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Review
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massive climate change) and the foundational inequalities of the problem of climate change. At the same time, as nation-states have struggled to reach agreement in recent climate change negotiations, some cities, states, and provinces around the world have formed their own arrangements separately from the main negotiations. For example, at the last three climate change negotiations, local and subnational governments have made commitments through the Copenhagen City Climate Catalogue,9 the Mexico City Pact,10 and the Durban Adaptation Charter for Local Governments.11 While these agreements lack legal force under international law and the formal UNFCCC negotiations, they represent yet another example of the diverse set of participants in international environmental law. They also further illuminate the multiscalar landscape described in the chapter “Levels of Environmental Governance” by Jeffrey L. Dunoff and the difficulties of shaping an “optimal” approach in an evolving human and ecological landscape (p. 105).12

These new developments, and many others beyond the scope of this review, reinforce the book’s enduring value. Although the specific problems, actors, institutions, interactions, and ecosystems will continue to evolve and while additional disciplines such as anthropology, geography, and sociology may become more central, this book’s explicit and implicit creation of physical, human, and normative maps provides a vision of responsive international environmental law. It embraces the complexity and nuances of this field while defining its distinctiveness, and it encourages the creative and rigorous thinking needed to adapt to current and future environmental concerns.

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In 1803, Chief Justice John Marshall declared it “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”1 Anne T. Gallagher, a human rights scholar and one of the world’s foremost experts on human trafficking, has picked up Justice Marshall’s mantle. In her recent book, The International Law of Human Trafficking, Gallagher is determined to say what the law on human trafficking is. And what it is not. Her task is a daunting one. One U.S. diplomat active in the human trafficking arena recently referred to trafficking as a “rigor-free zone.”2 That criticism generally provokes vigorous nods of agreement. Standard human trafficking literature has traditionally focused on heart-wrenching, sexually explicit narratives rather than on black-letter law. Gallagher’s book, a departure from that norm, is a scholarly and analytical treatise. Clearly written, this book combines meticulous legal research with an unparalleled understanding of the political terrain of human trafficking. Gallagher’s encyclopedic contribution has finally brought rigor and careful legal scholarship to a literature replete with anecdotes, ideology, and wishful thinking.


RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
Gallagher warns against the “campaigning scholarship that should not be relied upon when ascertaining the state of the law in this area” (p. 137). Her ambitious project is to create scholarship of “integrity, questioning, and genuine inquiry” (p. 503). She seeks to halt the human trafficking literature’s tendency to “confus[e] moral and legal claims,” to muddle the “is” of law with the “ought” (id.).

In 503 pages and 2,539 footnotes, Gallagher painstakingly lays out the sources of law and enforceable legal standards of human trafficking. She identifies a broad range of enforcement and compliance mechanisms. She then points out the substantial (and regrettable) gaps in those regimes. In so doing, Gallagher does not limit her analysis to the Trafficking Protocol or even the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Organized Crime Convention). Rather, Gallagher draws on her extensive knowledge of refugee law, transnational criminal law, international human rights law, international labor law, customary international law, regional legal agreements, and compliance mechanisms. She delineates the relative strengths and weaknesses of particular legal norms, distinguishing between the “hard” and the “soft” law of trafficking. Gallagher delivers her analysis with the crisp and objective tone of a high-court judge. Her assessment is sober and, in her words, even “conservative” (p. 134). She describes her role as “modest” and “essentially technical” (p. 7). In her own estimation, she has sought to observe, describe, classify, and explain the law as it currently stands; to separate law from what is not law; to acknowledge rather than ignore or gloss over weaknesses, gaps, and deficiencies; to be objective whenever possible; and to be truthful when the outcome is not optimal or where objectivity is difficult. (Id.)

Gallagher’s objective viewpoint is possible only because of her deep engagement as a practitioner in the human trafficking field. Few, if any, scholars have participated more actively in the drafting of the Trafficking Protocol and legal instruments that Gallagher describes so lucidly. As the adviser on human trafficking to the UN high commissioner for human rights, Gallagher represented that office in the negotiations on the United Nations Organized Crime Convention. Gallagher served as the founding chair of the UN Inter-Agency Group on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling. She oversaw the development of the UN Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking. She advises the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on criminal justice and human rights; ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan has publicly credited her with successes in the region in enhancing the criminal justice response to human trafficking. Gallagher is, in the inimitable words of Richard Nixon, “in the arena.”

And yet, it is not the arena she had anticipated. Gallagher admits to initial feelings of dismay—even outrage—as she watched trafficking “unceremoniously snatched away from its traditional home” in the human rights system in the late 1990s (p. 1). Trafficking landed in the UN institutions focused on drugs and crime. States concerned with organized crime and migrant smuggling convened meetings in 1998 and 1999 in Vienna under UN auspices. The leading states intended to quickly negotiate and adopt a transnational organized crime convention. Gallagher found herself charged with preventing the erosion of existing human rights protections, viewed by many as a very real risk. But even Gallagher, who initially decried “the removal of trafficking from

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3 British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco (Spain v. UK), 2 R.I.A.A. 615 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1925) (Huber, sole arb.).


the sacred chambers of the international human rights system” to the UN agencies tasked with criminal and narcotics issues (p. 4), became a reluctant convert. She ultimately concludes that the resulting “Trafficking Protocol has served international law very well” (p. 5).

Gallagher understands the tensions inherent in locating the Trafficking Protocol in the criminal and not the human rights legal regime:

At the informal as well as the formal level, there remains a strong sense of discord between the (State-preferred) criminal-justice-moderated-by-human-rights approach and the (NGO-preferred) approach that places human rights at the center of any response. While some hybrid networks have managed to bridge this divide, the perception of mutual incompatibility remains strong. (P. 489)

To say that Gallagher does not intend to push the law beyond its black-letter boundaries is not to imply that she lacks an agenda. Her quest for objectivity and clarity is not just an intellectual exercise. She seeks enforcement and accountability. “As long as the law remains unclear,” Gallagher argues, states will not be “brought to task for failing to apply it” (p. 7). In her view, normative precision in international law is an “operational necessity” (p. 8) if one wishes to shape states’ behavior. In The International Law of Human Trafficking, she seeks to enumerate the minimum standards that states cannot ignore. It is these minimum standards that give rise to state responsibility and, ultimately, to accountability.

The international minimum standards dictated by the Trafficking Protocol, however, are minimal indeed. States need do little more than criminalize human trafficking.8 Precisely what must be criminalized is defined in Article 3(a) of the Trafficking Protocol:

“Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.9

The Trafficking Protocol also includes weak language on the protection and support for trafficking victims.10 Gallagher accurately characterizes the Trafficking Protocol’s provisions in these areas as “ungenerous and equivocal” (p. 336). Translating Article 3(a)’s rather unwieldy definition into national criminal laws has produced decidedly mixed results. Incorporation of new criminal statutes into national laws has yielded few prosecutions in the decade since the adoption of the Trafficking Protocol. In 2012, for example, the U.S. Department of State reported only 7,909 criminal prosecutions worldwide.11 Of those, only 456 were for forced labor.12

9 Id., Art. 3(a). Article 3(c) clarifies that the means described in the definition are not required when the victim is a child under eighteen years of age. Even without these elements, the act qualifies as trafficking under the Trafficking Protocol in the case of a minor.

10 The Trafficking Protocol’s articles dealing with protection and support do not mandate action. For example, Article 6, concerning “Assistance to and protection of victims of trafficking in persons,” requires only that states consider implementing measures to provide for the “physical, psychological and social recovery of victims of trafficking . . . .” The provision of housing, medical care, legal assistance, and counseling is entirely discretionary. Id.


12 Id. Gallagher studiously avoids statistics on trafficking in her book, a reflection of the unreliability of those numbers. But, by way of comparison, the International Labour Organization (ILO) released updated estimates for human trafficking and forced labor in June 2012. The ILO reported that approximately 14.2 million individuals around the world are held in forced labor. The ILO estimated another 4.5 million are held in servitude in the sex industry. International Labour Organization, New ILO Global Estimate of Forced
Despite the rather dismal statistics on criminal enforcement, Gallagher is on a mission to preserve the relevance of the international legal regime for monitoring human trafficking. In her words, “One of the more pressing [reasons for promoting normative clarity at the international level] is the risk that the international legal framework around trafficking will be sidelined or rendered irrelevant through the emergence of a parallel unilateral regime that has adopted its own criteria for measuring State performance” (p. 8). That veiled reference to the “unilateral regime” and minimum standards relates to the U.S. Department of State’s Trafficking in Person Reports, which are discussed in chapter 9, one of the most interesting chapters in the book.

Gallagher marches methodically through the law, distinguishing between sources of law and analyzing their relative strengths. Chapter 1 covers the international legal definition of trafficking; chapter 2 analyzes the international legal framework, including a discussion of the 1949 Trafficking Convention, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Trafficking Protocol, and regional agreements; chapter 3 covers related legal issues such as protections for noncitizens, migrant workers, asylum, and statelessness; chapter 4 deals with state responsibility; chapter 5 highlights obligations of protection and support; chapter 6 covers obligations related to repatriation and remedies; chapter 7 lays out obligations of an effective criminal justice response; chapter 8 outlines the duty to prevent trafficking and respond lawfully; and chapter 9 discusses issues of compliance, implementation, and effectiveness. An additional fifty-eight pages of front matter (table of cases and table of treaties), a bibliography, and an index round out the content.

The book’s structure provides a useful framework to examine human trafficking law, scholarship, and unilateral regimes that have exploded over the last decade. Indeed, just ten to fifteen years ago, a human trafficking legal tome would have focused almost exclusively on human rights law. No more. Gallagher delves into the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), regional agreements, the Trafficking Protocol, the Organized Crime Convention, and the travaux préparatoires of multiple treaties and conventions, not to mention the conventions themselves. The book incorporates the negotiating history of many of the legal instruments that she analyzes. In the case of the Organized Crime Convention and its related protocols, Gallagher describes the largely unsuccessful efforts made by the UN high commissioner for human rights and UNICEF to enhance protections for trafficking victims. Nevertheless, in her view, a significant shift has occurred since the adoption of the Trafficking Protocol. It is a shift toward greater recognition of human rights and protections. In Gallagher’s assessment,

States appear to be moving steadily toward agreement that they are obliged, as a matter of international law, to accurately and quickly identify victims of trafficking; to avoid criminalizing victims for status offenses; to refrain from detaining victims; to provide at least immediate protection and support to victims that is not conditional on cooperation with criminal justice agencies; to provide additional protection and support to victim-witnesses; and to make special provision for child victims. (P. 336)

Gallagher herself is partly responsible for this trend. As the supervisor of the team drafting the UN Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking, Gallagher certainly wrote— or at least edited—much of the soft law to which she now points as emerging standards. In her analysis, the regional regimes


See infra note 21 and accompanying text.


lead the way. In particular, she points to the European Trafficking Convention’s enhanced victim protections as a harbinger of progress.

The book delivers Gallagher’s assessments without reference to her personal involvement in these debates. Beyond a brief biography, only a few personal impressions are incorporated into the introduction, and a vague reference to the author’s observations on ASEAN appears in chapter 9. Her detached tone conveys objectivity. And while the writing itself is excellent and fluid, disclosure of Gallagher’s own role would have been a welcome addition.

*The International Law of Human Trafficking* is not a case book. U.S. law students—accustomed to narrative case decisions and common law precedent—may find the book dense and challenging. Instead, it is a treatise, akin to a restatement of law. This approach is due in part to the dearth of litigated human trafficking cases. Gallagher avoids the anecdote. Rather, she grapples with law in the abstract. On the positive side, Gallagher has given scholars and students a great gift: an encyclopedic account of the black-letter human trafficking law. The analysis covers fundamental human rights law and international criminal law. It is a comprehensive baseline, a snapshot of the law today. Gallagher has made a conscious choice to exclude specific incidences of government failure to protect trafficking victims and government mishandling of criminal cases. The normal human rights tool of naming and shaming is conspicuously absent here. The lack of concrete application or illustration is consistent with Gallagher’s apolitical approach to the material. The illustrations, where they do appear, are generally relegated to footnotes and sparse in details. For example, the book mentions briefly that returning migrants have been sanctioned for unauthorized departure. Gallagher accurately describes this punishment as an anti-trafficking measure that may violate the right to leave one’s own country. She illustrates the point with a brief footnote, but no further explanation: “For example, in Lao PDR” (p. 162 n.89). The book does cite to country-specific studies, such as reports by the UN special rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, and other secondary sources. But Gallagher has eschewed domestic case law examples and lengthy case analysis. Lawyers from civil-law countries will find the approach familiar. The absence of examples and narratives, however, may be daunting for those unfamiliar with international law.

Gallagher is at her technical best when she reins in anti-trafficking advocates’ runaway legal conclusions. She cites “[t]he campaign to bring trafficking within the international legal prohibition on slavery” as just one example of an effort to misuse soft law to bolster a position not found in hard law (p. 142). And she points to “[e]fforts to identify prostitution and pornography as trafficking” as “similarly manipulative of international legal materials” (id.).

She identifies sociologist and activist Kevin Bales as the leading advocate for an expanded version of “slavery” (p. 178 n.195). She notes that several scholars have adopted his expansive view of slavery, despite “shaky” legal foundations (id.). Gallagher acknowledges the links between trafficking and slavery. But in her estimation, a careful reading of the core conventions precludes a merging of the two legal phenomena. The 1926 League of Nations Slavery Convention’s Article 1 defines slavery as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.”17 Gallagher, citing the extensive work of Jean Allain on the 1926 Slavery Convention’s travaux préparatoires,18 concludes that the broad, expansive reading of the slavery definition has been wholly discredited. Gallagher concludes that a “situation of trafficking, debt bondage, bonded labor, or forced labor will be identifiable as slavery only if it has involved, as required by the 1926 [Slavery] Convention, ‘the exercise of any or all of the powers attached to the right of ownership’” (p. 190).

Reviewing the case law, she concedes that this area of the law is in a state of flux. But, from her perspective, use of the term slavery, invoking the customary and *jus cogens* norm prohibiting slavery.
and the slave trade, is not an appropriate label for trafficking in all of its forms. However, a particularly egregious case of forced or bonded labor might suffice, and a concrete example of sufficiency might have added to the book’s clarity. Her main concern relates to the integrity of the law. Practitioners seeking to hold states and traffickers accountable see this concern from a different angle. Equating slavery and trafficking sets the bar too high. To the extent that trafficking and slavery merge in the popular and legal discourse, attorneys representing trafficking victims must prove that the perpetrator exercised all the powers attached to the right of ownership. That standard is extraordinarily high, requiring an extremely robust level of evidence. The political expediency and currency gained by references to “slavery” may result in unintended consequences, as attorneys must explain psychological—not physical—coercion to skeptical juries and judges. Intonation of “slavery” provokes popular outrage but also prompts skeptical questions, such as: “Where are the chains?”

The second fundamental area of legal overreach that Gallagher’s book identifies relates to the conflation of prostitution and pornography with trafficking.\(^\text{19}\) Gallagher points to “[m]aladroit attempts to identify pornography as ‘trafficking’” as a “manifestation of a potentially troubling expansionist trend” (p. 50). Wanting to tamp down this unfounded legal claim, she notes that the drafters of the Trafficking Protocol explicitly stated that the definition “did not operate to regulate or even pronounce on prostitution,” much less pornography (p. 51 n.164). And to those who argue that clients must be punished, Gallagher answers that “[d]iscussion of demand in the context of trafficking is often highly ideological—linked to, and used to reinforce, political or moral positions on controversial issues such as the regulation or prohibition of prostitution” (p. 433).

She has decidedly mixed feelings about the U.S. Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP Report).\(^\text{21}\) A quotation from Gallagher incorporated into the 2011 TIP Report might give the impression that she is an unwavering cheerleader.\(^\text{22}\) She is not. The book explains that “it is difficult for the international lawyer to be overly enthusiastic about an external compliance mechanism that rejects established international

\(^{19}\) One of the leading proponents of this international law theory is Catharine MacKinnon. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Trafficking, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 993, 1004 (2004).

\(^{20}\) Gallagher discusses the legal underpinnings of the “trafficking as slavery” debate in section 3.3.2 of the book.

\(^{21}\) Annual TIP Reports are available at the U.S. Department of State’s website, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/sis/tiprpt/.

legal rules in favor of an internally generated yardstick for measuring the performance of all States” (p. 486). That said, Gallagher admits that the U.S. Department of State’s annual yardstick approach occasionally works, but she relates her continuing concerns:

In her work with Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations between 2003 and 2010, for example, the author directly observed multiple instances in which the open threat of a negative grade in the U.S. TIP Report provided the impetus for major reform initiatives, including the criminalization of trafficking . . . . As explored at various points throughout this book, some of these responses have been highly problematic in human rights terms, a side effect that is not explored or even acknowledged by the U.S. Department of State’s reports themselves. (P. 485)

The book indicates that the sanctions created by the U.S. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 do not qualify as legitimate countermeasures under international law. Rather, they appear to be retorsions or “unfriendly conduct . . . not inconsistent with any international obligation of the State” (p. 269 n.277). The U.S. Department of State’s reporting and sanctioning system has “fundamentally altered the rules of the compliance game” (p. 497). The TIP Report—the elephant in the room—could “undermine the [international] regime’s legitimacy” (pp. 497–98). Gallagher points to the determinative factor: congruence between international law and the external enforcement mechanism. A side-by-side comparison of the TIP Report’s Minimum Standards for the Elimination of Trafficking in Persons, quoted in full in table 9.1 (pp. 482–84), and current international law would be another welcome addition to the human trafficking scholarship.

Ultimately, Gallagher has created an indispensable, splendid, and important book. Fluidly and beautifully written, it is a dense volume tackling complex legal issues and debates. She has penned the comprehensive treatise and reference textbook on the international law of human trafficking.

decade, we can only hope that Gallagher has already started drafting the second edition.

MARTINA E. VANDENBERG
Open Society Fellow

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