Implied Reverse Preemption

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With an elaborate Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, prepared and signed during the doldrums of midsummer 2008, Congress signaled its revived attention to the safety of consumer goods sold in the United States. The new statute, which almost won unanimity in both chambers, announced a new scope and ambition: by increasing the powers of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (“Commission” or “CPSC”) rather than removing any of them, Congress took a turn in a direction not seen in decades. The 2008 law ordered the Commission to write new standards for all-terrain vehicles. It declared a provisional ban on six chemicals that it suspected of disrupting human reproductive systems. It prohibited lead in products for children under twelve—this ban an outright rather than a provisional rule. It required testing of all new children’s products offered for sale. It wrote new protections for consumer-minded whistleblowers. It augmented the existing penalties

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2 The 2006 election had given the Democratic Party control of both houses for the first time in twelve years, making passage of this legislation possible. See Eric Lotke, Downsizing Government to Death: Thanks to “E. Coli Conservatism,” Weakened Government Watchdogs Have Put Us All at Risk, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2008, at M7.


4 See Aliya Sternstein, Product Safety Law Overhaul on Track to Clear Senate After Passing House, CONG. Q. TODAY, Jul. 30, 2008 (declaring that the new statute was “the most significant overhaul” of consumer safety laws in forty years (quoting Rep. John Dingell)); Editorial, The President and Product Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2008, at A18 (praising the new statute).


6 Id. § 108, 122 Stat. at 3036-37.


9 Id. § 219.
for violating consumer law.\textsuperscript{10} It invited state attorneys general into the federal courts to enforce some of its provisions.\textsuperscript{11}

Federal intervention in consumer safety as a plenary category began in the 1960s, when Congress established a National Commission on Product Safety to explore what the United States government could do to reduce product-caused injuries.\textsuperscript{12} Congress passed the Consumer Product Safety Act (\textquotedblleft CPSA\textquotedblright) in 1972.\textsuperscript{13} In its original form the CPSA defined consumer products broadly,\textsuperscript{14} exempting only a handful of manufactured items from its provisions.\textsuperscript{15} Congress bestowed on the newly created Consumer Product Safety Commission a wide array of \textquoteleft enforcement tools,\textquoteright including powers to set standards, seize and condemn goods, prohibit the sale of products, and order recalls.\textsuperscript{16}

Soon after its inception, burdened by onerous procedures that Congress had mandated, however, the Commission began to perform at a disappointing level.\textsuperscript{17} Its bureaucratic weakness got a boost from conservative ideology in 1981, when Congress started to roll back the federal presence in consumer regulation.\textsuperscript{18} A \textquoteleft deregulation-minded chairman,\textquoteright Terry Scanlon, arrived in the mid-1980s to lead the Commission into quiescence.\textsuperscript{19} Reagan-era retrenchments from consumer

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} Id. \S 217.
\item \textsuperscript{11} Id. \S 218.
\item \textsuperscript{13} For a history of the statute published soon after its enactment, see Antonin Scalia & Frank Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 UCLA L. Rev. 899, 899-904 (1973).
\item \textsuperscript{14} 15 U.S.C. \S 2052(a)(1) (2006) (referring to \textquoteleft any article, or component part thereof, produced or distributed for sale to a consumer\textquoteright).
\item \textsuperscript{15} Scalia & Goodman, supra note 13, at 902 (noting tobacco, firearms, and products covered by other federal legislation, such as boats, cosmetics, food, and aircraft).
\item \textsuperscript{16} Schwartz, supra note 12, at 42-43. The Consumer Product Safety Commission (\textquoteleft CPSC\textquoteright or \textquoteleft Commission\textquoteright) was established by statute in 1972. 15 U.S.C. \S 2053. In this Article I occasionally refer to the Commission as an \textquoteleft agency\textquoteright, a term some prefer to reserve for a single-administrator entity more closely associated with a presidential administration; Congress, led by Democrats, originally wrote the Consumer Product Safety Act (\textquoteleft CPSA\textquoteright) to make the Commission \textquoteleft independent\textquoteright from the Nixon presidency. Robert S. Adler, From \textquoteleft Model Agency\textquoteright to Basket Case— Can the Consumer Product Safety Commission Be Redeemed?, 41 Admin. L. Rev. 61, 82 n.123, 83 n.125 (1989). It functions as a \textquoteleft collegial body\textquoteright of commissioners. See id. at 82. Commissioners are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, cannot all be members of the same political party, and serve staggered terms of seven years, subject to removal by the President \textquoteleft for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.\textquoteright 15 U.S.C. \S 2053.
\item \textsuperscript{17} See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 34-35.
\item \textsuperscript{18} See infra Part III.B.
\end{itemize}

Following CPSC practice, I refer to the head of the CPSC as its chairman, even though women heads of the agency occupy more space in this Article than do CPSC chairmen S. John Byington, Terry Scanlon, Richard Simpson, and Hal Stratton.
safety regulation stayed in place through subsequent presidential administrations until the 2008 mandate and appropriations.20


In this Article, I contend that congressional oscillation on consumer safety can inform the most incendiary topic in current American products liability: the law of preemption. Within products liability discourse, the term preemption (which has a large set of other meanings outside the scope of the Article) refers specifically to the affirmative defense that will extinguish actions for personal injury brought under the common law of torts.21 In a preemption scenario, a plaintiff attributes an injury to a product defect. The defendant seller responds by saying that a particular federal regulation on point preempts the claim—because Congress, exercising a supreme legislative power, has said so—and accordingly any court applying state law must dismiss it.

Preemption divides into two categories. “Express” preemption is present when Congress makes an overt statement about its intent to foreclose common-law tort liability.22 Congress rarely chooses to make such a statement, perhaps because its members, in perpetual pursuit of campaign funds to get reelected, worry that taking a stand on the divisive

20 But see The Gale Group, Inc., Small Business Encyclopedia: Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), www.answers.com/topic/consumer-product-safety-commission (last visited Mar. 13, 2009) (identifying 1999 as a “vigorous” year for the Commission; in 1999 it “issued more than 300 product recalls” and “levied approximately ten times the amount of fines on companies that it had assessed a decade earlier”). As this Article goes to press, I cannot confirm my provisional belief that the 2008 legislation marks a significant shift. Should the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act reforms prove thin or illusory, my thesis remains the same.

21 DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 940 (2d ed. 2008) (describing preemption as a defense to liability). This working definition of preemption excludes broader alternative understandings. See id. at 969 (discussing preemption of state regulations); Richard C. Ausness, “After You, My Dear Alphonse!”: Should the Courts Defer to the FDA’s New Interpretation of § 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments?, 80 TUL. L. REV. 727, 734 & n.50 (2006) (describing applications of preemption that do not entirely immunize defendants); Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B. U. L. REV. 599, 562 n.14 (1997) (noting that, in addition to common law claims, state statutory remedies and punitive damages are amenable to preemption). Professor Ausness’s list of preemption cases includes International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987) (permitting tort liability, but holding that the Clean Water Act restricted plaintiffs to the law of only one state), and Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 582-84 (1981) (permitting liability, but holding that state doctrine on the calculation of contract damages was preempted under the Natural Gas Act). Id. at 734 n.50. This Article, by contrast, discusses preemption only insofar as it forecloses state tort liability.

22 OWEN, supra note 21, at 941.
subject of liability will offend financers. When Congress does speak overtly about preemption, it frequently will do so from two sides of its mouth: the same statute can contain both a preemption clause purporting to displace all contrary state regulation, perhaps including regulation by tort law, and a savings clause, purporting to preserve state tort liability.

By these means Congress punts its dilemma to the judiciary, and so preemption is found mainly in the other category, “implied” preemption, where courts read into a statute a pertinent congressional intent: that is, either to occupy a field through federal regulation (“field preemption”) or to set up a regulatory scheme inconsistent in its particulars with what injured litigants could receive if they prevailed under state tort law (often called “conflict preemption”). Conflict preemption is the type that often arises as an affirmative defense to personal injury claims, but either type of preemption can keep injured plaintiffs out of court. Part I gives a summary of implied preemption doctrine. This Part functions here mainly as background for the Article’s more novel claim.

Congressional oscillation, I argue, shows the need for another judge-made doctrine about preemption of tort liability. The consumer product safety example shows that Congress will occasionally move in more than one direction with respect to regulating industries, services, or public safety generally. The existence of implied preemption calls for a complementary judicial inference to recognize the abandonment of an earlier regulatory design. Any court empowered to infer that Congress

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25 Grey, supra note 21, at 618; id. at 617 (“Congress knows how to preempt state common law claims expressly and has demonstrated its ability to do so a number times. Therefore, courts should not preempt matters beyond the express language of a federal state.”) (footnotes omitted); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 449, 450 (2008) [hereinafter Sharkey, Institutional Approach] (using the punt metaphor).

intended to occupy a field or impose a scheme, when Congress did not announce this path expressly, is also empowered to infer a congressional retreat.\textsuperscript{27}

The parallel from express preemption is repeal. Here is an illustration. Suppose that in year $X$, Congress passes the Goldhelmet Safety Act (“GSA”), declaring in the statute that compliance with federal regulations pertaining to the manufacture and sale of solid-gold motorcycle helmets insulates sellers from tort liability. To keep complication out of the hypothetical, the statute contains no savings clause of any kind. It plainly preempts. The President signs the new law. As long as the GSA is in effect, plaintiffs who attribute injury to helmets made in accord with GSA requirements may not sue manufacturers or other sellers; express preemption kills their claims. Sometime after year $X$, in year $Y$, Congress takes the federal government out of the gold-helmet regulation business by repealing the GSA. Or it leaves other parts of the GSA in the United States Code, but repeals the express-preemption provision. When the repeal goes into effect, persons who attribute injury to their gold helmets may sue. Congress has abandoned its express preemption.\textsuperscript{28}

Similar reasoning should govern implied preemption. Any congressional scheme to occupy a field or establish comprehensive regulation can be abandoned. Overt, express takeovers of fields or comprehensive regulatory schemes done through federal legislation and rulemaking are relatively easy to observe; by contrast, a takeover or a comprehensive design that a court can educe only through inference disappears by means other than a written declaration. Abandonments of these preemptive initiatives render obsolete any earlier judicial inference that might have found a congressional intent to preempt. Just as courts find implied preemption where circumstances warrant, they must also, again only where circumstances warrant, infer a retreat from implied preemption. I discuss this inference of retreat by Congress, which I call “implied reverse preemption,”\textsuperscript{29} in Part II.

\textsuperscript{27} This proposal joins others I have presented as recommendations to judges who hear claims of injury. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Enhancing Drug Effectiveness and Efficacy Through Personal Injury Litigation, 15 J.L. & Pol’y 1051, 1082-98 (2007) (proposing a cause of action for persons who can show they suffered physical harm from a drug’s failure to live up to the promises on its label); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 445, 521-24 (1997) (offering a draft jury instruction for hostile-environment sexual harassment claims).


\textsuperscript{29} “Reverse preemption” is sometimes used to describe restraint or abstention by Congress in deference to state prerogatives. Courts apply the term to regulation of the insurance industry under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 543 F.3d 744, 752 (5th Cir. 2008); Genord v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 440 F.3d 802, 805 (6th Cir. 2006); In re Med. Care Mgmt. Co., 361 B.R. 863, 871 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2003). Commentators extend it to judicial refusals to apply federal law in a domain that is traditionally left to state authority. Reverse preemption of this sort has both detractors and admirers. Compare Daniel
As scholars have noted, the indicators of a tacit decision by Congress to bar state tort claims are both unclear and controversial,30 and analogous difficulties necessarily occlude the reverse-preemption analysis. Implied reverse preemption is, however, easier to use than implied preemption in one crucial respect: Congress manifests its retreat from a domain more transparently than it manifests its intent to preclude tort liability. Implied reverse preemption, in this respect very different from implied preemption, gives courts distinct markers of congressional intent to look for. In Part II, I propose some criteria for courts to find implied reverse preemption. Fulfillment of the criteria suggests that Congress has pulled back from an inferred early agenda and no longer forecloses tort liability.

Both courts and scholars of preemption recognize that although Congress, as the originator and source of congressional intent, is central to any analysis of preemption, the executive branch of government—represented here by the agency charged with enforcement of a statutory mandate—plays its own role in determining whether injured persons can bring claims under state law. Constitutional and administrative laws recognize the possibility of delegation, whereby Congress cedes decisionmaking power to a federal agency.31 Federal agencies have manifested their belief that this delegation has given them the power to preempt state tort claims. Some courts have accepted these announced beliefs as authoritative.32 With more unanimity, courts have held that agencies must comply with statutory obligations even when Congress has not appropriated the necessary funds.33 Accordingly, any federal

A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1, 27 (2008) (identifying an unhealthy reverse preemption in state laws that defeat the purposes of antitrust law as written by Congress), with Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, When the Federal Death Penalty is “Cruel and Unusual,” 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 819, 879-80 (2006) (extolling a form of reverse preemption whereby the choice of a state to have no death penalty would outweigh a federal statutory death penalty for crimes committed in that state). I use “implied reverse preemption” here very differently, as a short form of “inferred retreat from a previously inferred preemption.”

30 See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 298 (2000) (commenting that the Supreme Court has left the presumption against preemption indeterminate); Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 25, at 454 (“It is exceedingly difficult to demonstrate that any consistent principle or explanatory variable emerges from the Supreme Court’s products liability preemption jurisprudence.”). See generally OWEN, supra note 21, at 939-40 (summarizing the consensus among commentators that preemption is “a mess” (citation omitted)).


32 Among federal agencies, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) has attracted the most attention on this point. See Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting the FDA’s participation in the appeal as amicus curiae); Ausness, supra note 21, at 55-56. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 534 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d, 521 F.3d 253, 275-76 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, No. 08-437, 2009 WL 578682 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2009), marked the first successful attempt in the federal appellate courts to invoke the FDA preamble as establishing preemption as establishing preemption.

33 Cherokee Nation v. Levitt, 543 U.S. 631, 640-42 (2005) (forcing the Department of Health and Human Services to pay sums it owed to two Indian tribes, notwithstanding its contention that Congress had not appropriated the money it needed); N. Y. Airways, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.2d 743, 748 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
agency holding assigned authority over safety, be it “independent” or subordinated to a Cabinet department, has a presence distinct from that of Congress in the setting of regulatory policies that pertain to preemption.\textsuperscript{34}

For judges and policymakers receptive to the thesis of this Article, it remains an open question which statutes and agencies will give the judiciary instances of implied reverse preemption to find; the experience of consumer safety is clear enough to provide a model of the phenomenon. Beginning either in 1976 or 1981, and continuing until 2008,\textsuperscript{35} Congress knocked the teeth from the Consumer Product Safety Act and weakened the Consumer Product Safety Commission, whose leaders appeared to welcome rather than resist the stripping of their power. Unity and bipartisanship pervaded this reversal; both Democrats and Republicans pursued statutory rollback and a reduction in agency power.\textsuperscript{36} Part III presents these undisputed developments without argument or criticism: I have my views about the federal interest in consumer safety, but they are of no moment here. The point of Part III is that at some point during a period of seventeen years, Congress ceased to intend, if it ever did intend, to assert a federal safety-regulatory stance that precluded tort liability for injuries attributed to consumer products.\textsuperscript{37} Congress chose not to occupy the field of consumer safety, nor to establish a comprehensive regulatory scheme. This absence or withdrawal of preemption left consumer product safety open to the powers and prerogatives of state law, especially state tort liability.

Implied reverse preemption and traditional preemption function together harmoniously in the adversary binary of manufacturer-defendants versus consumer-plaintiffs. I will even claim that acceptance

\textsuperscript{34} Independent federal agencies, of which the CPSC is one, traditionally respond more closely to Congress than to the President. Geoffrey P. Miller, \textit{Introduction: The Debate Over Independent Agencies in Light of Empirical Evidence}, 1988 Duke L.J. 215, 218.

\textsuperscript{35} Though unanimous on the point that the CPSC plunged into somnolence during the Reagan years, commentators disagree on when this descent began. One publication that focuses on industry rather than consumers, the Small Business Encyclopedia, deemed 1999 a turnaround year. \textit{See supra} note 20; \textit{see also infra} Part III.B. (exploring the ambiguous decline of federal consumer safety regulation in the late Carter and early Reagan presidential administrations).


\textsuperscript{37} This inference rests on my understanding that preemption is different from a congressional grant of mere immunity. Implied preemption presumes that Congress has substituted federal regulation for state-based tort liability as a means to promote consumer safety; it casts tort claims as obstructing a scheme that benefits consumers. If this premise is correct, then implied reverse preemption becomes a necessary counterpart to implied preemption, because as soon as Congress no longer desires to promote safety through federal regulation, immediately tort claims, or “regulation through litigation,” become the only available instrument of safety law. Retaining preemption under those circumstances would therefore generate only immunity, not safety. \textit{See generally Big Loss for Big Tobacco}, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2008, at A36 (praising the Supreme Court for insisting that preemption law does not require immunity for cigarette manufacturers).
of this new doctrine would make the work of preemption litigation more satisfying for lawyers and judges. At present, with only preemption and not implied reverse preemption available to them, lawyers on both sides immerse themselves in assembling decisional law that favors their clients’ stance on a yes/no affirmative defense and try to distinguish the contrary line.38 Judges find either preemption or no preemption. Everyone on the battleground has a set of tasks that are relatively mechanical.

The new front opened by implied reverse preemption brings a healthy challenge to precedents that had barred tort liability. Lawyers build an answer to the question of whether old findings of a congressional intent to preempt have been superseded. Because the evidence to support implied reverse preemption comes from relatively intelligible and accessible sources—amendments, budgets, agency announcements—courts could adjudicate the issue “on papers,” using memoranda and exhibits rather than costly stagings like Daubert hearings. Through this doctrine, judges would make preemption more even-handed and more consistent with law as legislators make it.

I. IMPLIED PREEMPTION OF STATE TORT LIABILITY: INFERRING A FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE DESIGN TO BAR PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS

A. To Begin: Congressional Intent

Under varied sources of doctrine, of which the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution has garnered the most attention,39 state law must yield to contrary federal law. The eighteenth-century declaration of congressional supremacy in the Constitution probably did not anticipate the twentieth-century rise of federal power under the Commerce Clause, suggesting that the searches for congressional intent to preempt inconsistent state law that courts now undertake may be inconsistent with the framers’ design.40 Nevertheless, the constitutional base from which courts find preemption today is solid.41 In its preemption decisions, the Supreme Court frequently pauses to pledge fealty to legislative intent, which it has called “the ultimate touchstone” in preemption analysis.42

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38 See infra Part III.A (assembling cases that support an inference of preemption by the CPSA).
39 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
42 For expressions of the Court’s devotion to congressional intent in preemption decisions, see Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1013 (2008); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine,
Courts considering assertions of implied preemption must, at least in principle, construe statutes with a “presumption against preemption,” a canon first declared by the Supreme Court in 1926. Although this presumption appears to be of doubtful force, the Court has never declared it dead, and in more recent preemption decisions the Court has reiterated the presumption to hold that tort claims could proceed. Any attempt to understand or enhance preemption doctrine accordingly must reckon with the canon of construction that reminds courts not to rush to this inference unless Congress has made clear its preemptive intent. Looking ahead to the implied reverse preemption thesis of this Article, we can make use of the canon: A presumption against preemption, if it has any impact at all, should affect interpretations not only of whether preemption exists, but how long it stays alive in a statute. The canon tells courts to recognize the possibility that Congress has abandoned an earlier ambition to preempt.

Another point of statutory interpretation that can inform implied reverse preemption relates to drawing inferences from a legislature’s failure to act. Following what William Eskridge has called the acquiescence rule, federal courts, led by the Supreme Court, have held that a failure by Congress to respond to the judicial construction of a statute signals congressional acceptance of that decision. This inference will often be ill-founded in fact. Congress might not have considered the judicial decision in question; it might have disagreed with it but failed to make a priority of reversing the holding; it might have rejected it but become frozen on the question of how to respond. Nevertheless, courts will sometimes draw this inference of acceptance.

Inferring legislative acceptance from legislative inaction suggests a precedent for courts as they consider whether to infer retreat
by Congress from an earlier inferred preemption. Any inference of an acquiescence by the legislature, to which many courts are quick to leap, makes strenuous demands on judges. They must ignore the realities noted above that contradict acquiescence by Congress (ignorance of the new judicial interpretation, inability to agree on an expression of disagreement, and so on), as well as the larger reality that this legislature “is a discontinuous decision maker.” Membership in the body turns over. Even if membership in a legislature could stay fixed, the focus of its legislation will change form. These demands do not burden judges who apply the implied reverse preemption that this Article advocates. Judges can proceed without blinkering themselves to the probabilities, well gathered by Eskridge, that suggest a misunderstanding of congressional inaction. Inferring distraction, disengagement, or the abandonment of a once-held legislative goal calls for much less conjecture than the established inference of embrace and agreement.

B. Speculating About Why Congress Would Want to Bar Personal Injury Claims

The doctrine of preemption recognizes that Congress can have plans that are inconsistent with state tort liability. Two of these legislative designs are familiar to courts. First, Congress might intend to occupy a field so completely that any state-level contribution to the regulatory endeavor could not supplement it. Second, Congress might have particular purposes that state tort law would obstruct by opening the possibility of a contrary result.

Both state-tort and federal-agency modes of regulation can make sense as sources of safety, and Congress might desire either path to the destination of fewer injuries in particular and public welfare in general. When policymakers understand the federal regulatory path as preemptive, however, they add asymmetry to the paths: federal rulemaking extinguishes tort claims, but tort claims do not extinguish

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49 ESKRIDGE, supra note 46, at 247.
50 Eskridge, a gay activist as well as a scholar of statutory interpretation, gives the example of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, written to bar mentally ill persons from entering the United States. The Public Health Service, enforcing a 1950s view of mental health, understood the statute to exclude homosexual persons. In 1979 the PHS revered this position, reinterpreting the statute in light of charged circumstances. Id. at 51-55.
federal rulemaking. Even at its most potent, tort liability can only hamper or obstruct a federal regulatory scheme. Because a finding of preemption makes the federal regulatory role a destroyer—in contrast to a finding of no preemption, which does not destroy the regulatory alternative—an inference of preemption requires courts to identify a congressional agenda consistent not only with favoring the federal-regulatory mode but with actively rejecting and repudiating tort liability.

A couple of rationales for this congressional agenda are available. Both have implications for implied reverse preemption as well.

1. Conflict Preemption and Field Preemption

Conflict or obstacle preemption is the plausible type of implied preemption for personal injury claims. The alternative, “field preemption,” usually applies to traditionally federal domains, and tort law governing personal injuries is traditionally left to the states. State governments hold a “police power[] to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.” Tort liability is central to their police power.

Field preemption could plausibly arise, however, should Congress decide that state tort liability interferes with its regulation of a field. Discussing preemption of drug claims, for example, Richard Epstein has nominated as a possible “field” the effort by Congress to enhance innovation in the pharmaceutical sector, making regulation more streamlined and centralized. Should courts agree that Congress has chosen this field preemption, a range of personal injury actions would fall away from American dockets. Though cogent, the suggestion has not persuaded judges to identify field preemption of pharmaceuticals complaints in particular, or of products liability complaints in general. Field preemption appears too vast and ambitious for courts to assert its existence without clearer guidance from Congress.

Judges and commentators are more inclined to find conflict preemption of personal injury claims when the result that a plaintiff is seeking through litigation would diverge from what Congress intended.

53 The anomaly has drawn scholarly attention. See Owen, supra note 21, at 969 (noting that “there is in fact no reason, as a general matter, why products safety regulation and products liability litigation cannot comfortably co-exist”).
54 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
55 See Grey, supra note 21, at 622 (arguing that field preemption “has no legitimate role when the issue is whether Congress has preempted state tort remedies”).
57 Grey, supra note 21, at 613.
The clearest example of such an inferred congressional design appears in *Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.*,\(^{59}\) where the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, determined that the plaintiff had to lose because what she desired clashed with a federal mandate to deny her this desire. Implied preemption in *Geier* came from the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, which forbade states from maintaining a motor vehicle standard not “identical” to the federal safety standard.\(^{60}\) Alexis Geier objected to the lack of an airbag in a Honda vehicle, contending that the vehicular design was defective; the standard in effect at the time had condoned the no-airbag design.\(^{61}\) Because the plaintiff could prevail only through a state-tort judgment that would condemn the absence of an airbag, the Court concluded that her claim conflicted with the permissiveness that federal standards had conscientiously installed and thus was preempted.\(^{62}\)

As applied to defeat products liability under state tort law, both field preemption (which courts do not use for this purpose) and conflict preemption as exemplified by *Geier* rest on a premise that Congress has installed a federal regulatory scheme that functions actively and deliberately to foster safety. Although inferring preemption has the same effect on liability as does simple immunity for defendants—plaintiffs’ claims are dismissed—the rationale for this effect is very different from any rationale for immunity.\(^{63}\) Congress might want to immunize a sector from tort liability for numerous varied reasons, but the reason for a preemptive regulatory scheme must be safety.\(^{64}\) Should Congress lose its desire to foster safety through the regulatory scheme and, through its actions or inactions, cause the scheme to lose force, then this shift eliminates both field preemption and conflict preemption.

2. Regard for an Agency

Going beyond the doctrinal categories of field preemption and conflict preemption, another rationale can underlie the congressional decision to foreclose tort liability: Congress might regard a federal agency as the more competent regulator. For this suggestion I rely on, and extrapolate from, Catherine Sharkey’s work on agency deference.\(^{65}\)

\(^{59}\) 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
\(^{60}\) Id. at 867.
\(^{61}\) Id. at 865.
\(^{62}\) Id. at 866.
\(^{63}\) See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
\(^{64}\) Or so I presume. I thank Cathy Sharkey for urging me to state the premise and thereby clarify my argument for readers who may have joined the preemption debate from a contrary starting point.
Sharkey argues that the best predictor of what the Supreme Court will do with a preemption claim is the position on preemption that the relevant agency has asserted. This position will vary: agencies turn out “just as likely, if not more likely,” to oppose preemption as favor it. The same agency will articulate more than one stance. For example, the Food and Drug Administration argued for preemption in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal Committee and Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. but against preemption in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr; the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration wanted Alexis Geier to lose on preemption but opposed preemption in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick; the Supreme Court, finding preemption in three of these cases and declining to find it in the other two, sided with the agency in all five. Because the Court “has been cryptic at best” on “what stands behind such deference to agency views,” Sharkey is forced to supply her own rationale for deference to an agency in its interpretive (as contrasted to regulatory) role. Concluding that agencies are often well situated to know the relative merits of a state-tort versus a federal-agency fix, Sharkey encourages courts to apply “Skidmore deference” to agency views on preemption. A Skidmore judicial stance would respect the comparative advantage of an agency to know “whether a uniform federal regulatory policy should exist.”

This panoramic version of deference makes a point pertaining to congressional intent and agency power: Regardless of whether the Supreme Court should accept or reject a particular claim of preemption (a question Sharkey builds a model to answer), any particular instance of regulation originates at least in part in a view that Congress had about relative institutional competence. On occasions that warrant deference to agency wishes, Congress would have believed that the empowered agency is better positioned than state tort liability to resolve one iteration of the recurring question: Do we need a uniform federal rule here? Like regulation might be more competent than tort liability at achieving particular ends, see Hylton, supra note 42, at 219-20 (noting the importance of judicial, as contrasted to congressional, regard for an agency); Peter H. Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort Law in Drug Regulation: Finding the Sweet Spot, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73, 76 (2008) (comparing the “regulatory toolkit” that state tort liability and federal rules each offer).

66 Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 25, at 471.
67 Id. at 475.
73 Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 25, at 477.
74 Id. at 471-72.
75 Id. at 491-96 (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).
76 Id. at 484.
77 Ascribing this inquiry to Congress, keeper of the vaunted congressional intent, seems strained, as Keith Hylton has contended. See generally Hylton, supra note 42 (arguing that it is
any other faith, congressional faith in the superior power of an agency can dwindle or disappear. If the judgment about agency superiority rests on facts rather than, or in addition to, faith or ideology, this judgment too can recede when facts change.

II. IMPLIED REVERSE PREEMPTION OF STATE TORT LIABILITY: INFERRING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ANY JUDICIAZLY INFERRED BAR OF PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS THAT MAY HAVE ONCE EXISTED

Here we pursue the thesis of this Article: The exercise of drawing inferences about what a legislature once intended with respect to regulation necessarily entails the possibility of inferring that the legislature has relinquished an older inferred intent on this point. Any doctrine of implied preemption that does not recognize the possibility of abandoning a once-held preemptive scheme cuts courts off from reality. Dropping the regulatory ball is as normal and predictable—just as integral to regulation—as picking it up. This Part builds on the standard account of congressional intent by exploring congressional retreat from safety initiatives. After considering the markers of abandonment that Congress makes public, the Part proceeds to discuss abandonment as manifested by an agency.

A. Congressional Abandonment

Congress has at hand three devices to express its intentions regarding the launch of a regulatory agenda. To start, it can vote to approve a new statute that provides for agency rulemaking. Second, it can appropriate funds to support a federal agency in this initiative. Third, it can return to the statute as needed, codifying amendments to take into account developments in the regulated sector. The last two prerogatives are also at the center of any inferable withdrawal of regulation. Congress can withdraw from previous levels of appropriation, and it can enact amendments that contract or undermine the original regulatory endeavor.78

1. Appropriations in Retreat

The monolithic Congress that, according to preemption doctrine, chooses to express what lies at the core of preemption—its singular intent to occupy a field or establish a comprehensive scheme of regulation incompatible with tort liability, or perhaps to opine on agency

judges who hold a view about relative institutional competence). Regardless of who asks it, however, the question is central to any analysis of preemption.

78 Overt repeal of a statute, a reversal of the first prerogative, eliminates the need for inferring.
competence—is a fiction, as explained by the literatures on public choice, game theory, and other academic genres. With respect to any issue before it, Congress has many intents and agendas, never just one. An aspect of its multiplicity that pertains to implied reverse preemption is the gap between substantive law-writing and appropriations. To effect a legislative change that requires money to proceed, a safety-reform coalition must first get the new statute written and then get it funded. Both houses of Congress have powerful appropriations committees that hold authority over federal disbursements. It is fairly common for Congress not to appropriate funds to pay for a new law it voted to enact.

This manifested ambivalence complicates the use of an appropriations criterion to draw any legal conclusion, not just the implied reverse preemption conclusion of this Article, because Congress can express conflicting desires about a new piece of legislation. Legislators can vote for a measure (implying congressional acceptance) yet not fund it (implying congressional rejection). Regardless of whether they find the response mixed or even contradictory, however, courts must consider the money-message that Congress sends to them. Their acceptance of implied preemption as doctrine has committed courts to drawing inferences about what Congress wants. As the case law on implied preemption indicates, manifestations of these wants emerge shrouded in ambiguity and doubt.

Committed to an appropriations analysis, courts considering implied reverse preemption could begin with a metric of decline in spending. This metric would direct judicial attention to an inflation-adjusted drop in appropriations over a period of years for the regulatory entity empowered to enforce what Congress has mandated. A court can infer that other things being equal, fewer dollars appropriated expresses

79 See supra Part I.B.
81 The authority of appropriations committees in Congress derives from the Constitution, which provides that “[m]oney shall be drawn from the treasury” only “in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law,” in a section describing the powers of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 7.
82 “New programs receive funding only if they can fit within predetermined limits. They can succeed legislatively only if some previously funded programs receive fewer funds or no money at all.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 184 (2000).
83 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. For courts reviewing claims of implied reverse preemption, a plausible response to the funding gap would be to accept the enactment of substantive regulatory legislation as an expression of congressional interest, and after a reasonable interval (perhaps two years) to require Congress either to show observers the money, so to speak, or acknowledge that its earlier enactment did not articulate a serious regulatory plan.
less desire to regulate. 84 Use of this metric requires attention to the surrounding budgetary scene: agency budgets often include increases unrelated to regulatory policy. Federal agencies sometimes have to augment their expenditures on such items as mandatory pay raises, added premiums for employees’ insurance, increased pension contributions, and escalation in rents for its office spaces. 85 Whenever such upticks are beyond the control of agency budgets at a time that appropriations remain flat—especially if the agency carries out its mission using human employees more than hardware—Congress has in effect diminished its spending on regulation. 86

An alternative metric would focus on whether a level of funding suffices to fulfill the statutory agenda. This conclusion may appear beyond the judicial ken, replete as it is with tradeoffs and indeterminate variables piled on top of the question of what the statute seeks to achieve. Courts are familiar with it, however, having issued numerous judgments in response to contentions that the federal government lacks the money to pay a claim or cannot afford to fund entitlements. 87

For judges who resist accepting implied reverse preemption in the belief that it is too novel or too potentially far-reaching, one last metric could limit the doctrine to extraordinary circumstances. A court could choose to find implied reverse preemption only when the relevant agency appears unfunded to the point of utter dysfunction: a de facto abolition of the entity. 88 This conservative approach to implied reverse preemption is at odds with the ready inference of preemption to immunize tort defendants, a locus of what might be called judicial

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84 Courts could refine this analysis with attention to circumstances as they arise. For example, a domestic spending freeze might dictate a reduction in dollar appropriations throughout the federal bureaucracy. Such a reduction does not express retreat from the particular regulatory mandate. Another possible metric that attends to circumstances would consider relative decline in spending. Similarly situated agencies or entities might have received more money while the agency in question is receiving less. Courts may infer that this shift in expenditure manifests a reduced desire to affect the statute’s design. Relative decline, like the absolute decline mentioned above, would require data from a period of years to show the diminution in congressional interest, as well as an understanding of the relevant comparators.

85 Telephone Interview with Rachel Weintraub, Dir. of Prod. Safety and Senior Counsel, Consumer Fed. of Am. (Dec. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Weintraub Interview].

86 Id.

87 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. A state-law analogy emerges in education cases. When local governments contend that they cannot afford to honor state constitutional rights to education, courts often insist that they must. See generally Christopher E. Adams, Comment, Is Economic Integration the Fourth Wave in School Finance Litigation?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1613, 1620-23 (2007) (describing judges’ willingness to enforce rights by ordering expenditures).

88 I have in mind a collapse in funding that in turn generates consensus that the agency has fallen to the level of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) following Hurricane Katrina. See Cliff Chitwood, Study Risk of Quake Before Adopting Codes, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Jan. 19, 2008 (available on LEXIS) (“In FEMA’s world view, hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, earthquakes and any other event that might cost the federal government money are all of one kind and demand the same response: more money spent by others in the form of unfunded mandates”); Carol Eisenberg, FEMA Falls Short on L.I., NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Dec. 14, 2007, at A30 (referring to “the Katrina debacle”).
activism;\textsuperscript{89} but it offers courts a principled basis to reject implied reverse preemption for the common run of cases while having it available whenever dire appropriation levels support the inference.

2. Manifested Regulatory Design in Retreat: Later Amendments

Courts can find implied reverse preemption manifested in decisions by Congress to pull back from its earlier safety mandates. We have already noted the possibility of repeal, the plainest signal of congressional retreat from an agenda.\textsuperscript{90} Less overt, but just as probative of abandonment, is a pattern of amendments that weaken the original swath of regulatory powers. The inference gains strength the more numerous such weakening amendments become. A single piece of amending legislation that appears to express withdrawal from a preempting scheme, if ambiguous, ought to receive the benefit of the doubt: it could look like relinquishment but might amount to a different approach to the same safety agenda that had been, and remains, incompatible with tort liability. After the withdrawing amendments accrete, however, they express in the aggregate a congressional intent to do less to maintain the original safety-enhancing federal regime.

B. Agency Abandonment

Judicial inquiries into implied preemption, a construct rooted in legislative supremacy and, from there, in congressional intent, also consider the policies that an agency has manifested, distinct from the statutory provisions that empower it.\textsuperscript{91} As constitutional actors, agencies respond to the direction of Congress. Courts call this direction delegation.\textsuperscript{92} Like preemption itself, delegation is a judicial construct that need not—and typically will not—be manifested in overt action by Congress.\textsuperscript{93}

\textsuperscript{89} The writings of Mary Davis are on point. See generally Mary J. Davis, The Supreme Court and Our Culture of Irresponsibility, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1075 (1996) (summarizing the Supreme Court’s energetic embrace of doctrines to protect products liability defendants); Davis, Unmasking, supra note 40.

\textsuperscript{90} See supra note 28 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{91} See generally Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 25; see also Ausness, supra note 21, at 758-71 (noting the complications of deferring to an agency position that has shifted over time).


\textsuperscript{93} See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
1. Authority: Recognizing Delegation to Make a Decision About Reversing a Regulatory Direction

Every federal agency brings its own expertise and methods to a legislative agenda. Under the version of congressional intent that courts use to hold that a plaintiff may not proceed with a personal injury claim, courts infer that Congress, instead of (or in addition to) writing safety regulations of its own, gave an administrative authority the power to craft rules superior to those that would emerge from state decisional law. The competence that makes delegation plausible in a particular context necessarily includes a distinct identity.

Accompanying this premise, so central to implied preemption, is the mirror-premise central to implied reverse preemption: An agency that once was inclined to codify and enforce safety regulations can become disinclined to stick to this task.\(^94\) Inertia keeps old rules in the Code of Federal Regulations and other repositories long after individuals who effect agency policy have ceased to care about particular regulatory goals that the agency used to pursue. So seen, delegation represents a congressional grant of power that assigns an agency not only the prerogative to write rules potent enough to preempt tort liability, but also the prerogative to let go of its erstwhile preemptive ambition.\(^95\)

Any judge who reaches a conclusion of abandonment by an agency does not necessarily condemn this inaction. Agency restraint might bespeak a “no harm, no foul” conclusion about an industry or sector that has been functioning well, independent of or unaffected by the federal code. Alternatively, a problematic condition—sloth, corruption, capture by industry, or inadequate funding from Congress—might explain the torpor of a do-little agency.

Judges’ power to find implied reverse preemption has effects that are benign when the industry is functioning well and salutary when it needs intervention. If an agency has declined to write rules because the sector it regulates is not hurting anyone, then personal injury litigation will not clog the courts,\(^96\) and no harm to the congressional design will

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94. Cf. OWEN, supra note 21, at 954 (observing, in another context, that “even a federal agency has the right to change its mind, and that an agency’s current views on preemption are entitled to respect”).

95. See generally Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 25 (emphasizing the role of agencies as safety decisionmakers).

96. I assume an inverse relation between the safety of the sector’s activity and the rate of personal injury claiming. I do not mean to suggest that every claim filed bespeaks a real injury, only that preemption is not the solution to fraudulent or exaggerated allegations of injury by malingerers and their attorneys. Preemption functions to bar claims of true harm on the premise that giving plaintiffs the relief they seek, or forcing sellers to proceed with manufacture and distribution in anticipation of being sued, would retard rather than advance public safety. See supra text accompanying notes 59-62 (discussing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000)). Like all other affirmative defenses, preemption does not catch or discourage dishonest claiming. Fears of the falsity problem have no place in the law of preemption. When applying the doctrine, courts may reasonably assume that attempts to bring personal injury claims bespeak real injuries, and, conversely, that the lack of such attempts suggests a track record of safety.
follow. The existence of an industry flourishing—and hurting few people—with few agency-written rules and little liability provides an instance of success with which implied reverse preemption will not interfere. If the agency ought to have written and enforced rules but became inactive for malign reasons, then reversing the inference of preemption helps to cure a pathology.

2. Manifestations: Scant Rulemaking Activity, Budgetary Passivity, and a Subdued Public Presence

The Congressional Review Act, passed in 1996 as part of the famed anti-regulatory Contract With America, requires federal agencies to submit their proposed rules to Congress for approval. The statute declares that a proposed rule may fall into the “major” category; a major rule is defined as a rule expected to have an annual impact on the economy of at least $100 million. During the first decade of enactment, federal agencies duly conveyed to Congress and the General Accounting Office 41,218 non-major rules and 610 major rules, thereby setting a baseline quantity.

The rules appear numerous, but might not be so in relation to the amount of regulation needed. Scant rulemaking activity—or at least an attitude against rulemaking—occupied federal policy before the Contract With America. Calls for regulatory relief emerged loudly in the Reagan administration; critics who claimed that the government was wasting money on irrational and inefficient rules advocated successfully within the executive branch for cost-benefit analysis as a policy tool. The cost-benefit criterion compels administrators to justify proposed rules as tending to produce gains that exceed losses.

The premise behind the requirement is that administrators would otherwise overregulate. Advocates of regulatory rollback have argued that when unchecked by constraints like cost-benefit analysis, bureaucrats write rules more burdensome than what rational, informed

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97 An example of this success from my own long-concluded experience as a litigator: I used to defend personal injury claims for toxic shock syndrome, a disease attributed to tampons. Lawyers once specialized in this category of products liability work. Today, as a result of improved product design and well-written FDA-mandated warnings, tampon-associated toxic shock syndrome arises so much less often, and the decisional law about it has become so clear, that lawyers can no longer make a living prosecuting or defending these claims. Judges agree that claims of defective warning are preempted by compliance with the FDA script, see, e.g., Papike v. Tambrands, Inc., 107 F.3d 737, 740-41 (9th Cir. 1997); Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988-90 (8th Cir. 1994), but because of the absence of injuries and claims, a contrary understanding of preemption would leave manufacturers and consumers in the same position.

99 Id. § 804(2)(A).
100 Cindy Skrzycki, Reform’s Knockout Act, Kept Out of the Ring, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2006, at D1.
102 See id. at 449-50.
governments and individuals would choose. This claim, which critics have contested vigorously, may be stated in less controversial terms: Rule-promulgating is the core business of an agency. Administrators who do not occupy themselves with the creation of new rules are relatively inactive.

These administrators have other activities as well. Accompanying the truism that “rulemakers make rules” is the proposition that individuals who head agencies seek to maximize their budgets. Anyone actively heading a federal agency would desire larger appropriations from Congress and want decisionmakers within the executive branch like the Office of Management and Budget to support the agency’s petition for more money. Finally, administrators who manage agencies actively will pursue public relations, understanding that media visibility tends to bolster taxpayer support for the mission. Administrators of any agency whose mission includes public safety will want recognition of its safety-enhancing efforts.

Vital signs like these have their antonyms. Reduced rulemaking activity, budgetary passivity, and a subdued public presence all manifest retreat from a regulatory agenda. Any agency that writes few or no major rules, or an exceptionally low number of non-major rules, is doing relatively little regulating. Lack of advocacy for budgetary largesse implies lack of participation in the regulatory endeavor. The public-visibility aspect of agency strength, though harder to quantify than the other two indicators, is amenable to observation of the agency head at work.

III. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY AS AN INSTANCE OF IMPLIED REVERSE PREEMPTION

Evaluating consumer product safety in terms of implied reverse preemption calls for two steps of analysis. The first step, undertaken in the first section of this Part, looks for preemptive effects of federal statutes (focusing on the Consumer Product Safety Act) to show why readers of a statute might draw the inference of preemption and to explore the consequences of a retreat from preemption. The second section of the Part proceeds to evidence supporting an inference of retreat from preemption as manifested by both Congress and the Consumer Product Safety Commission.

103 See, e.g., id. at 448 (summarizing studies by John F. Morrall, Robert W. Hahn, and Tammy O. Tengs and John O. Graham).
104 See id. at 448-52.
105 See William A. Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617, 630 (1975); Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 101, at 452 (noting “that agency heads seek to increase their budgets”).
A. Statutory Language Supporting an Inference of Preemption

Congress empowered the Consumer Products Safety Commission to regulate under several statutes: the CPSA, the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, the Refrigerator Safety Act, the Flammable Fabrics Act, and the Poison Prevention Packaging Act. Preemption is not an issue for three of the five. Because the Poison Prevention Packaging Act and the Refrigerator Safety Act have been invoked only rarely in personal injury litigation, a preemption defense has not emerged in decisional law. The Flammable Fabrics Act is settled, at least as of this writing, in the opposite direction: even though this statute contains a preemption clause, “the courts have ruled that [it] does not preempt products liability claims for flammable clothing.”

As for the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (“FHSA”), this statute authorizes the Commission to establish mandatory labeling requirements for certain chemicals marketed for household use. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., which in 1992 held that congressionally mandated words on cigarette packaging preempted tort liability, invites a similar interpretation of CPSC-decreed warning language, and so one might have predicted the pattern reported in the leading products liability hornbook: cases from the 1970s find no preemption and cases post-Cipollone find that the FHSA does indeed preempt. Because the FHSA gives the Commission authority to script acceptable warnings, courts interpreting this statute after Cipollone have found the inference of preemption straightforward.

Although its case law is sparse, the Consumer Product Safety Act presents a more varied preemption picture. The CPSA contains both express-preemption and savings clauses. Express preemption appears in the CPSA provision that no state may establish a safety standard or regulation about a consumer product if a federal safety standard issued under authority of the CPSA already addresses this risk.
of injury.114 Two savings clauses are also present in the statute. One clause saves remedies available under state law for violation of CPSA provisions.115 The second, more familiar, savings clause provides that compliance with federal consumer safety rules will not relieve a seller from liability at common law.116

Since 2000, federal courts have used Geier v. American Honda Co., Inc.117 for guidance in navigating the inclusion of these apparently contradictory preemption messages. Although Geier ruled in favor of a seller-defendant, the opinion of the Court insisted that the presence of a savings clause in a statute mandates a narrow reading of preemption language: a broad reading would mean that “little, if any, potential ‘liability at common law’ would remain. And few, if any, tort actions would remain for the savings clause to save.”118 Thus, despite the failure of the plaintiff’s personal injury claim in Geier, consumer-safety decisions that cite Geier agree that the multiple clauses of the CPSA must preserve at least some tort liability.119

Framing the CPSA preemption question in terms of Geier means that courts must scrutinize the particulars of the plaintiff’s claim, which typically will allege a warning or design defect. If the remedy sought does not conflict with a regulation promulgated under the statute, then the claim is not preempted, and the plaintiff may seek redress in tort. If what the plaintiff seeks is at odds with federal consumer safety regulations, then the CPSA preempts the claim.

Courts applying the CPSA to particular complaints have reached different conclusions on preemption. Most of what might be called the lawnmower cases have concluded that the CPSA preempts claims of design defect and failure to warn. 120 The other product-specific set of cases, attributing harm to cigarette lighters, has produced more mixed results.121 Presenting no unanimity on the question of preemption, in sum,

115 Id. § 2075(b).
116 Id. § 2074(a).
118 Id. at 868.
120 See Moe v. MTD Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 179 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that warning claims but not design claims were preempted); Frazier v. Heckingers, 96 F. Supp. 2d 486, 491 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that the CPSA preempts both design and warning claims); Cortez v. MTD Prods., Inc., 927 F. Supp. 386, 389 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
decisional law does feature several judicial conclusions that the Consumer Product Safety Act, coupled with actions taken by the Consumer Product Safety Commission, can bar injured persons from bringing claims against product sellers.

B. Manifestations of a Lesser Federal Regulatory Interest

1. Amendments Marching Backward

Staffers at the Consumer Product Safety Commission recently prepared a list of amendments to the Consumer Product Safety Act enacted through 2008, in the form of an unofficial compilation. Of the ten pieces of legislation named, two pertain directly to implied reverse preemption: the 1981 amendments are most central, but amendments of 1976 are of interest as well. To show the arc of withdrawal, I review the 1976 and 1981 changes in chronological order.

The Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976 achieved its “improvements” prominently by removing Commission authority to regulate tobacco and firearms. As early as 1973 it had been clear enough to then-professor Antonin Scalia and his co-author Frank Goodman that the Act did not give the Commission any power with respect to these two products, but the 1976 amendment took the form of an overt ban on CPSC authority. An anti-regulatory sentiment is manifest throughout the 1976 amendments, which widened the swath of preemptable state law: the original CPSA had encouraged uniformity via its express preemption clause but allowed state consumer regulation to differ from CPSC-authorized rules whenever the CPSC approved these state alternatives as amenable to co-existence. The 1976 amendments ordered the CPSC to deem such state regulations

4:97-CV-02467, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19699, at *7-8 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2000) (holding that the plaintiff’s design claims were preempted, and that the warning claim failed for other reasons), and Frith v. BIC Corp., 863 So. 2d 960, 967 (Miss. 2004) (holding that design defect claim was preempted because the CPSC had issued cigarette lighter regulations that did not require the safety feature at issue), and BIC Pen Corp. v. Carter, 251 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. 2008) (same).


123 Six of the others, being narrower or more modest in scope, do not bear on the question of retreat; the Consumer Product Safety Improvements Act of 1990 focuses mainly on reporting obligations and does not relate directly to tort liability; the 2008 Act is written as a congressional volte-face. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.

124 Pub. L. No. 94-284, §§ 3(c), (e), 90 Stat. 503, 504 (1976).

125 Scalia & Goodman, supra note 13, at 902.

inconsistent when manufacturers’ economic difficulties with compliance were included in the “burden” these state regulations created.127

The maneuvers of 1976 show the need for a doctrine of implied reverse preemption. Implied reverse preemption perceives the difference between, on the one hand, a national scheme of safety regulation, which tort liability might obstruct and thereby harm public welfare and, on the other hand, an unprincipled gift of immunity to the injuring sector, which tort liability might also obstruct and thereby enhance public welfare. Mere enactments do not of themselves evince congressional occupation of a field or comprehensive regulation. As a judge can easily tell, the 1976 amendments did nothing to make consumer products safer. They took away from the CPSC regulatory authority over two products without giving this power to any other federal agency, and they squelched safety-fostering rules that states could otherwise have promulgated by adding an anti-safety economic-burden element to what the CPSC had to weigh when reviewing state regulations. Putting too much faith in the surface of the 1976 amendments—Look! The amendments extend federal control. Congress must have intended to preempt!—yields a wrong answer to the intent question. Implied reverse preemption, with its criteria for showing abandonment, repairs the error.

The Reagan-vintage 1981 amendments occupy the peak of congressional withdrawal from consumer product safety regulation. Declaring that the CPSC must do less and exercise less power, they display the retreat that is central to implied reverse preemption. Congress provided in 1981 that the CPSC could no longer write “requirements governing the contents, composition, design, construction, finish, or packaging of products.”128 Instead, it had to limit its standards to the domain of “performance, labeling, and warning.”129 Congress also prevented the Commission from releasing reports that manufacturers had provided about product hazards, removed amusement park rides from CPSC jurisdiction, and established a panel that had to be convened before the Commission could begin rulemaking about toxins.130

More notoriously, in the 1981 amendments Congress prohibited the Commission from promulgating mandatory rules. “Voluntary” standards became the regulatory mode of choice.131 Under this reform, rather than write a mandate, the Commission must publish an advance notice of proposed rulemaking and invite the submission of an existing

129 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
130 Adler, supra note 16, at 98 n. 204.
131 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 70.
voluntary standard or the intent to draft one.\textsuperscript{132} Only when no adequate voluntary standard emerges or when industry fails to comply with voluntary standards may the Commission resort to a mandatory rule.\textsuperscript{133}

The legislative history of the 1972 statute had expressed scorn for voluntary standards as a source of consumer safety.\textsuperscript{134} According to the 1970 report that Congress commissioned, any voluntary standard that originated in an industry’s “consensus” about what would be good typically will amount to “little more than an affirmation of the status quo.”\textsuperscript{135} An earlier report by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, also included in the legislative history, viewed mandatory safety standards as necessary to eliminating as much as twenty percent of household accidents.\textsuperscript{136} When it was young, the Commission habitually “expressed strong reservations about voluntary standards.”\textsuperscript{137}

It would be naïve to celebrate mandatory standards as desirable per se; they have had a problematic record in American consumer product safety. Writing in 1973 about the Commission’s administrative procedures, Scalia and Goodman described the extraordinarily cumbersome routes to mandatory rules that Congress had imposed on the fledgling agency.\textsuperscript{138} One especially burdensome process—a road probably paved with good intentions—banned the CPSC from writing its own mandatory standards; instead it had to receive petitions from the public (individual citizens, regulated industries, and dilettantes alike) that contained draft standards for its review.\textsuperscript{139} This “offeror” method of rulewriting, now gone, had the effect of compelling the Commission to dance to outsiders’ tunes, causing its second chairman, S. John Byington, to install new rules that streamlined the bulky procedures at the price of shifting more work onto petitioners.\textsuperscript{140} Thus, by the time Congress rejected mandatory standards in 1981, the CPSC had had negative experiences with such rules.

\textsuperscript{132} 15 U.S.C. § 2058(a)(5)-(6) (2006). Once it receives such a submission, the Commission is charged to assist in the development of voluntary standards. Id. § 2054(a)(3)-(4).

\textsuperscript{133} Id. § 2058(b)(2).


\textsuperscript{135} Id. at 1400 (quoting the Nat’l Comm’n on Prod. Safety, Final Report of the National Commission on Product Safety 62 (1970)).


\textsuperscript{137} Id. at 1400 (quoting the Nat’l Comm’n on Prod. Safety, Final Report of the National Commission on Product Safety 62 (1970)).


\textsuperscript{139} Id. at 1400 (quoting the Nat’l Comm’n on Prod. Safety, Final Report of the National Commission on Product Safety 62 (1970)).

Arguably, then, the mandatory-to-voluntary shift could manifest mindfulness—a carefully chosen regulatory policy—rather than pathology. As one lawyer who advocates for manufacturers before the Commission recently argued, any agency with jurisdiction over many varied products will function more flexibly using voluntary industry standards, other things being equal. Proposed new federal rules, the only alternative type of administrative regulation, must clear “cumbersome notice-and-comment requirements.” A plenary mandate means that the Commission can have little comparative advantage as a writer of new product-specific regulations and thus can delegate rulemaking effectively to industry evaluations. Under this approach, the Commission abstains conscientiously from the writing of standards (rather than fails to write them) and intervenes primarily through its power to find a “substantial product hazard” warranting a recall order.

To conclude that this mode of regulation supports a finding of implied reverse preemption is not to criticize the decisionmakers who choose it, nor the merits of any scheme that rests on voluntary standards. Undoubtedly both regulated sectors and Commission regulators could deploy the voluntary-standards method in good faith and with due regard for consumer welfare. The question for courts considering implied preemption, however, is not whether regulators are doing a bad job but whether the behavior of an agency bespeaks a retreat from overt intervention that had once been sufficient to indicate the occupying of a field or the imposition of a regulatory design incompatible with tort liability. Laissez-faire execution of a statutory mandate, whatever virtues it may offer, does not comport with field preemption or conflict preemption. Instead it manifests a plan to refrain from telling the regulated sector what to do. When such a plan is in place, tort liability fills the regulatory void, and to the extent it tells a manufacturer what to do, it defies no contrary orders from an agency or Congress. Taken as a whole, the Consumer Product Safety Amendments of 1981 identify federal regulation—rather than danger to consumers—as an ill to be eradicated. Tort liability becomes necessary whenever federal regulation is cast as problematic.

This necessity remains even when regulators praise the effectiveness of voluntary controls. In a 1995 report, the Commission claimed to have enjoyed “great success in working cooperatively with

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142 Id.
143 See id.
145 See Wilson v. Bradlees of New Eng., Inc., 96 F.3d 552, 557 (1st Cir. 1996) (observing that “[f]ederal regulation may be a substitute for common-law liability; industry self-regulation is not”).
industry to develop voluntary standards.” No better route to consumer safety, it asserted: “Indeed, the Commission has found that with the products it regulates, negotiating such standards can be far more efficient than rulemaking or even negotiated rulemaking.” Perhaps. This Article has no ideological quarrel with standards that industries write to govern themselves; such precepts might function better than mandatory rules.

Used to suppress personal injury claiming, however, voluntary standards obstruct the entitlements of all who did not consent to them and could otherwise bring tort actions. In function these standards become just as mandatory as they are voluntary. Courts cannot escape the inference of compulsion; faced with preemption disputes in the context of consumer safety, they can weigh in on the “mandatory” question only by determining who will be compelled, manufacturers or the persons alleging injury from defective products. The libertarian 1981 amendments are coercive indeed without a doctrine of implied reverse preemption to ameliorate what they compel.

2. Defunding

By whatever metric a court might apply—absolute defunding, relative defunding, funding insufficient to meet the agency’s statutory mandate, perhaps even defunding to the point of dysfunction—appropriations to support the Consumer Product Safety Commission were too low to sustain an inference of preemption for the period 1981 to 2008. Though less dramatic than the statutory retreat of 1981, the appropriation pattern of that same year lends further support to an inference of reverse preemption. Fiscal year 1982 manifested a shrunken budget for the CPSC: the Commission had to close offices and retrench its operations. The ideology ascendant in the early 1980s—deregulation coupled with tax cuts to “starve the beast”—helped to impose a view that one writer has described, with a straight face, as “Let the Market Protect Consumer Safety.”


147 Id.

148 In the context of pharmaceuticals, I have argued for a regulatory shift that would favor transparency, incentives for the industry, and information production over traditional command-based restraints. See generally Anita Bernstein & Joseph Bernstein, An Information Prescription for Drug Regulation, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 569 (2006).


150 For a summary of this ideology as put into effect in 1981, see Jon Margolis, Reagan Revolution Stronger Now than During Presidency, Chi. TRIB., June 6, 2004, at Cl.

151 Hood, supra note 19.
Commission funding never regained the level of the benchmark year 1974. In 1997, the General Accounting Office ("GAO") studied the appropriation of money to the CPSC and how the agency used these funds. During that year, the CPSC budget was $42.5 million, and the agency employed 480 full-time equivalents. The GAO calculated that these numbers represented a 60% drop in funding (adjusting for inflation) and a 43% cut in the staff compared to 1974. The Commission had noted with pride in 1994 that it had the same budget (unadjusted) that it had in 1979.

Flat levels of appropriation and staffing for the CPSC represent a retreat from regulation because "since 1974, many of the industries the CPSC regulates have experienced explosive growth." Injury rates too have increased: for example, "toy-related injuries [went] from about 130,000 in 1996 to about 220,000 in 2006," a rise that exceeds the concomitant growth in population. Similarly, the rise in deaths associated with all-terrain vehicles, "from 55 in 1985 to 734 in 2004," far exceeds their rise in sales.

Reductions in federal budgets result from a combination of lessened inclination among legislators to appropriate money and lessened agency requests. Negotiations among the CPSC, the Office of Management and Budget, and congressional committees yield each annual appropriation. Courts attuned to the negotiation dynamic can conclude that reduced appropriation for an agency may bespeak not only congressional retreat but an agency’s disinclination to spend money on regulation. Observed through this lens, the CPSC at least cooperated with, and may have hastened, the decline in congressional funding that supports an inference of reverse preemption.

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152 “From FY 1974, when the agency first became fully operational, to FY 2008, CPSC’s budget has been cut almost 40 percent when adjusted for inflation.” OMB Watch, Product Safety Regulator Hobbed by Decades of Negligence, Feb. 5, 2008, http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/4154/1/527 [hereinafter OMB Watch].
153 FELCHER, supra note 36, at 195.
154 Id.
155 Id.
157 FELCHER, supra note 36, at 195. Sectors that have burgeoned since the 1970s include home improvement equipment (marketed through the Home Depot chain, which grew enormous over those years), recreational equipment like snowmobiles and scooters, and items used to transport small children. Id.
158 OMB Watch, supra note 152.
159 Id.; see also Robin Ingle, Which Toys are Okay? Don’t Ask the Safety Police, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2007, at B3 (observing, from an inside-the-agency perspective, that by 2004 “[d]eaths and injuries [from all-terrain vehicles] had grown to such alarming numbers that my supervisor [at CPSC], a meticulous statistician, asked me to recalculate them several times”).
160 Weintraub interview, supra note 85.
3. Almost No Strong Rules

We have seen that two adjectives modify the word “standards” or “rules” to connote heft: “mandatory” and “major.” Rules in the mandatory category indicate that the Consumer Product Safety Commission deems the danger too strong for rulemaking by industry consensus. Rules in the major category have a significant effect on the economy. Both adjectives are vanishingly rare in the annals of consumer safety rulemaking from 1981 to 2009.

When the Consumer Product Safety Commission was formed, its first chairman, Richard Simpson, predicted that the Commission would promulgate about a hundred mandatory standards during its early years. Commissioner Simpson was off by a factor of about a hundred. Agency frustration with the mandatory-standard approach can account for only part of this slender record.

Over its entire history, the Consumer Product Safety Commission has written only one rule that falls into the “major” category: a rule on mattress flammability promulgated in 2006. Given the wide jurisdiction of the agency—”consumer product” describes many things, even after retrenchments from the original statutory language—it is hard to suppose that no other hazard belongs in the $150 million category. An output this slender shows a disinclination to write important rules.

4. Lassitude in Leadership

Torpor at the Consumer Product Safety Commission before the 2008 amendments exudes from the public behaviors of commissioners and those who appointed them. The two years preceding the 2008 legislation are particularly salient: in this period the Bush administration manifested its lack of interest in robust regulation of consumer safety. When the chairman of the CPSC, Hal Stratton, left the agency in 2006 to join “a law firm that specialize[d] in attacking class-action lawsuits filed by consumers,” the President did not appoint anyone to replace him.

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161 See supra text accompanying notes 131-133 (noting the exceptional status of mandatory rules in contemporary CPSC rulemaking); text accompanying notes 99-102 (describing major rules as classified in the Congressional Review Act).

162 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 44.

163 Felcher, supra note 36, at 29-30 (noting that by 1977 the Commission “had issued only three mandatory standards”).

164 See id.; see also supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.

165 See infra notes 178-186 (discussing this rule).

166 See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 42-43 (noting “expansive jurisdiction” of the statute and reporting estimates that the CPSC regulates about “ten thousand consumer products and over a million producers and sellers of such products”).

and left office without having named a chairman. 168 Starting in January 2008, until a stopgap in August 2008 was set up to run for the remainder of the calendar year, the CPSC lacked a quorum of commissioners and was thus precluded from doing much of its work. President Bush nominated an employee of the National Association of Manufacturers to one of the Commission’s vacant seats; this nominee withdrew two months later when members of the Senate insisted on seeing his severance agreement from this defense-side lobby. 169

This void at the Commission is sufficient of itself to evince an absence of field preemption or conflict preemption—that is, emptiness signifies inaction—and the public behaviors of its chairman during this period confirm the inference. It bears mention that regulators working in an era suspicious of regulation are under pressure not to look like zealots. 170 That said, a CPSC commissioner can stick out as especially disinclined to regulate.

The CPSC chairman holding office at the time of this writing embodies such disinclination. Back in 2007, when Congress began to plan its increased appropriations for consumer safety, Nancy Nord declared she did not want what a news story at the time called “more money and more power.” 171 A Senate panel had proposed to increase the agency’s budget from $63 million to nearly $142 million in 2015 and raise its cap on penalties from $1.8 million to $100 million. 172 The commissioner “said thanks but no thanks to the Senate’s offer.” 173 She wrote two letters to members of the Senate Commerce Committee, asking them “not to approve the bulk of legislation that would increase the agency’s authority, double its budget and sharply increase its dwindling staff.” 174

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168 See William M. Welch, Lead Law Throttles Youth Powersports, USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 2009, at 3A (reporting information announced to the media by the chief of staff to the acting chairman). In May 2009, when this Article was going to press, President Barak Obama named Inez Moore Tenenbaum as chairman and Robert S. Adler, a scholar of product safety regulation, as commissioner. Andrew Zajac, Head of Product Safety Is Named, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 2009, at B4; see also supra note 16 (citing Adler’s work on the CPSC).


170 One chairman appointed by President Clinton and remembered as a consumer activist, Ann Brown, mentioned early in her tenure that “being an advocate and being a regulator are very different, and they should be. I have to bring all the disparate interests together. I can’t just be advocating for any one group.” Julie Gannon Shoop, The New, Improved CPSC: Under Ann Brown, A Consumer Protection Revival, TRIAL, Sept. 1, 1994, at 22 (reporting an interview with Brown).

171 Lazarus, supra note 167.

172 Id.

173 Id.

174 Stephen Labaton, Bigger Budget? No, Responds Safety Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2007; see also id. (noting that the Commission had only one employee to test toys and only 15 inspectors handling imported consumer products, “a marketplace that last year was valued at $614 billion”).
The acting chairman made artful arguments against the proffered largesse. She did not say that she found the prospect of actually regulating anyone to be repugnant. Instead she spoke about agency expertise and unintended consequences. The whistleblower protection provision would, she protested, give the CPSC a “dramatic and unprecedented mission.”175 The proposed increase in penalties would motivate manufactures to blanket the CPSC with self-protective documentation. Both new powers—apparently, any new powers—could have the perverse effect of “hampering, rather than furthering consumer product safety,” she said.176 She also protested the absence of immediate appropriations to fund the expanded mandates, even though Congress always mandates first and funds second.177

Similar resistance to overt regulatory effort—if not out-and-out bad faith—emerges from the Commission’s long-awaited 2006 standard for mattress flammability.178 Here the Consumer Product Safety Commission practiced preemption by preamble, a measure that Congress banned two years later.179 One commentator describes the wording of this preemption statement as “expansive.”180 It was more than expansive; it was something of an ambush. In January 2005, the CPSC issued a far blander preamble in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.181 Both the January 2005 and the March 2006 notices in the Federal Register discuss preemption, as federal agencies must when they announce purposed new regulation;182 but whereas the 2005 notice purported only to summarize the existing effect of rules and standards created pursuant to the Flammable Fabrics Act,183 in 2006 the Commission wrote that it “intends and expects that the new mattress flammability standard will preempt inconsistent state standards and requirements.”184 It included “common law” as a source of such inconsistent input from the states,185 and deplored the possibility that “each state could use its tort law to enforce whatever flammability standard it deemed appropriate, potentially creating fifty different mattress fire standards across the nation.”186

175 Stephen J. Hedges, Toy Recalls Spur Call for Ouster, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 31, 2007, at Cl.
176 Id.
177 Lazarus, supra note 167.
179 See infra note 190-192 and accompanying text.
180 O’Loughlin, supra note 141, at 1038.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 13,497.
The 2008 amendments to the statute articulated a clear position on preemption-by-preamble that suggests 2008 was indeed a turning point.\(^{187}\) Under Section 231 of the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, the Commission and all other administrative units of the federal government writing rules pursuant to the CPSA, the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, and the Flammable Fabrics Act may not practice “preemption by preamble.”\(^{188}\) Congress drew up a comprehensive list—“any preamble, statement of policy, executive branch statements, or other matter associated with the publication” of a rule—of administrators’ devices that have been misused to declare a preemptive effect.\(^{189}\) The statement amounts to an “admonishment from Congress.”\(^{190}\) Implicitly it recognizes the dangers of preemption-by-preamble assertion. By repudiating this technique, Congress expressed its skepticism about the value of preempting tort claims. The statutory prohibition directs courts to infer preemption more parsimoniously post-2008 than did the courts willing to cede preemption-power to agency statements.

Observers investigating the CPSC for signs of withdrawal from regulation might also consider the informed impressions of a recently departed employee who left the agency saddened (rather than, as she noted, “disgruntled”).\(^{191}\) One year before the 2008 volte-face, a former statistician for the CPSC published an editorial in the Washington Post claiming that the agency had “lost the will to perform the function it was created for.”\(^{192}\) To say that an entity has lost the will for something is hard to document: the writer, Robin Ingle, met the challenge with a couple of telling anecdotes from the office. In 2004, after Ingle documented an astounding rise in all-terrain vehicle (“ATV”) deaths, the general counsel of the agency, who happened to have been a former lawyer for the industry, first tried (unsuccessfully) to get two CPSC statisticians to modify the presentation of data and then declined to release the report for three months. According to Ingle, CPSC employees circa 2007 labor inside “a defeatist anti-regulation atmosphere,” where no matter which product one worked on—ATVs, portable heating generators, hydroxides that poison children—individual efforts were impeded by industry resistance to rulemaking and even basic research on safety.\(^{193}\)

\(^{187}\) See supra note 1.

\(^{188}\) See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 227 (2007).


\(^{190}\) O’Loughlin, supra note 141, at 1038-39.

\(^{191}\) Ingle, supra note 159.

\(^{192}\) Id.

\(^{193}\) Id.
CONCLUSION

The doctrine of preemption as applied in federal courts contains a troubling asymmetry: Courts regularly infer that Congress intended to forestall tort liability, but have not been willing to infer that Congress, later on, abandoned this old intent. A longstanding tradition in accident law encourages judges (and juries) to examine circumstantial evidence in order to draw plausible conclusions. Consumer safety offers an illustration of what courts should be inferring: Strong circumstantial evidence supports the inference that no later than 1981, Congress and the Consumer Product Safety Commission jointly weakened federal consumer safety law. During a period of years that may have ended in 2008, any inference that the 1973 statute preempted tort liability—the only other law-based source of consumer safety—became no longer tenable.

I conclude with two anxieties about, and one extension of, the thesis of this Article.

Anxieties first. The Consumer Product Safety Act and Consumer Product Safety Commission present a strong illustration of implied reverse preemption—perhaps too strong, in that it may set the bar too high. Should courts come to see CPSA-levels of retreat as necessary to reverse a preexisting inference that had precluded state tort liability, several difficulties ensue. Parties and their lawyers will forfeit certainty about the presence of implied reverse preemption vel non. Judges will share in this uncertainty. Perhaps worse, it will become relatively easy for both members of Congress and agency administrators who want to foreclose tort liability to feign stronger commitments to federal regulation than they really hold. Recall the announcements by the acting chairman of the CPSC that Congress should decline to appropriate the money and power it had offered the agency. This individual, Nancy Nord, disclaimed her regulatory power transparently. Fearing implied reverse preemption, a savvier successor-bureaucrat could probably come up with a more convincing gesture toward real regulation while stymieing the agency’s mission as laid out in the statute. Other criteria proposed here are vulnerable to the same tactic. Congress has also feigned regulatory vigor. Courts inferring a retreat from preemption must proceed forewarned that the paradigm explored in this Article presents an instance of the phenomenon, rather than a set of tests and hurdles. What

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194 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 372 (2000) (explaining that although res ipsa loquitur is a form of circumstantial evidence, negligence law is replete with other circumstantial inferences).
195 See supra note 20 (expressing uncertainty about whether 2008 marks a distinct end).
196 Asked to name a power that her agency had and that she actually wanted, Commissioner Nord named only an obscure one, the prerogative to seize assets of companies convicted of crimes. Hedges, supra note 175.
197 See supra note 127 and accompanying text (summarizing the 1976 amendments to the CPSA, which appear busy but retreat from regulation).

Another peril presented in implied reverse preemption that could diminish safety is what the philosopher Albert Hirschman called “perversity” and “jeopardy” 198—here the possibility that this reform would extinguish more tort liability than it can preserve. Implied reverse preemption protects or revives personal injury claims that defendants could otherwise get dismissed as preempted. Fairness as parity between injured persons and product sellers suggests that sellers should lose access to shelter that only they now enjoy. In principle, implied reverse preemption puts plaintiffs and defendants on a level playing field, where each can benefit or suffer from judicial inferring. But just as a Congress desirous of reducing tort liability can feign regulation by appearing to empower an agency, it can also use the federal commerce power to abrogate state regulation altogether 199—and thereby extinguish tort liability, if courts agree that tort liability remains a form of state regulation. Congress has already eliminated whole categories of products liability from the reach of state courts. 200 Risk-adverse defenders of tort liability might prefer to take their chances with preemption as it now exists, which the Supreme Court occasionally deems no obstacle to plaintiffs, 201 rather than seek a pro-plaintiff rewrite that might tempt Congress to wipe out products liability categorically.

This misgiving noted, implied reverse preemption is desirable even at the level of trench-war realpolitik. Like Betsy Grey, who faced a similar dilemma when she proposed to “make Congress speak clearly” every time it wants to preempt, 202 I hope that compelling candor on the part of Congress would permit liability to coexist with codified regulation as a source of safety. Over the years since the tort reform movement began, Congress has declined to enact more proposed curbs

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198 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY 133 (1982); see also supra notes 172-176 (reporting the protestations of CPSC chairman Nancy Nord, to the effect that giving the agency more money and prerogatives would lower consumer safety).

199 Winokur & Robbins, supra note 106, at 233-35 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).


202 Grey, supra note 21.
on liability than it has codified. Should this pattern come to an end, and comprehensive liability-killing legislation enter the United States Code, I doubt that judicial recognition of retreats from preemptive intent will be the culprit. A doctrine of implied reverse preemption is more likely to foster awareness within Congress of the relation between its work product (for this purpose, new statutory language and appropriations) and liability.

Now, the more radical extension. Like implied preemption, the doctrine of implied reverse preemption has what I have called markers. Judges would frame and apply criteria for this legal conclusion just as they have framed and applied criteria for the conclusion of preemption. I have suggested a few available to courts, nominating two broad categories: amendments that move away from an earlier regulatory agenda and de-funding of the agency empowered to enforce safety statutes.

Markers from Congress—though inadequate as currently used for implied preemption—are a source of transparency and fairness for implied reverse preemption. As a matter of due process, manufacturers are entitled to notice about any shift in their status that removes an affirmative defense. Whenever old conclusions of preemption that had once sheltered them are no longer present, they have a right to know. Injured persons and their lawyers are entitled to the same information. Under a judicial regime that accepts implied reverse preemption, these persons and entities would keep alert to the indicators of retreat that Congress can manifest: amendments moving away from old regulatory agendas and de-funding of the agencies authorized to regular under federal statutes. Attorneys for both plaintiffs and defendants will know when the ground has given way under a preemption fortress.

The central criterion of intelligibility would also permit another application of the implied reverse preemption doctrine, one available to judges who accept the thesis of this Article. I have argued that any court competent to infer preemption is also competent to infer a retreat from preemption. The same competence can alter express preemption. As was noted, the line between express preemption and implied preemption is not bright: when the Supreme Court finds express preemption in a statutory clause that prohibits contrary state regulation, it uses inference, rather than explicit language from Congress, to deem tort liability a form of regulation. Nuance and ambiguity, in other words, are present in express preemption as well as implied preemption. Implied reverse preemption


\[204\] See supra Part III.B.

\[205\] See supra note 30 and accompanying text.

preemption could empower judges to return to old holdings that tort liability is expressly preempted, inferring from circumstantial evidence that a clause in a statute forbidding inconsistent state regulation has lost its inferred meaning of “no tort liability,” and so a personal injury claim can proceed. This mode of reading statutes places language once deemed as expressly preemptive within reach of judicial reinterpretation.\(^{207}\)

A decision by the United States District Court of the District of Massachusetts provides an example of how judges can give effect to a congressional retreat from express preemption. In *Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Insurance Company*,\(^{208}\) “one of the classic broadsides” against preemption by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”),\(^{209}\) the court noted with regret that Congress had expressly preempted the tort and contract claims that the plaintiff tried to bring.\(^{210}\) “Congress intended to relieve employers and ERISA plans from the burdens of compliance with conflicting state laws not as an end in and of itself,” wrote Judge Young, “but rather as a means to promote the principal object of ERISA as a whole,” i.e. protecting plan participants.\(^{211}\)

Back in 1974, according to Judge Young, “ERISA did provide an adequate remedy for the wrongful denial of health benefits. The present gap in remedies is therefore attributable . . . to the failure of Congress to amend ERISA’s civil enforcement provision to keep pace with the changing realities of the health care system.”\(^{212}\)

Implied reverse preemption recognizes, as did Judge Young, the existence of “changing realities”\(^{213}\) that render obsolete an earlier conclusion that Congress cut off, expressly or by implication, the opportunity for an injured person to seek redress in a state court. Diane Andrews-Clarke had to do without a remedy for the harm she suffered; Judge Young implored Congress to modify what he called “a law that has gone conspicuously awry from its original intent,” adding, “Does anyone care? Do you?”\(^{214}\) This Article has argued that Judge Young had in his hands the interpretive tool for which he longed. Any power to draw an inference favoring defendants necessarily includes the power to draw an inference favoring plaintiffs.\(^{215}\)

Judicial determinations of preemption not only may, but should, evolve in response to new circumstantial evidence that Congress has lost

\(^{207}\) See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 46 (arguing that the meaning of statutory language can change over time).


\(^{209}\) E-mail from Anthony Sebok, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, to author (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with author).


\(^{211}\) Id. at 58.

\(^{212}\) Id.

\(^{213}\) Id. at 53.

\(^{214}\) Id. at 65.

\(^{215}\) I thank Tony Sebok not only for alerting me to *Andrews-Clarke* but for adding a cogent analysis.
its earlier desire to thwart tort liability. What Peter Schuck has called “the sweet spot”\textsuperscript{216}—a balance between tort and administrative rules as a regulatory design—varies in response to what Congress, exercising legislative supremacy, installs. Courts attuned to this balance will find implied reverse preemption just as fundamental as preemption.

\textsuperscript{216} Schuck, \textit{supra} note 65.