier in Chapare turn back
police and stop the building of barracks (ibid. 45-6).

Crabtree 2005 refers to these mobilisations as ‘rooted in a tradition of “doing politics”
that highlights protagonism and direct action at the margins of parliamentary procedures’
(ibid. 109). It occurs through oscillating intensities operating through resonances across
localities. Diverse sectors mobilise over localised issues, and come together in accidental
alliances, usually in reaction against state and capitalist actions (ibid. 111). Protest is
‘intermittent, not constant’ – often broken by periods of dialogue or to facilitate everyday
activities – and exhibits varying intensity over time (ibid. 110-11). Hence, a ripple effect
often occurs. Protests occur as ‘waves’ of pressure (ibid. 112) – one protest inspires
others to protest, making it hard to isolate each protest (ibid. 112). Recurring focuses of
protest have included neoliberalism, resource extraction, American influence and the
defence of indigenous culture.

‘Mass incidents’ in China

With its ‘great firewall’, generalised social repression and reputation for stability built on
economic growth, China is perhaps the last place one would expect the growing wave of
social networks to be a destabilising force. Even here, however, autonomous forms of
social action are becoming frequent, directed against aspects of the dominant system such
as land and resource grabs, pollution, micro-regulation and racial discrimination.
Chinese commentator Li Datong has stated that ‘[a] constant feature of the extraordinary
social flux of contemporary China is the occurrence of serious clashes between the public
and the police’ (Li 2008). Only a few (probably the larger) incidents make it into the
global news, but official reports suggest there were a massive 80,000 ‘mass incidents’
(meaning incidents where police repression was attempted) in 2007 (Li 2008).

The occasion of Li’s analysis is the Weng’an uprising of Spring 2008, during which a
reported 10,000 people attacked official buildings in protests over a suspicious death
blamed on local officials. The uprisings often appear unconnected and localized, but they
also involve an implicit connectedness emerging out of growing use of the Internet and
evasion of state censorship. In the case of Weng’an for instance, images quickly spread
across the Internet, and even the official media were required to admit the existence of the
revolt (Li 2008).
According to Li, Chinese development under Deng and since has been based on the premise that state violence, directed against any and all protests or petitions to the state, will protect the regime from the effects of ‘unfair burdens… on the public’. But the population is emerging as ‘a power beyond law’, making it so that ‘this form of governance cannot persist’ (Li 2008). Li gives three reasons for this conclusion, all intimately connected to the growing power of networks. Firstly, people ‘have more access to information and freedom in circulating it than ever before’, partly due to the Internet. Secondly, general discontent means that localized incidents resonate with wider concerns, meaning ‘any available incident’ can trigger ‘bottled up’ frustration and ‘becom[e] the occasion for an eruption of mass fury’. Thirdly, reactions against local officials can reflect on the government as a whole (Li 2008).

**Societies without the state: the indigenous challenge**

Indigenous peoples are a special case of affinity-networks because they expand the network form to cover the whole of social and, indeed, ecological life. Hence, while studies of social movements generally involve finding ways in which partial autonomous spaces are constructed against dominant forms imposing hierarchies, studies of indigenous societies involve studies of the network form as a total social form. Indigenous peoples also sometimes express characteristics of reactive networks, and marginal forms of connection to alienated economies and states, but their predominant formal structure is a structure of radical immanence. Indigenous societies are non-state societies, without the characteristic forms of centralised power associated with the state and alienated social forms (though depending on the group being discussed, they may have forms of concentrated informal and/or diffuse formal power which create hierarchies, representationalisms or exclusions keeping them one degree removed from the affinity-network form). Between fully indigenous and metropolitan are the lifeworlds of peasants and the urban poor. Hence, aspects of indigenous forms of life arise very frequently among the numerical majority of the world’s population. As Harrison argues, rural informal civil society rarely takes capitalistic interest-based forms, instead being based on cooperatives, kinship ties and forms of status such as gender and age (2002: 96-7). Indigenous forms also appear in urban settings. For instance, a corporate lineage or clan is likely to have its own ward of barrio (Keesing, 1975: 40-1), a model of affinity now reproduced by activists at summit protests and protest camps.

The sheer number and diversity of indigenous societies eclipses that of state societies. According to Boulding, there are 10,000 distinct societies tucked into 180 nation-states (Boulding, 1994: 199). Many of these societies are indigenous. Against the myth of unproductive indigenous peoples, Martinez (2008) argues that ecosystems under indigenous stewardship are actively enabled to thrive by indigenous practices. Indigenous peoples occupy 22% of the Earth’s land but are stewards of 80% of the remaining biodiversity and 90% of the remaining cultural diversity (Martinez 2008). Indigenous struggles typically emerge at the intersection or frontier between indigenous forms of life and the world-system. According to Gurr and Harff, indigenous peoples ‘live mainly in peripheral regions of modern states’, have lost resources and lands to
developers and settlers, and seek to protect their languages and ways of life from ‘ethnocide’ or ‘cultural genocide’ and to defend or recover lands and resources (1994: 20).

Indigenous life-worlds are particularly singled out as targets of epistemological dismissal and colonial violence. As Clastres argues, ‘the world of [indigenous peoples] was literally unthinkable for European thought’ because it defied the assumption of ‘the One exterior to society’ (1994: 140). It remains unthinkable to much of mainstream and even critical political theory and political science. In contexts such as West Papua, there is a tendency for colonising assumptions to be used to disempower indigenous peoples – firstly, indigenous ways of life are reduced to the idea of subsistence as poverty, hence as lack of and need for development; secondly, this ‘underdevelopment’ is portrayed as a source of conflict; and thirdly, Papuan indigenous identity is elided beneath the assumptions that it must be a construct either of European ideas, hence nationalist, or of stagnant traditionalism, hence ethnic. This parallels exactly the account provided by Slater (2004:11-12) of colonial assumptions. In the colonial mindset, indigenous peoples are demonised as expressions of a non-state Other whose life is ‘nasty, brutish and short’. Contrary to the modern redefinition of Hobbes and Locke as proto-Rawlsians, Barry Hindess has shown that the idea of an empirical ‘state of nature’ was a widespread empirical assumption used as part of a developmentalist narrative directed at dispossession of indigenous peoples (Hindess 2007). The generic demonisation of the indigenous or Third World Other hence expresses a projection of an imaginary Other constructed through the inner structure of statist mythologies.

Such arguments are echoed elsewhere. Baudrillard (Mirror of Prod 59) has argued that the projection of capitalist metaphysics, such as the idea of production, onto indigenous societies undermines awareness of difference. Martinez (2008) argues that the myth of ‘manifest destiny’ and the related process of global enclosure and land grabs persists to this day – echoing the idea of the new enclosures put forward by the Midnight Notes Collective (1992). Authors such as Scott (1998) and Badie (2000) show how the imposition of statism has impacted negatively on stateless societies and everyday life. According to Inkeles (1966), attempts by African states to turn Africans into the ‘modern man’ of colonialism led to the systematic exclusion of indigenous peoples, who often had to defend themselves against their more ‘modern’ neighbours (Inkeles 1966).

Indigenous societies are best theorised as complex, immanent and resistant to the transcendentalism and representationalism of state societies. Contrary to the idea that capitalism is ‘complex’ and other societies ‘simple’ (e.g. Chew 2006), it has been noted that indigenous societies are actually extremely complex; indeed, statism is a ‘crude simplification’ in contrast (Ward, 1982: 49), a conclusion which concurs with our analysis of ethnicity (see below). James Scott has analysed the modernist state as involving a reductive gaze which elides the complexity of everyday life and which is fundamentally a matter of simplification (Scott 1998).

Indigenous peoples have been discussed both by world systems analysts and postcolonial theorists as especially relevant to transformative responses to the capitalist/colonial world
system (Feldman, 2007: 244; Hall and Fenelon, 2005: 101-2; Hall and Fenelon 2003: 183). According to Feldman, an emphasis on indigenous perspectives leads to discussion at a different, unrecognisable level compared to where postcolonial theory is today, by developing competence in non-western epistemologies (Feldman, 2007: 244). Author such as Spivak (1994) and Shiva (1993) show clearly the difference between indigenous diversity and capitalist monoculture, establishing the similarity of the former to Deleuzian themes of flows, becoming and openness, and the latter to monological modes of representation. Baudrillard similarly argues that indigenous perspectives can lead to radical perspective on (as opposed to an internal critique of) western culture (1973: 89). This subversive potential is pushed to the limit by eco-anarchist authors such as John Zerzan (1994), who use the existence of indigenous otherness as a persistent empirically-existing critique of capitalist alienation.

Extending this analysis in Deleuzian terms, indigenous social logics could be conceived in Deleuzian terms as a set of social functions or ‘machines’, which establish certain kinds of relations, which are radically non-capitalist and non-statist (whatever their systemic inscriptions). Functioning is here a relational rather than operational concept. Hence, there is no essence or secret of indigeneity, nomadism, ecology, sorcery, shamanism (or for that matter animality, femininity, childishness, etc); it is a question of forming a certain kind of connection in a certain kind of relational network (see e.g. Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 422-3). In contrast to the appropriative representational knowledge-from-above of colonial power-knowledge, this way of relating to indigeneity is non-representational and involves creation of the new through *bricolage* and becoming. Indigeneity is not a special attribute of certain peoples to be kept at a distance; it is a social machine which can be reconstructed, in whole or in part, in other times and places. Nomads and indigenous peoples are defined by their relational functioning and exist only in becoming and in interaction (ibid. 430). One could hence list a range of indigenous relations and affects: indigenous cosmology as immanence, plane of consistency, and inclusive affinity; indigenous economics as ‘primitive abundance’ and the gift economy; indigenous politics as warding-off of concentrated power and the state; indigenous social relations as networks, rhizomes and irreducible singularities in which each is indispensable. There are doubtless others (indigenous ‘justice’ as restorative rather than punitive for instance, and the difference between custom and law), but those we have identified are particularly important to our account. As a set of relations, indigenous social relations may be realised only some of the time by indigenous peoples, and may sometimes be realised by non-indigenous peoples. They are usually more prevalent, however, in indigenous societies.

In cases where indigenous societies have been able to defend themselves from dispossession or live in marginal areas as yet unenclosed by capital, one sees a flourishing of non-state social forms without political representation. Kropotkin, Barclay, Sahlins, Lee and Clastres famously document numerous such cases, and there are many indigenous communities today such as the Mbuti, the !Kung and other Bushmen groups, and the Andaman Islanders which are documented by anthropologists as able to function without political or intellectual leadership (Kropotkin, 1902; Clusters, 1989; Sahlins, 1972; Lee and DeVore, 1978; Barclay, 1982; Turnbull 1987).
The !Kung for instance, ‘have no formal authority figure or chief, but govern themselves by group consensus. Disputes are resolved through lengthy discussions where all involved have a chance to make their thoughts heard until some agreement is reached.’ (Shostak 1981).

In cases where societies have been partially colonised or dispossessed, the situation is more ambiguous, but indigenous logics persist as a type of social relation outside dominant relations. Marieke Clarke’s (1991) study of an Indian adivasi community, while rejecting the idea of a past ‘golden age’ or a present entirely outside the world-system, suggests the persistence of indigenous ways of life as an outside coexisting with insertion based on dispossession. Even in a largely landless adivasi community which has been considerably dispossessed and culturally colonised by local landlords, distinctly indigenous relations persist. People work land in local reciprocity relations in preference to working in the cash economy (Clarke, 1991: 201) and practice mutual aid (ibid. 195). Whereas richer villagers often neglect elderly relatives, poorer villagers do not (ibid. 218). Adivasi labourers, even the worst-off, can and do take unexplained days off (ibid. 88). Similarly, ‘adivasi children learn by doing’ and are included in social relations; it is unusual to see a crying child or an adult irritated by a child, since if there is tension, children will be transferred between adults (ibid. 39). Adivasi women are generally in a stronger social position than caste Hindu women (see 1991: chapter 3). Hence, even when they do not avoid contact with dominant social forms, indigenous societies persist in asserting an ‘outside’, a different type of social relations. While Marxists are often enthusiastic to reduce these ambiguous situations to their marginal systemic inscriptions and turn them into ‘internal’ contradictions of capitalism, it is often more plausible to suggest that local social life remains predominantly different from capitalist social forms, meaning that capitalist forms are either imposed in an external way, by violence, or that they have to adapt themselves to a marginal position in a hostile life-world.

Indigenous movements emerge as a challenge to the dominant system. Slater refers to movements such as the Zapatistas as a ‘counter-geopolitics, where an alternative indigenous memory of territory is deployed as part of the ideological struggle against a centralized and mono-cultural state’ (2004: 24). Mignolo similarly refers to a tradition of Amerindian expression which uses uprisings rather than writing as its main modality (2000: 166). In indigenous politics, everyday life becomes a site of conflict between hierarchical and network forms, with the density and complexity of ecological and social network relationalities mobilised against the simplifying mechanisms of hierarchical power.

Indigenous societies are not always entirely non-oppressive; there may, for instance, be forms of gender, age and even caste hierarchy, expressing slippage from the active to the reactive pole. They are, however, closer to being non-oppressive than metropolitan societies, even the most egalitarian and democratic metropolitan societies; they are substantively better than global capitalism in many ways, from egalitarianism to ecological responsiveness. Hence, the goal of creating a non-oppressive world can learn more from some societies than others, even if most contain some oppressive aspects. It should also be noted that oppression in indigenous societies nearly always takes reactive
rather than alienated forms. The problem of overthrowing the world-system and overcoming alienation is not the same as the problem of warding off reactive distortions of active affinity-networks.

In addition, it needs to be remembered that indigenous societies are historical societies which are responding to specific situations and problems, and not simply actualisations of abstract principles. They are constantly created and recreated, just as much as are metropolitan societies. They are not ‘perfect’, or final, or unchanging over time; they do not necessarily have all the answers to their own problems or anyone else’s. There is no unitary indigeneity, as every indigenous society is different and singular. Indigenous cosmology, which is relational and immanent, is a defining feature – but different societies are immanent to different situations and involve different sets of relations. Also, like the ecosystems they inhabit, indigenous societies have been hurt greatly by colonialism and capitalism. Above all, the validity of their knowledges and cosmologies must be recognised, and the ‘trunk’ status of statism and colonial modernity rejected.

We shall doubtless be accused of ‘romanticism’ by defenders of capitalist globalisation and the Marxist ‘passage through capitalism’. Historically, this refers to a kind of arborescence, a ‘counter-trunk’ of the peasant other. Today, it is more of a boo-word, used to denounce attacks on the dominant trunk on the grounds that the other of the trunk is imperfect. Logically, of course, this posited imperfection of the other is no reason to embrace arborescence, not only because arborescent forms are themselves far from perfect, but also because the process of replacing hierarchies with networks tends to undermine the pursuit of ‘perfection’ as a fixed state, replacing it with what Bonanno (n.d.b) terms ‘propulsive utopia’, the actualisation of difference in relations and processes which are active and which express the primacy of desiring-production.

**Indigenous peoples and world-systems analysis**

Authors working in the mainstream of world-systems analysis often neglect indigenous peoples. Chase-Dunn and Hall assume that all societies have an ecologically destructive impetus leading to expansion, which is productive of the cycles of the world-system. Chew (2006) portrays the return to or construction of indigenous forms of life following the decline of states and empires as a kind of social decay or ‘dark age’. Authors such as Arghiri Emmanuel and Samir Amin persist in viewing industrial development as the answer to global exclusion. All these perspectives tend to reproduce the privileging of ‘modernity’ and hence of metropolitan forms of life, failing to delink from the world-system at an epistemological level.

This kind of perspective also affects world-systems accounts of indigenous societies. Hence, for instance, Macharia rightly argues that some Africans are more indigenous than others, differentiating groups with ancestral cultural or land rights and excluded from the modern economy from groups which became symbiotic with the colonisers and took over African states during decolonisation (Macharia 2003: 190-1). In contrast to Fenelon and Hall, however, Macharia tends to portray indigenous peoples in terms suggesting they should be assimilated into global capitalism – they ‘would like to keep up’ in modern
development, are ‘disadvantaged in participating’ in modern systems and have had to ‘pay dearly’ for their cultural traditionalism (2003: 195-6, 199). Rather than simply being excluded from ‘modern’ capitalism and statism as Macharia suggests, indigenous peoples explicitly seek to defend other ways of life. They are certainly dispossessed and oppressed, but their refusal to participate in modern institutions is not necessarily an instance of either.

Though marginal to the mainstream of world-systems writings, indigenous peoples have not been entirely neglected in world-systems analysis, attracting a series of studies mostly focused on degrees of systemic insertion. A number of concrete studies have investigated conflict with and incorporation of indigenous peoples during the expansion of the modern world-system. For instance, Thomas Hall’s work on the American Southwest portrays a situation of conflict between indigenous and hierarchical (world-systemic) logics. For a long time, the two were able to coexist only because the world-system did not implant extensively in the ‘region of refuge’ of New Mexico and surrounding areas. There was a state of permanent frontier war as indigenous peoples reacted first to expansion then to retaliatory raids by Spanish settlers. This situation was only mitigated when the Spanish resorted to ‘buying’ peace and demilitarising the area (1989: 67-9). Indigenous resistance led to an array of repressive and conciliatory responses. Initially, colonisers divided indigenous societies between resistant nomads and incorporated sedentary villagers (1989: 84). However, as time went on, recuperation became unprofitable and sedentary peoples came to understand colonial power better, leading to revolt. The revolt, which drew on a hidden transcript articulated through secret societies, expelled the colonisers for around a decade (1989: 87-9). Colonisers sought to ‘punish’ indigenous peoples for raiding by destroying their means of subsistence. This often led to increased raiding, but sometimes managed to make indigenous peoples dependent on food grants and hence reservations (1989: 219). When villagers were targeted for atrocities, they often fled to join existing nomad bands (1989: 82).

Later, American conquest led to two centuries of anti-indigenous warfare waged mainly by people committed to exterminating indigenous peoples (1989: 204). With the region turned from a ‘region of refuge’ for non-state societies into a part of marginal and, later, core production systems, indigenous groups lost their autonomy (1989: 206). Nomads were turned at gunpoint into sedentary groups (1989: 210) or destroyed by intensive farming (1989: 230-1). The loss of land led remaining indigenous peoples to rely on raiding cattle ranches (1989: 217). Ultimately, Hall argues, with no room left for compromise, nomadic and gardening peoples had to become marginal or die resisting, which many did (1989: 234).

Hall’s seminal work is the best-known of a series of similar studies dealing with indigenous peoples from a world-systems perspective. Melissa L Meyer (1994) provides a WS analysis of the reservation system as system of dispossession. Gailey and Patterson (1998) theorise indigenous types of society as peripheral types of society which are formed as a reaction against state-formation. Arrighi and Silver briefly discuss the situation in India where 1.5 million people were at risk of being jailed for belonging to the wrong ethnicity, so-called ‘criminal tribes’ (1999: 241), while Dunaway (2000) has
discussed the impact of the fur trade on band societies in the American Northeast. These works provide important insights into the intersection of global and local logics, but stop short of analysing the persistence of network forms in the face of hierarchical systemic inscription. World-systems texts often leave the impression that indigenous peoples have been reduced to a situation of incorporation, emphasising periods of rapid change which are seen in terms of autonomy before and incorporation after. However, Pickering (2003: 202) questions this analysis, suggesting that incorporation has to be maintained constantly in everyday life, and is contested there. This parallels our own thesis of ‘affirmative entropy’ (see above).

Similarly, Hall and Fenelon argue that the survival of indigenous groups is inherently antisystemic because it involves the persistence of forms of life, and by implication the right to live, in ways other than those permitted or favoured by capitalism (2005 p. 206). This is a challenge, even if not always a threat, to capitalism. Capitalism cannot undergo reforms, evolution or revolution to enable indigenous social spaces and remain capitalist; yet such spaces are in fact being created, both as resistance movements and as cultural survival (ibid. 207). Indigenous communities are counterposed to hierarchical states, and are almost anti-political, orienting to community and land relations rather than political reformulation (2005: 108-9, 120). Hernandez similarly argues that indigenous movements should be viewed as antisystemic, not mystical (2005: 134). Indigenous peoples have proven highly resilient, having survived attempts at incorporation and eradication for 5000 years (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). Conflicts between state and non-state peoples are as old as states (Hall and Fenelon 2003: 173).

Hall and Fenelon argue that indigenous peoples, organised according to a logic different from that of the world-system, are more of a threat to it than are more powerful but less distinct groups (Hall and Fenelon in 2003: 181). They even suggest that indigenous peoples might be the source of a new world-system after capitalism, since they offer the widest range of alternatives, and since capitalism itself grew from small pockets of persistent marginal activity (183). They are arguably more diverse than are state societies (Hall and Fenelon 2003: 176). Indigenous peoples defend ‘fundamentally non-capitalist’ social structures (Hall and Fenelon 2005: 101). Where they use capitalist structures, they do so for the purpose of preserving non-capitalist structures (ibid. 103). They are a challenge to capitalism because their very existence shows that the idea that there is no alternative is false (ibid. 102). The persistence of indigenous peoples through millennia of capitalism and statism suggests that their continued survival is likely (ibid. 108). The question of how indigenous peoples have survived is crucial (ibid. 96). Survival is linked to the defence of land and ‘resources’ (ibid. 101-2), and strength drawn from kinship and community solidarities (ibid. 101). Indigenous societies offer a far more diverse and innovative range of alternatives to capitalism than emerge at the core (ibid. 107). Those which remain strongest are those which have retained a land-base, even if they are dispersed from it. Their strength is based on the connection of economics to community and kinship (Hall and Fenelon 2003: 180).

Following this line of argument, Hall and Fenelon (2005) suggest that indigenous movements may be ignored or tolerated when hegemony is strong and powerful when it
is weak; they are at the most risk in periods of changing or intermediate hegemony, but these are also contexts of opportunity (222). There may be other aspects involved also. For instance, if the core is contracting into a smaller space (global cities and extraction nodes), control of more marginal areas may relax, or be harder to maintain. As mechanisms of patronage and ‘addition of axioms’ lose their economic basis, forms of pacification by ‘buying off’ resistant populations or paying local strongmen to keep them quiet are supplanted by emergent movements of resistance. As the proportion of excluded to exploited increases, the system loses much of its motive to assimilate, and conflicts over resources may sharpen.

Hall and Fenelon also rather dubiously assert that indigenous peoples are at less risk in core countries rather than peripheral countries because of the ‘rule of law’ (2005: 206), despite admitting that their historical removal was genocidal and not legally sanctioned (ibid. 217) and that low-intensity warfare persists in contexts of conflict such as Pine Ridge (ibid. 221-2). They have a point, since northern indigenous movements have sometimes used legal channels successfully; but this strategy depends on the content of laws, the ideology of judges and the broader context – it has not been universally successful. It may be more important to observe that northern states have generally completed a high degree of incorporation or marginalisation of indigenous peoples; rarely do they encounter the kind of highly organised, autonomous indigenous peoples associated with conflicts in the south. In other words, if the North rarely resorts to the violence seen by the South, it is because the North is challenged less often, and has already completed the process of subordination the South is just beginning. It is in contexts where they are faced with an autonomous ‘war machine’ with its own social base and capacity to use force that states resort to genocidal means. That indigenous groups in the South can still pose this kind of challenge to states is a register of their strength, not their weakness. In Mexico, the Amazon and the Mapuche lands, indigenous peoples still defend themselves vigorously against colonisation, and in Ecuador and Bolivia they have actually brought down governments. Groups such as the Six Nations, the Western Shoshone and the Lubicon are fighting similar struggles, but with far less capacity for autonomous resistance.

Indigeneity versus ethnopolitics

Given the importance of kinship and ‘ascriptive’ characteristics in many indigenous societies, why do we distinguish between indigenous politics and ethnoreligious movements, assigning them, indeed, to opposite sides of the active-reactive divide? Whereas reactive ethnopolitics is based on the primacy of the high-level in-group category, Keesing suggests that in indigenous societies, the intense locus of attachment is to the immediate unit, and the wider mobilisation of ethnic categories is contingent and arises in disputes (1975: 28-9). While the immediate unit might be corporate, the degree of collective action declines the further one moves towards the abstraction. At the limit, the ethnic category might simply delineate outer limits of kinship obligation or exogamy (ibid. 32). What is more, the structure of the immediate group is impermanent (ibid. 30-1). For instance, each !Kung band has primary rights to a specific waterhole, but if it runs out, each person leaves temporarily to join other related bands (ibid. 6). Group
belonging is often transversal and crosscutting because of relations of intergroup alliance, intermarriage, gaps between entitlements and actual belongings, and differences between descent groups and domestic groups.

Bamford provides an interpretation of Kamea cosmology to point towards a disconnection between biology and kinship (Bamford 2007: 5-6). Kinship is retheorised as a socially created concept of relatedness linked to ideas of shared substance (ibid. 9-10), similar to our concept of affinity discussed above. The Kamea view of kinship is ‘relational’ not ‘substantive’ (ibid. 78). ‘Individuals and bodies are fully relational from the outset’ (ibid. 144), and transformation, not fixity, is the baseline for existence (ibid. 138). Interpersonal links, and ecological belonging to a context, is not autochthonous or biological, but rather, arises from a primordial mobility which transmutes into land-rights and other claims through combination with labour (ibid. 38, 73). Potentials must be actualised to be brought to fruition (ibid. 172). Kinship arises over time, through partaking of the same physical and social activity (ibid. 56-7). Cultural ideas such as ‘taboos’ arise from a desire to keep creating differentiation, for instance around gender; such differentiation is constituted by social action (ibid. 90-1, 99). ‘It is this need to keep differentiating against a countervailing pull of similitude that gives New Guinea cultures their forward momentum’ (ibid. 92). Social persistence is produced by reproducing identities and relations across generations through agency (ibid. 124). While we would question Bamford’s dismissal of concerns about technological monoculture, her account, and the culture she discusses, throw into sharp relief the contingency of dominant conceptions of belonging and ethnicity, showing how the Kamea depart radically from such conceptions. Illusions of substantive belonging linked to biological substance are crucial to the nation-state and to ethnoreligious networks, and emerge as part of the colonisation of networks by the state.

Hence, the association of indigeneity with the rigid ethnopolitical structures imposed by colonialism and with images of inflexible tradition must be rejected. Apparently rigid structural rules (about marriage for example) are sometimes broken, and when this happens, people are ritually reassigned to the correct category, with genealogies edited to fit with actual social relations (Keesing 1975: 88, 94). Lineages are not ‘basic’ units since many everyday activities are conduced outside them and group belonging is situationally variable (ibid. 124-5). Individual actions, sometimes responding to ecological pressures, can set in motion cultural drift (ibid. 141), suggesting a certain primacy of desiring-production. There are also phenomena of fictive kinship such as compadrazgo (ibid. 130). One could also refer here to the Na of China, who have no conception of biological fatherhood (Hua and Hustvedt 2008). Hence there is no simple in-group or “ethnic group” – rather, a number of overlapping and complex relational positions. The potentially reactive inscription of kinship as fixity is in practice undermined by an emphasis on the complexity of situational attachments.

Indigenous cosmology: radical immanence

The main gap in the world-systems literature is in the area of indigenous cosmology. In Fenelon and Hall’s various articles for example, which come closest in this literature to
realising the importance of indigenous movements, the absence of indigenous cosmology as a central concern means that indigenous demands are reduced to the triad of community power, egalitarianism and land rights. While these are certainly crucial concerns, they do not differentiate indigenous movements from conservative forms of culturalism and ethnic politics. What drives indigenous movements away from such repressive implications is the ‘differenciating’ force of indigenous cosmology.

Indigenous perspectives are frequently immanent on a very radical level; the spheres of nature, humanity and the supernatural and the subject and object worlds are not separated ontologically (Redfield, undated), and speech-acts are conceived in entirely situated term (De Souza 2002; 2003; 2004). This leads many anthropologists, not to mention indigenous people exposed to western culture, to question western assumptions about what ‘humanity’ involves. Escobar (1997 cited in Mignolo 2000) differentiates ‘organic nature’ as the ecological context of those who are not strictly modern from ‘capitalized nature’ associated with resource extraction. Local knowledges of organic nature may be characterised by the unity of nature, the human and the spiritual, as in Redfield’s account.

The absolute immanence of indigenous cosmology is clearly expressed in the following quote from an Ojibwe activist author. ‘In the Ahnishinahbeo’jibway world-view, every human being is put on this earth for a purpose, and every human being is born with the capability of understanding through their own personal relationship with the Universe what the meaning of their own life is, and living in harmony. Every person comes to this world for a purpose, and according to Ahnishinahbeo’jibway philosophy, is untainted by what the Judeo-Christians call ‘original sin’. (Wub-e-ke-niew 1995)

The importance of indigenous cosmology is recognised intermittently across a very broad literature. Hence for example, Thomas Hall argues that band societies ‘typically… imbue all actions with a religious aspect’ (1989: 65), while Ramachandra Guha argues that ‘[t]raditional societies experience life as an ever-expanding web of connections which reaches beyond local and national communities into the depths of nature’ (1989: 93). Pierre Clastres conceives indigenous peoples as radically other to, ‘unthinkable’ for, European thought because of their rejection of transcendentalism (1994:140). He analyses indigenous communities as composites of inscriptions into different ‘appurtenances’, meaning affinities or belongings (ibid. 153). These create a type of society which avoids alienation: ‘primitive society is, in its being, undivided’ (ibid. 154). Baudrillard, meanwhile, argues that other cultures have retained their hospitality and ability to incorporate the outside, including what comes from the West, in contrast to the West’s closure (1993; cf.). The poet Arguedas argues that ‘Quechua words also embrace the relationships that fortunately still exist between humanity and nature’ (cited Mignolo, 2000: 224). Even relatively mainstream authors such as Mitchell can mourn the failure of modernity to manage social affairs with anything like the understanding of chemical processes, suggesting that the west remains ‘backward’ in this regard (Hirsch and Marchi cited Mignolo 1990: 47).

In Kusch’s analysis for instance, ‘Amerindian’ (South American indigenous) cosmology avoids reference to a world of essences and exists as mere existence, in the here and now, on the margin with divine wrath. Its focus is ‘to be here’ rather than ‘to be someone’
(cited Mignolo, 2000: 155). This means that the ‘anonymous ones’ of the unspeakable other are still ‘here’, eating away at western ‘civilisation’ (ibid. 156). Hence, ‘the forces of “to be here” are fighting the hegemony of “to be someone”’ (Mignolo, 2000: 157). In this cosmology, far from the point being to establish hegemony and avoid chaos, the forces of chaos and order are viewed as coexisting and complementary (ibid. 157).

Mignolo argues that a ‘nonontological cosmology’ such as Amerindian cosmology ‘is an alternative to Western ontological cosmology as the grounding of totality’ (ibid. 329). ‘[W]hat survives and remains from the Amerindian past are cognitive patterns of dealing with new situations, allowing for creativity, resistance, and survival very much shaped by the colonial difference’ (ibid.153). Mignolo thus suggests that Amerindian categories can be used as ‘energy’ for thinking, rather than being taken as an object or ignored (ibid. 150).

A number of works have now been written emphasising the importance of local knowledges which are not recognised as knowledge on a global scale. Mudimbe (1988) for instance contrasts these local ‘gnoseologies’ to recognised ‘epistemologies’, while Mignolo (2000) argues they have been submerged by global regimes of power. Empirical scholars often find similar importance in local ideas. For example, Galvan (2004) suggests that peasants craft sustainability from dominant discourses by subverting them through local knowledges, while Harrison (2004: 24) suggests that peasant knowledge is often better for issues such as population control and effective prod in arid regions than western schemes. From local knowledges emerge forms of power which are disruptive of dominance. In the Indian state of Orissa, Das (2008) has argued that the interlinked forests used by wild animals are also used by Naxals and other dissidents, allowing invisible routes around the state. ‘These interlinked jungles and the pathways through them provide safe route for wild elephants and timber mafia. Now this route is being used by the naxals… The naxals seem to be learning from the movement of wild elephants through the inter-linked forests of the State.’ Counter-powers emerge from counter-knowledges.

Local knowledges enable forms of survival in contexts of domination. Comaroff and Comaroff (2001) have argued that marginalised peoples often use millenarian and heterodox religion as a basis for oppositional consciousness. Gledhill (2000) stresses the theme of healing the body as healing social relations linked to collective practices and labour. Keesing (1992) found that the Kwaio of the Solomon Islands used parody and inversion to defend their religion through emulation without deference of colonialism. Hence, like the Latin American Catholics who developed liberation theology, they used colonial or imported rituals to build an ‘invisible wall’ protecting their society from colonialism (Gledhill, 2000: 84). According to Mignolo, in Bolivia the idea of revolution becomes linked to the Aymara concept of pachacuti (catastrophe or millennium) (Mignolo, 2000: 200). Cusicanqui shows how evolutionary ideas are understood in a Benjaminian way, as ‘a renovation of time-space’, ‘past-as-future’. ‘A particular past that could change or renew the future could reverse the lived situation’. The idea of a hidden history which ‘survives the fissures of the Western world’ underlies pachacuti (Cusicanqui, cited Mignolo 172-3).
Indigenous cosmology opens onto the possibility of a smooth relation to space. Deleuze and Guattari refer to Inuit perspectives and Arab architecture as examples of smooth ways of engaging with space, in which touch predominates over sight and the eye takes on non-optical functions (1987: 494). This is related to the attribute of nomads as ‘distributed in’, rather than ‘distributing’, space. Fenelon and Hall similarly argue that the Maori are distributed in (belong to) the land, rather than owning it (2006:115), and a related analysis is offered by Genosko and Bryx (2005). The smoothing of space, performed constantly in the reproduction of affinity-based forms of life, undermines systemic domination. Smooth and striated are not the same as global and local, but rather, are different ways of seeing (Deuleze and Guattari 1987: 494). This opens up the possibility of a global smoothing, a global smooth space (something already realised, but in a negative way, by the global war-machine and capitalist flows).

**Indigenous societies and technology**

Compared to the autonomous movements discussed above, indigenous movements are typically rather ‘low-tech’. This is not, however, simply a question of lack. Authors such as Zerzan and Illich have differentiated indigenous and metropolitan types of relations to objects in terms of the distinction between ‘technology’, as something which dominates the user, and ‘tools’, which the user brings into new combinations. Using this definition, the level of a tool or piece of technology is not as important as how it is used. Hence, while it is usually associated with a rejection of ‘high technology’ as alienating and dominatory, it also suggests why certain technologies have found uses within indigenous movements.

While often hostile to extractive and hierarchical technologies, indigenous peoples take quickly and effectively to transversal types of media open to tool-like uses. Hence for instance, Hall and Fenelon (2005:212) argue that the Internet has aided the formation of connections between indigenous movements. Similarly in the Amazon, indigenous forest defenders use Google Earth and internet communications to track destructive activities (see below).

Isolated communities in the Jayawijaya mountains of West Papua have attempted to address isolation through creating radio stations. Without phones to run the station, people walk miles to make announcements. While the station is officially owned by the state broadcaster, military officers present at the launch were reported to be ‘guarded’ about it, recognizing that de facto local control will make it hard to keep human rights abuses unreported. In a similar situation in Maluku, a local regent who supported the establishment of a local station tried to shut it down because it exposed his corruption, but was defeated by the networked mobilization of users (Piper 2008).

**The indigenous revolution in Deleuze and Guattari**

Deleuze and Guattari are already ahead of us in perceiving the potential of indigenous logics to shatter dominant representationalist structures. We should recall here that the indigenous in Deleuze and Guattari is not a ‘pure’ figure but rather a socio-historical
function; indigeneity ‘wards off’ the state, or fights it (as war-machine). The so-called societies without history are set against history in that they are societies of becoming (1987: 292). The ‘leeway’ between social segments in indigenous societies and ‘communicability between heterogeneous elements’ occur in a ‘polyvocal code’ which is always in process, not fixed in place (ibid. 209). There is a multiplicity of eyes, or ways of seeing, associated for example with different animal spirits; hence, whatever centres or arborescences exist do not resonate with one another or dominate the social field, which remains rhizomatic (ibid. 211). State societies are no less segmentary but construct their segments in a far more rigid, compartmentalised and permanent way (ibid. 210).

The Ndembu doctor, Deleuze and Guattari claim following the symbolic-interactionist ethnographer Victor Turner, ‘alone has been able to treat Oedipus as an appearance, a décor, and to go back to the unconscious libidinal investments of the social field’ (1983: 360). Even in treating a neurosis with familial appearances, they pursue an analysis of the entire social field, and ‘launch into a social analysis concerning the territory and its environs, the chieftainship and its subchieftainships, the lineages and their segments, the alliances and the filiations’ (ibid.167), ‘a veritable group analysis centering on the sick individual’, not excluding in its remit colonizer-colonized relations (ibid. 168). Ritual methods are then manipulated to produce effects in this very field of social relations (ibid. 167-8). The magical object among the Ndembu and Kukuya arises in terms of selections from both signifying and material chains, ‘always multivocal and polysemous’, and referring back to the entire network of things and meanings (ibid. 181). The Kukuya magical object buti is ‘inseparable from the practical syntheses that produce, record, and consume it’ (ibid. 181).

The Ndembu doctor directly carries out the task assigned to schizoanalysis, ‘the destruction of the expressive pseudo forms of the unconscious, and the discovery of desire’s unconscious investments of the social field. It is from this point of view that we must consider many primitive cures; they are schizoanalysis in action’ (ibid. 167). Hence, the Ndembu doctor pursues a molecular analysis, opening sexuality and libidinal investment onto the socio-historical field, instead of closing them onto Oedipus (ibid. 183).

Indigenous cosmologies are assigned a crucial importance. ‘Why think that supernatural powers and magical aggressions constitute a myth that is inferior to Oedipus? On the contrary, is it not true that they move desire in the direction of more intense and more adequate investments of the social field…?’ (ibid. 170). Rather than these practices being local deviations, it is Oedipus which is declared to be ‘also a traditional norm, our own to be exact’ – the traditional norm of Europe as a colonising force, in other words, a global-local (ibid. 171). Via immanence, indigeneity moves beyond colonialism, destroying the unmarked term by eliminating transcendence.

**Indigenous politics: the war-machine and warding off the state**

Clastres argues that indigenous societies construct mechanisms to ward off the emergence of state-like social forms. The distribution of surplus is used to prevent
accumulation (1994: 155) and the political ‘criterion of non-division’ emphasises a rejection of inequality, alienation, representation and transcendence (ibid. 155).

Maintaining autonomy is the main political goal of indigenous societies (ibid. 162), and this requires that the logic of identity be rejected, and the indivisibility and totality of each society or band preserved (ibid. 157). War arises from ‘the will of each community to assert its difference’, meaning the grounds for outbreaks of war may be rather minimal (ibid. 157). For Clastres, ‘identification is a movement towards death, the primitive social being is an affirmation of life’ (ibid. 157). The function of war is ‘[t]o assure the permanence of the dispersion, the parcelling, the atomization of the groups’, an expression of a centrifugal logic which only sometimes finds expression in war, and which also has other expressions, such as the limits to the size of each band (164).

‘Thus, the logic of primitive society is a centrifugal logic, a logic of the multiple. The Savages want to the multiplication of the multiple’ (ibid. 165). This logic is directed against the state, the external One or Law, and alienation (ibid. 165-6). Clastres thus theorises ‘war… as the principle sociological means of promoting the centrifugal force of dispersion against the centripetal force of unification’ (ibid. 166). ‘The more war there is, the less unification there is, and the best enemy of the State is war’ (ibid. 166).

Indigenous war is thus a means to prevent change and alienation (ibid. 164, 166).

The emphasis on affinity excludes distance in social relations (ibid. 157). Autonomy between groups includes the possibility that each other group can be either ally or enemy, while intensity ensures either relation must be intense. For Clastres, the figure of the enemy is needed to avoid equivalence arising from identity; but permanent war is also impossible as it would lead to the inequality of victor and vanquished (ibid. 158). Each society claims an entitlement to a territory, to the exclusion of others, who have their own territories. This is not a matter of economic conflict; the situation is constructed to maintain ‘primitive affluence’ and ensure than none need encroach on others’ territories (ibid. 154). Rather, it is a political matter, ensuring the autonomy of each group. Each group has both allies and enemies, though who is in each place can change (ibid. 159).

For Deleuze and Guattari, war-machines emerge as a mobilisation and autonomisation of violence directed first and foremost against the state apparatus (1987: 448). For the state, this appears as primal violence against order, which precedes the state; it is a figure of social otherness, of forms of life which are not ‘criminal’ as such – an internal category of state law – but are so radically antagonistic to the state that the state deems them a kind of ultimate crime, as in the case of the ‘criminal tribes’ of India (see above). Deleuze and Guattari embrace Clastres’ analysis of indigenous societies as societies which ‘ward off’ the state – they have not failed to reach it as a stage, but rather, deploy mechanisms (the powerless chief, war between societies) which make the state-form impossible (ibid. 429). Hence the state operates as ‘the actual limit these [indigenous] societies warded off’ (ibid. 431). Warrior societies ward off the state through ‘a questioning of hierarchy, perpetual blackmail by abandonment or betrayal, and a very volatile sense of honor’ (ibid. 358).

Similarly, Hakim Bey uses Clastres’ ‘metaphor of centrifugal and centripetal’ to express the network-hierarchy antagonism, emphasizing that the retention of indigenous forms is
a matter of choice of the societies in question. ‘Consciously or unconsciously these societies developed certain social functions to centrifugalize power. They don't want power, they refuse power. They want a society, but they don't want the state. They don't want the centralization of power, they don't want class structure, they don't want economic hierarchy’ (Bey n.d.). Max Gluckman also reached the same conclusions as Clastres regarding the equilibrium-maintaining function of conflict and conflict-resolution (cites Keesing 1975: 49).

Clastres’ war-machine (and by extension, Deleuze and Guattari’s) thus has little in common with war in state societies, which is more akin to policing, has a function of domination or ‘pacification’, and increasingly transmutes into ‘non-war’ (see above). War is not necessary to the war-machine; the crucial purpose is to maintain the autonomy of each group, and the possibility of war to defend autonomy is inscribed in this function, but it can also be achieved by other kinds of coexistence and contestation (what is necessary is the diffusion of power and the existence of ‘agonism’ and radical difference).

Along with indigenous war, there are often counter-balances towards peace, such as the ‘leopard-skin chief’ among the Nuer and the role of women as guardians of subsistence among the Sambia (e.g. Keesing 1975: 50). A recent report from Mengel village, Papua New Guinea, suggests that women have mediated conflict between men from neighbouring ‘tribes’ by sharing a precious water tank (TV3, 2008). It should also be remembered that, in contrast to state war, indigenous war is more ritual than fatal. Clastres’ war-machine is a network which is not simply a web of positive affinities but rather, of intense connections which can be given a plus or minus sign depending on context. In certain regions, such as Afghanistan and Somalia, state war plugs into indigenous war as it seeks to enter dense social contexts. If Clastres is right, however, the state’s use of indigenous war is counterproductive, since the function of war for local agents is independence. It is also worth considering what the war-machine means in metropolitan contexts. Clearly there are parallels between the logics of differentiation, reprisal, defence of autonomy and preparedness for conflict in indigenous war and those emerging in European autonomism and in autonomous social movements more broadly.

There is some controversy over whether indigenous war is socially primary, arising from centrifugal power, or contingent, arising from ‘resource’ conflicts and ecological pressures. Clastres’ account, read subtly, can incorporate both points of view, with centrifugal logics necessitating preparedness to defend autonomy, but the presence of war or peace determined by contingent aspects of the situation. Other scholars have similarly indicated some kind of interplay between political and socio-economic aspects of indigenous war. Thomas Hall’s account includes both the claim that the main cause of war in band societies is revenge (1989: 125), and the claim that nomads who overshoot the ecological carrying capacity of their land (usually through being squeezed) resort to raiding as a means of subsistence (ibid. 132). He also suggests that the importance of rivalry to the Comanche and Apache threatened the Spanish system of control through alliances (ibid. 118). Keesing argues that, where there is little or no overarching hierarchy above the local lineage (social group), warfare and feuding can easily escalate,
but are also subject to resolution based on cross-cutting alliances and relations (1975: 49). Harrison argues that war is not a natural background state, but some societies such as the Sambia use ritual (usually male ritual) to socially produce war by mechanisms of othering, as a way to negate power (cited Gledhill 2000: 34-6).

In any case, the distinction between indigenous war and state war must be central to understanding militarism, autonomism and social conflict. While indigenous and autonomist use of force has centrifugal functions, breaking down mechanisms of state control and structural violence, state war is an extension of the regimes of disempowerment built into state politics and policing. State war is a matter of ‘security’, in the American sense (see Race 1973). Hence, Virilio is right to argue that indigenous and rural populations use escape, hiding and movement but never develop the structures of modern war – in particular, defence (1990: 13-14). Indigenous peoples and autonomist groups do, of course, defend themselves, but they do not seek a closure of space as a means of acquiring safety from diversity. There is thus a world of difference between alienated state war and the type of struggle available to networks. The issue of whether indigenous war leaves open the possibility of reactive formations is more problematic and ambiguous. The reactive pole often exists in terms of ‘predatory’ relations between distinct groups, possibly as an outgrowth of indigenous war. It does appear to exist in some otherwise non-hierarchical indigenous societies prior to colonialism (between the Nuer and Dinka for example). In these kinds of cases, the solution is not state ‘pacification’ but the deepening of indigenous forms of conflict resolution.

**Indigenous economics**

Indigenous economics challenges the dominance of alienated forms through ecological connectedness, abundance and gift economies. This renders such economics an implicit critique of capitalism. Sahlins for instance analyses some indigenous societies as being without conceptions of scarcity and lack, constructing rather a condition of ‘primitive affluence’ where the smooth immediacy of existence is taken as a kind of existential fullness. He analyses the metropolitan fascination with lack as a psychological rather than material factor, derived from a particular frame of reference (for instance, using concepts such as time and resources to construct existence as finite and limited). Hence, ‘the primitive analogue of social contract is not the State, but the gift’ (Sahlins 1972: 169). Marcel Mauss’s work on gift economies (1954) is a major underpinning of Baudrillard’s critique of productivism, as well as of eco-anarchism.

There are arguably several distinct indigenous modes of production and forms of inscription in production systems. Arguably, the foraging or hunter-gatherer, nomadic, and sedentary pastoralist or ‘gardening’ social forms are quite different; subsistence peasants also sometimes have indigenous characteristics, and some indigenous peoples occupy marginal positions in the capitalist economy (as petty commodity producers, coerced labourers or informal economic agents) or are recipients of some kind of aid or tribute from the state. There have been debates in international political economy about whether there is a distinct peasant mode of production subordinated by capitalism
Goran Hydén portrayed peasants as uncaptured, operating in a separate life-world based on affinities, ascriptions and a moral economy of affection (1980). He has been criticised because of the integration of peasants into markets, but this integration (as formal subsumption or overcoding rather than total fusion) retains implications of a distinct peasant mode. For instance, the world-systems thesis that peripheral labour is sustained by means of reproduction costs being met elsewhere suggests that capitalism is parasitic on another mode of production. Colin Bundy (1979) studied peasants in South Africa, suggesting that before they were expelled by the state, they maintained autonomy through control of land, engaged with markets only at their own discretion, and hence often outcompeted settlers.

A number of works at the intersection of world-systems analysis, postcolonial theory and ecology suggest the importance of subsistence production as an alternative to capitalism (Bennholdt-Thomsen et al, 2001; Bennholdt-Thomsen and Mies, 2000). Wallerstein defines subsistence so broadly as to include any task done for the self or household, without a market role (2004: 33). Wolfgang Sachs has recently argued that there is a need to separate measures of poverty between frugality (subsistence), destitution (dispossession) and scarcity (in the commodity economy) (cited Pieterse 2004: 65). The usual image of subsistence as bare existence and extreme poverty and toil must be challenged. This usual image comes from the unfortunate situation of many subsistence producers today, after decades or centuries of being squeezed by capitalism beyond the ecological carrying capacity of lands which have, as a result, become increasingly degraded. Studies such as Clarke (1991), Guha (1989) and Galvan (2004) show that this kind of condition arises from land grabs, commodity market inscription and the corrosion of indigenous forms of ecological management, rather than from the conditions for subsistence production as such.

The power of indigenous networks: indigenous social movements

Indigenous social movements are among the most widespread, persistent, and exciting autonomous social movements in the world today, despite the scant attention they have received from academic scholars. Alice Feldman (2007) criticises postcolonial theory for neglecting the indigenous rights movement and concentrating too much on European texts (ibid. 242). Indigenous movements have a special importance for transformative responses to colonialism, leading to discussion at a different level, unrecognisable compared to where we are today, by developing competence in non-western epistemologies (ibid. 244). It is in the power of indigenous movements that the possibility of ‘another world’ is most clearly manifested.

The Zapatistas

The Zapatistas are probably the best-known contemporary indigenous movement, and there are innumerable accounts of their movement; we here summarise Slater’s account. As well as being globally active and visible, the Zapatistas are deeply rooted in the local, and in Mayan culture. They draw on a long history, and ‘mythology’, of Mayan revolt. They treat the national as one level among many, and rely on transversal connections,
including the Internet and local media and radio, to bypass mass media dominance at the national level. The region in which they operate has a long history of exploitation including damage to farmland, attempted enclosures and rainforest destruction. In Zapatista imagery, this is presented as resources being sucked out of Chiapas through a thousand veins, as in dependency theory. The Zapatistas exert an almost magnetic pull on the world, attracting radical clergy and survivors of the 1968 massacre of students, as well as international media and activists. The state response has been to militarise Chiapas, but the Zapatistas’ media magnetism seems to have deterred a full-scale use of the state’s military capacity against them (Slater, 2004: 205-13).

Other accounts emphasise rhizomatic aspects of the Zapatista movement. For example, McManus (2005) stresses the Zapatistas’ continuity with Blochian utopianism, Holloway (2000) emphasises their disruption of capitalist insertion, Rus et al (2003) discusses their relationship to Mayan indigenous epistemology, Morton (2002) locates the Zapatista struggle in relation to land rights and resource wars, and Higgins (2004) shows how the Zapatistas reinscribe indigenous discourse outside and against the patronage forms prevalent in Chiapas. The Zapatistas are not entirely without reactive elements such as punishment and prohibition, but tend strongly towards the affinity-network pole. Their movement is a mobilisation of networks at the ‘periphery of the periphery’ to assert local autonomy and establish other forms of life.

**Andean autonomy**

Isbell’s study of the Andean people of Chuschi shows a persistent defence of autonomy even where insertion in the economy occurs. They have tried persistently ‘to retain autonomy and self-determination’, mainly through ‘social and economic closure’, such as relying on subsistence and self-sufficiency instead of the cash economy (1985: 19). Villagers do not participate in the cash-labour economy among themselves except in the rare event that they are ostracised from the reciprocity network (ibid. 168). Chuschinos viewed themselves as an independent, closed, corporate community separate from the national culture (ibid. 181). Their local ecological insertion includes detailed diversification between areas (ibid. 24). The society of Chuschi displays ambiguities over whether it is fully rhizomatic or pulled towards a socially conservative, but non-institutional, ‘trunk’. Its fuzzy boundaries are suggestive of the former, but exclusionary discourses and localised compulsion are suggestive of reactive tendencies.

In-group formation is used to defend the locality against the outside world, based on certain basic dichotomies, but is also subject to variation (ibid. 12-13, 97). It is also varied as suggested above, so for instance, degrees of distance are redefined to permit marriage and other kinds of interaction. ‘It appears that real activities motivate the restructuring of ideology’ (ibid. 15). Hence, it is not so much a constitutive exclusion as a barrier against the specific effects of capitalism. Comparisons of levels of village exogamy over time also suggest that this defensive stance has increased over time, as the village closed in on itself for survival (ibid. 134-5). Autonomy is also haunted by the asymmetrical power of Chuschino urban migrants (ibid. 217). Reciprocity networks extend beyond village and kin, firstly in their extension to (and into) a particular squatted
settlement in Lima, and secondly via compadrazgo (ibid. 38, 46, 115). On the other hand, the basic ‘ethnic’ division between villagers and foreigners (qalas) is defined primarily by the former’s membership of the village as ‘commune’ and participation in its obligations of reciprocal aid (ibid. 73). To be unable to draw on reciprocal aid is considered to be a form of poverty worse than low wealth (ibid. 76-7). In contrast, one climbs the prestige hierarchy by service to the community (ibid. 85). While the Zapatistas make explicit use of political network forms to resist neoliberalism, Chuschinos rely on a quieter but similar modality of everyday persistence in the maintenance of alternative social networks.

Protest movements in Bolivia often show signs of similar varieties of Andean epistemology and social forms. For instance, indigenous farmers have waged a long horizontal struggle over water access and against privatisation (Crabtree 2005: 25). This struggle is primarily between neoliberal capitalism and indigenous people. Indigenous activists claim that indigenous people have their own way of resolving conflicts with colonisers and landless peasants – their real conflicts are with ranchers and timber concerns (ibid. 61). Crabtree argues that indigenous social forms are more relevant to everyday life and more gender-inclusive than the more recently acquired sindicato (workerist) model (ibid. 88). As seen above, these movements have mobilised extensive network powers against the Bolivian state and against neoliberalism.

Himalayan indigenous resistance

Ramachandra Guha documents in detail the struggle of indigenous peasants in Uttarakhand, India, to preserve social and ecological affinity-relations against colonial and postcolonial reductions to the production-system. Descriptions of pre-colonial Uttarakhand suggest it produced surplus grain and were often idyllic (1989: 15). Peasants owned or had easy access to land, women had a significant social role, and a strong sense of local belonging was expressed in a local panchayat (ibid. 16, 21-2). Peasants preserved, and even planted, forests which had both subsistence and ritual/religious significance (ibid. 28-9). Today, in contrast, the region is dependent on food imports and remittances, and subject to eco degradation (ibid. 145-7). However forests under panchayat control remain better maintained than state-run forests (ibid. 149-50), and the gap between sapling survival in state compared to Chipko (activist)-administered forests is massive: 10-15% compared to 65-80% (ibid. 180). Guha maintains that locals have maintained a ‘reservoir of local ecological knowledge’ (ibid. 151). Women in particular have acted as bearers of cultural traditions linked to subsistence (ibid. 175). In other words, although they have not prevented ecological degradation, local peasants remain the source of a potential ecological revival.

Guha’s account counterposes colonial destruction and unsustainable exploitation to an older tradition of peasant coexistence with and stewardship of nature. Colonialism introduced parcelling of space (ibid. 44-5), and ‘both legislation and silvicultural technique were designed to facilitate social control’ (ibid. 59). Guha portrays silviculture in India as an archetypal ‘royal science’, with commercial and state use defining which trees were deemed superior or useful, people defined as hazards and traditional users.
defined as enemies of the forest (ibid. 59-61). Hence, the conflict between locals and capitalist/state elites is over different views of the world. ‘The conflicting perspectives rest on fundamentally different conceptions of the forest, on radically different systems of meaning’ – peasants linking it to the continuity of their life-world (ibid. 189); peasants resisted not only enclosure but also an alien control system (ibid. 190), an apparatus of capture. Faced with domination, peasants sought to survive the situation with the greatest possible degree of self-determination (ibid. 97). They create new worldviews when established ones diverge from their situation (ibid. 127), and persistently rejected the supposed ‘fact’ of state ownership of land (ibid. 106).

Peasants resisted colonial encroachment through social movements and persistent everyday rulebreaking (ibid. 48-9). Historical forms included appeals to rulers and firestarting, but the best-known movement is the more recent wave of Chipko ‘tree hugging’ protests. The protests were so successful as to effectively disrupt tree felling and force loggers to abandon the affected areas (ibid. 166). Chipko protesters were highly ecologically aware, and had a discourse focused on resisting alienation from nature as well as defending customary rights (ibid. 168). The movement was a huge success, leading to joint forest management and recognition of some forest rights in most of India (ibid. 201).

*Everyday persistence: Lakota cultural survival*

From a world-systems perspective, Pickering has analysed the ‘impressive’ retention of cultural traditions by Lakota in America even in contexts of extensive incorporation (2003: 201). She studied the economic activities of Lakota on two reservations and found that their insertion into the work-economy was highly marginal and on-and-off, with few keeping full-time jobs over time. In contrast, subsistence, including hunting and gathering, and petty commodity production (small crafts) remain important. To the extent that there are pressures for systemic incorporation, they are arising through the latter (ibid. 202-3). Extended family structures enable people to survive between or without jobs, and home-based production sustains cultural values (ibid. 204), and generosity enhances the welfare of the worse-off, meeting needs such as transport and housing (ibid. 208). There is a spectrum of degrees of involvement in the cash economy, but culture tends to limit small businesspeople from pursuing accumulation (ibid. 205-6).

In a sense, the informal sector subsidises the formal, underwriting low pay (ibid. 204). ‘Lakota household economic activities end up subsidizing the broader system’ (ibid. 210). But on the other hand, the persistence of the subsistence sector is connected to ongoing affirmation of values in which relations are more important than possessions, poverty does not impact heavily on identity, and individuality is respected (ibid. 207, 215). Pickering suggests that Lakota people are pursuing import substitution by means of subsistence, which means they have access to more ‘goods and services’ than their annual income would suggest (ibid. 208). The main barrier to further delinking is dependence on goods only available through the cash economy (suggesting that further transversal connections to other marginal groups may be needed). Lakota people have an ambiguous relationship to the consumer economy – they usually want consumer goods in the
abstract, but they also want independence from the treadmill of production and to maintain Lakota values (ibid. 209). Despite this kind of connection, we would resist the view that this kind of insertion compromises the status of at least part of Lakota social life as ‘outside’ the system. The inner dynamic of Lakota life is based on non-capitalist economies and cosmologies, but insertion emerges at marginal points, as attempts to use capitalism for non-capitalist ends.

Other cases: a world of rhizomes

There are hundreds if not thousands of similar cases the world over. One could refer, for example, to Keesing’s (1992) studies of the cultural persistence of the Kwaio, Rigby’s (1985) research on the Maasai, Galvan’s (2004) detailed reconstruction of everyday life among the Serer of Senegal, Graeber’s (2007) observation of anarchistic social forms in rural Madagascar, or the various works of indigenous scholars such as Churchill (1997) and Deloria (1988). Martin (2002) shows that Ecuadorian indigenous peoples have organised via transnational networks to bypass local blockages, and Gray (2002) shows how the spiritually-based lifeworld of the Arakambut of the Amazon region is in conflict with the encroachment of western capitalism through gold mining. Macharia (2003) presents a number of cases from sub-Saharan Africa, including Okiek hunter-gatherers at risk of being removed from their forests, Maasai and Barabaig who have lost out to land grabs by corporations and states, the Twa of Central Africa who have been displaced from forests by guerrillas, and the Hadzabe hunter-gatherers banned from hunting in Tanzania (197-9). Mander and Tauli-Corpuz (2006) detail dozens of cases of indigenous social movements and mobilisations, and authors such as Shiva (1993) portray a global struggle between the diverse multiplicity of local ways of life and the repressive oneness of corporate monoculture. Diverse groups such as the Bushmen, West Papuans, Lubicon, Western Shoshone, Okiek, Akha, and even the uncontacted peoples of Peru have become objects, partners or agents of international campaigns for survival. Fenelon and Hall discuss the case of the Warli adivasis in India, who have periodically fought off state attempts to evict them from contested land (2006: 116). In 1989, indigenous people won a massive victory with the closure of the Panguna mine on Bougainville Island.

Indigenous struggles often take the form of ‘resource wars’ over issues such as land rights, mining and intensive farming. Helan (2008) discusses an ongoing struggle in Sarawak over forest destruction. Local communities are under threat due to Malaysia’s drive for ‘development’, which in Sarawak, means commercial logging. Sarawak’s forests have been depleted by over 90% since the 1960s, carried out by a ‘rhizome’ state based on ‘corruption, cronyism and opportunism’. Small groups in sites such as Long Kerong continue to defend their autonomy. The local community is resourceful, living in a way which is ‘intimately intertwined’ with their ecological context. In 1997, bulldozers encroached on ancestral land, and villagers set up road blockades and defied Malaysian soldiers. The resistance paid off with a court injunction against further development. This was just one instance of ‘wide-scale indigenous resistance’ in the 1980s and 90s, which occurred alongside persistent attempts by the patronage state to incorporate local groups. For instance, headmen were only recognised if they collaborated with the state.
Overall, indigenous peoples emerge as one of the main agents and beneficiaries of the power of networks pitted against hierarchies. As ‘societies against the state’, they create important aspects of a networked ‘outside’ even in those cases where they are subordinated or dispossessed. Indigenous social movements are effective in a manner typical of social networks, and informative for other affinity-networked movements. The density of their everyday social relations, their connections into wider ecological webs and their operation of radically non-capitalist and immanent cosmologies and gnoseologies generate possibilities of types of assemblage which exceed those permitted in alienated social structures. The path to another world will doubtless pass through such autonomous zones.

Chapter 4 REACTIVE NETWORKS

Defining reactive networks

Reactive networks are what Deleuze and Guattari, and later Day, call ‘radicle’ networks, forming the root-network of a ‘trunk’ or hierarchy (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; Day, 2005: 216). Typically they have an internal hierarchy of some kind, and when they do not, they retain hierarchy at the conceptual level, in terms of epistemological privileging of an in-group defined against an excluded other. Reactive networks have many of the characteristics of affinity-networks, often being indistinguishable in internal organisational terms alone. These kinds of movements have in common with active affinity networks the fact that they operate largely in everyday life, through actual social practices (more than through the spectacle). They involve action rather than passivity of their participants. They often involve the construction of dense social networks within the in-group, that they are often antagonistic to the dominant forces of alienation, and also they seem to exist on a spectrum – people, groups and ideas move between reactive and active networks more easily than to and from the passive space of the spectacle. Their power is also connected to similar social spaces and conditions. The type of social opening, which empowers affinity-networks may also release reactive forces (see e.g. Scott 1990: 223; Day 2005: 216). This means that reactive networks are frequently ‘suicidal’, in that they fight for the actualisation of social conditions of closure, hierarchy and striated space, which destroy their own conditions of existence.

Where they differ is in their relation to others and to scarcity: they are based on reactive rather than active desires, involve a constitutive exclusion, and close off their social networks at a certain point (where the same becomes other). Whereas an affinity-network is open-ended and minoritarian, a reactive network is constructed around a strong attachment to a single core identity, constructed through a constitutive exclusion. Hence, they are representational, have a majoritarian logic (even as organisers of “minorities” as defined groups), and internalise the logic of scarcity, in terms of a conflictual or predatory relations to an ‘Other’, which deemed to be beyond the pale of the network’s form of meaning. The concept of ‘reactive’ versus ‘active’ in use here is derived from Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy (2006). In more conventionally Deleuzian terms,
reactive networks can be viewed as the construction of molar aggregates as products of paranoiac desire. They are engineered into existence by pitting the units of active network formation, ‘packs’ and ‘masses’, against one another (1983: 279). They can also be connected to the ideas of microfascism and fascist desire. They are typically opposed to open space and inclusion because of their hostility to a constitutive Other. Reactive networks claim exclusive ownership of a nation, physical space, entitlements, etc, on the basis of their purported essence and its libidinal, social and other investments. ‘Ownership’ is hence denied to others, and with it rights, liberties and ethical claims of all kinds. Day typifies ‘radicle’ networks as containing hierarchical and authoritarian aspects (Day 2005: 216). In world systems analysis, Arrighi makes a similar argument regarding the relationship between social and national movements in the nineteenth century, with very different definitions of social problems (1997: 30-1, 66).

While affinity-networks exist in or construct a world of ‘absolute territorialisation’, a smooth world, reactive networks seek violent reterritorialisations around their organising ‘trunk’. They are thus in many ways an autogenerated limiting of the potential of networks to reconstruct the world (presumably for psychological or cultural reasons). While affinity-networks are ‘small’ in the sense of being nondenumerable and anti-majoritarian, reactive networks aspire to be large, but keep themselves ‘small’ in a different sense, by limiting the scope of their world and cutting off dialogism and heteroglossia. They could be presented metaphorically as boxes in which flows are trapped so that they remain active but only within a constrained space. Marc Sageman has theorized political Islam in terms of the idea of the ‘small-world network’ created partly by a limitation of the social world to a particular group and partly by strong positive relations operating within the group. Social affiliation within the small world network consists of close ties of friendship, kinship, discipleship and so on; the network functions through cliques, flexible and virtual links and the ‘strength of weak bonds’ (2004:107, 138). In a sense, whatever their scale, reactive networks are always small-world networks, limited to a self-contained insider unit; within this unit, however, they have many of the affirmative effects of affinity-networks, enabling strong affinity-relations among those who qualify to enter the ‘small world’.

Affinity-networks and reactive networks exist on a continuum. Harrison for example claims that the same binding social traits based on lineage and the same social fluidity are characteristic equally of everyday life and of channels of accumulation and patronage (Harrison 2002: 17). Indigenous relations turn into exclusionary ethnic relations if the other is alienated or is outside existing networks. Entry into transversal networks tends to overcome this phenomenon. Some indigenous groups have strategies to reinforce the expansivity and openness of networks, such as the Amazonian concept of predation as absorption of otherness (de Souza 2002; 2003; 2004), not to be confused with Appadurai’s concept of predation (see below). Hence, as Wallerstein has argued, the demand for recognition can lead in two opposite directions – towards the (affinity-based) unity of a ‘family of oppressed groups’ in an open space, or towards (reactively) ‘creating a fortress’ of each group (Wallerstein 2006: 38).
One might speculate that indigenous dynamics take on sinister forms when mapped onto fixed categories, outside the situated relationality of indigenous cosmologies. For instance, the dynamic of raiding and revenge, a partially stabilising force between band societies, which is arguably necessary to ward off states and state-formation, takes on insidious characteristics when transmuted into meta-assemblages. It is possible that phenomena of ‘terrorism’ (suicide bombings in Israel and Pakistan, events such as 911) and genocide (such as in Rwanda) are a raiding and retaliatory logic mapped onto a macro-scale, in the same way that the raiding logic was used to make Native American and African societies into appendages of the slave trade. The structural distortion introduced in such cases is the replacement of the rival band, as a specifiable living assemblage, with the enemy society as reified imaginary entity. Hence the guerrilla raids the enemy society as if it were an integrated totality, like a rival band – instead of concentrating on the actual assemblages at work in waging war on the outside. The articulation of indigenous peoples into state or world-systemic webs often relies heavily on reactive networks. It is only possible when indigenous groups map the imposed system as simply one more in the series of immanent groups, and instead of uniting against the logics of alienation and domination, fighting each other for similar resources or positions within the frame of the system. Such inscriptions channel flows in ways, which render them destructive and reactive rather than expansive for networks.

Reactive networks take a variety of forms, varying with the specific ‘content’, which is mobilized through them, and the particular identity, which forms their ‘trunk’. They range from networks, which are almost entirely insidious to networks, which are extremely ambiguous, torn between rhizomatic and arborescent logics. Examples of reactive networks include patronage networks through which localities are inserted into the global economy or the state; ethnoreligious, ‘fundamentalist’ and ‘communalist’ political movements such as political Islam, autochthony in Cote d’Ivoire, and Hindutva in India; fascist, racist and Nazi movements when they are not in power, in their ‘movement’ as opposed to ‘state’ incarnations; and gangs, ‘shadow state’ forms, ‘warlord’ militias, and other entities exercising concentrated sanctions in the shadowy world of informal and illicit economics and politics. Most of the armed opposition groups commonly labelled ‘terrorist’ are reactive networks.

Aijaz Ahmad associates what we are terming reactive networks with the ‘idea of the pre-modern as the postmodern solution for problems of modernity’. Usually these movements are especially widespread and in the periphery, but under Bush ‘[t]he United States itself is gripped today by a peculiar, cabal-like combination of Christian fundamentalists, Zionists, far-right neo-conservatives and militarists’ (2004: 47). It would be a mistake, however, to view such movements as truly ‘pre-modern’. This is often how they conceive themselves, but their structure, strategy and conditions of emergence are thoroughly contemporary. Christian Karner’s analysis of the thought-world of Hindutva, for example, contrasts the ‘emic primordialism’ through which its adherents experience the world with its modern and ethno-symbolic roles (Karner 2006). As Minoo Moallem has argued, ‘fundamentalisms’ are a byproduct of modernity ‘discontinuous with related premodern discourses’ (1999: 323).
It is not uncommon for Marxist scholars from peripheral countries beset with reactive movements, such as Patnaik (1993), Ungpakorn (2008) and RAWA (1998) to depict all reactive networks as directly and literally fascist. We feel the term ‘reactive networks’ (or ‘microfascisms’) to be more fair: they are certainly similar in type to fascist movements, and the label is also fair in some cases (particularly the Hindutva pogroms), but classical fascism also has a certain geopolitical content which peripheral movements do not always replicate, and it is common for peripheral reactive movements to also map themselves onto legitimate grievances arising from oppressed groups to a degree that core fascist movements do not. Fascism in its historical sense was viciously statist, and has certain continuities with ‘neo-totalitarian’ social forms today (Robinson 1996). Reactive movements more broadly tend to reproduce ‘fascist’ desire and ‘microfascist’ politics, and the ‘mass psychology of fascism’ as viewed by Reich (1972), but also to involve mappings of strata of the excluded and strong aspects of network politics pitted against the power of states. It would be unimaginable for classical fascism to mobilise the Pashtun, Baloch, Chechens or Somalis for example, and not only because of its racism. The desire of such peoples to be left alone by a dominating state alien to local networks and practices, the resentment of excluded groups against Kikuyu settlers aligned with the Kibaki elite faction, the fear of Islam as ‘impurity’ by Hindu Indians rendered powerless in a world system and mobilised through affective/bodily practices by caste elites, and the simple skin-colour dichotomies of neo-Nazis attached to disembodied ideas of racial essence, are quite different phenomena. They represent in some regards a continuum in terms of the degree of affinity/horizontalism which persists in identity/verticalism – the Wazir discourse is almost entirely of affinity and actuality (albeit plugged into wider identitarian networks), the Nazi discourse entirely a matter of spooks.

The various contexts inflect the movements very differently: some express a distorted version of an affinity project such as self-determination and local autonomy, given a reactive edge by a context of war or scarcity (Pashtun mobilization in the Taleban for example); others operate as extensions of fully hierarchical machines, mobilizing network resources to preserve dominant hierarchical privileges (as in the case of white racists, or American conservative Christians). Deleuze and Guattari analyse fascism as something more complex than simply a reproduction of the state form. It is a molecular movement which penetrates every cell of society (1987: 214-15), and a war-machine which takes over the state, ‘a war machine that no longer had anything but war as its object’ (ibid. 231). A war-machine with war as its object suggests that antagonism has become constitutive instead of contingent, and that ‘predation’ in Appadurai’s sense has become its dominant affect. In contrast, ethnic movements and gangs are taken as having ambivalent qualities capable of active or reactive inscription (see above). We would question, however, the assumed necessity of reactive networks, which sometimes appears in poststructuralist works. Partha Chatterjee for instance operates with a model of community, based on quasi-authoritarian ascriptive characteristics and appeals against exteriority and secession, as the necessary form of politics (1993: 231-2). We would argue that this, like much scholarship on social movements, ignores the possibility of the affinity-network form.
Reactive networks and hierarchies

Reactive networks are crucial to understanding the ability of alienated entities to exist within everyday life. Forms of power operating outside the density of everyday life cannot enter it, and only in extreme cases can it destroy it. Hence effective power requires entering this density, which means working with agents within it, who are usually syncretists combining aspects of network and hierarchical forms. Most often this means using ethnoreligious movements and/or patronage politics. This is true whether the power is an imperialist agent, an outside state, or an armed (or other) opposition movement. Very often, influence will vary not with how far the power can amend the locality, but how much it can offer. Since what it can offer is usually force or weapons, its use is greatest when it can insert itself into or inflame rivalries between groups; or failing that, when it can offer patronage to those who partially cooperate vis-à-vis those who don’t. Hence, states and statelike entities gain roots in everyday life by means of patronage based on reactive networks.

Alienated, hierarchical assemblages such as capital and the state typically plug into reactive networks as sources of energy, in preference to plugging into active networks. Nevertheless, they are quite different from categories, which only exist at the level of the spectacle. There is a significant difference, for example, between someone who is part of a group of football hooligans involved in clashes with rival hooligan firms, and someone who follows football passively on the television; or between (say) a Palestinian nationalist who takes part in the networks of social support and activism created by a movement such as Hamas, and someone who participates in nationalism only by means of symbols refracted through the media. The effect of the spectacle is that people do not act (or only act passively); the spectacle is the decomposition of social action. The effect of reactive networks, in contrast, is that people do act, but in ways directed primarily at attacking or repressing others; social composition occurs, but in a form which is directed against other social compositions.

We therefore reject the view that reactive networks are simply strategies or effects of capital or the state. There is certainly this aspect to many of them - it is often a function they serve, and some of them arise in this way - but they can also arise from the ways in which reactive social forms in everyday life and reactive psychological structures play out. If we look at how capitalism or the state seeks to manage the networks and flows, which escape it, the category of reactive networks becomes crucial. It is certainly possible to have a reactive network, which is pitted against capitalism and against (existing) states. But when states try to manage a recalcitrant context (such as Iraq or Afghanistan), they often have recourse to reactive networks. These have to be integrated and ‘bought off’ in certain ways to become part of the structure of power. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that capitalist markets are better at incorporating flows than are states (1987: 226). As an assemblage of flows itself, capitalism can add axioms so as to draw energies from network forms – the process known as ‘recuperation’ by the Situationists.
An example of viewing reactive networks as strategies or effects of capital or state is Bobbit’s *Terror and Consent*. He argues that in wars against terror, market states are building a basis of legitimacy for the new, emerging constitutional order, to preclude a world in which terror rather than consent establishes the State’s legitimacy. (Bobbit, 2008:12). According to Bobbit, the strategic raison d’etre of the market state is the protection of civilians, not simply territory or national wealth or any particular dynasty, class, religion or ideology (Bobbit, 2008:12). Bobbit views terrorism as endemic to the unique vulnerabilities of globalized, networked market states (Bobbit, 2008: 19). Market state terrorism is principally directed against the leading market states, the U.S. and the E.U. ‘The objectives of market terrorism will inevitably evoke attempts to achieve a constant state of terror because this is the most formidable alternative to global order of state systems of consent and international regimes of human rights’ (Bobbit, 2008: 62). Hence, the specificity of particular networks gets fused into a catch-all category of ‘terrorism’, including reactive and even active networks, and attributing all the opposition groups to a single dynamic. Conflating what he unwisely terms as ‘ecoterrorists, animal rights terrorist antiglobalization terrorists’, along with al-Qaeda and similar groups, he then argues to have this in common: they cannot accept the existence of market states of consent, and thus will be at perpetual war with them (Bobbit, 2008: 62). In the usual manner, he blames ‘the postmodern, deterritorialized societies of Western Europe and the more cosmopolitan states of the Middle East that have bred the foot soldiers of al-Qaeda. These young men find they must choose their identities. Global communications have made an Islamic identity behind a mask of terror one compelling option’ (Bobbit, 2008: 63).

In juxtaposition to this analysis, Cooke and Lawrence in *Muslim Networks* (2005) instead urge us to examine the levels of diversity, learning and trust that have motivated so many Muslims across time and space. Mainstream and marginalized groups all use the internet and create Muslim networks, and al-Qaeda is a tiny fringe organization with no viable entrenched constituency, marginal even within the jihadist scene. For Cooke and Lawrence American commentators have failed to see that there are critiques of al-Qaeda by Muslim scholars, fault lines between jihadists and a vast societal opposition to global jihad. Had they listened to internal struggles, they would have known that the jihadist movement has been torn apart and that al-Qaeda does not speak for or represent nationalists – or Muslim public opinion. (Cooke and Lawrence, 2005: 270; see also below section on reactive network tensions).

Another problem with Bobbit’s theory is that it explains terrorism only as another form of the market ‘just as global, networked, decentralized, and devolved and rely just as much on outsourcing and incentivizing as the market state’. The relationship between state and terrorism changes from state sponsors with leverage over their terrorist clients to international terrorist networks with increasing leverage over the associated states. (Bobbit, 2008: 45). Bobbit is basing his explanation of marketization of terrorism on its financing without accounting for the reactive identities and contradictions inherent in it. He argues that because the financing is from relying on local crime or on state sponsors to fund their activities to relying on a wider variety of sources for funding, market state terrorists have greater freedom of action than their predecessors: ‘market state terrorist
operations are often outsourced to local groups which are paid for their work and provided with infrastructure and some planning’ (Bobbit, 2008: 49-50). What is more, fitting the network model to the market state does not do favour to his argument. Bobbit does not distinguish the inherent hierarchies and quasi-networks in this type of terrorism, nor the reactive predatory nature of these networks, as he explains away market state terrorist structures as resembling more ‘VISA or Mastercard organization charts that they do the centralized, hierarchical structures of nation state governmental organizations, including nation state terrorist groups (or for that matter the twentieth century corporate business structure of the nation state’ (ibid. 51). The parallel link he identifies is anti-Western and anti-American (ibid. 52), but this cannot simply be explained away as an effect of the marketization of terrorism. It has other elements, which his theory cannot explain. For example Cooke and Lawrence argue that the origins of the jihadist movement have deeper roots than ordinarily thought:

From the outset the modern jihadist movement was a revolt against the autocratic political and social order at home, not against the global order…In fact, one of the arguments advanced in this book is that the shift to transnationalism must be understood as a product of the strategic defeat of religious nationalists on their home fronts. Therefore, jihadist attacks on America were a desperate attempt to reinvigorate their declining movement, even though…, they had possessed deeply entrenched anti-Western attitudes and an obsession with identity and authenticity.

(Cooke and Lawrence 2005: 273).

Perhaps Sageman’s argument of a ‘virtual market’ is more apt than market state terrorism and VISA like arrangements. This might be the answer to Bobbit’s question ‘Is al-Qaeda a market state terrorist group because it shares the structure of the market state and its practices while defining itself by its rejection of market state ideology, or is it a virtual market state that attempts to maximize the opportunities of its citizens—the faithful—by creating a global caliphate where they can find lifestyles denied them by human-rights-respecting states?’ (Bobbit, 2008: 64). Sageman in Leaderless Jihad, argues that whatever little coherence the al-Qaeda social movement displays is mediated through a virtual market in analogy to a real market, but not actually one:

In effect, through its spokesman Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda Central advertises demands for terrorist operations on the Internet and local networks provide terrorist activities, just as the marketplace coordinates the distribution of goods and services in a country. No one is in charge of the market…Each small terrorist network pursues its own activity for its own local reasons, and in doing so promotes far more effectively the overall goals and strategy of the al-Qaeda terrorist social movement than al-Qaeda central could...The overall pattern of international violence is an emergent trend far more effectively carried out by “market forces” than by a single intentional entity (Sageman, 2008: 145).
Another problem with Bobbit’s theory is the significance he places on the ‘inspirational defiance, media, and financial acumen of a base, without which, the decentralized force would dissolve and sink back into local struggles’ (Bobbit, 2008: 53). Market state terrorism is ‘more theatrical, producing vivid dramas and tableaux for the global network connected by the Internet, the World Wide Web, satellite television, and video technologies’ (Bobbit, 2008: 60). He quotes a Saudi interior ministry spokesman who estimated that the Internet is responsible for 80 percent of the recruitment of youths for the jihad. Then he argues that this technology reinforces the less hierarchial nature of market state terrorism. ‘Whereas nation states depended on broadcasts—top down, centralized communications—jihadists often thrash out strategy online and have adapted the user-driven techniques of the Internet to enhance the growth of terrorist networks, even to creating self-organizing units’. Asharq al-Awsat 2 May 2007, cited in Terrorism Focus 4, no 13 (8 may 2007).] (Bobbit, 2008: 56). This view does not take account of the fact that these technologies can also be used by hierarchies, adapting fast to the network aspects of communications and successfully managing censorship and surveillance of the internet. And although he argues it is the communications and the decentralised nature of these structures which make them vulnerable, most of the time it is these that make them robust. However vulnerable to information warfare they may be, it is well-known that states have trouble using legally such tactics and there is no international regulation on the use of these tactics. They are equally, if not more, available to jihadists and other opposition groups as to states.

The real effects of communications are not so much seen on the inspirational front and the financing, or the vulnerability of decentralised structures as Bobbit thinks. The main issue with the internet is on the front of propaganda and recruitment and practical aspects of global jihadism and ‘radicalization’. For instance, Hashim in Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, argues that The internet has greatly facilitated the ability of the insurgents to fight the media monopoly (Hashim, 2006: 166). The insurgents have used the Internet to provide would-be recruits with directions on how to make their way into Iraq via Syria (Hashim, 2006: 167). The use of the internet as a medium for combat training is another important effect, ‘although it remains difficult to ascertain how effective this has been because it does not have the advantage of hands-on training’ (Hashim, 2006: 163). Nevertheless, ‘Various insurgent groups have posted instructions on the Internet on how to disable or destroy US armoured vehicles such as M1A1 or M1A2, instructions on how to make IEDs and prepare car bombs’ (Hashim, 2006: 164). Interestingly,

The development of linkages between insurgent/terrorist groups and criminal gangs becomes much smoother if individuals are members of both organizations and if the politics-driven insurgency/terrorist groups engage in economic criminal activity as a matter either of strategic policy (to ensure that the state cannot restore normal economic activity or of replenishing their coffers…The merging of insurgent groups is proving chaotic for intelligence gathering.

(Hashim, 2006:169-170)
Chehab in *Iraq Ablaze: Inside the Insurgency*, mentions that Zarqawi is compared to Bill Gates because of his wizardry with computers, he is conversant with all kinds of technology using sophisticated methods of communication to prevent detection, as well as monitoring new stories to keep abreast of developments in other parts of the country and the world in general. Zarqawi is assiduous in keeping up-to-date with international affairs using all manners of technology—even when on the run—and its clued up on the opinions of the principal players on the global political scene (Chehab 2006: 48). In terms of broader jihadist mobilisations, Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2009) have examined in concrete terms how they promote their discourse online.

Further, Bobbit’s decentralised vulnerability point is missing another vital argument. This is linked to the self-limitation of leaderless movements, inability for transition to the political, and loose discipline of ‘franchise’ terrorists, which can discredit the movement. In which case, if leaders become discredited, the movement will fade over time and expire on its own.

Although a virtual leaderless social movement may survive even the most repressive state strategy, it is also self-limiting. It dares not move beyond this stage for fear of creating a leadership that might finally provide a target for effective law enforcement agencies. It cannot negotiate this shift from violence to political compromise for it does not have any method to terminate violence, except by general consensus on the Internet, which is probably impossible A leaderless jihad...is vulnerable to whatever may diminish its appeal among the young. By definition a leaderless social movement has no way to impose discipline on its participants. It is permanently at their mercy.

(Sageman, 2008: 146)

In certain respects Bobbit’s analysis points to the fusions of reactive networks with states. Indeed, reactive networks often have a particular imaginary of the state as an extension of the reactive network itself: the state is treated as if it were a voluntary association one joined, but one with legitimate coercive powers. Often the network is itself endowed with coercive powers also, of a state-like type. Authoritarianism in its classic and peripheral forms is rather anomalous despite its pervasiveness; it seems to emerge where an imported or imposed state is fused with a social culture unconducive to the state as such. Since the state as specialised agency has no culturally recognised role, the state is able to identify itself with society, and to claim to take on the functions which might otherwise be those of social networks, figureheads or local leaders. Since the function of the latter is expansive and based on welfare and what Rawls would term ‘comprehensive doctrines’ (the promotion of a single religion, ethnicity, way of life and so on), the state if accepted at all is also attributed these functions. A number of analyses of power in Southeast Asian societies have suggested this (Landau 2008; Ramasamy 2004; Curtis 1998, Slocomb 2006). For instance, Slocomb argues that the Cambodian state has assumed mass passivity and relied on ethnicity, ‘Khmerness’, to obtain legitimacy (2006: 376), meaning that, as Curtis argues, liberal-democratic discourses are overshadowed by ‘old’ patterns of legitimation such as state handouts to the poor (1998: 129). It is a dangerous outcome
of ‘uneven development’ in which cultures which have emerged to resist tributary empires/states or ensure extraction from local power-holders prove unable to limit a state which has a quite different structural origin.

In many ways, this kind of network analysis is a fundamental challenge to older binaries of community versus individual which persist in many varieties of Marxism and radical theory. Capitalist atomisation is not principally about alienation from community, but about the rupturing of active network ties and abundance as a social construct, and the replacement of these with scarcity and vulnerability. People are not primordially atomised until socially composed; nor are people primordially communal until decomposed by capital. Rather, one effect or the other is produced by the particular social and ecological assemblages into which people enter, motivated by the structures of their desires. For example, Vincent Lyon-Calvo (2008) has analysed the growth of fundamentalist churches in Michigan based on Mike Davis’s (2006) arguments that such churches provide much-needed services and community for poor people who distrust corporations and the state, meeting social and emotional needs at the same time as reproducing aspects of dominant ideologies. This makes a certain sense. Threatened with exclusion by capital, the ‘logical’ structural response is the affinity-network form and the politics of autonomy – the reconstruction of a situation of abundance by blocking hierarchical flows and creating new ecological relations (squatting, subsistence activities and so on). But where this is unthinkable in systems of meaning or is emotionally unbearable, people opt for the next-best thing, which is the patronage or ethnoreligious network. The formation of networks in a context where scarcity is constructed and not challenged militates towards the formation of exclusionary networks with reactive politics. The movement from scarcity to abundance is partly a matter of ‘real’ connections and ‘resources’, and partly a matter of psychology – the former issue being met by finding alternative ways of meeting needs and providing emotional fulfilment, the latter by disidentifying with the dominant model of scarcity, growth and development. Dr Humam al Shama’a, a professor of economics and finance at Baghdad University: ‘The state made a tremendous effort to rebuild the infrastructure of the country after the war ended [in 1991]. With no financial resources, it was forced to resort to emission of currency, which accelerated the rhythm of inflation four and a half times a year until 1995. Wealth disappeared under the inflationary pressure. The currency deteriorated. People depending on salaries [i.e. the middle class] were gradually impoverished. Tens of thousands of Iraqi families now rely only on government rations to survive. (Escobar 30 March 2002). Unlike most developing countries where there is constant rural to urban migration, in Iraq there was a reverse process in the 1990s, as a result of sanctions. People went back to the countryside. The sanctions regime that existed between 1991 and 2003 promoted the return to religion among the Iraqi population. The destruction of the Iraqi middle class, the decline of the secular educational system and the rise of illiteracy, and the growth of despair and anomie have resulted in large numbers of Iraqis seeking succor in religion (Hashim, 2006: 104)

Reactive networks constructed by states often persist after the fall of the state to which they are connected. For instance, it is notable that Haitian dissident commentators following the fall of Duvalier resorted to a characteristically Deleuzian figure: ‘we cut
down the tree, but we haven’t got rid of the roots’ (cited Robinson 1996: 280). In other words, when a regime operates through the reactive recomposition or construction or everyday networks, these ‘radicle’ networks gain resilience similar to that of rhizomes, and persist in attempting to reconstitute the trunk. One could speculate that the Ba’ath Party in Iraq has a similar ‘radicle’ outreach which is persisting indefinitely into the post-Saddam period, forming part of the backbone of the Ba’athist wing of the Iraqi resistance.

The existential origins of reactive networks: scarcity and anxiety

The transmutation of active into reactive networks can only be understood in terms of the transformation of active into reactive affective/emotional structures, which is often a product of social conditions and the way they are interpreted to produce meaning. Where groups are arranged in such a way as to be encouraged to compete for scarce resources, or subject to systematic discrimination in such a way as to produce segmentary stratifications, the effect is to generate a strong pressure towards reactive recomposition. This can be an unintended consequence of abstract forces, but it can also be brought into being very consciously (as it often was in colonial settings). There are experiments in positivist psychology which have found it to be entirely possible to artificially create reactive identities and prejudices through manufacturing situations of discrimination – favouring children with one eye-colour over those with another in class (Elliott, cited Bloom 2005) – or scarcity and antagonism – creating intergroup conflict at an artificial youth-camp setting (Sherif et al, 1961). In the latter case, the experiment also showed that creating situations where cooperation or intergroup affinity was useful could break down the artificial antagonisms. To summarise, one could say that reactive networks have their origins in a combination of social composition and density with a state of anxiety which is projected onto others.

Arjun Appadurai provides perhaps the most systematic treatment of the formation of reactive groups in the contemporary world. He observes the growing prevalence of phenomena of ethnic and anti-minority violence. ‘We now live in a world… in which fear often appears to be the source and ground for intensive campaigns of group violence’ (2006: 1). There is ‘a virtually worldwide genocidal impulse towards minorities’ ranging from people without ‘proper’ documents to ethnic minorities and survivors of histories of violence and abuse (ibid. 40). Asking why groups which are often small and weak are subjected to such vicious fear and rage, Appadurai answers that such groups are targets of anxiety because of their problematic position in nation-state discourse (ibid. 49). Assigning minorities as a grey area between citizen and humanity-in-general, states displace fear of their own marginalisation onto minorities (ibid. 43).

The underlying reason for such acting-out is the insecurity produced by neoliberal capitalism and a rapidly-changing world (ibid. 83-4). ‘[M]inorities are the flash point for a series of uncertainties that mediate between everyday life and its fast-shifting global
backdrop’ (ibid. 44). Ethnocide thus combines social uncertainty and ideological certainty (ibid. 90). Citing Mbembe (2001), he argues that social orders can be built around the fact or prospect of violence (Appadurai 2006: 31). Hence, violence is not simply a consequence of, but a means to produce antagonistic identities, which ward off uncertainty (ibid. 7). It is ‘not about old hatreds and primordial fears’ rather ‘an effort to exorcise the new, the emergent, and the uncertain’ (ibid. 47-8). Minorities are picked on because they blur boundaries (ibid. ibid. 44). The role of denumerability in polyarchic polities leads to an anxiety about incompleteness, i.e., the gap separating the whole from the majority. ‘Numerical majorities can become predatory and ethnocidal… precisely when some minorities (and their small numbers) remind these majorities of the small group… between their condition as majorities and the horizon of an unsullied national whole’ (ibid. 8). Minorities represent a tiny obstacle between majority and totality or purity (ibid. 53). The majority fear becoming a minority and hence strive to close the gap between majority and whole (ibid. 52).

Constitutive exclusion is crucial to this kind of warding-off of anxiety. Violence requires minorities who are produced as such (ibid. 45-6). In other words, ‘majorities need minorities in order to exist’ (ibid. 50). In this context, the narcissism of minor differences has gained a new importance. Difference itself is the target of narcissism, and the impossibility of its elimination leads to an excess of violence (ibid. 11). Majority identities can become predatory identities, meaning they ‘require the extinction of other, proximate social categories’ defined as threats (ibid. 51). Hence, ‘all majoritarianisms have in them the seeds of genocide’ (ibid. 57). Majorities can be mobilised around a fear of becoming minor (ibid. 83).

Usually the majority discourse involves mapping a larger script onto ‘minor wounds of everyday life’, grudges and suspicions (ibid. 91). The other becomes suspect as their everyday face is viewed as a mask (ibid. 90-1). Hindu communalism or Hindutva, for example, plays on global flows (from overseas labour and arranged marriages abroad to the hajj pilgrimage and Middle Eastern funding of Islamic organisations) to portray Indian Muslims as agents of global Islam as a foreign entity (ibid. 70-1). They seek to link Muslims to ‘appeasement’ of Pakistan as an external threat (ibid. 78). The Hindu majority is a project, not a fact – elites with much to lose from caste divisions play up Hindu-Muslim tensions to consolidate the Hindu bloc (ibid. 74). Meanwhile, exclusionary discourses are mobilised for internal social cleansing. Anti-Muslim communalism is linked to social cleansing of slums, street traders and the like (ibid. 97-8), discursively articulated as purges reminiscent of the Nazi discourse on ghettos (ibid.107).

Reactive networks are reinforced in contexts, which seem desperate or hopeless, where the structure of social and ecological life reinforces assumptions of scarcity. This is the key to their prevalence today. Similar conclusions have been reached by a number of authors. As Pierre Bourdieu has argued, neoliberalism flourishes on the global production of insecurity and emotional turmoil, induced by the generation of global competition. He argues that people are ‘thrown into demoralization, devaluation, and political disillusionment, which is expressed in the crisis of activism or, worse, in a desperate
rallying to the themes of quasi-fascist extremism” (1998, 100). Bauman similarly argues that paranoid acting-out is an effect of the combination of nationalism and insecurity (Bauman 2000).

Negri has similarly argued that the emergence of ‘terrorism’, in the sense of hardened armed opposition groups, is a reactive transformation of resistance caused by blockages in its active process (Negri, 1996: 172). The World Revolution Manifesto, released during the recent uprising in Greece, argues that cultural conflict emerges from processes of identity-construction built into the dominant system. ‘The plenitude of constructed identities creates a condition of “cultural war” in each of the planet’s societies (as well as trans-nationally) where identities compete with one another, often in favour of the Regime, as this will lead its respectable citizens to demand even tighter security’ (World Revolution, 2008). Renata Salecl argues that hate-speech and prejudicial violence put the Other in her/his place so that the self can feel secure in her/his place (1998: 120-1). Stavrakakis similarly argues that conflict arises from sources of libidinal insecurity: the ‘clash of civilisations’ is really a clash of ways of organising jouissance (2007: 283).

Tamir (1995), discussing nationalism, argues that it is the very fluidity of global capitalism which generates a ‘need’ to impute deep historical roots. And David Harvey argues that ‘localism and nationalism have become stronger precisely because of the quest for… security… in the midst of all the shifting that flexible accumulation implies’ (Harvey 1989: 306).

Wallerstein provides a rather different, but compatible, perspective, theorising reactive networks in terms of the systematic importance of status-groups and related identities (such as ethnicity) in the graded stratifications of the world system. Such gradings – into marked and unmarked terms, or different ranks – may be disavowed but remain normatively operative (2004: 39). The repressive, Oedipal (in his words, ‘socialising’) role of the family is closely linked to the pursuit of status-group identities, fixing ‘socialisation’ or social becoming into a pattern establishing cultural rigidity (ibid. 37). Other institutions, such as states, religions and ethnic organisations, seek to pressure or influence families into prioritising their particular identity in cases of conflict, and ‘socialisations’ can be antisystemic (deviant, rebellious, withdrawing) as well as systemic (ibid. 37-8). Hence, as Reich and Laing deduced and Deleuze and Guattari confirmed, the repressive context of familial authoritarianism is the breeding-ground for reactive assemblages.

Marxists, and liberal critics such as Barber (1996), are right to see in reactive movements a type of resistance to neoliberal globalisation. They sometimes fail, however, to draw necessary distinctions. Harvey for instance argues that nationalism and religion act as ‘antidote[s] to the dissolution of former bonds of social solidarity under the impact of neo-liberalism’ (2006: 60). This is true, but one needs to make further distinctions. The targets of such movements are typically vulnerable minorities, or issues of lifestyle freedom. In addition, they often channel unrest back into neoliberalism: anti-neoliberal forces are transmuted into anti-cosmopolitanism, hence into strength of the unitary identity, hence into neoliberalism (as means to strengthen the ‘nation’). Also, their
fantasmatic reassertion and practical actualisation of the ‘social principle’ is combined with its political rejection, with a project of spatial and social closure.

Alfredo Bonanno goes some way to integrating these two aspects. Discussing the crisis in eastern Europe, he concurs with the view (see below) that it is due to a conflict between power-holders. However, he also argues that it is partly a consequence of a ‘social war’ arising in a context where the older kinds of class struggle have been superseded. With conditions of life put at risk, irrational mass attachments resurface, channelling in a distorted way the new class contradiction between included and excluded. Nationalism for instance arises when popular movements against oppression are funneled into statist projects to seize power. Oppression in such a situation is not simply economic, but also psychological, ethical and even imaginary, with social conflict revolving as much around cultural exclusion as economic exploitation. With North-South conflicts also sharpening, ideologies such as political Islam emerge as ways of expressing such contradictions. In political Islam, the new categories of oppressor and oppressed are mapped onto older categories of believer and unbeliever, a particular kind of despotic or totalitarian recuperation of the struggle against exclusion which is strangely out of sorts with Islam’s history of tolerance (Bonanno, n.d.a).

Through this mapping, a group, which is in fact subordinate fantasises itself in a position of domination and sets about establishing this domination through the micro-regulation of everyday life and a generalised violence against outsiders. The difference between ethnoreligious/reactive identities and affinity-networks is that the former typically maps the in-group as both eternal and privileged (or superior to others), whereas socially-located identities react more directly to social relations and conjunctures, without the same degree of mediation by abstract, mythical categories. Political Islam is here not unique; Bonanno recognises parallels with certain eastern European nationalisms, and phenomena such as Hindu communalism could be added to the list. The basic device here is a refusal to identify as an excluded, peripheral or minoritarian figure, instead hiding behind a myth in which one identifies as a member of a superior in-group, albeit a dispossessed and unfairly treated one, and attempts to establish this in-group as the new master, overthrowing the existing masters only to replace one domination with another. Its characteristics include an often extreme violence against outsiders – not only members of the dominant group on an undifferentiated basis, but also other out-groups, perceived traitors to the in-group, and people whose personal autonomy puts them outside the fixed essence attributed to the in-group. Islamists for instance have repeatedly targeted groups such as gay men, unveiled women, film-goers, barbers, members of the Ahmadi sect, indigenous Papuans, non-Muslim minorities such as the Balinese Hindus, and members of different branches of Islam, as well as targeting westerners, Christians and Jews in an undifferentiated way. This generalised violence against out-groups is discursively a practice of domination, even if socially it sometimes correlates with a struggle against real oppressors.

**Empirical cases of the affinity-reactive tension**
In concrete cases, the distinction between active and reactive networks is sometimes clear, but sometimes involves social forms and forces, which oscillate between the two poles. Because of the overdetermination of conflicts with active, anarchistic and reactive, totalitarian elements (resistance to oppressors and establishment of domination), peripheral networks can slip between emancipatory and repressive social forms rapidly and almost imperceptibly. An example is the panchayat or village commune model, which operates in many isolated rural parts of the Indian subcontinent, such as the ungovernable highlands of western Pakistan. These agencies of autonomous local power are the locus of resistance movements such as the revolt against Pakistani state control in Waziristan, and often organise resistance to capitalism and the state, such as the expulsion of Coca-Cola from Plachimada, India. However, they are also the structural basis for localised forms of domination, as in the case of Mukhtar Mai, publicly gang-raped as a punishment for breaching inter-clan barriers and damaging the honour of a privileged group. The form of local autonomy seems to produce emancipatory and domiliary effects depending on the balance of hierarchical and libertarian elements in the local power-structures and dominant customs which come into play there.

The distinction between affinity networks and ethnic-based movements is clearer in the case of Manipur. In 2004, a mass social movement against emergency powers shook the Indian occupation. This movement was not based on ethnic categories, but rather, operated across the lines of the various social groups. One of its most notable features was the adoption of a fragmented, centreless, localised form of organisation in which social groups, classes, villages, and so on, were able to organise their own autonomous activities. This proliferation of direct action overwhelmed the state machine. One report states that ‘[t]he entire stretch of the road, from Karong to Hiyangthang was dotted with such barricades, and attempts by the police to clear the road were frustrated due to the sheer number of agitators’ (Imphal Free Press, 14 August). With villagers in each area organising autonomously, the state was overwhelmed by action. Parallels with effective anti-capitalist and ecological direct action in the west are very obvious here.

In contrast, ethnic politics in Manipur takes the form of the operation of a number of hierarchical armed opposition groups. Each of these groups is attached to one or another ethnicity, and their methods take the form of persecution and exclusion of others. Each is fighting for some kind of state in the world system – greater privileges in the distribution of patronage, an independent state under the control of a specific group, or the institutionalisation of one or another set of privileges (such as language criteria) establishing the supremacy of a particular ethnicity. While Meitei groups seek an independent state of Manipur, Naga and Kuki groups fight for separate homelands, and in contrast to the popular autonomy expressed by the social movements, the armed opposition groups operate in an extremely hierarchical way, imposing “moral codes” (such as traditional dress and alcohol prohibition) by means of violence and punishment (Routray 26, January 10, 2005). Armed opposition groups ‘regularly conduct publicity seeking exercises such as setting fire to drugs, breaking alcohol bottles and destroying video cassettes of Hindi and pornographic movies in a bid to project themselves as protectors of State's culture and moral values’ (ibid.) This complicity in statism and
It is notable that there is a large amount of tension between the various armed groups, and between these groups and the social movements. Women’s, peace, and human rights groups have organised protests against killings by armed groups and dialogues for peace between different ethnic groups. It is interesting to note in this context that the Indian government seems more inclined to negotiate with armed opposition groups and to rehabilitate their members than it is to engage with the demands of civil-societal groups across the northeast; and also that it seems to encourage ethnic tension, both by pursuing peacemeal negotiations with groups one at a time, and allegedly by setting up certain groups to maintain division. In other words, the state is quite happy with the existence of a war system or a system of negotiations with state-like bodies, in which it can use means such as patronage to pursue integration. It is far less happy dealing with movements of a type dissimilar from its own. The same can be said for the Russian state in Chechnya, which has concentrated on eradicating secular militias and covertly strengthening Islamist factions.

One of the authors’ previous work on cyberconflict similarly produces an empirically-based distinction between ethnoreligious and sociopolitical movements, with the former based on rigid identity categories and exclusions, and the latter notable for looser kinds of attachments. The latter are more able to use the more horizontal characteristics of information networks, whereas the former are likely to simply repeat the war model they draw from conventional politics. Thus for instance, in relation to the Iraq war, a clear difference can be observed between those movements pursuing ethnoreligious and sociopolitical reasons for opposing the war (Karatzogianni, 2006).

A similar distinction can be made between the kind of messianic Judaism embraced by authors such as Walter Benjamin and Martin Buber, and the type espoused by statist Zionists as the basis for constructing an ethnically exclusionary state. European racists found Jews threatening precisely because of their non-inscription in the state system and their resultant outsider status. It was from this position – as bearers of hybridity and as people ‘out of place’ – that the most important radical developments of Jewish thought have arisen. In contrast, with the exception of a small neo-Nazi fringe, the normalisation of Jewish identity through the creation of a state-based ethnicity has effectively defused anti-Semitism among European nationalists and statists. Rather, there is now a kind of fellow-feeling with Israel as a “western” power contributing to world-system integration in an unstable region. This rapid turnaround from hostility to commonality can be
explained in terms of the system-integrative functions of ethnicity. Contrary to appearances, what European statists hated about Jews was not anything specific to this particular group, but rather, the fact that a particular group (any particular group – one could also refer to the Roma here) could not be inscribed in the dominant system. The moment this exceptional status was eliminated by means of integration into the dominant system of representations, a discourse of antagonism was replaced by a discourse of similarity and equivalence.

**Intranetwork disputes**

In relation to al-Qaeda and political Islam, the tendency of reactive networks to feud around different versions of a trunk expresses itself in disputes among different jihadist and Salafist factions, disputes which undermine the mainstream tendency to conflate all these groups as al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda-linked. For instance, Abu al Walid al-Masri, a former associate of the al-Qaeda leadership who knew Mullah Omar and bin Laden well and worked closely with both, wrote a critical document for the newspaper Asharq al-Awsat titled ‘The Story of the Afghan Arabs; From the Entry to Afghanistan to the Final Exodus with the Taleban’ commenting on bin Laden’s ‘catastrophic leadership” (Gerges, 2005: 192). According to Gerges this important testimony shows bin Laden in a highly negative light, managing al-Qaeda like a tribal fiefdom. Abu al-Walid identifies bin Laden’s stifling internal debate and hampering open and effective decision-making as responsible for military defeat (rather than underestimating America). Gerges describes Abu al Walid’s first hand account taking personal stabs at bin Laden ‘by talking about his “extreme fascination” or “crazy attraction” with the media in general and the international media in particular; Mullah Omar and other Taleban officials often impressed on bin Laden the need to refrain from giving interviews to the international media and involving them in unnecessary conflicts with the world community’ (ibid.193). ‘His final verdict is that bin Laden’s autocratic style was responsible for plunging jihadis into an unequal confrontation with America (and Israel), which, in his opinion, is “beyond present capabilities of the whole Islamist movement” (Gerges 2005: 198).

‘Another striking feature of this criticism is acknowledgment of disarray and defeat. This is not a simple matter because it goes against jihadis’ notion of calculating loss and gain’ (Gerges 2005: 199). Many jihadis both within and outside of al-Qaeda have concluded the war is lost and that bin Laden and his hawkish aides had promised heaven but delivered dust. ‘New fault lines appear to have emerged among transnationalist jihadis, mirroring those between them and religious nationalists. The war within could be more fatal to bin Laden’s network than the war waged against it by the international community’ (ibid.) In the way Gerges understands it, since the late 1990s religious nationalists have scrupulously abided by their proposed unilateral ceasefire and have engaged in internal debates that have culminated in a rejection of the armed struggle. ‘Regardless of what one thinks of the Islamic Group’s “ideological revisions,” it has
refrained from using violence and had deactivated its paramilitary cells; it has not carried out a single military operation since the late 1990s’ (ibid. 211)

Gerges’s view is that Muslim and Western officials should listen closely to intrajihadist debates and the ideological revisions undertaken by religious nationalists: ‘Lumping all jihadists together with al-Qaedais conceptually false and politically shortsighted. For example, al Jama’a’s critique of al-Qaeda, because it is a potent force that might resonate with some of al-Qaedais wavering operators [see Al Jama’a Al Islamiya’s critique of al-Qaedais 200-18]’ (ibid. 202). He provides evidence that of all Islamist and jihadist organizations, the Islamic Group presented the most systematic and devastating critique of al-Qaeda, using the Shariah to puncture another hole in the doctrinaire jihadist legitimization of attacking the Americans (ibid. 212). In fact, the extent to intra-jihadist dispute is so evident with imprisoned Egyptian leaders of Islamic Jihad and Tanzim al-jihad (who have split with Zawahiri) and of the Islamic Group releasing ‘two separate statements in which they strongly criticized Zarqawi for killing civilians, including diplomats and government employees, and accused his organization of trying to “annihilate” the Shiites, not to “liberate” Iraq. These are strong words from two former Sunni jihadist organizations’ (ibid. 261). In fact, the question of the reach of al-Qaeda has been haunted by disputes. Despite common western assumptions, there is debate over whether there is a continuing global organisation of this name, aside from its core group; what exists is a diffuse jihadist scene in which the core group of al-Qaeda competes for attention with many other tendencies, but with the media attention given to the al-Qaeda label leading an increasing number of small groups (from organised groups like al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb to small groups of friends) to adopt its name, its tactics or both. In the case of the London bombings for instance, police referred to the attacks as showing hallmarks of the al-Qaeda approach, stating ‘Al Qaeda is not an organization. Al Qaeda is a way of working’. No evidence of a link to al-Qaeda as an organisation was ever found (Fox News 2005; Benetto 2005). Authors such as Wright (2006) and Bergen (2006) argue that the group existed and use the name al-Qaeda before 911, but the documentary The Power of Nightmares (Curtis 2004) presents a view that it does not exist aside from the core group. Brynjar Lia (2007) argues that al-Qaida has adopted al-Suri’s doctrine of decentralised war, that ‘there should be “an operative system” or template available anywhere for anybody wishing to participate in the global jihad either on one's own or with a small group of trusted associates, and there should not exist any "organization for operations."’. Despite this apparently rhizomatic form, the trunk of ideology remains important. ‘The decisive factor for successful jihadi training is the moral motivation and the desire to fight, not knowledge in the use of arms, al-Suri asserts. If the ideological program is not fully digested and the mental preparation is absent, weapons training is of no use’ (Lia 2007).

In either case, its current structure is that of a loose network and not a centralised organisation. Khalil el-Anani argues that al-Qaida mutated from an organisation into a doctrine, and that ‘Al-Qaida’s doctrine is currently being "hijacked" by small groups who claim to be its affiliates. These groups are generally more hardcore than Al-Qaida’ (el-
In this context, western attacks on Muslim countries and the conflation of local jihadist groups with al-Qaeda almost certainly increases the likelihood that others will join or imitate the group. Mann (2005) argues that, by treating ‘local terrorists’ as if they are ‘international terrorists’, America creates a self-fulfilling prophecy, putting itself at risk. Esposito’s recent research shows that only 7% of Muslims condone terrorist attacks, and they do so for political, not religious reasons (Esposito et al., 2007).

Similarly, a study of insurgents in Kandahar shows that they are not motivated by hatred of the west, which they barely know of. ‘The typical Taleban foot soldier battling Canadian troops and their allies in Kandahar is not a global jihadist who dreams of some day waging war on Canadian soil. In fact, he would have trouble finding Canada on a map’ (Smith, 2008). Of course, the dangers of attempting to prohibit or wage war on something which has become simply a ‘doctrine’ are sharper than if it is an ‘organisation’.

On the other hand, despite a quasi-rhizomatic structure insulating against repression, al-Qaeda (or whatever its offshoots might be called) has a strategy which is far from likely to produce victory for it. The structure proposed by al-Suri is basically indestructible and self-replicating. It has two major weaknesses however. The first is that the success of “deterrence” relies on the message being transmitted from “terrorist” to dominant society without interruption. In fact, mythological inscriptions of “terrorism” are placed in between the attack and the masses, so the intended impact (for instance, realization that foreign policy is making people vulnerable, or that war on difference breeds a situation of social war) is generally avoided – instead it is diverted, by means which might be termed information or psychological warfare, into psychological states supportive of continued repression. Also, the idea that states care enough about the survival of individual people to alter policy to avoid attacks is naïve. The second is that the model relies on external origins of motive based in identity. This makes it vulnerable to factors affecting people’s identities and ideological development which are outside the control of opposition groups. The ‘war on terror’ may have given al-Qaeda a new lease of life, but ultimately it is too dependent on insertion into diverse local contexts to establish a new trunk. If the goal is a new caliphate based on a strict Wahhabi doctrine, it is rendered untenable by the very localism, ‘tribal’ power and syncretic logics of the sites (Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, northwest Pakistan, Yemen, etc) where resistance to western power gives jihadism a force of attraction.

**Reactive networks and the Hobbesian objection to networks**

Before we move on to examine specific types of reactive networks, the theoretical importance of reactive networks should be clarified further, in relation to a common objection. The argument that networks are a positive alternative to states, with its subversive implication that states are dispensable, is resisted tenaciously by advocates of various statist perspectives (from liberalism to many forms of Marxism). Various arguments are advanced, some of which we will leave aside (such as the claim that it is somehow ‘reductionist’ to impute a social logic to the state, but not to networks, capital, classes, etc). But we feel the need to address one objection in particular, which comes closer to engaging with our argument. This is the argument that basically uses the
existence of reactive networks as a case against network politics in general. It takes various forms, all of which come down to the contention that one cannot rely on networks because some of them are reactive. It can be summarised in the statement: ‘without the state, the strong dominate the weak’. Hence it is concluded that statism is ‘realistic’ whereas anarchy is not; or, that glorifying networks is oversimplistic; or, that ‘human nature’ inevitably falls back on conflict and antagonism, requiring a Hobbesian response; or, that since the network form cannot guarantee against the emergence of reactive networks, therefore it is unstable, unrealisable or does enormous harm (by allowing space for the reactive networks to come into being).

Fear of reactive networks is often cited in anti-protest and anti-rights discourse. It might be a fear that recognising basic rights will lead to space for ‘terrorists’ or racists, the passage of anti-protest laws ostensibly aimed at the far right but used against dissidents, or even a generic claim that if people were not ‘under control’ – alienated, repressed – everyone would be killing each other in an ethnic, religious or inter-group bloodbath. There is fear that immediacy, that a general ethical position privileging freedom, desire, rights, etc, leads to domination by ‘mobs’, constructed fantasmatically as reactive. For this to be sustained, it is necessary to imagine active affinity-networks as equivalent to reactive networks, and hence to demonise them.

A telling case here can be found in official reports on the 2008 May Day demonstrations in Hamburg, where autonomous anti-fascists fought back against fascists and police. Not satisfied with the usual hypocritical denunciations of ‘violence’, the police chief Peter Born tried to exaggerate the risk enormously, claiming he is ‘firmly convinced’ that ‘there would have been deaths’ without police involvement, and equating the two sides by referring to the fascists as ‘nationalist anarchists’. A court which upheld the anti-fascists’ right to protest was denounced as ‘irresponsible’ and putting police at risk (Spiegel 2008). This discourse, which would be laughable but for its pervasiveness, demonstrates clearly the assumptions of statism. Firstly, there is a wilful refusal to distinguish between networks of different kinds, an insistence on conflating whatever does not belong to the statist trunk into a single incomprehensible mess (Nazis=anarchists). Secondly, there is an attempt to terrify people about the level of risk involved in network forms by exaggerating their fatality, assuming that clashes between networks are normally fatal. This carries the bracketed assumption that police repression, not to mention day-to-day life in an alienated society, is non-fatal and harmless. In fact the danger of networks is far less than the danger of alienation, of states and of capitalism – millions die from capitalist ‘business as usual’. By presenting an isolated risk out of this broader context, the risk is made to seem intolerable – networks are associated with a danger of disaster lurking just below the surface of social ‘peace’. In this way, the very idea of rights is undermined, with the preservation of state power turned into a frame for rights and a limit on them, instead of its usual fantasmatic presentation as something, which operates within a regime of rights as an outer frame.

In fact, this discourse is hypocritical. Violence can emerge from networks, and networks can turn reactive, but this tendency is not especially prevalent or persistent. Nor is it necessarily increased by the emancipation of networks in general. Rather, the reactive
logic breeds most virulently where networks are suppressed and where external repression turns into internal resentment and negative emotions. It is implicitly encouraged by the state, which constantly plugs into and incites reactive networks, and overcodes active networks so as to make them reactive. Indeed, as Wilhelm Reich has shown, the reactive structure is an underlying requirement of the alienated structure, something repressed and buried beneath it. Different states structure produce different terrorists, as terrorists would mimick state structure and behaviour:

In each era, terrorism derives its ideology in reaction to the raison d’être of the dominant constitutional order, at the same time negating and rejecting that form’s unique ideology but mimicking the form’s structural characteristics. …A state devoted to enhancing the sectarian perquisites of one particular prince will find it has evoked a permanent terrorist mercenary force—available to anyone—but one that, like this sort of state, reflects the most severe sectarian prejudices. A state whose constitutional order validates its actions by measuring them against the ruthless aggrandizement of dynastic glory by war will spawn a terrorism that is egalitarian but equally prone to aggrandizement by means of warfare based on claims of absolute sovereignty.

(Bobbit, 2008: 26).

Our first response to this line of criticism is that it is based on the possibility that networks can become reactive. The possibility is real, but if it can be warded off, or if it is less dangerous than the dangers of alienated politics, it is not a decisive case against network politics. For the claim that ‘without the state, the strong dominate the weak’ to be true, it would be necessary that all societies without the state be characterised by brutal violence, and that this characterise internal as well as external relations. That violence is possible among stateless peoples is not in doubt, but for the argument for the state to hold up, this violence needs to be unavoidable and pervasive, not just in one case but in all cases; it needs to be shown that the network form only exists as the reactive network form, and that the affinity-network form does not exist. Even one exception disproves the claim that the state is necessary. Even if there were a million stateless societies and only one were entirely peaceful one could still justifiably claim that this one society is enough to falsify the claim that people slaughter each other without the state, that this one society shows that peaceful anarchism is possible.

Another point about the argument is that it applies different standards to networks and to the state. One could also show a possibility that, out of the entire range of states, a great many are dictatorships and some are outright fascist. One can also find again and again, the state used as the means whereby the strong dominate the weak. The Nigerian army works for Shell in the Niger Delta, the Indonesian army for Freeport, the army of Botswana arrests Bushmen at the behest of diamond miners, the Canadian state works for uranium companies against the First Nations, and so on. One can also definitively say that there has never been an entirely peaceful state, since by its nature a state always has police or soldiers, some kind of apparatus of repression, operating a day-to-day coercion.
There is not a single state in the world today which does not stand accused of some kind of atrocity - remember it was the Swedish police who first opened fire on anti-capitalist protesters, the Swiss who nearly killed someone by cutting a rope, Iceland devastating the environment for heavy industry, Holland attacking immigrants and with vicious police raids on squats, Canada with troops in Afghanistan, Ireland with the Rossport issue, New Zealand arresting Maori dissidents as “terrorists” and holding children at gunpoint… who if not these are examples of the “good” state? Where and when, anywhere in the world, has there been a state, which is the tool of the weak against the strong?

Hence, while it is questionable whether it is even possible to realise the benevolent state of liberal and Marxist utopias, it is empirically demonstrable that forms of horizontal dialogism and conflict-resolution can reconstruct reactive networks as affinity-networks, or at least keep the conflicts at a tolerable level. There is a sophisticated anthropological literature on the functions and limits of conflict in indigenous societies, Pierre Clastres being the best-known, though Max Gluckman for example has reached the same conclusions in a different setting. The logic of ‘war’ wards off the state by preventing concentrations of power – war is a way of ‘warding off’ the state. The ‘normal’ form of conflict is (or was before colonialism) ritualised, consisting of non- or less-lethal exchanges such as stick-throwing or raiding (in the Sambia society, notable among the entire range of indigenous societies as one of the most warlike and patriarchal, it involves exchanges of bow-fire which are not intended to kill, but to show martial prestige and to train participants). It only escalates into potentially lethal feuding if someone is accidentally killed in such exchanges. In this case, there are mechanisms to end the feuding if it escalates. For the Sambia for instance, this happened through an assertion of power by the otherwise subordinate women, who implored the men to stop fighting because of the impact on subsistence activities. Also, even the most warlike societies are also capable of maintaining peaceful relations not only within the society but with distant allies and trading partners. There is nothing natural or inevitable about war in stateless societies. People certainly do not slaughter each other the moment the balance of power suits them. Only in capitalist-statist society do people act this way.

One can also add that the addition of the state to regions where conflict occurs between non-state societies has the effect of escalating conflict and hardening reactive aspects of networks against active aspects. Let us see whether the addition of the state to regions such as, say, Darfur, Rwanda or Afghanistan has reduced or intensified inter-group conflicts. In virtually every case, while the state may have suppressed low-intensity ritualised disputes, it has replaced them with bloody resource wars and accumulation-by-dispossession. The Afghan state has never been anything but a means for one ethnic group or faction to wage war on others. Rwanda has no history of genocide until colonisers come along and import external ethnic labels such as the Hamitic-Bantu distinction. In Sudan it is well-known that the Janjaweed are a state construct born of the war in the south.

Sharon Hutchinson (1996) has studied the impact of the modern state and found that it undermines conflict-resolution structures and introduces destabilising forces which lead to more extreme forms of violence among formerly stateless peoples. The Nuer of
southern Sudan became the exemplar of a stateless society from early anthropology, but the colonial state undermined their conflict-resolution structures as government-appointed chiefs manipulated rituals to accumulate power. For instance, colonial landownership undermined older tenure systems designed to prevent inter-group conflict (Macharia 2003: 189). One result was that feuding became more central to social life. The introduction of modern weapons into a society with a relational and holistic epistemology is a lifeworld-shattering event, especially when states or statist agents can manipulate the shift in meanings it entails. One of the constraints on feuding was that a killer risked pollution; the leopard-skin chief who acted as mediator was able to maintain this role because of a posited ability to remove the pollution. The initial Nuer response to firearms was to equate them with death by lightning, an especially dangerous form of death in which the dead became a guardian spirit. But with such deaths becoming increasingly common, this inscription was undermined by another – promoted by the SPLA, the dominant statist force in the Nuer region – that killing with guns does not pollute. Hence the imported state plus the imported technology is the cause of the apparently unconstrained violence that a people such as the Nuer may display in a contemporary context (Gledhill 2000: 42-3). It did not happen because there was something in Nuer society as a stateless society which makes the strong prey on the weak. Nuer society also contained, and still contains, mechanisms pointing towards conflict resolution. It’s just a matter of which potentialities are activated or enabled by the dominant framework.

So, stateless societies, which assimilate statist meanings and state forms of warfare are quite capable of atrocities against social outsiders. What about stateless societies which endorse anarchistic worldviews instead, or which simply resist the demand to assimilate? We suspect that even communities, which are antagonistic to begin with tend to become peaceful towards one another in the context of an attachment to a politics of horizontal networks in opposition to verticality; this has happened to a degree with the Amazonian peoples who were antagonistic in the past. If instead of being inserted into domanitory state frameworks, indigenous peoples become connected to one another and to other networks through horizontal affinity relations, the conflict-resolution and autonomous aspects of their existing approaches are played up, instead of the conflictual and exclusionary aspects. Much depends on the creation of an existential and psychological context of abundance instead of scarcity.

**Ethnoreligious movements**

**Defining and situating ethnoreligious movements**

Ethnoreligious movements are a particular subset of reactive movements defined principally by their attachment to an ethnic or religious identity as their primary identity or ‘trunk’. Typically of reactive movements, ethnic movements have a dual character as de- and reterritorialising. On the one hand, ethnicity emerges as a decentring force in
relation to centralised nation-state-based forms of control. In the context of the growing reliance of US power, and of resistance to US power, on local ethnic and religious allegiances, it is crucial to recall Partha Chatterjee’s remarks on the discursive exclusions constructed by the imposition of nationalism and development discourse in India (the Indian variety of the process of hegemony and subsumption discussed above). According to Chatterjee, the construction of the nation occurred alongside the emergence of various ‘others’, which in various ways exceeded national identity and could not be subsumed into it. Identities constructed around class, caste, ethnicity, gender, local identities, and so on, became the focus of loyalties, which could not be controlled by the official system (Chatterjee 1993).

On the other hand, however, ethnicity cannot be understood as a primarily rhizomatic phenomenon, because of its unusual quasi-permanence and its rigid and exclusionary implications. Ethnic affiliation provides a sense of security in a divided society, reciprocal help, and protection against neglect of one’s interests by strangers. As Horowitz argues,

Because ethnicity tops cultural and symbolic issues - basic notions of identity and the self, of individual and group worth and entitlement - the conflicts it generates are intrinsically less amenable to compromise than those revolving around material issues…. In deeply divided societies ethnicity - in contrast to other lines of cleavage, such as class or occupation - appears permanent and all encompassing, predetermining who will be granted and denied access to power and resources.

(Horowitz, 1994: xviii)

Some interesting questions then inevitably should be asked. As Vivienne Jabri discusses in her work Discourses on Violence, these involve the processes which constitute the individual identity, how identity comes to be framed in exclusionist terms and how the inclusion-exclusion dichotomy results in the emergence of and support for violent human conflict (Jabri, 1996; c.f. Benhabib, 1996; Campbell, 1999). Ali Khan similarly argues that the construction of exclusionary walls and boundaries satisfies a long-standing, apparently primordial human inclination to maintain self-identity by continually creating an “other”, a process sustained through patronage networks (Khan, 1996). Kapferer argues that the appeal of ‘myth’, including ethnoreligious identity, arises when someone recognises in its scheme their own insertion in reality and become bound to the unfolding of its scheme (cited Gledhill 2000: 147-8). In Sri Lankan nationalism, this leads to viewing integrity of state as condition for integrity of person, and Tamils as threat to state and hence to individual persons (Gledhill 2000: 148).

Deleuze and Guattari would challenge the primordiality of such forms of discourse, and theorise them as psychological rather than ontological, but their pervasiveness today is undeniable. The world system has become increasingly dependent on loyalties based on
identities and boundaries, in order to construct patronage networks and thereby exercise control. In contexts such as Afghanistan and Iraq, such networks are the only means whereby arborescent structures can be erected atop a diffusion of rhizomatic forces. Such themes are also pervasive in making “global war” a possibility. The discourse of war aims at the construction of a mythology based on inclusion and exclusion. This categorisation sharply contrasts the insider from the outsider/s who are the “others” or the deserving enemy.

As we have seen, ethnic and other reactive movements are often ‘emic primordialists’ (Karner 2006). In reality however, primordialism is almost untenable in the contemporary world; ‘situational, reactive, or interest-based ethnicity seems to be far more common’ (Hall 1997). Indeed, William H. McNeill has argued that ‘polyethnicty is normal’ in large societies, whereas ideals of ethnic purity are unusual (McNeill 1986: 4). As a result, ethnic movements rely on an ‘ethno-symbolism’ which attaches identitarian ‘us-them’ meanings to facets of everyday life, giving reality to Barthesian mythologies by projecting them onto specific incidents. Hence, ethnoreligious movements often mobilize around small details which seem trivial to outsiders – matters such as historic claims to a piece of land (Ayodhya for example), street names, borders between administrative regions (let alone states), instances of people being insulted or caricatured – and take them extremely seriously, to the point of mass mobilizations, protests, use of force, and sometimes even killing.

In these cases, it is necessary to analyse a distinction between ‘form’ and ‘substance’ of concerns: the specific issue does have a certain emotional significance for participants in movements, but only because it is reinforced by indirect substance, by a broader feeling (whether justified or not) of being under siege, under attack from outsiders, fighting a zero-sum game for the levers of power, or being kept from realization (of jouissance, of the past Golden Age) by outside forces. The specific issue is significant only because it is taken as a symptom of the broader issue. It is also very notable how those who dismiss others’ concerns as silly or disproportionate (as those outside the ethnoreligious movement in question nearly always do) are often equally quick to jump on similar bandwagons regarding their own taboos and cultural icons (for an instructive critique of the British press reaction to a case in Sudan, in relation to their treatment of a similar case in Britain, see Earthquake Cove, 2007). Joan Scott (2007) has made a similar case that the persecution of hijab-wearers in French schools is an expression of wider majoritarian anxiety. Actually, it would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that ethnoreligious movements often seek out controversies, irreconcilable issues, or things to be offended about. Far from responding to antagonisms, they often seem to seek out issues about irreducible single places and inscription in symbolic systems, which are irreducibly ‘either-or’.

**Ethnoreligious reactive networks in the Iraqi insurgency**

*Ideology, Motivations and Causes*
The Iraq issue involves both ethnoreligious and socio-political concerns, but ethnoreligious networks play a preponderant role in the Iraqi resistance to American occupation. Hashim argues that, there are four key values, nationalism, honor, revenge and pride, which dictate the need to fight occupation. In other words, resisting occupation simply because it is an occupation is a major motivating factor. ‘While in Iraq I came across Iraqis who would espouse a vague kind of nationalism as they expressed their distaste for the foreign presence in the country. Others who were more articulate or better educated expounded their disgust from within a framework of a more coherent nationalist ideology’ (Hashim, 2006: 99). The other obvious motivation is that conservative Islamists and nationalist are unlikely submit to foreign infidels. This for Hashim stems from the traditional tribal reluctance to submit to onerous, strong central authority (The Dulaime rebellion in Ramadi in 1995) (ibid. 104). Nevertheless, Hashim maintains that religion has also made a comeback, manipulated to create nationalist feelings among the population, even if it was identified by many Iraqi activists as a move from ‘infidelity to hypocrisy’ (Hashim, 2006: 104). Nationalists can easily subscribe to religion with a renewed fervor, particularly in times of identity crises and stress (ibid.120). In fact, The Iraqi National Resistance Movement is motivated by religious principles: ‘This resistance did not emerge as a reaction to US provocative acts against the Iraqi people or for the lack of services as some analysts deluded themselves into believing. It is rather a resistance to drive out the occupier based on principles and faith and in order to win nothing but a place in heaven’ (ibid. 103 quotes Madhani 14 July 2004). Many Sunnis only became insurgents after they felt the effects of the occupation and its policies (Hashim, 2006: 134).

The occupation caused a further rallying around resistance, as Sunni clerics were propelled to the limelight by the ‘discriminatory’ treatment of the Sunni community at the hands of the foreign presence (ibid.112). Arrests, seizures of mosques, and indiscriminate targeting, as anyone Salafist was thought of as promoting resistance moved the Sunni clerical establishment ‘either to seek a more activist political role or deeper and more active involvement in the insurgency itself’ (ibid. 113). Especially since there was a leadership and power vacuum, the Friday sermons by clerics both Sunni and Shia ‘served as major mobilization and recruitment centers for the insurgency, particularly in Fallujah, where the vast majority of mosques served either as insurgent strongholds, command-and control centers, and storage points for supplies, weapons and ammunition’ (ibid. 115). The biggest problem for the leadership of the Ba’ath-based insurgents is that the dilution of the Ba’ath ideology has seen the rise of leaders who are more likely to adopt a fusion or a mish-mash of Islamist and nationalist motifs for the struggle (Hashim, 2006: 156). ‘In Iraq we have witnessed a rising tide of political activism among the mainstream clerical establishment and the emergence of younger politically active clergymen (imams) with clear-cut Salafist tendencies—that is, those who seek a purist interpretation and application of Islam’ (ibid.108).

Organizational structure and Recruitment
Gerges describes the Iraqi resistance as highly complex, diverse, and decentralized, with a broad spectrum of ideological orientations and perspectives. Similarly, Hashim views the situation as ‘low-intensity, localized and decentralized insurgency’, with large numbers of decentralized insurgent groups engaging in violence to disrupt and remove the US presence. For US troops in the ground, ‘the violence is hardly “low intensity” who have at one time or another faced an average of eighty-four to 110 attacks a day. But the tempo of attacks is sporadic, and on many occasions there are seemingly inexplicable lulls in the battle’ (ibid. 125). As Hashim explains, the epicentre of the insurgency in Iraq is what is known as the Sunni triangle ‘an area bounded by Baghdad in the east, Ramadi to the west and Tikrit to the North, and which includes a heavy concentration of Sunni Arab tribes whose members served in the armed forces and security services of the former regimes… [In the] Shia south, most [violence] has nothing to do with Sunni insurgents but with local inter-Shia feuds’ (ibid. 129).

Hashim thinks that the insurgency does not have the support of all Sunni Arabs but its range encompasses all classes and it is urban and rural, since it includes students, intellectuals, former soldiers, tribal youth and farmers, and Islamists (ibid. 131). There is also support from other Islamist subnational groups, Arab nationalists, disgruntled Muslims, foreign fighters and Sunni extremists (ibid. 138). Foreign fighters reportedly play a bigger role than their small number, as spectacular suicide bombings against Iraqi security forces, Shiites, and Sunni Kurds act as force multipliers, when in fact more than 90 percent of the fighters are homegrown Iraqis inspired by national and religious sentiment (Gerges, 2005: 260; Hashim, 2006:138). These foreign fighters came to Iraq after watching clerics declaring jihad on al-Jazeera and events in Abu Ghraib (Hashim, 2006: 144). Despite their presence in Iraq ‘...hard evidence –often from the US military indicates that the foreign element is miniscule...By blaming foreigners, the Bush administration and CPA hoped to squash the notion that there was an insurgency within the Iraqi population, in order to frame the conflict as part of the wider war on terror’ (ibid. 139).

The Ansar al-Islam which later merged with al-Qaeda in Iraq, was comprised by many different groups, for instance Taleban moving to Iraq from Afghanistan, and even marrying into Kurdish families. The similar religious faith, with Salafism well represented in the region, meant various groups were formed such as Al Ansar Al Sunnah, or the Salafu Jihadists or Al Tawhid Wa Al Jihad, whose leader is the notorious Abu Musab Al Zarqawi. ‘Together, these groups formed the basis of the ruthless organization Al-Ansar Al Islam. Abu Musab Al Zarqawi became the leader of an umbrella organization, Al Tawhid Wa Al jihad, and his organization has ‘claimed responsibility for multiple beheadings, kidnappings, and suicide bombings against foreigners, coalition forces, and the newly established Iraqi police force and army’ (Chehab 2006: 44). In 2004, ‘when Zarqawi made his famous statement approving the alliance between his organization and that of al-Qaeda, describing it as, “The pinnacle in the struggle against the Americans,” bin Laden returned the compliment by promoting him to “Emir of al-Qaeda in the Country of Two Rivers”’ (Chehab 2006: 58). In terms of formalising alliances, initially bin Laden was reluctant to agree to a merger between al-
Tawid wa al-jihad in Iraq and al-Qaeda because of Zarqawi’s excessive sectarianism and bloodletting, as Zarqawi not only excommunicates believers but also justifies collateral killing of Muslims (Gerges, 2005: 257). Zarqawi gained international notoriety and stardom among militant Islamists, he came under pressure by operatives to swear fealty to bin laden and merge with al-Qaeda. A formal association with the parent organization would confer revolutionary legitimacy on Zarqawi and turn him from a mere field commander in Iraq to a global jihadi on a par with the masters such as bin Laden and Zawahiri, meanwhile this would bring this a new crop of jihadist volunteers – and funds – into Iraq (Gerges, 2005: 258). Equally for bin Laden it means taking credit for military successes there and helps to rejuvenate his battered base. At the same bin Laden’s aims would broaden his network’s appeal to Arab and Muslim masses who feel strongly about the American occupation of Islamic territories (Gerges, 2005: 259).

In terms of recruitment, once they reach Iraq the foreigners are helped by Iraqi facilitators who direct the young fighters to safe houses where they get provisions, arms and some rudimentary training. Initially, they were not connected to former regime loyalists, but it became obvious that the best network would be to contact former regime loyalists (Hashim, 2006:147). In fact,

There is a consensus from independent investigators, US officials, terrorism experts that ‘prior to the Iraq war, [the vast majority of non-Iraqi Arabs] were not Islamic extremists seeking to attack the united States, as al-Qaeda did four years ago. Rather, they were part of a new generation of terrorists responding to calls to defend their fellow Muslims from ‘crusaders’ and ‘infidels’ (Hashim, 2006: 150-1).

There is some disagreement over how recruitment of foreign fighters occurs. Dutch intelligence argues that recruitment into the jihadist network is an individual development rather than a group development process; recruiters socially isolate the potential recruit to gradually drive them apart from their family and friends in order to be able to control and manipulate them and to begin to indoctrinate them with the radical Islamic range of ideas. (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken Koninrijksrelaties 2004; Hashim, 2006: 145). However, Sageman (see above) argues that positive benefits for recruits of the ‘small-world network’ outweigh factors of isolation and hostility, and questions the idea of propagandistic brainwashing.

Organizational Structure

The Iraqi insurgency is mostly decentralised in form. Hierarchical organizations have a well-defined vertical chain of command and control from the leadership to the rest of the organization, data and intelligence flows up and down the organizational channels but not horizontally. Such units are functionally specialized with units that fight, gather intelligence, recruit, and supply money and weapons (Hashim, 2006: 152). The decentralized, or networked, organizational structure has in contrast been described as ‘loose’ and ‘flat’, with fluid or less distinct boundaries between its various subunits. Such organizations have leadership but are weak because of cultural and environmental
factors (i.e. kinship or traditional ties within the leadership) or the lack of any particular skills that identify one person over another as designated leader. In Iraq some of the early insurgent groups or groups were made up of family members of neighbour friends (Hashim, 2006: 153). The Ba‘ath party in Iraq was a hierarchical organization, and after April 2003 largely retained its traditional organizational structure, but it had to decentralize its operations (Hashim, 2006: 153).

Decentralized insurgent groups are characterized by fluidity and lack of constancy in membership. Whether such a body is more hierarchical or more decentralized depends on a host of factors such as its culture, what the organization is required or has tasked itself to do and of course, the dynamic and highly uncertain environment in which it finds itself functioning. Hashim argues that a wholly decentralized insurgent group could not continue to exist for long or be able to carry more than very limited operations in a limited geographical locale, e.g. one’s neighbourhood or tribal lands (Hashim, 2006: 154); hence this would not be appropriate for reactive networks. The Iraqi insurgents have exhibited features of both organizational types (network and hierarchy), with larger, more geographically extended insurgent groups made up of former regime elements tending towards the hierarchical mode, and tribal or neighbourhood insurgents tending towards the decentralized (Hashim, 2006: 155).

Chehab describes the cell structure as comprising of small clusters consisting of just three to five members, with no knowledge of the higher command or real names, joining jihad either really committed to the cause or doing it for money. Chehab interviewed several fighters in a Baghdad prison and the small clusters system proved one of the reasons that Iraqi intelligence and the American-led coalition had difficulty in tracing militant organizations (Chehab 2006:59). Of these small cluster groups, Hashim describes combatant cells, where the attackers are usually young men, either former soldiers, whose attacks and ambushes have been the best-organized and most professional, or men without military experience, such as students, tribal youths or the unemployed (Hashim, 2006: 158). The organizational structure of such combatant cells is simple: a small number of cells report to commanders, often from the middle levels of the former regime. Most of the part-time insurgents come from groups that have little or no external funding, and consist of people with some kind of employment, who act as part-time insurgents.

By contrast, the former regime personnel and the Islamist volunteers can afford to have full-time insurgents because both groups have external sources of funding. There are also more specialized cells, which have specific technical skills, for example ‘suicide bomber control’, training, intelligence, and propaganda (Hashim, 2006: 159). Targets and tactics of the insurgency include targeting military forces in firefights, targeting and ambushing military convoys and vehicular movements with roadside bombs, targeting of senior Iraqi political figures associated with the Coalition, targeting of foreign companies and individuals working with occupation authorities in Iraq, targeting of Iraqis collaborating with the occupation authorities, targeting of Iraqi security officers and services, targeting of coalition resilience, targeting and sabotage of critical infrastructure, and targeting of symbols (Hashim, 2006: 188-213). Another important part of the insurgency is that
information about convoy movements is flowing to insurgent cells from within the Iraqi security services, primarily the Iraqi police force, which is rife with sympathy for the insurgents (Hashim, 2006: 164). In contrast, the Coalition finds it difficult to find information on the resistance. The clannish structure of some of the insurgent groups—particularly around Ramadi and Fallujah where the tribal element of the insurgency is strong---ensures that outsiders are viewed with suspicion. There is reluctance to surrender or inform because this is dishonourable (Hashim, 2006: 166).

Weaknesses of the Iraqi resistance and international jihad

Some authors suggest that the Iraqi resistance is an extension of a highly capable international movement. For instance, Bobbit views al-Qaeda today as a sophisticated operation, ‘with a sophisticated propaganda machine based in Pakistan, a secondary but independent base in Iraq, and an expanding reach in Europe. Its leadership is intact. Its decentralized command and control structure has allowed it to survive the loss of key operatives such as Zarqawi. Its Taleban allies are making a comeback in Afghanistan and it is certain to get a big boost there if NATO pulls out. It will also claim a victory when U.S. forces start withdrawing from Iraq’ (Bobbit, 2008: 15). However, as we suggested above, scholars such as Bobbit tend to exaggerate al-Qaeda’s scope and size by conflating it with the broader jihadist scene and other kinds of Muslim resistance. Others have identified a series of weaknesses in the Iraqi resistance, including multiple splits and internal wars in the jihadist movement; diminishing mobilization and recruitment capacity; degrading quality of recruits due to inability to reach al-Qaeda central (e.g. technical expertise); difficulty in cooperation and coordination between insurgent groups at the political and strategic levels; and inability to create a political platform.

In terms of al-Qaeda internationally, Gerges makes the argument that on the political, moral, and operational levels, the multiple internal wars have degraded al-Qaeda’s decision making and considerably reduced the flow of recruits to its ranks. Important countries—Afghanistan Saudi Arabia, and Yemen— that have provided al-Qaeda with secure bases of support and thousands of volunteers have become inhospitable and highly dangerous. ‘Yes, al-Qaeda can occasionally inspire a direct attack, but its mobilizational and recruiting capacity has steadily been diminishing. But there is one promising theatre, Iraq, which has provided al-Qaeda with a new lease of life, second generation of recruits and fighters, and a powerful outlet to expand its ideological outreach activities to Muslims worldwide, thanks to the 2003 American-led invasion and occupation of the country (ibid. 251). However, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have been accused of returning to form, resuscitating their old strategy of tolerating jihadists provided they leave the local regime alone (Worth 2008, Boucek 2008), while new base areas have been created in northwest Pakistan’s tribal belt. Al-Qaeda and other jihadists have also moved towards the decentralised model suggested by al-Suri, working through localised cells and the Internet.

The decentring of the jihadi movement following the loss of the Afghan bases has led to what is termed the ‘third wave’ of jihadism. The groups forming the third wave come radicalized on their own initiative (even indirect clerical supporters can no longer espouse
violence openly without being arrested or deported). These groups are autonomous and unknown to al-Qaeda central. These new groups must finance their own financial operations. In the case of these small, local cells, the major obstacle is not finance but expertise (Sageman, 2008: ibid. 140). Discursively, they reproduce the reactive logic more clearly than the groups in Afghanistan and Iraq, weaving together a general narrative of a world polarized between good (Salafi Islam) and evil (the West). Despite this ideological coherence, Sageman suggests there is little evidence of a coherent political strategy or a grand plan (144). They exhibit varying degrees of commitment (141), but also an increasing propensity towards suicidal operations: while an earlier generation went abroad to train or fight, the current generation go to warzones to die (143). Between decentralised organisation without training camps and the deaths of those who go abroad to fight, the result is that the ‘third wave’ groups lack access to technical expertise and are poorly trained, meaning that the quality of attacks has gone down sharply (Sageman 2008).

Writing prior to the recent rise of the ‘Awakening’ movement, Hashim explains that one of the weaknesses of the insurgency is the attainment of cooperation and coordination between insurgent groups at the political and strategic levels, in order to present joint goals and common demands (Hashim, 2006: 202). There is an inability by Sunni political groups to reach out to the insurgents, as they have no constituency, strength of personality or positive program to offer the insurgents, just as they lack the political skills, resources and vision to rally people to their cause (Hashim, 2006: 203). This inability, according to Hashim lies in the fact that nationalist insurgents have overlooked the possibility of creating a political platform by distancing themselves from the religious and centralising sentiments of the Bath (Hashim, 2006: 207). In the final analysis, the following problems persist:

First the insurgents, Ba’thist or otherwise, simply do not have the luxury of focusing on the post-liberation phase. Second, the insurgency is not a monolithic united movement directed by a leadership with a unitary and disciplined ideological vision or unified goal or set of goals. Third, this is an insurgency whose members may have calculated that they do not, at this stage, need an elaborate political and socio-economic vision for a ‘free’ Iraq; that is to say, to gain the support of the people is enough to articulate a desire to be free of foreign occupation. Fourth, its is likely that these myriad groups who cooperate with one another and coordinate attacks at the operational and tactical levels, but who may have profound political differences, wish to avoid fratricidal conflicts

(Hashim, 2006: 122).

Ethnicity in the world system, and the formation of ethnic groups
Ethnicity as a broad category, as originally applied by anthropologists, refers to sets of practices which exist in most societies, such as networks of actual and fictive kinship, reciprocity networks and forms of culture. The term ‘ethnic group’, however, tends to be used in political scholarship in a rather different sense, referring to molar totalities constructed through ethnoreligious movement-formation. Although the identity aspect is crucial to the internal composition and symbolism of ethnoreligious movements, it is rarely entirely arbitrary in social-systemic and world-systemic terms. Ethnic groups are associated with particular segmentary divisions in the world-system between included and excluded, or privileged and marginalised groups.

According to Thomas Hall, ethnic groups frequently come into existence as a result of conquest or migration, or can be formed in response to another, conquering society (Hall American 1989: 1, 4, 10). For instance, ‘tribes’ come into existence as a result of responses to invasion of band societies by states (Hall 1989: 10, using Fried 1967, 1975). Ethnic groups or ‘ethnoclasses’ (such as the mixed-ethnicity genizaros in the American Southwest) exist as a sub-unit of states and systems, and come and go with structural changes (Hall 1989: 246). They also undergo rapid transformations, such as the fragmentation of northeast American groups into smaller proprietary groups due to the fur trade (Wolf 1982: 158-63). In Hall’s study, the Comanches for example become cemented as a tribe as part of the process of becoming a vassal group allied to the Spanish (Hall 1989: 120-1). David Harvey reinforces this reading in his argument that ethnic conflicts (for instance, the Israel-Palestine conflict) often revolve around dispossession and exclusion from resources. Ethnicity is therefore often a question of support of or resistance to accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2006: 111).

Gurr and Harff divide ethnic groups into four different types: ethnonationalists, indigenous peoples, communal contenders and ethnoclasses. The first two types seek autonomy and the latter two integration; each type has different political goals (Gurr and Harff 1994: 15). In some cases the formation of a distinct group is a response to conditions of exclusion. For instance, the migrant group identity of German Turks and Malaysian Chinese is effectively defined by the majority definition of these groups as out-groups, and related discrimination (Gurr and Harff 1994: 108). We would suggest that ethnonationalists and communal contenders relate more closely to the category of reactive networks than the other two, although all four can take reactive forms. Ethnoclasses often (but not always) form from exclusion or marginalisation, or from discriminatory segmentarities, while indigenous groups defend immanence from systemic encroachment (see above).

According to Pickering, economic issues among the Lakota become confused and conflated with ethnic categories of full-blood versus mixed-blood, each connected as a category to an in-group patronage network and to particular political options. Integrationist ideologies tend to favour people of mixed origin whereas reduced government intervention favouring people of full-blood origin (Pickering 2003: 211-12). Hall and Fenelon go even further, suggesting that full-blood and mixed-blood are metaphorical terms for less and more assimilated subject-positions (Hall and Fenelon 2003: 179).
There are a variety of means whereby ethnoreligious identity-categories are constructed. We shall explore below, two of the most common assemblages which forge such identities: nationalism and colonialism. Such processes also operate more broadly in world-systemic structures, leading to a constant pressure on groups to transform into the preferred kind of ethnoreligious entity. Hence, Wallerstein argues that the Republican Party has a strategy to ‘hive off the upwardly mobile’ within ethnic minorities, which is especially used in relation to Latin@ or Hispanic people (Wallerstein 2006: 37). This leads to what Agustin Lao-Montes refers to as a ‘public discourse that pits one essentialized group against the other’, for instance, Latin@s against African-Americans (2006: 75). This is built on the transmutation of identity into ethnoreligious forms, in this context termed ‘cultural nationalism’. According to Hernandez, cultural nationalism appropriates indigenous symbols while ignoring indigenous struggles and meanings, and filtering out transversal leftist meanings also (2006: 130). The surveillance tendencies of cultural nationalist organisations reproduce dominant nationalist paranoia, and hence show the discontinuity of ethnoreligious movements with the pre-modern forms they claim to imitate (2006: 130-1). Gledhill similarly discusses this strategy as a kind of incorporation. ‘Power and resources accrued to “Hispanic” leaders… [and] dangerous chicanos were converted into respectable, hard-working, self-realizing Hispanics… This is a paradigmatic case of the way metropolitan societies politicize ethnicity’ (Gledhill 2000: 200). Recently this division mapped onto a rather different political rivalry, between Obama and Clinton supporters in the Democratic Party. Indeed, the contest between the two nominees was sometimes portrayed as mobilised through different identity-categories (Best 2008).

Nationalism and ethnicity

The place of nationalism in relation to reactive movements and ethnoreligious categories deserves special attention. Authors influenced by liberalism and social-democracy typically draw a boundary between ‘bad’ ethnic movements and racisms, and ‘good’ nationalisms (Kristeva, 1993; Held, 1995; Barber, 1996; Giddens, 1990). This division is problematic given the continuity between ethnoreligious politics and nationalism. The authors are typically looking for a ‘good’ alternative to an ethnopolitical vision of the ‘nation’, but it is questionable whether such an identity could exist. The state as monological decision-maker dovetails conveniently with nationalism as a monocultural expression of ethnopolitics. Authors such as Benedict Anderson (1991) and Hobsbawm and Ranger (1992) are divided sharply on the origins of the ‘nation’ as an imaginary category, whether it arose spontaneously from existential conditions (Anderson’s novels, newspapers and maps) or was constructed self-consciously by elites seeking to demobilise class movements. In either case, however, it is admitted that it is a recent occurrence, and that it is closely related to the emergence of capitalist modernity.

World-systems analysts and other scholars have argued firmly against such a view. For instance, Wallerstein determinately locates the state among the status-group identities
which provide the segmentary aspect of the world system and the fuel for reactive networks (2004: 54). Arrighi et al argue that the division between nationals and immigrants is a category-set created by the world-systemic interstate system, and hence has no place in antisytemic movements (1989: 91). Hannes Lacher refers to nationalism in terms of ‘the promotion of the state as an alternative “imagined community” to that of class’ (2006: 18), and a political response by ‘state classes’ and other elites to transnational social and class struggle (2006: 132-3). Michael Mann argues that ‘peopling the world with nation-states tended to move violence within states’ (2005: 107), while Jan Nederveen Pieterse questions if there is any difference between ethnicity and nationalism, and if there is, which is the problem (2004: 115). His reading of nationalism as monological statist inscription of ethnicity echoes our own analysis of the role of state-constructed ethnicities. Partha Chatterjee similarly views nationalism as divisive, arguing that ‘it is the very singularity of the idea of a national history which divides Indians from one another’ (Chatterjee 1993: 115). In other words, the attempt to possess a trunk turns difference into inequality. This complicity of nationalism as ‘global-local’ with ethnicity is perhaps the reason communal pogroms have become such a ‘touchy nodal point’ in India. In the case of World War 1, research shows the basis of state mobilisation on everyday reactive networks (Migdal 2001: 34).

Appadurai similarly argues for continuity between ethnicity and nationalism. The modern state rests on ‘a fundamental, dangerous idea’ of a ‘national ethnos’ (2006: 3). This idea comes to the fore in contexts of uncertainty, with surveillance used to vivisect the suspect national body (ibid. 5). It is related to the processes of recording and social construction associated with the modern state; ‘both minorities and majorities are the products of a distinctly modern world of statistics, censuses, population maps, and other tools of state created mostly since the 17th century’ (ibid. 41). The Hobbesian view of the state as a solution to conflict is thus radically false. There is a “normal” state of low-intensity ethnic warfare in many statist societies, and warfare and the discourse of terrorism escape nation-state borders (15). Similar criticisms relate to non-standard types of nationalism. For instance, Paul Gilroy relates the rise of national populism in Britain to an older xenophobic outlook (Gilroy 2004: 158-9), while long-distance nationalisms such as the virtual Tamil nationalism discussed by Föglerund (1999) and Vidanage (2009) have been criticised as especially prone to being purified of nuances (Gledhill 2000: 163). Vidanage (2009), however, has compared such movements to nomadic war-machines.

Hence, we can safely conclude that national identity is simply a special type of ethnoreligious identity, not at all something separate, and that the attempts to construct a separate image of ‘good’ nationalism are attempts by Northern elites to distance themselves from the North’s basis in the same kind of reactive formations it denounces when they appear in the South. The danger in much current discussion of ethnicity is that it targets only the ethnic identities and movements of the unmarked term, implicitly shielding the much more insidious (because more powerful) reactive structures of the marked term.

**Colonialism and ethnic identity**
The view of culture and particularity exhibited by authors such as Huntington and Barber relies on abstract, reified categories abstracted from everyday contexts. It tends to avoid ethnographic inquiry and distinctions, and has been soundly critiqued by authors such as Edward Saïd (1978). What goes missing in such accounts, along with the social density and depth of everyday relations and the role of reciprocity networks in survival and resistance (both hidden beneath the negative connotations of terms such as ‘tribalism’ and ‘ethnicity’), is the intersection of social construction of ethnicities with patronage networks and networks of political mobilisations run by powerful politicians who use categories to include or exclude. The difference between massified and networked ethnonational identities is also elided.

Contrary to the dominant portrayal, ethnicity is not something primordial and premodern, but something systematically constructed through colonialism and imperialism. Gledhill summarises the stereotypical view of ethnicity as follows. ‘Ethnic’ identifications are often presented as primordial and atavistic, aspects of a ‘traditional’ social order surviving under the veneer of modernity’. He raises a number of objections: firstly, that leaders of ‘ethnic’ movements are ‘generally thoroughly ‘modern’ politicians vying for power with another elite faction’, and using ‘invented or reinvented’ symbols; secondly, that the ‘means and ends of the conflict centre on “modern” conceptions of political and economic organization’ such as the independence or autonomy of local states (Gledhill 2000: 14). Rejecting this view means admitting the role of colonialism in current ethnic conflicts. ‘The implication of rejecting a view of certain kinds of conflict as indices of imperfect transitions to “modernity” is that there is a deeper sense in which Western colonial expansion and… “cultural globalization” shape the diverse forms of modern political and social conflict’ (Gledhill 2000: 14).

In most of the world, modern ethnicity is a colonial invention. It apparently derives from some combination of nationalism with theories of biological superiority derived from discourses of aristocratic class privilege. As Bayart et al argue, colonisation reified and ‘fixed’ ethnic awareness which previous was ‘highly fluid’ and constantly renegotiated (1999: 33). Colonial administrators and allied anthropologists went to great lengths to categorise people into groups based on ethnicity – the basic function of the colonial census as a device of subject-construction (Anderson 1991: 164-5), as well as to construct and promote discourses differentiating the various groups and associating them with some “eternal” essence. As Saïd argues, these categories were projected onto actual groups and used in the reconstruction of colonial societies. ‘No merely asserted generality is denied the dignity of truth; no theoretical list of Oriental attributes is without application to the behavior of Orientals in the real world’ (1978: 49). In some cases (such as Vietnam), colonisers actually went to the lengths of inventing an entire written script in order to construct the colonised population as an ethnicity (Anderson 1991: 128). They also attempted to develop some knowledge of local cultures in order to obtain some degree of legitimacy and allow indirect rule. Sometimes, as among the Tswana, this did appear to lead to some legitimacy (Migdal 2001: 155).
Colonialism also fuelled ethnic conflict by strategically using certain ethnic groups as middlemen and importing immigrants to perform unpopular roles (Gurr and Harff 1994: 16-17). Hence, Macharia argues that nearly everywhere in Africa, the postcolonial state is the property of a single ethnic group previously groomed by the colonizers (2003). Similarly, in the context of Indochina, Jean Lacouture refers to ‘double domination’ during the colonial period, of French over everyone then of Vietnamese over others (cited Chomsky 2004: 259-60).

This project continued after decolonisation, and in this regard at least, the postcolonial state is far more a continuation of colonialism than its triumphant adversary. Nominally independent states (often under the watchful eye of imperial gunships and international financial institutions) do a much more extensive job of constructing and enforcing ethno-national categories than their colonial forebears. Thus one finds the Algerians, Iranians and Indians acting much the same way towards the Berbers, Kurds and Nagas as the French and British once acted towards them. Nine times out of ten, one also finds the subordinate states performing the function of integration into the world system on their own behalf, saving the imperial powers any need to expend military resources on their compliance. In the Indian context for instance, leading members of the far-right anti-western RSS have also been at the forefront of privatisation, which leads to increasing foreign ownership. Roy argues that these people are playing a double game, diverting people with ethnoreligious concerns while selling off resources (2004: 51-2).

State/capitalist encouragement of ethnic tension also continue to this day. For instance, Okonta and Douglas (2003) provide evidence that the Nigerian army has incited ethnic conflict between the Ijaw and Itsekiri in the Niger Delta by carrying out false flag operations dressed up as people from rival groups, in order to disrupt local movements against oil extraction. With such local ethnoreligious forces operating as regional gauleiters or imperial governors, imperial violence is then reduced to a kind of firefighting operation, suppressing those lines of flight which take particular peoples outside of the state system (so-called ‘failed states’) or which pit particular states against the dominant powers (so-called ‘rogue states’).

To turn indigenous peoples without states and local formations with tributary states into appendages of the world-system, strategies of incorporation were needed. In his discussion of Spanish power in what is today the American Southwest, Hall lists a series of strategies which involve conversion of band societies into ‘safer’ ethnic groups. These included bribing or paying tribute to ‘Indian’ groups, divide-and-rule, political centralisation of groups, inducing dependence on supplies and resources which were controlled by the colonisers (such as land and gunpowder), making peace conditional on ending autonomy and feuding, attempting to sedentarise nomads, appointing local chiefs or ‘big men’ as state officials, merging small bands into larger groups, and insisting on a single leader for negotiations (Hall 1989: 112-13, 115, 119-21). These strategies all tend in particular directions: from nomadism to sedentarity, from minoritarian to majoritarian, from stateless to centralised and state-inserted, and from autonomous to dependent. Hall speculates that the Spanish could actually have won peace far more easily by freeing enslaved prisoners, but they never considered doing this, hence reproducing the cause of
war (in demand for captives and revenge for captive-taking) despite all its attempts at

Colonial indirect rule was especially problematic in stateless societies, where chiefs could
often be ‘found’ but did not have the authority imputed to them (Gledhill 2000: 1).
Colonialism eventually tended to produce ‘chiefs’ who reinforced the role it assigned to
them, but at the cost of losing their social influence. In Nuer society for instance,
government-appointed chiefs began to distort compensation rituals by taking the
resources for themselves and their supporters in the colonial police (Gledhill 2000: 42-3).
Not surprisingly, this led to the decline of the affinity-based energies which supported
their power. This sometimes leads to ethnoreligious movements as an attempt to re-
establish ‘traditional’ power on a new basis. Mamdani provides a detailed account of
how colonial powers in Africa invented chiefs and customs which they imposed and then
passed off as traditional (Mamdani 1996). In a similar but distinct context, Fijian critical
scholar Asesela Ravuvu analysed the ethnically-inflected military coup in 2000 as a result
of the declining power of chiefs due to their loss of influence over their own people. This,
he said, was due to colonial changes and the establishment of a rigid hereditary system.
"(When) the people of the land no longer have the power to select and install their
leaders, the chiefs lose their mana or power," he said. As a result, chiefs sought to
emphasise traditional values which reinforced the status quo. Many of these ‘traditions’
were colonial legacies which had been recast as indigenous (Ravuvu 2000).

Ethnoreligious conflict can also prove to be self-reinforcing through the emergence of
systems of violence. Hall (1989) provides such an analysis of the situation in the
Southwest, where the deployment of soldiers boosted the local economy and provided
incentives for continued warfare, while also generating practices of raiding and
plundering which set in motion cycles of violence. Richani (2002) argues that present-
day Colombia is ruled through ‘systems of violence’ which render violence part of the
everyday social structure and in which the contenders reinforce one another. Migdal has
similarly argues, in relation to British-occupied Palestine and Ireland, that ‘the
persistence, even intensification, of ethnic violence in the face of a strong commitment by
a powerful state to impose order’ is an outcome of ‘quiet coalitions’ whereby the
dominant state became complicit with local reactive networks. Dependent on these
networks for local knowledge, personnel and other resources, the supposed peacekeeping
operation actually reinforced conflict (2001: 27-8). In other words, the deep state as a
social logic tends to reproduce conflict even when official state leaders claim to be
seeking peace. The resolution of conflicts emerges rather when the logic of the included
and the addition of axioms takes over from the deep state and the subtraction of axioms.

The identities which ethnoreligious movements define as primordial, which are the focus
of their ‘emic primordialism’, are often closely tied to the identities and categories
imposed by colonialism. Chatterjee argues that Hindu communalism imports Orientalist
themes including the nation (as distinct from kingdom or realm), the glorious past and
degraded present, a “we” constructed from ancient achievements, and negative Orientalist
stereotypes of Muslims (Chatterjee 1993: 97-9). Saïd similarly argues that Islamic
‘fundamentalists’ rely on Orientalist stereotypes (1978: 333). Ashis Nandy similarly
suggests that western formal models, what he terms ‘cultural codes’, are being generalised by fundamentalists and others who seek equality with the west through formal uniformization such as strong nation-states, even while positing radical separation at the level of content (Nandy 1990: 104). In effect, one sees the ‘imported nation’ or ethnicity being formed as a response to the ‘imported state’ as a social form (Badie 2000). Modern discourse on ethnicity, on the other hand, echoes the excuses made for this very colonial project. Even the theme of ethnic strife as grounds for western intervention can be traced back to Orientalist arguments for despotism (Arrighi and Silver 1999: 241).

The outcome of colonial categories being reformulated as local ‘ethnicities’, complete with western stereotypes and mappings, is clearly shown in an article by Nigerian author Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie. The article discusses the imposition of a conservative western morality of the Oedipal Victorian type, portrayed as traditionally Nigerian and as a defence of distinctly local values. The article focuses on a bill to ban miniskirts, and argues that it is about making women ‘safe scapegoats’, blaming women for male desire and violence. ‘The common story is that in "real" African culture, before it was tainted by the west, gender roles were rigid and women were contentedly oppressed. There are men and women who, while holding their imported cellphones and driving their imported cars, say that women should conform to certain gender roles so as to preserve our "real" culture. The historical truth is that most of these reductive gender ideas came from Victorian England.’ If Nigeria wanted to return to pre-colonial cultures, it would have to accept fluid gender roles, lesbian marriages and bare-breasted market traders. The real immorality, she argues, is systematic institutional corruption, which is concealed by the hypocrisy of those who steal in private but demand piety and modesty in public. Paradoxically, moral panics and moral policing simply reinforce this hypocritical ‘immorality’ (Adichie 2008). Adichie’s analysis shows several crucial features of the particular type of identity mobilized by ethnoreligious concerns: it is focused on the superficial and on regulation of others, it conforms to colonial categories, it ignores or overcodes particularities of everyday life, it involves a coercive ‘morality’ but does not have a substantive ‘ethics’, and it tends to be ethically empty in relation to its own advocates’ practices.

Lest one imagine that this problem only arises in postcolonial contexts, a Northern example can also be added. Theologian Giles Fraser deconstructs Bush’s deployment of Christianity in terms reminiscent of those discussed above; basically, Bush is shown to have an ethnoreligious definition of Christianity. Bush, argues Fraser, is ‘a funny kind of Christian’ because of what we would term the absence of ethics from his political position, i.e. the fact that he views anything and everything (torture for example) as justified in the interests of his ‘side’, of the ‘people who count’. For Fraser, this reproduces the logic analysed by René Girard of scapegoating as a means of securing communal solidarity. It thus entirely ignores the specificity of Christianity, ‘the story of a God who deliberately takes the place of the despised and rejected so as to expose the moral degeneracy of a society that purchases its own togetherness at the cost of innocent suffering’ (Fraser 2008). This emptying of substantive ethical content is typical of ethnoreligious inscriptions of religion. Ethnoreligious movements need to be understood
in relation to patronage politics and resource wars, not primarily as outgrowths of ideational constructs.

Analyzing specific cases of ‘ethnic conflict’

To support our contention that ethnoreligious conflicts are closely linked to inscriptions in the world-system, we shall examine a number of cases. Let us begin with the case of violence between Hutu and Tutsi peoples in Rwanda and Burundi. Peter Rigby has argued that the problems in Rwanda and Burundi were created by colonialism, which exaggerated Tutsi-Hutu differences and turned them into an entrenched hierarchy which did not previously exist (Rigby 1996: 69-70). Rwanda inherited exploitative structures from Belgian colonisers (not from precolonial kingdoms), which converted some Batutsi into colonial petty dictators and created massive wealth differentials (101). Rwanda conflict was thus a ‘contemporary, thoroughly modern class conflict over land, wealth and power’ (102). Uvin has confirmed this analysis, arguing that Rwanda was primarily a political conflict which the west perceived as ethnic due to a racist coding of the other (Uvin 1998). Pieterse argues that this misperception of the Rwanda conflict as ethnic is linked to anti-popular (implicitly, anti-network, pro-hierarchy) imagery going back to crowd theory, the ‘bestial crowd’, ‘socialism or barbarism’, and the assumption of popular disorganisation and entropy (2004: 114-15).

Similar arguments have been made regarding the Bosnia war. Malcolm (1994) has argued that ancient conflicts have been used by various partisans in Bosnia to excuse or obscure present-day political motivations. Zizek (1990) provides a similar analysis, adding that the ethnic performances are added for the western observer. Thomas Hall argues that, ‘as the Bosnian example shows, ethnonationalism remains a convenient ideology for rationalizing seizure of power and property. That is, the ideal of ethnically homogeneous states can be marshaled for other political causes’ (Hall 1997).

The 2007-8 Kenyan election crisis, widely reported in the west as ethnic or tribal violence similar to Rwanda, provides a similar example, analysed as more complex and political by divergent sources. Writing in a Kenyan newspaper, Karl Lyimo argues that ‘naked tribalism is the least of Kenya’s problems’. As a belief, it is ‘engendered by politicians of dubious calibre’. He puts down the crisis over the elections to a ‘competitive spirit’ or striving to be ‘top dog’ between ethnic groups and candidates which is ‘not tribalistic’. Candidates like Odinga and Kibaki have systematically garnered votes in regions well outside their ethnic constituencies (Lyimo 2008). Mukoma Wa Ngugi argues that the two contending parties ‘are mirror images of each other… and they manipulate ethnicity to hide their bankruptcy’. In particular, the opposition is not a unitary bloc, but consists of at least three factions, ‘the activist-intellectual left, the Moi-ist retrogressives, and the populists’. It is the second of these factions which has encouraged pogroms. Because of the misunderstanding of underlying issues, ‘valid discussions of equality and equity, social development and societal wellbeing, are projected as primordial competition’, a line the global media ‘swallow’ (Wa Ngugi,
Kiama Kaara argues that ethnicization appears because of a ‘political void’. ‘The ‘us’ versus ‘them’ typology plays on ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ abstractions interpreted in the context of contending forces, preventing an explicit understanding of the political/economic dynamics at play’ (Kaara 2008). Finally, BBC journalist Mark Doyle argues that headlines are ‘misleading’ and partial. Many Africans rely on family and tribe for their marginal economic survival and to provide services; politicians ‘know this formula very well and… exploit it ruthlessly’. Nevertheless, the root of the crisis is ‘money – or a lack of it… It is no coincidence that the people who usually perpetrate “tribal violence” are unemployed young men’, nor that the site of much of the Kenyan violence was the Rift Valley, a region with ‘a history of land disputes’ (Doyle 2008).

Similar arguments have been made about Christian-Muslim clashes in northern Nigeria. Nigerian religious leader Alhaji Garba Yusuf argues that pogroms and unrest in the north are about ‘politics and poverty’ rather than religion. ‘Most of these problems have to do more with poverty as it always believed that a hungry man is an angry man. Most of the perpetrators are people suffering from economic problems, while in other cases, politicians tend to exploit the impoverished situation of these categories of Nigerians to achieve their selfish interest, knowing that religion is a very sentimental issue which touches on the emotions of the people and could easily fight back if this sentiment is tampered with’. He argues that the violence is not religious because none of the religions involved espouse violence, and that religious motives would not explain the prevalence of looting during the unrest, claiming rather than it shows that the crisis is caused by a need to loot for survival (Kabir 2008). Similar arguments are raised by scholar Graham Harrison (2002) regarding the importance of youth exclusion and disillusionment in urban unrest across Africa.

In Iraq, the end of the Saddam patronage pyramid led to declining power of tribal sheiks. Hence, while parts of the resistance involve local and tribal pressures, young men seem to have drifted outside the control of tribal sheiks, pursuing economic opportunities and rewards though armed groups (Hashim 2006: 105). ‘The sheiks simply no longer have control over the young men of their tribes. Indeed, on many occasions sheiks told me that they have no authority or rewards with which they can exercise control over the young men. Saddam had provided them with the wherewithal to exert their authority. They expected us to do the same. The failure to do so opened the way for these young men to ‘stray’. And stray many did---they joined either criminal gangs or the insurgency’ (Hashim, 2006: 106-7).

Other situations add different complexities and structural forces. The Darfur conflict, for example, involves the cross-mapping of at least three different conflicts: the land-use conflict between sedentary and nomadic groups within Darfur, the conflict between the Sudanese government and various rebel armies using the region as a base (some with support from Chad), and the global frame, which maps the conflict onto broader conflicts between the west and Sudan as a ‘rogue state’. The local conflict arises partly due to desertification, an effect of cash-crop exploitation and possibly global warming which reinforces antagonisms connected to scarcity. The activities of the janjaweed nomadic militias are further complicated by a history of negative patronage through which they
were allowed to plunder parts of the South in return for service to the Sudanese state. In cases such as Afghanistan, northwest Pakistan, and Somalia, the situation is complicated even further by the tendency towards the emergence of rival ‘warlords’ or ‘elders’ against whoever happens to hold power.

Hence, the American presence, and alliance with some leaders, led to a rival coalition under Aideed; the Pakistani intervention prompted the emergence of Baitullah Mehsud, whose rise in turn prompted rival leaders to side with Pakistan, and so on. If Pierre Clastres is right about the dynamics of indigenous intergroup conflict, ‘pacifying’ such contexts is practically impossible. The American response of ignoring the density of everyday life and seeking to concrete over the world is simply not an adequate response, as resistance to concentrations of power produces new ‘forkings’ in the complex setting.

**Multiculturalism as ethnic patronage**

The form which ethnic integration takes in western societies is the ‘community leader’ phenomenon, also known as multiculturalism. Basically, this phenomenon operates by creating a stratum of privileged individuals within each disenfranchised or excluded group, whose purpose is to socially manage the group, to channel its frustrations into a positive attachment to an ethnic category, and to defuse these frustrations by means of the negotiation of this group’s constructed identity within the system.

The history of this strategy can be traced back to the British Empire, which often used local leaders (religious figures, chiefs, kings, etc.) in this kind of way – a strategy which was absolutely crucial to the management of a wide-ranging empire given the small number of settlers and administrators (Darwin, 1988). It was also used in nineteenth-century Italy, where it took the peculiar form known as ‘trasformismo’ – the ‘beheading’ of social movements through the parliamentary or administrative incorporation of movement leaders or figureheads. It reached something akin to its modern form in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, which were the world’s first ‘multicultural’ states. Each ‘nationality’ was permitted its own local party structure, representative institutions and so on – but its representatives, much like today’s ‘community leaders’, were appointed from within the state-wide party-state apparatus, usually by the central leadership, as a means of integrating the various ‘national’ areas. It reached its current form as a response to social crises in countries such as America, Britain, Canada and Australia – as a strategy for defusing the increasingly militant struggles of black people, migrant populations, and indigenous peoples. Though often counterposed to the monocultural models of ethnic-majority populism, it is in fact structurally similar, relying on a similar model of social integration through ethnic categories.

A similar strategy has been used to contain prison revolt. When the black consciousness movement first reached prisons, the resulting assertiveness of black prisoners was welcomed by the entire prison population, as something which altered the balance of power between prisoners and screws and which won important gains for prisoners. To
undermine this solidarity, screws started playing favourites – giving benefits to black prisoners only, to create resentment from other prisoners, or rewarding other groups for being compliant. In this way, one can see the origins of the ethnic prison gangs, which have since come into existence. These gangs can be seen as at least partly a result of divide-and-rule strategies, which used ethnicity to undermine resistance.

When network social forms have outflanked control-apparatuses, ethnicity can be used by states and other dominant groups in order to re-establish control. The effects of this become very clear in contexts where the state uses pogroms to defuse anti-state unrest. The Indonesian financial crisis of 1997 offers an especially clear example – state forces suppressed popular anti-capitalist, anti-state and anti-dictatorship protests, but encouraged and collaborated with pogroms against the Chinese population of Indonesia. These pogroms served as a way to channel social discontent in a way which was harmless for the state and capitalism. This kind of pogrom may be uncommon in Indonesia, but the channelling of frustrations onto ethnic groups deployed socially as intermediaries is very common – not only are the Chinese frequently exploited in this way throughout Southeast Asia, but colonial regimes frequently used ethnic minorities (the Tutsi, the Tamils) or migrant communities (such as South Asians in East Africa) in the same way, and one could even interpret European anti-Semitism along these lines. In addition, ethnic politics based on pogroms and constant conflict is a normal part of capitalist management in certain parts of Nigeria (eg. Kaduna), Indonesia (eg. Ambon) and India (eg. Gujarat). There are also similarities with the situation in Sydney, where a racist pogrom – tolerated, encouraged and incited by state agents – followed two years of mass unrest against the state. The boundary between rigid ethnic identities and loose affiliations in revolt against oppressors is a slim one, and one which the socially excluded cross over on a regular basis; the emotional and psychological reactions generated by social and economic marginality and exclusion seem to be equally open to either kind of articulation. This fluidity is something the state exploits in order to prevent the kinds of revolts, which really threaten its power.

A similar observation could be made regarding events in Britain and France in November 2005. In France, the absence of multiculturalist integration left open the possibility of revolts which crossed boundaries of ethnicity and religion, and which were directed primarily against the state. The result was a massive urban insurrection organised on a network basis against the poor, directed primarily at crackdown culture and the repressive apparatuses of the state and capitalism. There was also unrest in Lozells, Birmingham, at around the same time – an area, which hosted a large anti-state uprising in the mid-1980s. In this case, however, the discontent – while clearly sparked by exclusion, poverty and social alienation – was channelled in directions which were largely harmless to the state. Instead of taking the form of an uprising against the police, the revolt took the form of communal fighting between young men of Asian and African origin, on the basis of firm identifications with specific ethnic categories. This is the harvest the state has reaped for its strategy of multiculturalist integration – the use of ethnically-targeted state patronage to solidify group identities, and the use of populism to channel concerns arising from social exclusion and economic precarity into ethnic categories.
In conjunction, the systems of control erected in Iraq and Afghanistan involve an uneasy tension between arborescent and rhizomatic structures which attest to severe weaknesses in American control. In both areas, local control is largely held by rulers who are sometimes termed ‘warlords’, ‘tribal chiefs’ and ‘local dignitaries’ in official discourse. Such rulers are ambiguous figures, because they represent American imperialism only by locating themselves in fragmentary local discourses. Both their control and their loyalty are frequently doubtful. Meanwhile, American troops have established symbolic control by occupying key urban centres and economic resources such as oilfields. This symbolic control reasserts the primacy of the American master-signifier, but even then it is ambiguous: witness the haste with which American flags were removed from Iraqi monuments after being raised by the invading forces in Iraq. It is an open secret that American control in Afghanistan does not extend beyond the borders of Kabul, and that the Taleban are still in control of large areas of the countryside. A similar situation is now coming into being in Iraq, with entire cities periodically established as no-go areas for American troops, and a new offensive every few months to retake Najaf, Fallujah, Ramadi, al-Qaim, or some other city – often one which has already been “liberated” several times before. In other words, American occupation perpetuates the situation of indeterminacy: America’s opponents may not (yet) be able to expel its forces militarily, but by maintaining the situation of uncertainty, they prevent American ‘victory’ and the re-establishment of hegemony and of stable subsumption. Rather, one sees American forces bogged down in situations, which confirm Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s analysis, as Bruce Hoffman makes clear.

The importance of ethnic allegiances in the structure of societies under US domination (both the indirect means of US rule and the paradigmatic structures of resistance movements) make the issue of ethnicity important for this discussion. Ethnicity is an ambiguous category because, while emerging as ‘other’ to centralised nation-state identity, and while being structured in relation to everyday patronage networks and localised, often kinship-linked, forms of micropower, it is also in many respects an arborescent kind of identity, and therefore malleable by US forces and other agents of control.

The Iraqi insurgency today appears to have no clear leader (or leadership), no ambition to seize and actually hold territory (except ephemerally, as in the recent cases of Fallujah and Najaf), no unifying ideology, and, most important, no identifiable organization. Rather, what we find in Iraq is the closest manifestation yet of "netwar," a concept defined in 1992 by the RAND analysts John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt as unconventional warfare involving flat, segmented networks instead of the pyramidal hierarchies and command-and-control systems (no matter how primitive) that have governed traditional insurgent organizations (Hoffman 2004). Similar strategies have been used in occupied Iraq as part of the strategy to contain resistance to the occupation. The Iraqi elections were constructed in such a way as to encourage the formation of ethnic political blocs and their competition for state resources. Ethnic and sectarian militias have been incorporated into local state apparatuses and allowed to take control of local governmental machineries in return for collaboration. These militias have then been deployed against other ethnic groups – Shiite militias in al-Qaim, Kurds in Fallujah – to
foment divisions and create a basis for colonial power in the internal structures of Iraqi society. American troops forge alliances with local tribes, using existing rivalries to undermine opposition militias (Allam and al Dulaimy May 17 2005). An American military leader adopts the dress, mannersisms and customs of village sheikhs in an attempt to gain influence (Castaneda, July 31 2005). Ethnic militias attract recruits with payment and perks (McGrory 1 May 2006), while the British army effectively hand over southern towns to the Mahdi and Badr militias (Juan Cole May 3rd 2006). Iraq’s interior ministry, controlled by the Shiite SCIRI faction, refuses to deploy western-trained troops, instead delivering positions to its own loyalists (GI Special 4D5, April 3rd 2006). Similarly in Afghanistan, the occupying forces rely on local militias to maintain control. In both cases, it is only the use of local ethnic patronage networks that has stood between the occupier and instant collapse. The blatant use of such networks in these cases of sharpened conflict is a clear indication of their crucial function they play in the integration of systemic power at the periphery.

**Afghanistan**

**Causes**

There is an important distinction between the localised ethnoreligious movements of the Taleban and neo-Taleban, and the broader Islamism of an international movement. Islamic movements, arising out of local and particular tensions in the former Yugoslavia, in the Caucasus, in Central Asia, in Afghanistan and Pakistan represented a distrust of urban society, civil institutions, and the secular world. ‘The declining cultural order that Anderson was referring to was one which a concept of “fraternity” was based on religious affiliation (such as Christendom or the Muslim ummah); on a conception of “power” in which monarchs had the right to rule “by some form of cosmological (divine) dispensation”; and on presumption of “temporality” that fused “cosmology and history”…The modern concept of the “nation” replacing the old political mentality…A “nation” was a collective body that had a place, a distinguishable tradition and an ancestry; it was a kind of “race” that shared lifeways and traditions of thought. And it was pre-eminently a moral entity’ (Canfield, 2008: 213). At the same time Canfield views the adoption of Islamic fundamentalism by groups in Central Asia, as inevitably following the end of the certainties of the superpower rivalry, capitalism versus communism. ‘The “search” for a new paradigm of political categories linking notions of fraternity, power, and time was now “on” (Canfield, 2008: 215). The new politico-moral orientation was also a reaction against Western hegemony and culture and in that respect was similar to the communist ideology. As any successful ideology, Islamism resonates because it links particular problems to a general one, enabling groups to collectively join a cause (Canfield, 2008: 216). As Canfield explains:

These Islamists share a sense of fraternity as Muslims, in fact, in this case as Sunni Muslims, who desire a more just world in which Muslims have more leverage, more dignity, more hope. The share a common conception of power in
that they grant leadership to individuals who speak in the name of God and can muster a force by which to actively confront the cultural juggernaut of the West, some of them even supposing their martyrdom for this cause would be honorable and spiritually rewarded. They share a common sense of time in the sense of cosmology and an eschatology that situates their present dilemmas in a trajectory of history.

(Canfield, 2008: 236).

In the case of Afghanistan, the fraternity and power created by the Islamist ideology was used in very specific raw geopolitical terms. Tarzi has argued that al-Qaeda was not interested in Afghanistan but needed the country as a base for its global jihadist plans. Hence, al-Qaeda’s main policy would have required keeping Afghanistan—that is, the Taleban regime—from ever becoming palatable internationally. Tarzi’s description of this is worth quoting in length:

An unproven theory suggests that some of the actions of al-Qaeda, specifically the terrorist attacks against U.S embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 and the destruction of the Buddha statues in Bamyan in 2001, were in part an attempt to create a larger gap between the Taleban regime and the rest of the world, especially the West…In 1998 a consortium led by the U.S.-based company Unocal signed an agreement with the Taleban regime to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan, through Afghanistan, despite mounting opposition by international women’s rights groups and other activists…The African embassy bombings prompted the United States to launch missiles into Afghanistan, the location from which al-Qaeda operated, the Unocal withdrew its support for the pipeline project—Afghanistan was now seen as pariah. However, that gain for al-Qaeda was short-lived, as the United States continued to seek rapprochement with the moderates in the Taleban regime. The issue of poppy eradication in 1999-2000 brought the two parties together. To thwart the moderates and undermine the nascent and strained relationship between the two parties, al-Qaeda orchestrated a symbolic attack of cultural and religious symbols in Afghanistan—the two Buddha statues in Bamyan. The Taleban carried out the destruction; however, their actions were reportedly in response to Arab pressure.

(Tarzi, 2008: 305).

Mark Danner has gone even further, arguing that the 911 attacks were a deliberate strategy by bin Laden to draw America into a quagmire in Afghanistan (Danner 2008). What these theories suggest is that al-Qaeda’s core group operates in a manner typical of ethnoreligious networks, creating rather than resolving conflicts. The American state rises to the provocations because of its own reactive attachments.

The situation on the ground in Afghanistan following the American invasion was even more complicated. The establishment of a new state in Afghanistan was in more ways
than one unsuccessful, as the leadership was a continuation of sorts. Some of the commanders, whom the original Taleban had risen up against in 1994 and were called ‘warlords’ by the expatriate community were allied to the Americans, flush with funds form the international community intended for the development of the country. They labelled their enemies “Taleban” and “al-Qaeda” in order to win Americans’ help in doing away with them (Canfield, 2008: 227). Meanwhile, Karzai resorted to traditional tribal methods of governance, ending up governing through a projection of powerful tribal personalities rather than as the building of institutions. Despite funds spent by the Americans and British, his office remained unorganised. ‘The presidential staff were as dysfunctional as they had been in 2002, with no teamwork or accountability an nobody accepting responsibility when things went wrong. The chronic disconnect between the government, NATO, the UN, and the major donors continued’ (Rashid, 2008: 365). As a result, Pashtun elders described the cabinet as waraktun, or Karzai’s kindergarten (ibid. 365).

Even if tribal dominance was followed in terms of governance, although Karzai was Pashtun, most of his cabinet were not, and ethnoreligious tensions continued to destabilise the new regime (Canfield, 2008: 228). Amin Tarzi in his article ‘The Neo-Taleban’ points to the fact that in February 2004 Karzai attempted to approach the competing political factions by publicly an offer of reconciliation to most members of the Taleban regime, nevertheless this gave further currency to the charge that the Karzai administration viewed the Taleban as neither reprehensible nor reproachable: Karzai did not call to account those who committed atrocities through some form of a reconciliation process; instead, he welcomed them to the political discussion…What is clear is that this amnesty afforded members of the fallen regime the opportunity to either regroup or recalibrate their political, cultural, and religious ideologies.


The reconciliation tactic and the poor intelligence on Taleban in the South – the Pentagon had ignored the south, believing there to be no al-Qaeda leaders there (Rashid, 2008: 359) – along with NATO forces taking over, exacerbating fighting in the south, the widespread publicized deaths of civilians, and a new refugee crisis as families fled the war zone caused a pall of gloom to envelop Kabul, which soon exploded into fury:

a U.S. Army track, part of a convoy, had brake failure on a steep hill on the outskirts of Kabul and careened down, hitting a dozen vehicles and killing five people. As crowds gathered, nervous American soldiers in the other tracks opened fire. The killing sparked riots in the city. Police deserted their posts and threw away their uniforms as small groups of rioters rampaged through residential areas, stoning, burning, and ransacking offices of Westerners and NGO’s.

(Rashid, 2008: 361).
This led to a period in which the number of conflict-related deaths increased sharply. The first six months of 2006 witnessed the greatest number of conflict-related deaths since the fall of the Taleban. Although they had failed to penetrate Kandahar, the Taleban had put so many in the field that they were able to continue suicide bombings, ambushes, and attacks in the western and eastern provinces for several weeks (Rashid 2008: 364). At this point the Taleban re-emerged as a functioning alternative government in the south, based on the summary ‘justice’ of on-the-spot courts using the Taleban interpretation of Shariah law. With official courts mired in corruption and long delays, the harsh simplicity of the Taleban system became a recruiting tool (Rashid 2008: 362).

**Identity and Alliance**

An example of the bizarre identity issues that have surrounded the Taleban, neo-Taleban, and their whole historical continuities and discontinuities is very evident in Musharraf’s inconsistent take on them (not to mention his relationship to Karzai). Musharraf after denying they were any Taleban in Pakistan and accusing Karzai of being controlled by India, admitted in a TV speech that there were Taleban in Pakistan, although their centre was in Afghanistan and not Pakistan (Rashid, 2008: 369). This is how Rashid describes it:

> Then, just before he visited Washington and three days after signing the agreement with the Pakistani Taleban in North Waziristan, Musharraf unexpectedly visited Kabul, where he again admitted that “there are al-Qaeda and Taleban in both Afghanistan and in Pakistan”...A few days later in Brussels, he contradicted himself again by glorifying the Taleban, saying they were Pashtuns with roots in the people who had always resisted foreign forces, and in Washington he again attacked Karzai for his ignorance and kowtowing to the Indians (Rashid, 2008: 369).

The interesting thing with the Taleban is that they originated in 1994 taking up the cause against the commanders in Kandahar. Canfield describes them as a small band that had no knowledge of the hardship of other Muslims and they did not have particular problems with Western culture. What changed this was the addition of young men from Pakistani madrasas, who were had little family life and were trained in the Deobandi tradition in schools financed by Saudi Arabia. The Pakistani connection was made through representatives of the Pakistani military, representatives of the madrasas and representatives of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). In fact, when the ISI, with the connivance of the CIA recruited Muslim youths from all over the world for the holy war against the Soviets, the training they received had “strong anti-US overtones”. Some of the remaining mujahedin from the fight against the Soviets became Taleban with no fanfare: They simply put on turbans, grew beards, and joined the cause (Canfield, 2008: 220):
And after the Afghan-Soviet war, certain Arab-Afghans being sought by the United States government for their involvement in attacks against Americans elsewhere were protected by Pakistani officials who helped them obtain fake passports that enabled them to return to their countries of origin, where many of them continued their jihadi activities (Canfield, 2008: 223-5).

Rashid mentions a U.S., NATO, and Afghan intelligence report that detailed how the Taleban movement was constituted.

It surmised that the Taleban comprised four distinct elements: hard-core extremist leaders linked to al-Qaeda, fighters recruited in Pakistan, unemployed youth and disaffected tribes… At least four of the top ten Taleban leaders were based in Pakistan. Fighters recruited primarily from the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan were “heavily indoctrinated” and “trained within Pakistan in combat, communications, IEDs and suicide operations”. The report described how the “elder fighters with experience are producing steady throughput of fighters for the insurgency”. The last two categories of Taleban could be won over with jobs, education, and development projects, as they were heavily indoctrinated but were a “result of the insurgency, not the cause of the insurgency”. The report described Pakistan’s role in the most unflattering light of any intelligence report so far…As the report circulated to NATO capitals it became impossible for European government to ignore Pakistan’s duplicity’.

(Rashid, 2008: 368)

On top of that, Pashtuns with chauvinistic leanings had become alarmed that Kabul was under the control of non-Pashtuns, a circumstance scarcely known in Afghanistan history. So, in addition to the sense that this was a good religious cause, some Pashtuns were motivated by a kind of ethnonationalism (Canfield, 2008: 219). At the same time the moral vision that had animated the mujahedin and the Taleban was still alive in the tribal areas, objectified in the tapes and discs being sold in the streets. Videos displayed heroic exploits against the Soviets, and also the destruction of Afghan homes by American bombs; by implication the Americans were like the Soviets. Narratives celebrating jihad against alien kafirs (infidels) declared that the holy struggle against unbelievers was not over—but now the enemy were Americans (229). It turned out that the Taleban had not dissolved as they had seemed to in 2001-2. Rather, Mullah Omar had instructed his warriors to keep in touch after they returned home, and to “wait for the call” (Canfield, 2008: 228). The neo-Taleban is not, however, just a resurrection of the Taleban regime, taking on characteristics similar to the Iraqi insurgency. Authors such as Tarzi have theorised it as a multidimensional, uncoordinated or quasi-coordinated alliance of forces including ‘not only “Taleban” or those struggling to reinstate the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, but also those using the Taleban name to further their causes, such as disenchanted political personalities and groupings, centuries-old tribal rivals, and the foreign players—not limited to Pakistan—and their finance and support networks of druglords and warlords’ (Tarzi, 2008: 310). For instance, a study of suicide bombers in
Afghanistan and Pakistan found that, in contrast to al-Qaeda, neo-Taleban bombers were from poor backgrounds and usually angered about local issues such as the Lal Masjid siege (Raman 2008). In this context, an American admiral has said that America faces a ‘classic growing insurgency’ and is far from winning in Afghanistan (Landay 2008).

Giustozzi has spoken to an NGO director in Banu, near North Waziristan, the centre of the neo-Taleban in Pakistan. His interpretation is that the underlying factors in the neo-Taleban’s appeal to Pashtun tribal youth is that ‘the tribal system is in crisis and that it can no longer provide ‘peace, income, a sense of purpose, a social network’ to the local youth, who then turn to radical movements (collectively known as the Pakistani Taleban) as the only outlet where they can express their frustration and earn the prestige once offered by the tribal system. Officials working in the region support this view, claiming that the youth ‘oppose the current tribal system because they know that this is not...harnessing their potential’ (Guistozzi 2007:39). The sidelining of the Waziri tribal elders and the emergence of the clergy in a prominent political role resulted from the first time in the recruitment of members of rival tribes under a common banner for long-term political action. ‘Tribal’ dynamics have resurfaced, however, in conflicts between Taleban-aligned leaders and other tribal leaders who have aligned themselves with the Pakistani state’s counterinsurgency efforts (McGregor 2008). In a different context, Slackman (2008) suggests there is a clear link between the stifling of young people with limited opportunities is a crucial factor behind ‘Islamic fervour’ in Egypt, which Watts (2008) has referred to what is known locally as the ‘restive youth problem’ as central to conflict in the Niger Delta. The issue, in a context of the declining formal economy, is a global one, not limited to the Islamic world. As Caffentzis puts it, ‘Once again, as at the dawn of capitalism, the physiognomy of the world proletariat is that of the pauper, the vagabond, the criminal, the panhandler, the refugee sweatshop worker, the mercenary, the rioter’ (1992: 321). This excluded stratum tends towards the network form, but can easily end up pulled into the reactive rather than active kind of network. In the neo-Taleban case, as in many other cases, this insurrectionary force of the excluded is channelled into network forms, but of a reactive network type. In the Niger Delta case, something more like an active network emerges.

Although like the other conflicts discussed above, the underlying attractions for neo-Taleban recruits are ethnic rather than religious and are deeply connected to poverty and youth disaffection, they were given a religious aspect as an integrating force. These young men were educated to think of their participation with the Taleban as a jihad—a struggle against evil in the world—even though their opponents were other Muslims...Their horizons were presumably narrow in a different way than those of the “original Taleban”: they probably had heard about the Muslim cause in Kashmir, they probably did not know much about the problems in the Middle East, and they knew, Ahmed Rashid says, little about Afghanistan’s past. They were rather better informed on the great exploits of Muslims in the first few centuries of Islam (Canfield, 2008: 218-20).
The crucial point where religion took an extraordinary dimension was in April 4, 1996, when Mullah Muhammad Omar entered the shrine housing the sacred cloak of Mohammed, and ceremonially wrapped himself in it:

The public act was a claim to legitimacy, the right to lead the all-powerful organization of the Taleban, but it also entailed a broader moral claim. If this was a religious cause for the Taleban, it was now declared a holy cause for Muslims generally...That the Tajiks they opposed in Kabul were also Sunni Muslims was no longer significant; they were the enemy, and for the Pashtun Muslim community this was now an explicitly religious war, no less than the ones before it—but now, with ethnonational nuances.

(Canfield, 220).

The setting was ripe for Osama bin Laden to arrive with a planeload of “Arab-Afghans” a month later. And this was a crucial moment for the Taleban, as for the first time they had access to the global ‘experienced’ jihadis who already had been involved in a razzmatazz of “terrorist camps” in several countries: Somalia, Egypt, Sudan, and Yemen as well as Afghanistan. Once ensconced in Afghanistan, bin Laden began to cultivate Mullah Muhammad Omar, moving to Kadahar in 1997. It was a fateful bond (Canfield, 221). This broadening of the Taleban’s imaginative world, however, has been fostered not only by Osama bin laden and the other Arab-Afghans but also by the Pakistan military establishment itself (Canfield, 2008: 223-5).

As the Taleban and al-Qaeda grew stronger in the Federally Administered Areas of Pakistan, they began to raid police and military forces inside Afghanistan. The cross-border attacks induced the Pakistani army, under American pressure, to undertake for the first time in the history of the country, a military incursion into the tribal areas in search of al-Qaeda fugitives. The invasion of eight thousand troops in March 2004 outraged the local populations. Resistance, organized by Taleban commanders, was intense and effective: 250 Pakistani soldiers were killed. The Taleban negotiated the truce, an indication that power had shifted from the tribal elders to the Taleban. Because of their heavy losses (seven hundred dead, fifteen hundred wounded) the army negotiated two peace accords, in South Waziristan (2004) and North Waziristan (2006), recently extended to Swat (2009). Intended to end violence between tribal militants and Pakistani troops, the deals also opened the way for militants to attack Afghanistan with impunity (Canfield, 2008: 231).

Fighters from Central Asia, western China, and Turkey and Arabs from a multitude of countries came as a result of al-Qaeda’s call to help the Taleban. They worked in Pakistan’s FATA region, helping train a new generation of Taleban and Pakistani extremists in the arts of bomb making and fund-raising and also as sub-commanders in Afghanistan, honing the Taleban on new tactics. The Arabs in the camps used their international contacts to encourage more Muslim militants living in Europe to travel to Pakistan and Afghanistan for training. These included Muslims from Britain, France, Germany and Scandinavia. In 2007, many of these militants were to fight alongside the
Pakistani Taliban as they extended their writ across the North-West Frontier Province. 
al-Qaeda was reconstituting itself in ways that were unimaginable after this initial rout in 
Afghanistan (Rashid, 2008: 367).

By 2006 the Taliban had formed a complex opposition alliance comprising:

- at the centre their purely ideological driven madrasa students (including a significant number NWFP);
- a second ring of genuine jihadist recruits provided by village mullahs;
- a third, and by 2006 the largest, ring of local allies (communities and opportunists);
- an outer ring of mercenaries.

The first two categories can be said to be part of the ‘hard-core’ Taliban, while the remaining two are both ‘non-core’ in character (Guistozzi 2007: 42).

The neo-Taliban can also be divided into two ideological groups. The first are those who align themselves with the al-Qaeda ideologues and the views eventually adopted by Mullah Omar and the more radical Taliban toward the end of the Taliban regime. The other group of neo-Taliban seems to have gone back to their more traditional Pashtun roots and are trying to become a voice, not only for the Pashtuns, but also for traditionalist Muslims in Afghanistan. The latter category of the neo-Taliban draw their adherents from—and appeal to—a great number of alienated Pashtuns, a community that one CIA station chief has dubbed the “pissed-off Pashtuns” (Tarzi, 2008: 306).

‘Examining the current Afghan reality through the Taliban looking-glass fails to capture the complexity of the emerging resistance. Unlike the Taliban regime, actors participating in this insurgency are not a cohesive group under a single banner. As the Afghan government and its supporters seek to curb the violence, they must recognize that they are facing a complicated, multifaced enemy’ (Tarzi, 2008: 309).

Recruitment

One major successful tactic of the Taliban, in relation to recruitment, was that they were inclusive of every tribe and ethnicity and did not want to be seen as aligned with specific tribes. This not only won them cadres from a wide range of tribal backgrounds, but it made the population more prepared to accept them as being above inter-community rivalry. All those who had supported the Taliban regime and had been marginalised afterwards were prime targets for recruitment, regardless of their tribal background (Guistozzi 2007: 47).

The absence of prestigious madrasas in Afghan territory and the financially advantageous conditions offered by some Pakistani madrasas convinced Afghan families to send their children across the border. However, from 2003 onwards recruitment started following other paths too. An obvious one in the Afghan context was kinship ties, which became a privileged channel of recruitment. It appears, however, that the biggest numbers came through the support of the clergy and through enlisting community support in specific
areas (Guistozzi 2007: 38-9). On average, by 2006 village jihadists might have accounted for perhaps 15-25 per cent of the active fighting strength of the Taleban at any given time, with madrasa recruits accounting for around 25 per cent, local allies for 40-50 per cent and mercenaries for an other 10-15 per cent (Guistozzi 2007:43).

Changes in recruitment patterns occurred in late 2006 when the Taleban increasingly focused their efforts at trying to achieve a national mobilization and trigger a wider jihad movement. In certain cases they attempted to do that by relaxing their ideological strictures. Giustozzi mentions Musa Qala, where the Taleban were no longer demanding that men grow a beard, keep their hair short or refrain from watching movies (Guistozzi 2007:72). According to Guistozzi, this effort consisted of at least three main components:

The first…was aimed at spreading their influence at the village level as wide as possible. The second saw for the first time the Taleban targeting cities…The third component of this effort targeted the old jihadi commanders, who had mostly been fighting against the Taleban until 2001 (Guistozzi 2007: 71).

Contrary to the Iraqi insurgency, where lack of co-ordination and internal wars disable the effectiveness of the movement, ‘the fluidity of the Neo-Taleban, its lack of rigid structures and its modus operandi all contribute to prevent small cracks and fissures from having such impact on its functionality’. The Taleban achieve cohesion in the field through the strong ideological commitment of their ‘cadres’ and the accepted legitimacy of its leadership. The latter is especially important, as the leadership travels often to the zone of operations, which helps to maintain its legitimacy. This strategy is demonstrated by the killing of leaders inside Afghanistan (Guistozzi 2007: 84).

Similar to the weaknesses of the Iraqi insurgency mentioned in the previous section on Iraq, the Afghanistan case points to problems of tactical skills, as the stress was placed on ideological indoctrination and on the formation of group comradeship. ‘Often in the early times of the insurgency little military training was imparted at all, resulting in disastrous outcomes on the battlefield. …Another shortcoming derived from poor training was weak radio discipline, despite the awareness that NATO/US forces were constantly monitoring the insurgents’ communications’ (Guistozzi 2007: 153-4).

A potential factor for medium to long-term fragmentation of the Taleban is represented by the extensive recruitment of local communities, which could one day quit the movement once their interests start diverging. Not much is known about the specifics of the deals worked out between such communities and the Taleban themselves, but whatever little evidence is available suggests that the Taleban have been taking care of integrating local causes as solidly as possible. Intermarriages and the training of local youth in the madaras have reportedly been used to consolidate the alliances. Eventually, such practices might succeed in merging the core with its peripheral components, even if in the short term the latter maintained their pre-eminent local interests. The Taleban’s micromanagement of local communities, with their ability to rely on village mullahs to identify friends and potential foes and subsequently ruthlessly eliminate the latter, is likely to be playing a key role in the consolidation of the Movement (Guistozzi 2007: 85).
Future

The United States and NATO have failed to understand that the neo-Taliban belong to neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan, but are a socially-excluded population, the product of refugee camps, militarized madrasas, and the lack of opportunities in the borderland of Pakistan and Afghanistan. They have neither been true citizens of either country nor experienced traditional Pashtun society. ‘Today, seven years after 9/11, Mullah Omar and the original Afghan Taliban Shura still live in Balochistan province. Afghan and Pakistani Taliban leaders live farther North, in FATA, as do the militias of Jalaludin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hikmetyar. al-Qaeda has a safe haven in FATA, and along with them reside a plethora of Asian and Arab terrorist groups who are now expanding their reach into Europe and the United States. The longer the war goes on, the more deeply rooted and widespread the Taliban and their transnational milieu will become’ (Rashid, 2008: 401).

Rashid argues that the region of South and Central Asia will not see stability unless there is a new global compact among the leading players—the United States, NATO, and the UN. This would include settling the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, and funding a massive education and job-creation program in the borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan and along their borders with Central Asia. The paramount overall policy should include approaching the region holistically rather than in a piecemeal fashion, and it has to persuade its own populations to agree to a long-term commitment of troops and money (Rashid, 2008:402).

Terrorism, reactive networks and Hegemonic Decline

Although arising from forces which are in an ambiguous relation to the world system and at least tendentially excluded from it, its emergence is connected to the hegemonic crisis and systemic breakdown discussed above, and the resultant proliferation of excluded groups. According to Bergensen and Lizardo, international terrorism bunches, clumps, or comes in waves and appears to originate in semiperipheral zones during periods of hegemonic decline. The political forms of these semiperipheral areas in which terrorist activity is largely centred do not survive their respective period. For them, terrorism is generated by the system’s reproductive logic and is not exogenous to the functioning of the global system. Terrorism and war involved in hegemonic-succession struggles expand and reproduce the structures of the world-system (2002: 237).

The basis of their argument follows this logic:

We have long known that economic expansion/contraction (Schumpeter 1939; Kondratieff [1926] 1979), hegemonic peace/rivalry-war (Modelski &Thomson 1995), free trade/protectionism (Chase-Dunn, Kawano, & Brewer 2000), and colonialism/decolonialization (Bergesen & Schoenberg 1980) appear in a cyclic format; and we would like to suggest here that international terrorism works
similarly and further, that the correlation between hegemonic decline and outbreaks of terrorist activity is not spurious.

(2002: 230)

Bergensen and Lizardo see the following waves of terrorism in periods of hegemonic decline: the first wave on the more agreed-upon Spanish Habsburg hegemony of the 16th century and the thirty years war, the second wave during the British decline at the end of the nineteenth/twentieth centuries, and the third wave during the American decline at the end of the twentieth/beginning of the twenty-first centuries. In each case, terrorism emerged from semi peripheral regions directed against the core: the first time in the Holy Roman Empire (modern Germany) before its economic rise, the second after the rise of Germany in less developed areas in central and eastern Europe, and the third wave mainly in the Arab and Islamic worlds (2002: 228-33). The first semiperipheral zone of terrorism, seventeenth-century central Germany, would give rise to a major core state, Germany, that would participate in the next round of conflicts over who was to be the next hegemon. The new semiperipheral zone of terrorism would move east to the Ottoman/Russian/Austro-Hungarian empires, and after the conflict there would see dominant states, such as the Soviet Union, emerge. If the first wave of terrorism sided toward the religious identities, the second seemed more on the ethnic end. By the third wave, the two poles appear as one: Arab-Islamic terrorism. Hence, they summarise the cycles as follows: religiously Protestant versus Catholic the first time; ethnically Balkan nationalisms versus Austro-Hungarian/Ottoman empires the second; and now the ethnic/religious combination in the third cycle, Arab-Islamic religious ethnicity against U.S. global dominance (ibid. 236).

In waves one and two, terrorist incidents provided the trigger for the war phase of the world-system (Bergensen & Lizardo 2002). The outcome of the third cycle is yet to be decided, but the second cycle saw the terrorist assassination of the Austrian archduke as the trigger to the first of the world wars over British succession. The terrorist events emanating from the semiperipheral zone of the Middle East may be an equivalent triggering, or bridging event that sets off the wider conflict of a global war, which in retrospect we would call the first war in the struggle for American (hegemonic) succession (ibid. 234). In conjunction, in autocratic semiperipheral states dependent upon support from the hegemon to maintain repressive regimes, there is a legitimacy crisis. The growing competition between core states, generated by hegemonic decline, manifests itself as rivalry and colonial/neo-colonial interventionism in the affairs of peripheral and semiperipheral states, which also destabilizes them (they quote Kowaleski 1991). The mixture then of delegitimation in culture and geopolitical competition destabilizes semiperipheral states at moments of hegemonic decline (Bergensen and Lizardo, 2002: 236). This is how they explain the present situation in the Middle East:

…Middle Eastern regimes have come under attack from within with the emergence of terrorist organizations. The semiperipheral autocrats, in turn, repress them, and the terrorists often flee abroad, which then gives rise to a more distinctly “international” character of terrorist activity. Terrorist groups begin to
cross the often-porous national borders of peripheral states away from the repressive regimes within which they arose and toward more receptive areas of the periphery, usually rivals of their home state, who are willing to provide a safe haven in exchange for being able to use terrorist groups for their own local geopolitical ambitions. However, this can be a costly bargain, as the importation of terrorist groups to other states in the periphery may create further instability within those borders. This can lead to new terrorist organizations arising within the protector nation, which in turn become the victims of violent state response and exportation, thus widening the spiral. So, international terrorism has a world-system origin but not one that is usually thought of; for it is not so much a direct link between semiperipheral terrorists and dislike of the hegemon but a displacement from a repressive semiperipheral regime that leads to new non-semiperipheral targets—like the hegemon and its outposts… Interestingly, the stronger the hegemon, the more secure the semiperipheral autocrat and so less resistance and less domestic terrorism in the semiperiphery. That is why terrorism appears during hegemonic decline and not at its height.

(2002: 236)

Conclusion

The challenge of the present epoch is the challenge of a global split between a dominant world system and a proliferating rhizomatic resistance (sometimes mediated by the forms of ethnoreligious identity through which the former can entrap the latter). As Cox and Schechter argue, ‘within societies across the world, in the West as well as the non-West, opposition has been mobilizing in increasingly demonstrative confrontations against the economic and military manifestations of this concentrated power. These evidences of resistance express rejection of the Western version of a unitary political and economic global governance’. Against this proliferating resistance, the world system responds with an ever-tightening grip, seeking to re-establish control by means of brute force in the service of a discourse of deterrence and control. A choice is therefore posed for all of those engaged with this situation – not so much whether we are “with Bush or with the terrorists”, as whether the continued attempt to impose global domination is to proceed “with or without” each of us as contributors to it.

This book has discussed the problems facing US foreign policy in relation to emerging network/rhizomatic forms of organisation and resistance. The efforts made by the US to respond to ethnoreligious movements such as al-Qaeda, and sociopolitical movements

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such as the antiwar or antiglobalisation movements, has relied on violence, closure of space and fixity of identities. This is a strategy which is probably doomed to failure for reasons of relative strength. The information revolution is favouring and strengthening networked organisational designs, often at the expense of hierarchies, reinforcing the persistent powers of indigenous and everyday resistance. The American state has begun to realise that networks can be fought effectively only by flexible network-style responses. But this process of recuperation is only in its early stages, and currently being overridden by the desire to repress. The survival of the world system will depend on its ability to develop network forms of its own – such as the capitalist biopower discussed by Hardt and Negri – in order to recuperate, control, and draw on the energies of rhizomatic movements.

The question is not, however, limited to the question of how the world system can rearrange its global power. The question is also about whether the world system – and more generally, the logic of hierarchies based on fixed identities – is a necessary or valuable feature of the social world. The development of new technologies and new rhizomatic organisational forms creates new opportunities for lines of flight from the current social arrangement, which are not reducible to the recurrence of fixed ethnoreligious categories or the continued dominance of the world system. According to Day, growing complexity increases the holes in the system, creating gaps and margins such as abandoned buildings, low-rent areas and inaccessible regions which become sites for autonomous zones (Day 2005: 205). There are also unprecedented opportunities for sociopolitical movements to set in motion centrifugal forces which could ultimately render the world system non-viable. The collision between “with you” and “without you” – between those who remain incorporated into the system and those whose peripherality and marginality slips over into lines of flight – is the epochal issue of the current era, and on its results depends the future of international relations in an increasingly networked world.

Hence, alongside the field of network recuperations arises the field of networked societies against the state. One might imagine this in terms of a transition occurring through the cumulative expansion of autonomous spaces. A new logic could arise first as reclaimed spaces, a social centre here, an inaccessible area there, prefigured for instance
in indigenous movements and squats. As the number and strength of these sites grow, they then becomes a consolidated area from which the state is effectively excluded, with its own parallel institutions (while still retaining outposts, areas of lesser intensity). Finally, this networked society lays siege to the state. This society would sometimes display forms of agency such as ‘ripple effects’ which would strengthen its hand in each area, not through diplomacy as with states, but through a logic of solidarity (an attack by the state at any one point would provide repercussions along the entire frontier). One could expect this to operate by outwardly decreasing ripples. Interconnection at every point in the dominant system makes the dominant system vulnerable to diffuse responses at every point (an attack by one state leaves that state open to counterattack against the nodes through which it is connected to other places and spaces) hence to disruption of its insertion. States would thus face a dilemma – maintain a state of peace, or of feud, and possibly survive; or attempt a state of war and be crushed. By intensifying interconnections and mobilities between network spaces, transversality across networks can neutralize the state strategy of intensively pinpointing and attacking at particular sites of strategic resistance.

In distinction to Mike Davis’s ‘planet of slums’ (2006), a world where the majority are radically excluded, the coming world is a ‘world of squats’ (with the social centre as paradigm), or rather of informal diffuse networks distributed transversally, in which the excluded space becomes a space of abundance. The ‘world of squats’ might be a ‘world of slums’ with problems of resource extraction addressed and local areas reconfigured as planes of ecological connection. In a sense, the whole world would become a borderland, in the absence of trunks. The result for states might be what was known in ancient Greece as stasis, the paralysis of everyday life (Price 2001).

**Delinking Capabilities**

Instead of delinking economically at the state level, which keeps the arborescent form on a smaller scale (the branch and its twigs), which isolates and cuts off flows, and which fails to delink structurally and epistemologically, we advocate transversal connections which cut across "peripheral" points, relating them into rhizomes which do not pass through the core nodes. This means increasing the density of connections of a rhizomatic type outside the arborescent model, which can either involve supposedly traditional kinds of indigenous networks and "networks of reciprocity" (Lomnitz), new hi-tech activisms using new technologies, or some mix of the two. As a political proposal, we can consider the possible emergence of global transversal networks as the becoming-other of the periphery, which ceases to be defined reactively in relation to the core (as happens in the process of liberation from cultural submersion in Freire [1970]), and instead becomes not periphery but rhizome, hence generating a centrifugal force (pulling energy away from the core). The networks created by core insertions create very limited networks with limited local and transversal insertion. The response may well be a need to delink from core networks while also creating transversal connections between rhizome sites, and densities of local networks.
We can think of this process in terms of Saskia Sassen’s concept of capabilities. In her analysis, she distinguishes elements (discursive units similar to social logics) from their ‘particular historically constructed encasements’, dislodging them analytically so as to examine their historical changes and relations (2006: 5). Crucially, she theorises capabilities as emerging at the level of elements, and therefore as capable of use towards objectives other than those for which they were developed (ibid. 6). Historical change is thus possible because of the multivalence (posibility of multiple uses) of capabilities, which can remain the same but ‘jump tracks’, changing drastically their function (ibid. 8-9). Often, it is the excluded who ‘make history’ by constructing capabilities (ibid. 10). It is possible, for instance, that Hardt and Negri are right about the capabilities which are developing, or even prevalent, but exaggerate the extent to which they have been actualised in the dominant system.

We are more interested, however, in the possibility of today’s excluded ‘making history’. The implication for social change is that capabilities need to be built up to a certain critical mass before they bring about a ‘tipping point’, a moment of rupture, which produces a ‘foundational change’ and a new ‘organising logic’. It is only after the ‘tipping point’ that the old dominant logic loses its ability to impose itself. Hence, the process is similar to that portrayed in evolutionary anarchism, by authors such as Barrett (1990): the emergence of webs of peripheral forces could sap power from within, rights demands could then be established which eventually become unconditional and make command-logics collapse. Sassen does not theorise in detail the new capabilities emerging from autonomous social movements and from resistance in everyday life, concentrating mainly on demands for systemic reform. We would argue, however, that such social forces exhibit a social logic which is distinct from that which is dominant, enacting a partial insertion of a revolutionary temporality of autonomy, affinity, abundance, and subsistence and gift economies in a world where it is absolutely alien to the dominant system. In ‘temporary autonomous zones’ and autonomous movements, existing capabilities of social networks become a different “organising logic” (or a logic of no overarching logic) which is livelier than the dominant system, certainly more humane and sustainable, but which has not yet become either prevalent (occurring more frequently than other forms of life) or “hegemonic” (widespread as a pole of attraction). This new potential organising logic links with and through the existing “capabilities” of forms of life – peasant subsistence, worker solidarity, indigenous immanence – as well as newer ones such as hacktivism.

The difference from previous situations is that it has no single organising logic in the sense of a way things should be done, but only a certain way of relating diverse multiplicities without a centre. Citing Paul Goodman and Colin Ward, Day emphasises that the new society is not a new order but rather, an extension of spheres of free action (2005: 217). Someone with just about any specific way of life can be attracted to this way of relating, since it contains potential space for all specificities (it does not require acceptance of an exclusionary master-signifier); it is chosen as a way to relate and interlink/network, not as an entire or even partial form of life. Hence the division between the “other worlds” and the current world is not a hegemony or a master-signifier, nor a core identity, nor a way of life. Rather, it is a different “organising logic” in Sassen’s
sense, to which existing “capacities” can be reattached (the logic being a matter of epistemology, not of a nodal point or dominant pole), and through which they “switch tracks” – e.g. ecology from pressure politics to direct action.

This is precisely not one of two things which are often posited as alternative in the literature. It is not an extension of the social/liberal-democratic approach of inclusive participatory statism; it is also not a radical democratisation, which is to say, a fusion of state and society. It may strategically use these kinds of democracy in its relations to the system as exteriority, but its core logic or intentionality is that of autonomy/affinity, which tends away from governance even in its “radicle” forms, away from a privileged moment (even one which everyone participates in) and away from statism (even in its democratised, participatory forms). Purpose of engagement with state is to ward it off (e.g. by expanding liberties, legalising oppositions) – specifically to ward off the command logic – not to turn the command logic to one’s own purpose.

In the world-systems literature, the option of profusion of networks is partly warded-off under the label of ‘chaos’, the other of global order. After all, the profusion of networks does not lead to a single author, but rather, to open space, the possibility of freedom, of non-oppressive life. Overtly autonomist and anarchist groups obviously approximate this closely, followed shortly after by some indigenous peoples; but it is wrong to assume the next closest approximation is a liberal, social-democratic or Marxist state. Rather, the proliferation of diffuse networks and situations of syncretic and unfixable meanings – the terrain of “global chaos”, “failed states”, “shadow states”, “planet of slums”, the intersection of resistance and criminality, the quasi-autonomy of informal economies – is the next stop for building a global alternative space. Falling short of autonomy and continuing to express hierarchical logics, these phenomena create an unsightly excess of violence, which is, however, far less than the structural violence of the dominant system. This does not mean that they express a logic which is worse than that of the ordering tendencies of the system. The possibility of expression of creative energies, hence the building of autonomous projects and horizontal networks, is a primary good. Such expression is more likely to emerge through the ambiguities of partially autonomous spaces than through a well-meaning but socially closed state.

It is instructive to contrast the two binaries of local vs cosmopolitan and indigenous vs local. The local is associated with one’s horizon being repressively limited, and also enabled, by the confines of a particular culture which is taken as natural and obvious. Cosmopolitanism is associated with being equally comfortable in several different lifeworlds while maintaining a distance from each, and with “choosing” a way of life (as opposed to being born into it and taking it as a limiting horizon). In the usual western reading, indigenous is mapped onto local in the ideas of ascription and tradition, and an assumption of fixity (appropriate for reactive but not affinity-networks). This has the effect of making a particular caste of western (metropolitan) cosmopolitans into the exclusive bearers of the “universal” and of cosmopolitan values such as choice and freedom. The assumption is that a person who is cosmopolitan, and hence has choices of which culture/identity/etc to adopt, will choose metropolitan rather than indigenous epistemology, both overall and in the specifics (fixity over relationality, transcendence
over immanence, separation over holism, instrumental rationality over
gnosis/spirituality/situational reasoning, etc).

However, de Souza’s (2002; 2003; 2004) idea that indigenous epistemologies are already
attuned to absorb otherness, and even more so the emergence of indigenous
epistemologies as an “other” of global capitalism/colonialism, suggest a placing of the
indigenous on the side of the cosmopolitan. Perhaps the categories therefore can be
mapped as a four-way grid – metropolitan-local, metropolitan-cosmopolitan, indigenous-
local, indigenous-cosmopolitan – where the fourth term is what is usually foreclosed in
ways of thinking about globalisation, modernity etc. An epistemology which remains
indigenous while embracing “border thinking” and hybridity would fit into the fourth,
“impossible” category. This category is already emerging in the global articulations of
indigenous political movements, and in the emergence of ecological movements which
construct aspirant or revived indigeneities. It is not to be confused with the incorporation
of indigenous and marginal peoples into a humanised capitalism, or the commodification
of indigenous ideas in western societies.

The role of revolutionary agency

The new world of absolute deterritorialisation is a space in which desire reclaims its
centrality from social inscriptions. It is hence a diffusion and proliferation of differences,
beyond the possibility of any trunk to inscribe them. Hence, as Guattari argues, ‘it is a
matter of constituting networks and rhizomes in order to escape the system of
modelization in which we are entangled’ (Genosko ed. 1996: 132). Fanon has argued
that affirmative potentials underlie transformative action. ‘Man [meaning humanity] is a
yes that vibrates to cosmic harmonies’ (Fanon 1967: 10), and is expressed in an
existential stance – ‘to stand up to the world’ (Fanon 1967: 78). One does not dis-
alienate by rediscovering one’s culture or past, but in flight from the past and present
(Fanon 1967: 226-7).

A transformation from reactive and alienated to active and affinity-based assemblages of
desire is crucial to the transformation. Guattari argues that a revolutionary ‘war machine’
requires analysis of desires, but does not require an ‘external synthesizing apparatus’.
The transformation of desire in a transformative becoming does not involve adapting,
socialising or disciplining desire, but rather, ‘engaging it in such a way that its
development is not brought to a halt in an impenetrable social body, but opens out into a
collective utterance… a kind of infinite swarming of desiring machines’ (Guattari 1984:
230). Deleuze has also added that affirmative ethics involves an aspect of sustainability,
which for him is the basic meaning of Nietzsche’s idea of eternal return (2006: 68-9).
The opening of new spaces necessarily has a deconstructive and dialogical dimension,
which opens onto a space of affirmation: ‘deconstruction obliges you to say yes to
everything’, even ‘that which interrupts your project’ (Spivak 1990: 47). This means that
one should never confidently believe that one is ‘done’ deconstructing oppression (Day
2005: 200). It is always possible that something has been missed, or that active forces
have coalesced into a new ‘black hole’ of reactive energies. The arts of dialogism are currently being redeveloped by innovative scholars concerned about critical literacy and openness to the Other (Andreotti and Warwick 2007). The art of remaining socially open, of warding off the state and reactive energies, will have to be re-learnt. Its basis, however, is the expression of active desire.

Such expressions of desire already occur, but in fits and starts, in ‘moments of madness’. Moments of revolt, temporary autonomous zones, effective direct action campaigns, inspite a sudden influx of positive energy onto which the disparate desires of different ‘others’ are frequently mapped, a moment when the quantitative and the segmented system of differences are replaced by a glimpse of abundance where difference is affirmative. The difficulty is that these eruptions today tend to be ephemeral and temporary. The trick is to pass from a revolt, a stasis – from events such as France 1968 or Greece 2008 – to a different kind of society which is a permanent continuation of the revolt, in which the revolt is not recuperated and ‘normality’ is not ‘restored’. So far, revolts, for all the excitement of the moment, tend to fizzle out from eventual fatigue or induce systemic rearrangements and reforms. A society which is a permanent continuation would turn active energy, gift economy, abundance, direct action, diffuse power and desiring-production into the basic ‘capabilities’ of open space.

The new world replaces ‘morality’ with ‘ethics’. The difference between the two is that ethics is ‘beyond good and evil’ in Nietzsche’s sense. It is a relational approach, assessing forms of life and underlying social logics, rather than judging particularities by transcendent standards (Day 2005: 167). One of the roles of ethics is to ward off the formation of morality (2005: 170). Day cites Anzaldúa’s idea of a community of all of those who do not fit, open to everything except apparatuses of capture (Day 2005: 185-6). The new world is a world for those whose active energies drive them to seek it. It is not accountable to the majority, the state, the system, even the movement. It is a movement of those who join the exodus. Day views ‘the will to save everyone at once’, rather than those who join the exodus, as hegemonic (Day 2005: 215).

In Guattari’s terms, the central aspect of such an ethics is an affirmation of difference, ‘a fundamental right to singularity’ (Genosko ed. 1996: 104). Hence, the ethical positions associated with the striving for a new world are not those of reasserting ‘communities’ against ‘individuals’ or ‘responsibilities’ against ‘rights’ which are commonly seen in both left and right responses to globalisation. The fallback on ‘collective’ ethics as an alternative to ‘rights’ is a reactive gesture of rerritorialisation, rejecting capitalism for its deterritorialising aspect and not for its suppression of difference. Such an ethical position is implicitly reactive and arborescent, empowering those who can claim to be the global-local, the ‘collective’, or to represent it, to speak for it, against others who are granted a lower status as minoritarian ‘individuals’. Instead, the crucial aspect of the critique of formal rights should be to counterpose these formal rights to actual rights, which are actualised in the emancipation of desire. The same separation of the utopian potential of ethical concepts from their formal, representational inscriptions is possible with most ‘moral’ concepts. Of course, ‘rights’ also undergo a transformation as they are transmuted from matters of law (backed by concentrated formal sanctions) to matters of
custom (backed by diffuse informal sanctions), and as a violation is reclassified as
dishonourable rather than ‘guilty’. And ‘rights’ cannot be invested primarily in the molar
self, but rather, in the molecular self, and the flows of desire themselves.

For people in the South especially, the important question is epistemological as well as
systemic delinking and relinking. Hence, as Ashis Nandy argues, ‘[w]e shouldn’t be
reduced to being passive participants in the West’s dialogue with itself and its chosen
others… [I]t is not our responsibility to contribute to, criticize, reform or defend that non-
West which is a projection of parts of the West’s self-hood’ (1990: 102) Nandy instead
seeks ‘new and creative possibilities’ against molar totalising myths such as nationalism
(103). Delinking is to be encouraged if it doesn’t lead to exploitation or domination (Day
2005: 209). The most exciting delinkings occur at the points which are in any case least
intensely inserted or barely inserted at all, such as Bougainville, Chiapas and West Papua.
Just as crucial, however, is the development of transversal connections which relink
outside the terms of the system. This is where discourses of hybridity, transmodernity,
transversality, diversality and other figures of nonsystemic global connectedness gain a
non-recuperative dimension.

Delinking in a classical sense could also work in relation to neoliberal control regimes.
Since most southern countries are spending more on debt repayments than they get in aid
and loans, since their repayments exceed assets in the west (which could usually be
neutralised in any case), it would make sense to renege on debt which in any case is
unethical for three reasons: due to the impossibility of bankruptcy, the neo-colonial
context, and the despotic regimes when it was adopted. The west might retaliate but
would have hands tied regarding larger countries or blocks of countries (Brazil, India, or
a group of say 20). What would be put at risk? Imports – sometimes meaning consumer
goods, food, medicines. But reneging on debt and rejecting the WTO, GATS and TRIPS
also would lead to cheap local medicines. Any international sanctions would turn over
cash-crop land for food production. The bloc could become an internal trade area to
make up for western boycotts. Also, it is likely that interlinked neighbours would not
boycott much larger countries, and that China, and probably also Russia and France,
would covertly break sanctions knowing they could get away with it (as they already do
with political ‘rogue states’). Europe and Asia would come under pressure to take
advantage of the situation instead of toeing the American line. It is unclear in human
development terms if countries would suffer in the medium term from reneging. China
has not done badly from remaining outside the system. Cheap medicines and an end to
structural adjustment spending caps would compensate for whatever risks were incurred
by withdrawal of aid. Military attack is the biggest risk, which is why a bloc or large
country would be the most effective.

The ‘counter-society’ or network of networks exists only nascently at present, and does
not have its full gamut of capabilities fully developed. It has organic intellectuals, but
they are vulnerable to periodic repression; and it has autonomous spaces, but has
difficulty securing them against repression from states which claim territories
everywhere. There is a need for permanent liberated spaces, which would require
increasing the capacities of networks to either expel or neutralize states. According to
Negri, the role of revolutionary agency is ‘rupturing capitalist restructuring, command, and stabilization’ (2005: 156). With ‘self-valorisation’ and autonomous networks proliferating, the main task of transformative politics is to repel repression. Negri terms this defending the frontiers of self-valorisation (2005: 276).

There are a number of ways in which repression can be warded off. One of these might be the development of new technologies of defence or evasion, though this is hardly an area where critical theory can help. Another is that safety is increased with ‘security’ in Race’s second, dissident sense, safety which arises from invisibility and imperceptibility in the density of social networks. As autonomous forces mobilise in everyday life, they transmute it into a terrain which is ‘barbarian’, does not speak the imperial language, and is impenetrable to imperial thought. Similar effects can emerge from insertions in similarly dense physical and ecological terrains. Another possible response is to increase the diffuse informal sanctions available through transversal connections. Already this is seen to some degree, as repression in one site leads to solidarity protests elsewhere, and the locking-down of sites of corporate abuse leads to targeting of their supply chains and wider insertions. It has been effective in ‘locking in’ certain achievements of social movements because state transgressions of a frontier will lead to a response – if an American dignitary visits Greece for example, or if a squat is evicted in Germany or Spain. As transversal connections intensify, an attack by a state against social networks at one site will risk reverberations against the attacker’s wider insertions in the web of networks, making such attacks costly for states. Today, affinity-networks are insufficiently internetworked and state attacks are too frequent for the full effectiveness of this strategy to appear; states often find the upsurge they face from annoyed autonomists to be ‘worth it’ to avoid locking-in autonomy. As networks grow in strength, they may find ways to enrich this capability, making it as impossible for states to violate autonomy or breach frontiers with autonomous spaces as it is to antagonise certain other states.

Creating spaces of peace

Another aspect of the project of global transformation, more oriented to the current situation of global war, is the need to affirm and defend open spaces. Here, we are proposing a change in the relations between hierarchies and networks, and hence proposing something which could be approached from either end, as a strategy of networks (as with La Ruta Pacifica’s peacemaking activities, and direct action against the mechanisms of total war) or as a ‘policy’ of states (for instance, as constitutional limits on state activity and the recognition of certain asylum or sanctuary spaces). Currently, the drive towards subtraction of axioms, the elimination of open space as space which could be used by the enemy, is pervasive (Robinson 2007). Such closure could not be justified in any circumstances from the perspective of a politics of desire; the social force which initiates such closure instantly shows itself to be a force of repression. It also fails on its own terms: the effect of the cumulative elimination of open space at core and core-controlled sites is not the elimination of the space for war, but the elimination of the
space of peace. The Other, denied voice and ‘legitimate’ agency of any kind, is denied any possibility of making the transition from war to peace; negotiated transition becomes impossible; dialogue is foreclosed in advance. The Other, denied a voice, is left with radical antagonism as the only means of speaking.

The existence of third spaces, spaces of peace – where the enemy and the in-group are allowed to operate freely in a peaceful way, tolerated ‘as long as they don’t do it here’ – is crucial for overcoming the current situation regarding, for instance, the unwinnable war between America and the global jihadist movement. It is already established in the history of states that peaceful coexistence depends on the existence of third spaces, spaces of peace (from the United Nations to the diplomatic system and third-party mediations), and on the ‘humanisation’ of conflict by restricting actions between adversaries (for example, the Geneva Convention and the ‘laws’, more accurately customs, of war). Ideas of asylum of sanctuary have also been extended at various times and places by state assemblages to exclude soldiers and police from universities or religious sites, by activists to exclude statists from social centres, and by touchiness over state intrusions into private homes (a major focus of liberal concerns about privacy and due cause). What is urgently needed, yet has not been proposed so far, is to extend this idea of third spaces to cover networked resistances.

It might be objected that network agents, in contrast to states, are not able to be moderated in this way. But this is a strange view; states have certainly committed worse atrocities than networks over time. In any case, it has already been shown by the long experience of Saudi Arabia, Yemen and more recently Pakistan that it is possible to make truces with jihadists. It is also noticeable that non-combatant European societies such as Sweden have been explicitly excluded from jihadist targeting. The difficulty is, rather, that states are reluctant to give up the established privileges of the interstate system and accord equal or at least dignified status to networks. And of course, the established forms are geared to states; they may not work for networks. There are, however, many ways of ensuring that war does not encompass the whole of social life, which also serve the aim of creating the potential for a third space. Not only certain ‘national’ spaces beyond the territory of the combatants, but also certain social sites (religious sites, universities, social centres, maybe even private homes) could be given a status such as to keep them out of the war. The doctrine of asylum needs to be expanded to combat the lurch to global war.

The good of open space – met best in stateless societies, and next-best in societies with ‘weak’, socially- or constitutionally-limited states – is an inclusive good of genuine ethical status, actualizing values of human rights, freedom and welfare. In contrast, the fictional ‘goods’ of state closure of space – met best in authoritarian state societies – actualize fascistic values of order, conformity, state (not human) security, control of space and simple manipulation of outcomes. Whatever such an order accords to insiders is limited to insiders: the excluded, the ‘non-people’, receive neither freedom nor security. If state repression works (which mostly it does not), the result is that a lesser violence is prevented by means of a greater violence.
From our own standpoint, open space is a value as such, necessary for the expression of difference and to ward off or counteract the totalizing aspects of state power. Closed spaces cannot be justified in Deleuzian theory, because they create spatial conditions derived from social-production which are prior to ways of life and to flows of desire. Some ways of life, which are not in themselves oppressive but are simply beyond what is expected or permitted, are then precluded or repressed. Open spaces are also necessary to ward off the ‘political principle’, establishing its dependence on the ‘social principle’ and hence preventing its unconditional reach. Open spaces are necessary for dissidents opposing oppressive regimes, for theorists who need to be allowed to follow their thoughts where they lead without fear of persecution, and for people who are different in some way, whom the existing state regime does not perfectly fit and who hence need to avoid entanglements with it. Hence, open spaces are not some kind of optional extra to be added in conditions of peace; they are an absolute necessity to the excluded. Hence, autonomous movements constitute open spaces whether states allow them to or not, though as we have seen, the external threat posed by states can drive the networks into reactive forms. The struggle for open spaces does not require ‘benefits’ to the state or the total situation to be justifiable to the excluded, to affinity-networks; it will continue regardless of what the states do.

Nevertheless, the position states take will have effects on the total situation: on whether the situation will become an increasingly extreme antagonism and situation of permanent war, or whether the growing power of networks will be more of a processual, evolutionary transition. The creation and defence of spaces beyond global war has a whole number of benefits. Firstly, it is a benefit for human rights. Innocent people targeted by combatants could escape by seeking safe spaces. People wrongly targeted because they are ‘suspected’ of fighting for the other side are similarly protected from show-trials and persecution. Spatial separations and restrictions on state action, such as prohibiting the repression of simple advocacy of the other side’s views, protect basic liberties such as free speech from the totalitarian propensities of warmongers. Secondly, the existence of spaces beyond the war creates the possibility for total, ‘lawless’ war to be mediated by dialogue. Thirdly, the safe spaces become a frame for dialogue themselves. Fourth, the safe spaces are not only spaces of drift ‘into’ deviance (the fear of statists reluctant to permit such spaces) but also of drift ‘out’ of deviance. The availability of these spaces allows someone on either side to pull out of active conflict. By doing so, they can enter onto other paths. The possibilities that they use the space to recruit others or simply to hide from the enemy are not the only possibilities. States dislike open space because it is space where what the state terms ‘radicalisation’ can occur. Indeed, it can; but that doesn’t mean it necessarily will. In addition, the existence of open space precludes other ways in which people are antagonised into a stance of militant opposition, i.e. through desperation at total control, anger at the violation of rights or at unlimited state violence.

There could also be an extension to networks and opposition groups other statuses of states, with regard to the recognition and rights of prisoners of war, the injustice of attack in times of peace, etc. The ultimate taboo for the state might be the admission that people will choose who, if anyone, to fight for based on their own connections, not their inferred
‘nationality’. In a world of transnational networks and cosmopolitanism, it is irrational to assume that people will fight for or side with the armed force which happens to be identified with their place of birth; one instead sees proliferating armed forces associated with different identity-groups. Of course states dislike losing their privilege in this way, but it is a trend they also embrace in their moves towards mercenary armies, local warlord proxies and special forces. In this context, there is a need to extend protections of combatants more broadly – and to make sure transnational forces obtain the status previously reserved for states.

The discourse of rights can operate as a barrier between the system or state while they survive, and the spaces of network proliferation. Once it becomes clear that networks are large enough and persistent enough to be irrepressible (which may be, when networks, like Ruta Pacifica, generalise the response of transforming repression from a demoralising into an energising force), states will be faced by a global ‘Vietnam syndrome’ of loss of power. The threat of an overwhelming response where rights are violated renders it wise for states to take a utilitarian course in a situation, so as to preserve state power in general by not provoking networks. Whether states are ‘rational’ enough to make such calculations, or will choose to incite a global war rather than go quietly, remains to be seen.

(Not) the end

Much still remains to be seen. The world-system could reconfigure itself in a number of ways. Hierarchies are losing power to networks, but they might not yet be ready to collapse, for all that we might hope for it. They may fight on for a prolonged period, defending their declining power with rearguard actions and integralist ‘total war’, or they may find ways to create more-or-less stable syncretisms between hierarchical and networked power, maintaining their existence as part of networked assemblages for indefinite periods. Capital and the state may fuse more tightly, relying on one another to weather the storm, or bifurcate sharply, with capital turning to networked forms to avoid being dragged down with its statist allies. Networks will doubtless continue to proliferate, and it is likely that their power will grow. But it is more questionable whether networks will express primarily an affinity-logic, or whether reactive and ‘predatory’ relations between networks will persist as the dominant type of network.

It is here that the role of agency is crucial. By reinforcing the construction of networked spaces, one can aid in creating the new networked world and corroding the powers of hierarchies. There are a wide range of specific capabilities to be developed within the networked world, from forms of peacemaking among networks to defences against anxiety and the psychological effects of repression, to the development of new techniques of direct action and means to neutralise dominant technologies. Projects of intercultural dialogue, cultural literacy building and networking across borders can help strengthen the affinity pole of the network field, against the reactive pole. Solidarities without borders can help to open up the closed spaces of ‘small-world’ networks and reactive formations. There is a lot to be done.
We hope that in theorising the structures of hierarchies and networks, and relating these to the current crisis of the world-system and the problem of reactive networks, we are contributing to developing the capabilities which will bring into being the new world. In this task, in which desires and intentional projects are connected into the social field in an immanent way, there is no ‘end’ – even the achievement of the new world would be something to be rebuilt each day, an expression of constitutive and not constituted power, a form of non-alienated action. Hence, while our book here comes to an end, the processes it describes do not. We hope to have provided tools, and lenses of understanding, for those who wish to engage with and intervene in the potentials of the present situation. If our book is able to inspire action, to increase clarity of perception in a social field, or to inspire others to explore the complex structures of the present world, then our work is done. For now.
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