Article
Two Notions of Metaphysical Modality
Synthese
(2018)
Abstract
The paper explores the project of an ambitious modal epistemology that attempts to combine the a priori methods of Chalmers’ 2D semantics with Kripke’s modal metaphysics. I argue that such a project is not viable. The ambitious modal epistemology involves an inconsistent triad composed of (1) Modal Monism, (2) Two-Dimensionalism, and what I call (3) “Metaphysical Kripkeanism”. I present the three theses and show how only two of those can be true at a time. There is a fundamental incompatibility between Chalmers’ Modal Rationalism and Kripke’s modal metaphysics. Specifically, Chalmers’ conceivability entails possibilities that a Kripkean rejects as genuinely metaphysical. However, three positive stances in modal epistemology emerge from the combinations that the triad allows. One of those offers a promising way forward for 2D modal epistemologies. But it comes with a cost, as it requires abandoning modal monism and reshaping the scope of what a priori conceivability can give us access to.
Disciplines
Publication Date
February 1, 2018
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1702-2
Citation Information
Antonella Mallozzi. "Two Notions of Metaphysical Modality" Synthese (2018) p. 1 - 22 ISSN: 0039-7857 Available at: http://works.bepress.com/antonella-mallozzi/7/