Global Analysis of an Expectations Augmented Evolutionary DynamicsJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Publication TypeJournal Article
AbstractWe consider a deterministic evolutionary model where players form expectations about future play. Players are not fully rational and have expectations that change over time in response to current payoffs and feedback from the past. We provide a complete characterization of the qualitative dynamics so induced for a two strategies population game, and relate our findings to standard evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium selection when agents have rational forward looking expectations.
- evolutionary games,
- dynamic systems,
- bounded rationality.
Creative Commons LicenseCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0
Citation InformationAngelo Antoci, Antonio Gay, Massimiliano LANDI and Pier Luigi Sacco. "Global Analysis of an Expectations Augmented Evolutionary Dynamics" Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control Vol. 32 Iss. 12 (2007) p. 3877 - 3894 ISSN: 0165-1889
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/angelo_antoci/1/