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Article
Coalition Formation and Stability
Social Choice and Welfare (2006)
  • Jose Alcalde, University of Alicante
  • Antonio Romero-Medina, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Abstract
This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player's payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We identify four natural conditions on individuals' preferences and show that, under each condition, stable (core) allocations exists.
Keywords
  • Coalition Formation,
  • Core,
  • NTU Games,
  • Stability.
Publication Date
2006
Citation Information
Jose Alcalde and Antonio Romero-Medina. "Coalition Formation and Stability" Social Choice and Welfare Vol. 27 (2006)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/antonio_romero_medina/5/