“[I]f today I heard that some American had committed suicide rather than live in disgrace, I would fully understand....”

-- J.M. Coetzee, *Diary of a Bad Year*¹

I. INTRODUCTION

It is now horrifyingly apparent that American prosecution of the war in Iraq, and its attendant detention policies, have been rife with abuses. American soldiers have killed Iraqi civilians by throwing them into the Tigris,² or shooting them in “massacres” at Haditha and Mahmoudiya,³ or running them over in supply-carrying convoys intent on moving through traffic.⁴ During raids, it was “very common” to shoot the family dog in front of the family who owned it, and routine to “destroy” the family’s property with no subsequent compensation.⁵ Detainees died after having been exposed to extreme temperatures,⁶ or subjected to stress positions;⁷ in one case, an Iraqi prisoner suffered a lethal heart attack after he was forced to do long sessions of jumping jacks with a sandbag over his head.⁸

Cries of ignorance, perhaps once possible, are now unavailable and unavailing. The pictorial evidence has been too graphic, the pleas for judicial relief too numerous, and the revelations by journalists and veterans too widespread and wrenching, for Americans to invoke the Bush Administration’s penchant for secrets and deceit (and sometimes that of the Obama Administration as well) as sources of immunity.⁹ The
question of responsibility therefore presses upon us: What responsibility do Americans bear for these war crimes?

From the perspective of criminal law, the answer is “none.” On the conception of responsibility underpinning both domestic and international criminal law, individual causal responsibility is seen to be the sine qua non of culpability. Yet, as a handful of scholars have recently argued, the collective nature of crimes of war escapes the bounds of the individualist paradigm of Western criminal law. Thus Mark Drumbl forcefully argues in this collection that “[t]he collective nature of [atrocity] sits uncomfortably with international criminal law’s predicate of individual agency, action, and authorship.” Similarly, George Fletcher contends that “the liberal bias toward individual criminal responsibility obscures basic truths about the crimes that now constitute the core of international criminal law. The[se] crimes … are deeds that by their very nature are committed by groups and typically against individuals as members of groups.”

One might have thought that dissatisfaction with the conception of responsibility underpinning the response to atrocity would have occasioned support for the notion of collective guilt. But the alternatives proposed by critics like Fletcher and Drumbl are far more modest. Fletcher’s interest in collective guilt is intended not to implicate those who acquiesced in atrocity but instead to mitigate the responsibility of those who committed it. Drumbl is prepared to countenance group-based responsibility, but only if individual group members are permitted “the subsequent opportunity … to affirmatively demonstrate why they should be excluded from the liable group.” Accordingly, group members who resisted or spoke out against mass atrocity would be exempt from having to contribute to a collective sanction levied against other members of the group, on
Drumbl’s account. Similarly, others who have entertained the notion of collective sanctions in this context contemplate internal rights of contribution, which would allow the group to apportion group-based sanctions according to members’ relative amounts of wrongdoing. In short, those who call for a more encompassing understanding of responsibility for atrocity have nonetheless remained faithful to the principle of individual culpability embodied in international criminal law.

By contrast, this paper takes seriously the notion that individuals may bear responsibility for the transgressions of their group even where they do not bear the hallmarks of individual culpability. More specifically, I shall contend that citizenship itself can ground responsibility for the crimes of one’s nation-state. To be clear, my interest here lies not in uncovering when and why it is appropriate to hold groups responsible (whether conceived as nations or states), questions addressed by the papers by Toni Erskine and Tony Lang in this volume; nor am I interested in determining the circumstances when, and grounds upon which, it is appropriate to transmit sanctions imposed upon the group to its members, which is the question Richard Vernon and Avia Pasternak confront in their contributions. I am interested instead in locating and interrogating the grounds upon which we may, in the first instance, hold group members responsible for a transgression of their group. The focus here is then on responsibility assigned directly to members, and not derivative of the responsibility of the group.

Moreover, the kind of responsibility I have in mind is not simply the forward-looking variety, which is what many forms of civil liability and reparations programs contemplate; nor is it simply outcome responsibility, which arises where an individual deserves to incur the material consequences of her acts, but not moral sanction. Instead,
I shall argue that U.S. citizens are legitimate targets of blame for abuses committed in the course of the war in Iraq.

The account of citizen responsibility that I advance differs from the individualist account insofar as it severs moral and causal responsibility: Again, I shall argue that the citizen may bear moral responsibility even though she did not participate in, facilitate, or even tolerate the abuses committed in her midst. The account also severs the notions of guilt and blameworthiness: I shall argue that the citizen may be an appropriate object of blame (and hence appropriately subject to resentment and indignation) even though she need not conceive of herself as guilty. And I shall suggest that this fracturing of the traditional troika of guilt, resentment, and indignation has implications for the way we think about moral responsibility more generally.

I begin by articulating an account of the relationship between the citizen and her nation-state that grounds the citizen’s responsibility for a transgression of her nation-state independent of the extent of her participation in that transgression. I do not anticipate, however, that that account will induce guilt in every American who encounters it. The resistance to guilt is itself interesting and, in the second section of the paper, I seek to investigate its source. To that end, I undertake an exploration of the moral psychology of guilt and resentment, especially as these emotions pertain to understandings of responsibility for war crimes among members of the perpetrator and victim populations. I end by gesturing to the ways in which the account challenges accepted truths about moral responsibility and its relationship to the reactive attitudes.

Some words about terminology first: By “morally responsible,” I shall mean “appropriately subject to blame,” which I take to mean the same thing as “blameworthy.”
Further, I conceive of the experience of guilt as being constituted, at least in part, by the judgment that one has breached an expectation whose authority one recognizes.\textsuperscript{21} Whether that experience is also constituted by guilt feelings is a question I shall have occasion to consider in what follows. For now, it is sufficient to note that by “guilt feelings” I shall mean the phenomenological correlates of the judgment involved in experiencing guilt – typically, pain, sadness, etc.\textsuperscript{22} Finally, I refer to the entity whose acts occasion responsibility as the “nation-state.”\textsuperscript{23}

\section*{II. Citizen Responsibility}

The notion that one may be held morally responsible for a group wrong not in virtue of one’s participation in it but instead in virtue of group membership alone has been termed “tribal,”\textsuperscript{24} and even “barbaric.”\textsuperscript{25} Indeed, attempts to ground Americans’ responsibility for abuses committed in the war in Iraq have been accused of succumbing to the same kind of spurious logic that allowed the 9/11 terrorists to kill American civilians in retaliation for (purported) grievances against the American government.\textsuperscript{26} But what these critics fail to see (and what the 9/11 terrorists, tragically, failed to see) is that assignments of responsibility need not be one-size-fits-all. Instead, we may hold different people responsible \textit{to different degrees} for the same event or state of affairs, which may lead to our imposing upon them different kinds or amounts of sanction. It is worth beginning our inquiry into citizens’ responsibility by considering two factors that govern the magnitude of a responsibility assignment.

First, and most obviously, responsibility turns on the nature of the injury in question, which we may call the \textit{object} of responsibility. Thus, the murderer is more
blameworthy, *ceteris paribus*, than is the assailant whose victim sustains only non-lethal injuries. Second, the magnitude of a responsibility assignment varies according to the nature of the individual’s relationship to the injury for which we seek to assign responsibility. Thus, for example, Kitty Genovese’s assailant bears more responsibility for her death than do the residents of Kew Gardens; the former intends her death, while the latter recklessly refuse her rescue, and thereby contribute to her death.27 We may refer to this second factor as the ground of responsibility.28

Now, the claim to be defended in this section is that all Americans of majority age bear responsibility for American transgressions – that is, the object of responsibility is the same for all. But it is worth noting up front that the ground of responsibility will differ in accordance with the nature of their relationship to the transgression in question. In particular, perpetrators, bystanders and opponents of the transgression each bear a different relationship to it, and these differences entail differences in the magnitude of responsibility to be assigned to members of each camp.

To take one example: The complacent bystander (but not the dissident) has done nothing to diminish the perpetrator’s motivation to commit the atrocity in question. The complacent bystander thereby signals to the perpetrator (as well, as his victim, perhaps) that the victim’s treatment does not merit opposition. In this way, he helps to normalize this treatment. So the ground of the complacent bystander’s responsibility, but not that of the dissident, includes the support through silence that complacency confers. The complacent bystander will thus come to bear more responsibility than will the dissident.29

More generally, it cannot be denied that the perpetrators and facilitators of atrocity are related to the atrocity in ways that the dissident, and other non-participants,
are not. But there is one way in which all adult citizens are related to the atrocity, and it is this relationship upon which I focus here.

Each citizen bears a *commitment* to the nation-state, and this commitment, as I argue at greater length elsewhere,\(^30\) provides a ground for holding each citizen responsible for the nation-state’s acts, no matter the extent of her participation or opposition. More specifically, the citizen’s commitment to the nation-state contains a normative dimension that requires the citizen to accept responsibility for her nation-state’s transgressions.

To get a better handle on the normative dimension of commitment, it will be useful first to contemplate other, more intimate contexts of commitment. Consider the marital union, for example. Individuals in a marriage must act with a certain regard for their union.\(^31\) While exit is a real option, each nonetheless bears an obligation to the other to put the possibility of exit out of his or her mind, at least while less disruptive options exist. And, each is obligated to the other to present a united front to the world, for maligning one’s spouse to others would degrade the union and violate marital trust.

Similarly, individuals in a joint business partnership must each also operate with a certain regard for the joint venture, and commit themselves to working out the kinks of the operation before contemplating dissolution. And, where one partner is empowered to, say, manage the partnership’s business, the other partner may not publicly disparage the result, and disavow responsibility for it. To do so would be to make a fool of the producing partner, and to exhibit a reproachable lack of loyalty.

Now, we should note that the strength of the obligations each member of the joint venture bears to the other(s) will depend on the strength of the commitment the joint
venture expects of its members. Thus spouses typically have greater obligations of fidelity to each other than do business partners since a marriage typically demands more of the individuals comprising it than does a business venture. Nonetheless, some amount of fidelity follows from membership in the partnership just as it does in the marital union. More to the point, some amount of fidelity follows from membership in the nation-state, as well. Thus, with appropriate adjustments for strength of commitment to the nation-state, we may transpose the foregoing observations to the context of the citizen’s responsibility for American atrocities committed in the course of the war in Iraq.

The citizen harbors a commitment to the nation-state and that commitment obligates him in special ways to his fellow citizens. Most relevant here, his commitment entails that he may not step outside the nation-state to point a finger in righteous indignation at his state’s transgressions; instead, he must stand in judgment with his fellow citizens, in recognition that the nation-state is his as well as theirs. To do otherwise is to denigrate the shared venture; it is to demonstrate a solipsism incompatible with citizenship.

Three points of clarification are necessary here: First, given that commitment to the nation-state licenses our holding citizens responsible, it is expected only of those individuals who qualify as moral agents. The agency requirement follows from the conditions under which it would be permissible to hold an individual responsible for her own acts. Citizens who do not satisfy the criteria for individual responsibility ought not to bear responsibility derived exclusively from their group affiliations. Henceforth, I shall use the term "citizen" as a shorthand for all mentally competent, adult citizens.
Second, the commitment that grounds the citizen’s responsibility is, again, a normative component of citizenship. This commitment may well have attendant psychological effects – in particular, it may be accompanied by a feeling of loyalty toward one’s fellow citizens and the nation-state itself, a feeling of pride at their or the nation-state’s successes, or a feeling of shame in the face of their or its misdeeds. Indeed, the commitment entails a normative expectation that the citizen will experience just these feelings in the appropriate contexts. But the psychological concomitants of the citizen’s commitment are not themselves the ground of his responsibility. If they were, a citizen could deny responsibility simply by disclaiming any psychological attachment to the nation-state. Instead, the disaffected citizen bears an amount of responsibility for the nation-state’s transgressions that corresponds to the strength of the commitment citizenship entails, regardless of whether the citizen has fulfilled her commitment by harboring the feelings of loyalty that the commitment demands.

Third, that citizenship has the normative cast invoked here is a contingent, and not a conceptual, matter; citizenship need not function in this way everywhere and at all times. For example, loose political associations in which citizenship is a shorthand for eligibility for a set of legal entitlements and obligations, with no attendant sense that citizens are joined in a shared project, would not sustain the normative component of citizenship that grounds responsibility here. Citizenship in some of the states of the United States might well be of this kind. Similarly, individuals who have been granted formal citizenship but are denied inclusion in the joint project of the nation-state would not be subject to the normative pressures that ground responsibility. Think here of Blacks in the Jim Crow south, or Jews in the early years of the Nazi regime, who still enjoyed
formal citizenship but nonetheless experienced significant political disempowerment. The account advanced here would not extend to these excluded citizens either.

Nonetheless, there is good reason to think that American citizenship is more than sufficiently robust to comprehend the normative elements that, I have argued, ground the American’s responsibility. It is certainly true that the life of the American citizen is largely lived in private, and so she is afforded much latitude for self-regarding acts. Nonetheless, there are moments in her life – moments of “extraordinary politics,” as Bruce Ackerman refers to them – when she, and her fellow citizens, are called upon to transcend the pursuit of self-interest in deference to the needs of the country or their compatriots. The practice of dissent, far from being taken to rend the fabric of national unity, is cast as a paradigmatically American form of enacting one’s citizenship, and construed as part of the project of national stewardship.

More generally, the obligation to act with an eye toward the national interest is, in America, a national trope, figuring in presidential addresses (“Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country”) and patriotic slogans (“I only regret that I have but one life to give my country”). Nor is the prospect of self-sacrifice merely symbolic; it is instead, as Paul Kahn argues, foundational in the American political culture, both in the sense that the United States was born in revolution, and that the United States is sustained by the government’s continued authority to demand that Americans kill or be killed on its behalf. To make his point, Kahn invites us to consider the naturalization oath of allegiance, which, in requiring the individual seeking American citizenship to pledge that she will “bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by law to do so,” conveys, Kahn notes, the “sovereign demand on citizenship as
an open-ended willingness to sacrifice.”\textsuperscript{35} The prerogative of the sovereign to demand its citizens’ deaths makes sense only within a nation-state that claims a commitment of its citizens of the kind at issue here.\textsuperscript{36} And, even if one resists the idea that ultimate sacrifice lies at the heart of what it means to be an American, one should still acknowledge that the expectations of loyalty and lesser sacrifices, imposed on behalf of the United States or one’s fellow Americans, condition the American identity, and bespeak the kind of commitment that entails citizen responsibility.\textsuperscript{37}

The foregoing provides insight into not only the generic American’s responsibility for abuses in Iraq but that of the opponent of the war as well, for the dissident also harbors a commitment to the nation-state. Indeed, it is in virtue of this commitment that the dissident enacts her opposition: She believes that the pursuit and conduct of the war in Iraq grossly betray values she takes to be fundamental and sacred to her beloved country, and her opposition is intended to restore America to its rightful path (or her conception of it, anyway). Were she not so committed to the United States, she might well have sought to leave it. Having stayed, however, she must accept that its acts redound to her. Just as the non-producing business partner may not disown the products of his partnership so the dissident may not disown the acts of the United States.\textsuperscript{38}

In short, a citizen’s commitment to her nation-state grounds her responsibility for its acts, and the expected strength of that commitment determines the magnitude of responsibility she bears through citizenship alone. In light of my earlier statements about the magnitude of responsibility, we may say that the magnitude of the generic citizen’s responsibility corresponds to the strength of commitment expected of her. Three assumptions round out this part of the account. First, I here assume that it is possible to
measure the extent of expected or actual commitment, but I do not offer a methodology for doing so here, leaving that task instead to sociologists and psychologists. I assume further that, in the United States, the expected strength of commitment is the same for all citizens who have reached the age of majority. Thus, the generic American and the U.S. perpetrator of war crimes in Iraq will both bear equal responsibility for these war crimes in light of their citizenship. The perpetrator will, in addition to the responsibility she bears qua citizen, bear responsibility qua perpetrator. We should then expect the perpetrator’s responsibility to be significantly greater than that of the generic American. But there is nonetheless some (non-zero) amount of responsibility appropriately assigned to the generic American citizen. Finally, I do not venture to spell out the nature of the sanctions appropriate to generic Americans simply in virtue of their citizenship except to say that I assume that the magnitude of their responsibility would be too little to warrant individual punishment. Instead, responsibility of the kind and magnitude entailed by citizenship is much better cashed out in the form of emotional sanctions like resentment and indignation, as we shall see in the next Part. (Indeed, it is for this reason that the American who opposes the war in Iraq is likely to choose dissidence over emigration -- the costs of uprooting oneself and renouncing one’s attachment to one’s beloved nation-state are far greater than the emotional sanctions to which citizenship on its own gives rise.)

Because citizenship grounds the American’s responsibility for U.S. transgressions, and because one either is or is not a citizen, Mark Drumbl refers to the account just advanced as “crude,”\textsuperscript{39} and he rejects it in favor of what he terms the “crude-careful” way, which delineates the responsible group crudely, but allows individual
members to escape liability where they can demonstrate, for example, that they sought to prevent the atrocity in question, or were themselves victims of their state’s crime. But this way of putting the difference between our accounts is misleading, for citizenship is not, on my account, some rough proxy for individual culpability, as it may be on Drumbl’s crude-careful account. Citizenship is instead a real basis of individual culpability, though the culpability it yields may be overwhelmed by countervailing sources of moral credit, which include acts undertaken to oppose the atrocity. Indeed, we shall see in the next Part that the citizen’s dissidence can sometimes, though not always, undercut the warrant for others’ resentment or indignation. In short, then, it is not clear that my account is any less careful than Drumbl’s; it is just that I attach moral weight to citizenship and Drumbl does not, so that dissident citizens more readily (though not necessarily more deservedly) escape liability on his account than on my own.

On a related note, Drumbl is correct that my account, focused as it is on American wrongdoing in the war in Iraq, does not contemplate situations in which some citizens were themselves victimized by the state transgression for which we seek to assign responsibility. Here too though it is not clear that relying on citizenship, as my account does, produces outcomes that are less just than those of Drumbl’s account. As I have argued in a different context, 40 requiring formerly oppressed citizens to contribute to programs aimed at rectifying past abuses against them affirms their co-equal membership in the nation-state. And, the compensation amount can be inflated beyond what is owed for the abuses themselves in order to reimburse the formerly oppressed citizens for their contributions. In this way, victimized citizens’ contributions come to have a purely symbolic function: They reinforce the equality that was denied by the oppression by
including the victims in the national program of repair, and they do not, in the end, cost the victims anything.

That theorists like Drumbl who appreciate the collective character of atrocity nonetheless deny that blameworthiness can arise independent of individual fault should give us pause. For it turns out that there are deep psychological currents that make an individualist stance difficult to overcome, as we shall now see.

III. Citizen Responsibility and the Reactive Attitudes

I noted at the outset that an American who did not support the war in Iraq might resist the idea that she bears responsibility for abuses committed in its course. Even were she to encounter the arguments of the last Part, she might nonetheless maintain – with full honesty – that she feels no guilt over American war crimes committed in Iraq. More specifically, the citizen in question might lack the unpleasant sensation of guilt, and she might also resist the belief that she has acted wrongly. Her response provides an occasion to assess the relationship between bearing guilt, experiencing guilt, and feeling guilt – or, put more generally, the relationship between responsibility, the reactive attitudes, and their accompanying sensations.

I seek to argue here that although our paradigmatic experience of responsibility involves the blamed individual’s felt guilt and acknowledgement of wrongdoing, an assignment of responsibility may well be warranted even where one or both of these pieces are absent. This is not an uncontroversial claim. On some conceptions of responsibility, a judgment of responsibility is believed to be constituted by one or more reactive attitudes; and, on some conceptions of the reactive attitudes, emotions are
themselves believed to be constituted by feeling-sensations. How, then, can we arrive at a justified assignment of responsibility where the citizen – when presented with the grounds of her responsibility -- neither responds to herself with guilt nor has any kind of guilt sensation? Put differently, how can it at once be appropriate for the Iraqi to resent the American, and the American to forswear remorse?

To answer these questions, I begin with the case of the dissident. The dissident need not deny that citizenship is a ground of responsibility, as the last Part argues. She may nonetheless maintain that her dissidence functions as a defense. More specifically, the dissident may believe that her acts of resistance more than offset her commitment to the United States, and so exempt her from responsibility. As such, she does not perceive herself as having acted wrongly and, accordingly, feels no guilt. In the first section of this Part, I attempt to make sense of her experience of her relationship to U.S. transgressions in light of resentment that victims of these transgressions might direct toward her.

The generic citizen is situated differently from the dissident. He cannot call upon a set of activities that purportedly tempers or eliminates his responsibility in order to explain his self-asserted innocence. Instead, he invokes the absence of guilt feelings as a defense in itself: “Were I morally responsible,” this imagined citizen might argue, “surely I would feel guilt. But I do not feel guilt, so I cannot be morally responsible.” In the second section of this Part, I inquire into his response.

Finally, in the last section of this Part, I draw out some of the implications of the insights of the first two sections for philosophical thinking about moral responsibility.

A. Dissidence and Divergent Viewpoints
In the literature on the reactive attitudes, resentment turns on a particular conception of the kind of treatment persons deserve. Peter Strawson, for example, argues that resentment is predicated upon “an expectation of, and demand for, the manifestation of a certain degree of goodwill or regard on the part of other human beings towards [others]; or at least on the expectation of, and demand for, an absence of the manifestation of active ill will or indifferent disregard.” In a similar vein, Jean Hampton locates the source of resentment in treatment that is “objectively demeaning, that is, disrespectful of [the victim’s] worth.” In short, then, resentment on these accounts responds to wrongs that consist of a failure adequately to evidence a proper respect for persons. In this way, resentment bears a distinctively Kantian imprint.

Now, some of this may be a matter of contingency. Much of the work on the reactive attitudes arises in discussions around resentment and retributive desire, and indifference toward others may well be paradigmatic of the kind of wrongdoing that elicits the impulse for retribution. But even those who examine resentment outside of discussions of retribution seem to have within their purview only wrongs of the Kantian kind.

One way to gain clarity on the dissident’s insistence that she is not an appropriate object of blame may then be to question whether resentment can be warranted for wrongs that cannot conclusively be construed as instances of “indifferent disregard,” or “objectively demeaning” treatment. The family context provides a starting point: Consider that resentment often arises in families though the party harboring resentment will, if prompted, acknowledge that the resented party has not in fact proceeded with indifference to the resentful party; even still, this acknowledgment does not dispel the
resentment. Thus, a parent may resent what she takes to be deficiencies in her child’s talents or character. Sometimes these purported deficiencies result from a reproachable lack of effort on the child’s behalf but, even when they do, it would likely be inappropriate – at least sometimes – to construe the inadequate effort as a slight against the child’s parents. And, the purported deficiencies might arouse resentment even where the child is striving admirably. This last instance of resentment might well be irrational, but I think an alternative explanation exists, which I shall proffer in a moment.

First, though, consider that resentment may have a similar structure where directed from child to parent. A child might resent his parents for their failure to “get” him. Thus, he might recognize that his parents have acted with utmost care and devotion toward him and yet still begrudge particular choices they made on his behalf as inauthentic to who he is (or to the person he believes himself to be). His parents’ purported mistakes might well be attributable to a genuine failure on their part to see their child clearly and a corresponding tendency to choose for him in light of a conception of him as the person they would like him to be. But these purported mistakes need not have this, or any other, reproachable source. Instead, the child’s parents may well have appreciated him in all his particularity; it may just be that their particularized image of him, while largely consonant with the child’s image of himself, differs in a few significant ways. This child might well credit his parents’ efforts to understand him and yet still feel resentment in light of this divergence. Again, the resentment might be irrational, but it needn’t be.

In each of these cases, there exists an unbridgeable gap between parent and child: The parent who resents her child’s purported deficiencies confronts a gap between the
child she has and the one for whom she had hoped; the child who resents his parents’ choices for him confronts a gap between his self-understanding and their understanding of him. In each case, the parent harbors a conception of the child that the child doesn’t share, and so the possibility for complete understanding and acceptance is foreclosed.

What about this gap prompts resentment, though? I believe the answer lies in a kind of cognitive dissonance: The prospect of being separated from a loved one is intensely painful; the thought that the separation is irremediable even more so. Imagining, then, that the separation results from some wrongdoing of the resented party – a failure to actualize one’s capacities, or a failure to undertake to understand one’s child – renders the separation less harrowing, insofar as it leaves open the prospect for rapprochement: Greater effort on the alleged wrongdoer’s part will suffice to undo the separation and bring the parent and child closer together. For this reason, the parent in the first scenario and the child in the second are each motivated to construe the separation as a kind of betrayal.  

Now, on the account just articulated, resentment flows from an (imagined) injury: the purported betrayal arises because there exists an expectation that separations of the kind just described have no place in the parent-child relationship, and one party blames the other for frustrating this expectation. No such expectation exists between the American opponent of the war in Iraq and the Iraqi. Still, the dynamic of resentment between the dissident and Iraqi is beset by a separation similar to that between parent and child.

The dissident believes that her resistance cancels out whatever responsibility she should come to bear in virtue of her commitment to the United States as a whole. She has
arrived at this self-judgment because she has synthesized the dimension of her identity that flows from her citizenship and the dimension of her identity that flows from her dissidence and arrived at a coherent conception of herself in which her dissidence is much more definitive of who she is. But though each of us is empowered to perform this synthesis and arrive at a self-understanding that makes sense of the disparate and sometimes conflicting strands of our identity, none of us is entitled to have others conceive of us as we conceive of ourselves. In particular, the dissident cannot legitimately expect that her self-understanding will govern the Iraqi’s conception of her; he is entitled to believe that citizenship looms larger as a constituent element of an American’s (or anyone’s) identity than do acts opposing the policies or practices of one’s government. And, so long as he does hold this belief, he will harbor resentment toward the American citizen, no matter how valiant her efforts at resistance.

The divergence just described arose from differing conceptions of the relative weights to place upon commitment to one’s nation-state, on the one hand, and resistance to its acts, on the other, in constructing the dissident’s individual identity. But there is a second possible source of separation between the dissident and the Iraqi that arises from a divergence between the conception of America that each harbors. As we have seen, the dissident may undertake opposition to the war in Iraq because she conceives of an America in which the prosecution of the war in Iraq has been distinctly un-American. Indeed, it might be precisely because she harbors a vision of America as different from, and better than, has been in recent time that she is motivated to resist, and thereby restore her beloved nation-state to her imagined conception of it. But just as she must recognize that her self-conception holds no authority for others, so too she must recognize that her
conception of America must also yield, at least sometimes, to that of outsiders. Thus an Iraqi might detect a cultural imperialism in the quest to “liberate” his country, and an exceptionalism in the potential impunity with which high-ranking U.S. officials have violated the laws of war, that strike him as unmistakably American. Rooted in his perspective on America, the Iraqi might find the dissident’s commitment to America all the more reproachable.

Importantly, in each of the sources of resentment just described – the first rooted in divergence over the dissident’s identity, and the second rooted in divergence over the identity of America – there may be no principled way of adjudicating between the competing conceptions. This is not to say that there cannot be cases in which one or the other party may be mistaken: the dissident could harbor a kind of false consciousness, or the Iraqi might operate with an unduly prejudiced mindset. In each of these cases, evidence could be invoked to bring the mistaken party to see things differently. But I see no reason to believe that every case is of this kind. Individuals and nations are complex, multi-faceted entities, admitting of multiple constructions and narratives, and there may well be several of these that each synthesize the constituent elements equally plausibly. In short, there may be an unbridgeable gap between the dissident and the Iraqi, just as there was in the parent-child scenarios discussed above, and it is in the face of this gap that resentment may rightfully take hold.

Where there is an insuperable divergence regarding the dissident’s blameworthiness, we might well want each party to recognize it, and proceed with humility. Thus, we might ask that the dissident resist disclaiming responsibility, and the Iraqi withhold contempt, despite the fact that each holds fast to his or her respective
beliefs about the dissident’s relationship to the United States. But we might also allow that there are situations in which forbearance is too much to demand. Thus, the Iraqi who lost a family member in the Haditha massacre might, given his loss and also his not completely baseless belief in American prejudice against Muslims of middle-eastern descent, be permitted his resentment.

Here too, as in the parent-child scenarios discussed above, a kind of cognitive dissonance arises. To inhabit the dissident’s perspective on America and herself, the Iraqi must abandon a stance of righteous anger through which he might seek to vindicate the worth of his lost loved one, or the Iraqi people as a whole. He must instead contend with the notion that he cannot find an outlet in blame for his loss and injury that corresponds sufficiently to their (perceived) magnitude. He would then incur not just the pain of his tragedy but the profound burden of self-restraint in stifling his own sense of the injury and deferring to that of one of his (apparent) injurers. Should we really reproach him for spurning this path? Given the additional pain of forbearance, is he not entitled to presume the legitimacy of his own perspective, and proceed with resentment?

Ideally, individuals should be given some latitude in making sense of tragedies that befall them. That latitude ought not to be so great that it permits blaming innocents. But where one possible interpretation is more comforting than another and the two are equally plausible, the more comforting interpretation should prevail. Here, then, the Iraqi should be permitted his resentment. This does not, of course, entail that the dissident is compelled to feel guilt -- feelings, after all, cannot be compelled. But, though she may inwardly maintain her innocence, she must nonetheless accept that she is an appropriate object of blame. Just as the dissident bears an obligation of loyalty to her fellow members
to refrain from disavowing the group act, so too she bears an obligation of decency to the victims of her group’s transgression to do the same.\textsuperscript{52}

The foregoing is intended to suggest that the warrant for resentment need not rest exclusively on an undeniable wrongdoing. It can instead arise where an individual conceives of his harm as a wrongful injury, and where his understanding of the harm is no less reasonable than is the understanding of the resented party. It follows, then, that resentment can be justified even when the target of resentment cannot recognize her wrongdoing, and this not because she is constitutionally impaired in some way (as the psychopath is) but because she rejects the victim’s interpretation of her relationship to the wrong. Correspondingly, indignation can be justified even where its target denies wrongdoing, for third-parties too might harbor a conception of the injury that implicates someone who does not conceive of herself as culpable, and here too the two conceptions may be equally plausible.

In short, resentment and indignation are meaning-creating emotions, and the circumstances in which they are appropriate are not always clear. Where there is genuine uncertainty about their warrant, it may well be the case that we ought to defer to the interpretation of the injury that confers meaning on the party most in need of making sense of his situation.\textsuperscript{53}

B. Citizen Responsibility and the Emotions

The generic citizen – the one who neither supported nor opposed the war – may insist that he too is an inappropriate object of resentment, notwithstanding his commitment to the United States. His defense would proceed not by marshaling
considerations intended to rebut or outweigh that commitment, as the dissident’s defense does; instead, he may just maintain, without any false consciousness, that the notion that he must accept blame fails to connect emotionally. Underlying his position is the thought that our emotions are presumptive guides to moral truth: Contemplating his commitment to the United States, he nonetheless feels no guilt over American war crimes in Iraq; he thus concludes that he bears no responsibility. What might explain his response?

One possibility, which others have raised, is that the generic citizen’s responsibility is not strictly moral responsibility – i.e., responsibility understood as appropriate liability to blame; it is instead a highly personal response to a tragedy in which one chooses to see one’s agency, though one in fact bears no guilt for the wrong. Given that the experience of responsibility is optional on this possibility, the generic citizen who disclaims responsibility is then one who has simply opted not to conceive of his agency in this way.

Karl Jaspers is among the exponents of this possibility. Thus he argues that the citizen who neither participated nor acquiesced in the Nazi regime bears not moral guilt but metaphysical guilt – a kind of guilt arising though its bearer could not have done otherwise. He writes of Germans who survived the war: “We did not go into the streets when our Jewish friends were led away; we did not scream until we too were destroyed. We preferred to stay alive, on the feeble, if logical, ground that our death could not have helped anyone. We are guilty of being alive.” Similarly, Larry May, who offers a subtle reconstruction of Jaspers’ account, agrees that, where a group member did not participate in the group harm, and where she could not have prevented it, “moral responsibility, at least understood on the model of individual moral guilt, would be inappropriate.”
Finally, Herbert Morris refers to the *non-moral guilt* the American who visits Hiroshima shortly after World War II might experience – non-moral because its bearer is, by hypothesis, without fault for the Hiroshima bombings.\(^56\)

Importantly, for each of these theorists, whether the member who did not participate in the group transgression conceives of herself as bearing responsibility for that transgression is a matter over which she alone has authority. For Jaspers, the German citizen’s metaphysical guilt is something no one else can “prescribe” or “anticipate”;\(^57\) whereas others may sit in judgment where political or legal guilt is concerned, “[j]urisdiction for [metaphysical guilt] rests with God alone.”\(^58\) May also seems to recognize the optional character of metaphysical guilt. Identification with the group is the ground of moral taint for May, and he acknowledges that the degree, or even the presence, of such identification may be up to the individual. Thus, he notes that, “for members who are only on the fringe of the community… the group identification may be so weak as to not generate feelings of metaphysical guilt.”\(^59\) For Morris, non-moral guilt also rests upon identification with the wrongdoer; in particular, he argues that it arises where the individual who is blameless nonetheless identifies with the one who is blameworthy, whether a family member or even just a fellow human being.\(^60\) Reasonably enough, then, he contends that “[w]e may not ask of ourselves or of others that guilt be felt in these situations.”\(^61\)

Underlying each of these accounts is the thought that an individual has full discretion about whether she will harbor the identificatory ties upon which the experience of responsibility is purportedly predicated. Since these ties may not be mandated from without, on these theories, neither may the sense of responsibility that they yield.
These theorists may well be right that identification is discretionary in some cases; it is not, however, discretionary in the context of an institutional group like the nation-state, as I sought to argue in the last section. Instead, as we saw, citizenship has a normative dimension that compels the citizen to recognize the way in which her identity is bound up with that of the nation-state, and to accept responsibility for its acts as a result. To understand the generic citizen’s response to the claim that he is responsible, then, we will have to look to something other than theories that entertain discretionary guilt experiences.

An inquiry into the natural history of guilt provides useful insights. Guilt, as Herbert Morris notes, “is a painful state.” One can trace the unpleasant sensation accompanying guilt by way of an evolutionary account that looks to the practical effect of our emotional life. On such an account, the unpleasantness of guilt is useful for its power to regulate behavior. We come to associate certain courses of conduct with this pain and refrain from pursuing them in order to avoid suffering this pain. From an evolutionary standpoint, it makes sense that guilt should have naturally evolved in connection with wrongs in which we played a causal role, given that the unpleasantness of guilt functions to deter us from future wrongdoing. The natural history of guilt thereby privileges those acts in which our agency is substantially implicated. Correspondingly, for acts in which our causal role is remote or non-existent, guilt may not be activated.

Importantly, the thought here is not that our relationship to those wrongs of our nation-state in which we did not participate causes us to experience some feeling that we cannot name. Instead, the impoverishment resides in our emotional vocabulary: we are bereft of the capacity to feel in the face of wrongs in which our agency is not salient. It is
perhaps for this reason that Karl Jaspers refers to the German citizen’s failure to wage a
fruitless opposition against the Nazi regime as *metaphysical guilt*, a species of guilt
whose phenomenological component seems utterly mysterious.\(^{64}\) It is also perhaps for
this reason that others who have contemplated the possibility of a sense of responsibility
in the absence of wrongdoing have identified shame, rather than guilt, as its attendant
emotion.\(^{65}\)

If guilt does have the natural history just described, then we should not expect
cases of wrongdoing that do not fit the paradigm – again, a paradigm in which we bear
significant causal responsibility for the wrongs for which we are held responsible – to
elicit the feeling of guilt. But their failure to do so need not entail that we do not bear a
reproachable connection to the wrongdoing. An understanding of guilt’s evolutionary
role opens up the possibility, then, that our emotions are not infallible guides to
responsibility. This possibility warrants further consideration.

C. Citizen Responsibility and Licensed Blame

I have argued that resentment may be appropriate even though guilt is not (the
case of the dissident), and that one can have the cognitive component of guilt – *i.e.*,
recognition of one’s blameworthiness – even though the feeling of guilt is absent (the
case of the generic citizen). As I have characterized them, then, these cases sit
uncomfortably alongside several core ideas within philosophical understandings of moral
responsibility. In particular, these cases challenge the idea that judgments of moral
responsibility are constituted by a particular triad of reactive attitudes, and the idea that
judgments of responsibility are constituted by reactive attitudes in general. Most
fundamentally, these cases challenge the notion that blameworthiness presupposes guilt. I elaborate on each of these implications in turn.

In the literature linking responsibility and the reactive attitudes, it is nearly a gospel truth that guilt, resentment, and indignation co-travel. More specifically, on these accounts – which we may call Strawsonian after Peter Strawson’s seminal paper -- one and the same transgression is supposed to induce guilt in the person who carries it out, resentment in its victim, and indignation in third-parties who learn of it. But I have argued that, in the case of the dissident, the supposed triad of guilt, resentment and indignation dissolves: The dissident may be an appropriate object of resentment and indignation even if she need not conceive of herself as guilty. In other words, there may be asymmetries between the self-reactive attitudes and other-directed reactive attitudes. The Strawsonian theorist of responsibility, who holds that responsibility is constituted by the reactive attitudes, is then left with a paradox, for the dissident, on his account, both would and would not be responsible. More specifically, canvassing the dissident’s emotional response to herself would compel the conclusion that she was innocent, while canvassing the emotional response of the Iraqi or member of the international community to the dissident would compel the conclusion that she was not.

The situation for the Strawsonian gets worse when we turn to the reflections on the natural history of guilt marshaled above. For the Strawsonian, moral salience is brought to light through the emotions. If I am right that our emotional vocabulary is limited where our causal agency is absent, however, then there may be a whole swath of acts or outcomes for which we bear responsibility and to which we are blind. The blindness becomes troubling where it is not universal – in particular, where victims or
third-parties assign responsibility to us and we are incapable of experiencing the corresponding self-assessment. But it is also possible that our relationship to some wrong will elicit no guilt, no resentment and no indignation. This possibility arises because those who judge us may be no less primed to view responsibility through a causal lens than we are, and so they too might overlook the fact that we – now cast as generic members of institutional groups in whose transgressions we have not participated – deserve blame. On this possibility, then, there would be blameworthiness that no emotion could disclose. And yet it is not clear that the interests or status of the individuals affected by the blameworthy act would thereby warrant any less vindication.

Finally, it is not just the Strawsonian understanding of responsibility that occludes judgments of responsibility in which our causal agency is not implicated. It is a commonplace across the literature on responsibility that it is a necessary condition of X’s being morally responsible for Y that it be appropriate for X to experience guilt in relation to Y.  But the account of citizen responsibility I have advanced dispenses with the supposedly necessary connection between moral responsibility and the appropriateness of guilt. More specifically, on my account, one need not experience guilt in relation to some wrong in order to bear moral responsibility for it; sometimes, the fact that others would be licensed in blaming us is enough to ground our moral responsibility.

In short, we may be implicated in wrongs in ways that we do not feel and do not see. Our moral reality may then transcend the scope of our emotional awareness. As such, we ought to be open to the possibility that we bear more responsibility for the transgressions of our nation-state than we think. And, where we are, we ought to
acknowledge that we owe those who rightfully resent us all of the trappings that would accompany a recognition of our liability to blame.

1 J.M. COETZEE, DIARY OF A BAD YEAR 43 (2007) (reflecting on American shame in the face of abuses committed in the course of the war in Iraq). In a probing critique of this passage, Jeff McMahan argues that “even if there are institutional connections between ordinary Americans and their government that make it rational for them to feel personal shame over its deeds, to suggest that it might be desirable, meritorious, noble, or even morally necessary for them to kill themselves is to attribute vastly disproportionate significance to the grounds for shame.” Jeff McMahan, “Torture and Collective Shame,” in Anton Leist and Peter Singer, eds., Coetzee and Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). Earlier in his essay, McMahan dismisses out of hand the notion that the generic American might bear any guilt for the torture of Iraqis; operating with an unfailingly individualist conception of responsibility, McMahan contends that where he neither participated in torture nor failed to prevent torture that it was in his power to prevent, he cannot be said to bear individual guilt for torture perpetrated by his government. The most that can be ascribed to the generic American is, for McMahan, a kind of moral taint by association. It is for this reason that suicide seems to McMahan sogrossly disproportionate – a product of megalomania or else an obsessive need for moral purity. In contrast to McMahan, this essay takes seriously the notion that Americans are individually blameworthy for abuses committed in the course of the war in Iraq. Nothing in this essay should be taken to endorse suicide as an appropriate response to America’s transgressions, but the arguments advanced herein should nonetheless help to make sense of the sentiment underlying the epigraph.

2 Dexter Filkins, The Fall of the Warrior King, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2005).
5 Id.
8 Greenwald, supra note 8.
9 For examples of statements issued by the Bush Administration intended to deny its role in these abuses, see, for instance, Dan Froomkin, Pack of Liars, White House Watch, Dec. 12, 2008, at washingtonpost.com. The Obama Administration has at times upheld the Bush position. For example, the Obama Administration followed the Bush strategy of invoking the state secrets defense in order to thwart an ACLU lawsuit challenging the U.S. program of rendition, which abducted alleged terrorists and sent them to other countries to be tortured. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, Obama fails his first test on civil liberties and accountability -- resoundingly and disgracefully, Salon, Feb. 9, 2009; David Luban, You Cover It Up, You Own It, Balkinization, Feb. 10, 2009.
10 My use of the term “war crimes” is not intended to be polemical. A Spanish prosecutor, for example, recently filed a complaint seeking an indictment against six high-level Bush officials for the torture of detainees as a war crime. A copy of the complaint can be found here: http://www.publico.es/resources/archivos/2009/3/27/1238184153397QUERELLA_VERSION_FINAL.pdf. Cf. Neta C. Crawford, Individual and Collective Moral Responsibility for Systemic Military Atrocity, 15 J. POLITICAL PHIL. 187 (2007) (arguing that the killing of Iraqi civilians by American soldiers at Haditha and Ramadi constitute “systemic atrocities,” – i.e., those that are unintended but foreseeable, resulting from the constraints of a larger social structure rather than any individual’s intentional act).
11 For a statement embracing the principle of individual culpability in international law, see the Appeals’ decision in Prosecutor v. Tadic, before the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY): “The basic assumption must be that in international law as much as in national systems, the foundation of
criminal responsibility is the principle of personal culpability: nobody may be held criminally responsible for acts or transactions in which he has not personally engaged or in some other way participated (nulla poena sine culpa).” Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Appeal Judgment, July 15, 1999), at ¶ 186 (footnotes omitted). Resistance to accomplice liability in domestic law is a prominent place exhibiting reverence for the principle of individual culpability as, for example, in Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91 (1985).
12 See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. L. REV. 539, 542 (2005) (hereinafter Collective Violence) (“The dominant discourse determines accountability through third-party trial adjudication premised on liberalism’s construction of the individual as the central unit of action. This means that a number of selected guilty individuals squarely are to be blamed for systemic levels of violence.”) (footnote omitted); George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499 (2002). Cf. LARRY MAY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT 246-49 (2005) (advocating collective responsibility as a supplement to individual responsibility in “situations of group-based harm, [where] many members of the society may have chosen to play a role in the climate that has been instrumental in nurturing the harmful conduct.”); LARRY MAY, WAR CRIMES AND JUST WAR 247-56 (offering a qualified defense of joint criminal enterprise as a kind of collective responsibility where the responsibility of each member turns on his having an intention to participate in the collective injury).
13 Mark Drumbl, Collective Responsibility and Post-Conflict Justice, at 1. See also MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (2007) (“[i]nternational criminal culpability is too crude a device to assimilate and measure the small things many people do that make the larger things fewer people do truly pandemic.”).
14 Fletcher, supra note 12 at 1513.
15 Fletcher, supra note 12 at 1541-42.
16 Mark Drumbl, Collective Responsibility and Post-Conflict Justice, at 25.
17 Id. at 208. Drumbl worries that an assessment that ignores individual culpability will entail not only that the debtor class will include “innocent” group members, but also that the beneficiary class will include complicit group members. Such an assessment “would restitute some individuals while unjustly enriching others.” Id. at 200. While I go on to defend an assignment of responsibility that Drumbl deems “crude”, I see no reason why this assignment could not function alongside a careful delineation of the individuals entitled to compensation.
18 See, e.g., Mark Osiel: The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1842-59 (2005) (advocating the imposition of collective civil sanctions on military units, and arguing that these are just because they allow military officers to redistribute the sanction internally so that it is levied in accordance with individual guilt). Cf. Darryl Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 345 (2003) (advocating collective sanctions within criminal law, but anticipating that the sanctions will work themselves out internally, to cohere with principles of individual culpability).
19 See, e.g., David Miller, Holding Nations Responsible, Ethics 114 (January 2004): 244-46; Richard Vernon, Punishing Collectives: States or Nations at 14.
20 Most accounts that seek to assign responsibility to group members who did not participate in the group transgression contemplate forward-looking responsibility, and not responsibility as an assignment of blame. For example, John Parrish has sought to argue that Americans bear responsibility, understood as an obligation of repair, independent of individual blameworthiness, for illegal killings and other injuries suffered by Iraqi civilians. John M. Parrish, Collective Responsibility and the State, 1 INTERNATIONAL THEORY 119 (2009). Similarly, in other contexts, theorists have argued that citizens may be held responsible to redress harms of their nation-state, though these citizens are innocent of wrongdoing. See, e.g., Debra Satz, What Do We Owe the Global Poor?, Ethics and International Affairs, 19, 1 (2005) 50. The kind of responsibility these theorists have in mind, then, is, like Parrish’s, a responsibility to carry out the obligations of one’s nation-state; it is not an assignment of blame.

Juha Raikka is one who has argued that even those who dissociate themselves from their group’s wrongdoing may nonetheless warrant blame for that wrongdoing. Juha Raikka, On Disassociating Oneself from Collective Responsibility, 23 SOC. THEORY & PRACTICE 93 (1997). In brief, Raikka argues that dissidents come to bear responsibility for group acts that they oppose where they must participate in, or otherwise support, an evil practice in order to oppose an evil practice. Raikka’s account is not as far-
reaching as my own, and it is particularly unhelpful here, since we are concerned to justify an assignment of responsibility for abuses committed in the course of the war in Iraq to the American opponent of the war in Iraq, and it isn’t clear that the American dissident need participate in any evil practice in order to voice her opposition.

21 Cf. Gabriele Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment 85 (“To feel guilty, [an individual] must accept not only that he has done something which is forbidden, he must accept also that it is forbidden, and thereby accept the authority of whoever or whatever forbids it.”). Though Taylor here speaks of “feel[ing] guilt,” she clearly has the cognitive component of guilt in mind and so her description fits what I have referred to as the judgment involved in the experience of guilt.


23 In his contribution to this volume, Richard Vernon offers an incisive inquiry into whether the responsible collective ought to be understood as the state or the nation, and Vernon settles on the latter. Vernon persuasively argues that the transmission of liability from a socio-political entity to its members can be defended for states, but not for nations, since it is the open-ended delegation of authority to the state that legitimates our imposing upon citizens the consequences of that delegation (here, the sanctions arising in the aftermath of state crime), and this open-ended delegation of authority is an essential feature of the state, but not the nation. All of this seems correct if one is concerned with citizens’ derivative liability, as Vernon is. But I am concerned with citizens’ individual moral responsibility. For my purposes, something more normatively robust than the mere state is required. More specifically, the collective entity in question must possess the political character of a state since, as Vernon rightly notes, it is in its political aspect that the collectivity commits crimes of war. But mere states, we shall see, need not encompass the normative obligations of fidelity to fellow members and the group itself that ground responsibility here. For these reason, I invoke the nation-state as the collective actor of interest.


26 See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 11 at 205.


28 Since, on at least some accounts, responsibility presupposes freedom, I will note here that the account of citizen responsibility I advance depends upon a genuine right of exit and, as such, applies only where each citizen can emigrate and is not unduly deprived by the state of the resources necessary to do so. I take it that it is relatively uncontroversial to presuppose that Americans possess genuine rights of exit.

29 To be sure, there may be many complacent bystanders – so many that the causal role of any one of them may be insignificant. But moral responsibility is not a zero-sum matter, with the portion of responsibility for each individual turning on the number of people sharing responsibility. For one thing, it would be a matter of moral luck if complacency were rampant. The complacent bystander should not be treated more leniently, then, just because others join him in providing psychic support to the atrocity’s perpetrators. Indeed, we might say something even stronger than this: Each of these bystanders reinforces the complacency of the other, and thereby comes to bear responsibility not only for the atrocity the complacency supports but also the complacency itself. Cf. May, Sharing Responsibility, supra note 29 at 47 (arguing that those who hold racist attitudes “causally contribut[e] to a climate that influences others to cause harm.”).


31 Cf. Herbert Morris, On Guilt and Innocence Morris 124-25 (1976) (arguing that a husband’s intention to commit adultery, even if never acted upon, constitutes a betrayal of one’s spouse because marriage “is defined partly by each partner being prepared to exercise restraint out of love and respect for the other. The man’s intention reveals that he is no longer prepared to abide by this condition.”).

32 But see Farid Abdel-Nour, National Responsibility, 31 Polit. Th. 693, 703 (2003) (contending that citizens’ national responsibility “only extends to the actions that have historically brought about the objects of their national pride.”) (italics in original); Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 959 (1992). Both Abdel-Nour and Dan-Cohen argue that citizens can share responsibility for the nation-state’s acts in virtue of actual feelings of national identification – in particular,
acts that elicit pride or shame on the part of the citizen. The problem with these accounts is that they risk implicating outsiders who unwarrantedly identify with the country in question, or else exculpating disaffected insiders. 

33 See Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations (1993).

34 Consider, for example, Justice Brandeis’s stirring defense of the right to dissent in his concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), a case challenging the defendant’s conviction for her membership in the Communist Labor Party: “Those who won our independence believed … that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized … that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies. … Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.” Id. at 375 (footnote omitted). Cf. Andrew Mason, Special Obligations to Compatriots, Ethics 107 (April 1997): 427-443, 444. (“The idea that we have a special obligation to our compatriots to participate fully in public life has been thought to include or entail various specific obligations, such as an obligation … to keep a watchful eye on government and speak out when it acts unjustly.”)


36 In his contribution to this volume, David Luban offers a critique of the state cast as jealous god, demanding its citizens’ lives when its own existence is threatened, and fighting wars against other states with near impunity. While I find his critique compelling, my purpose here is simply to describe, and not evaluate, the cultural phenomenon in question.

37 In her contribution to this volume, Avia Pasternak offers an account of citizenship as an associative obligation that resonates well with the conception of citizenship articulated here. Nonetheless, I do not agree with Pasternak that her account can justify an equal distribution (ED) of burdens among citizens. Instead, it seems to me that the “solidary” nature of citizenship would be disrupted if each citizen were to carry an equal burden independent of the extent of his or her participation in the state transgression in question. Far from fostering solidarity, an insistence upon an equal distribution in the face of differential contributions to the wrong might instead prompt friction between citizens, as those who did not participate in the wrong rightfully awaited exoneration – or at least relief from the sharing of burdens – from those who did participate. My account, by contrast, seeks to be sensitive to the different kinds of relationships citizens can have to a transgression of their nation-state, and to adjust the magnitude of responsibility accordingly. At the same time, it views citizenship as an inescapable ground of responsibility, and in that way may well honor the good of citizenship that Pasternak helpfully identifies, without fomenting the resentments to which, I worry, her account may give rise.

38 Richard Vernon argues, in his contribution, that the mere fact that a citizen supports the project of the nation-state need not entail that she bears responsibility for any acts undertaken in furtherance of that project. In particular, where the citizen valiantly opposes the acts in question, Vernon contends, her opposition ought to thwart an attempt to hold her responsible. After all, to will the end is not to will the means, Vernon pithily reminds us. To be clear, then, the ground of responsibility on my account is different from the one that Vernon critiques. For one thing, the dissident would come to bear responsibility for a national wrong on my account even if the wrong proved ineffective at protecting or promoting the nation-state. More generally, the dissident’s commitment need bear no relationship – teleological, motivational, or otherwise -- to the misdeed of her compatriots in order for her to merit responsibility for that misdeed. Instead, the ground of the dissident’s responsibility follows from an obligation of fidelity that she owes her fellow citizens, and an obligation of integrity that she owes herself.

39 Mark Drumbl, Collective Responsibility and Post-Conflict Justice, at 17.


41 See, e.g., Gary Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme, in Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology 256, 257 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (“Strawson’s radical claim is that these ‘reactive attitudes’ (as he calls them) are constitutive of moral responsibility; to regard oneself or another as responsible just is the proneness to react to them in these kinds of ways under certain conditions.”).

42 See, e.g., Elisa A. Hurley, Working Passions: Emotions and Creative Engagement with Value, 45 Southern J. Phil., 78, 83 (2007) (“Feelings seem to he somehow essential to what emotions are, even if
they are not necessarily present on every token occasion of emotion.”); MORRIS, supra note 31 at 102 (“When feeling guilty we characteristically suffer pain that is partly constitutive of the feeling.”).

43 Drumbl restricts the category of moral guilt to those who have been convicted of violating a criminal law. I am here using moral guilt as a species of moral responsibility that would apply to any wrongdoing, not just wrongdoing that rises to the level of criminality. Drumbl, supra note 12 at 44

44 Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 45, 56-57 (John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza eds., 1993). See also Watson, supra note 44 at 264 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (“The negative reactive attitudes express a moral demand, a demand for reasonable regard.”).

45 Jeffrie Murphy’s definition of resentment is representative here. Murphy contends that resentment issues from two kinds of wrongs: “direct violations of one’s rights (as in assault) or resentment that another has taken unfair advantage of one’s sacrifices by free-riding on a mutually beneficial scheme of reciprocal cooperation,” where the contemplated scheme is one of adherence to a body of law. Forgiveness and Resentment, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 15, 17 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds. 1988).

46 See, e.g., R. Jay Wallace, The Argument from Resentment, 107 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 295, 302 (2007) (“Resentment, at its most basic, is an emotional reaction that we are subject to when people treat us in certain ways. Its characteristic thought is that another person has acted wrongly, flouting a requirement of or demand that we hold them to or expect them to comply with.”). Marguerite La Caze, Envy and Resentment, 1 PHIL. EXPLORATIONS 31, 39 (2001) (“Resentment is an emotional recognition of injustice in the form of injury…..”);

47 Here, the pain of separation is felt by the resentful party. But it is worth noting a potential point of convergence with Herbert Morris’ account of guilt, in which he traces the pain of guilt at least in part to the rupture of a union, or separation, that wrongdoing wreaks. In guilt, he writes, “there is the pain that comes from separating ourselves from the union we value. To be cut off from what we love is intensely painful, and the pain of separation involved in guilt resembles this.” Morris, supra note 31 at 99.


50 In principle, there may also be cases in which a dissident might be permitted to disclaim, given how violative an ascription of blame for national transgressions is to her vision of her nation-state and herself. I assume here, however, that the transgressions committed against Iraqis are so egregious that it wouldn’t be plausible to think that the Iraqi victim’s resentment ought to give way to the American dissident’s self-conception.

51 The philosophical literature on resentment contains a debate about whether resentment is, all things considered, a useful emotion or instead one that is self-debasing. Compare Annette Baier, Hume on Resentment, 6 HUME STUDIES 133 (1980) (arguing that resentment, for Hume, functioned to call attention, and thereby reduce, imbalances in power) and Jeffrie Murphy, supra note 45 at 16 (“Resentment … is a good thing for it is essentially tied to a non-controversially good thing – self-respect.”) with FRIEDRICH W. NIETZSCHE, THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 24 (Douglas Smith trans. 1999) (“While the noble man lives for himself in trust and openness …, the man of resentment is neither upright nor naive in his dealings with others, nor is he honest and open with himself: … he has a perfect understanding of how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to make himself provisionally small and submissive.”). To the extent that I here promote resentment as an important implement in allowing the victim of atrocity to make sense of his lot, I align myself with those who defend the usefulness of resentment.

52 Insofar as the argument here permits us to blame, and hence condemn, someone who is not unequivocally culpable, it might be accused of unwarrantedly relying upon a retributivist conception of justice. In her contribution to this volume, Erin Kelly exhorts us to abandon retributivist conceptions of justice, where retribution is pursued for its own sake, given the natural and social factors that often undermine human agency. She nonetheless allows that retribution might be permissible for the sake of some other social good. One who is moved by Kelly’s rejection of retributive justice for its own sake might nonetheless find no objection with assigning blame to the dissident, given that the assignment may be
therapeutic for the victim of the wrong, and that the dissident does bear some relationship to the wrong, even if not the relationship that retributive justice ought to require.

53 Compare BERNARD WILLIAMS, SHAME AND NECESSITY 70 (1993) (arguing that it may be appropriate for victims of a harm to hold responsible the agent who unintentionally caused the harm even though the agent is not a wrongdoer: “Those who have been hurt need a response; simply what has happened to them may give them a right to seek it, and where can they look more appropriately than to you, the cause?”).

54 Jaspers, supra note 48 at 68

55 LARRY MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY 152 (1996).


57 Jaspers, supra note 48 at 68.

58 Id. at 26.

59 May, supra note 29 at 153.

60 E.g., Morris, supra note 56 at 240.

61 Id. at 237.

62 MORRIS, supra note 31 at 89.

63 Compare Joseph Butler, Upon Resentment, in FIFTEEN SERMONS 131 (1949) (arguing that, where virtue fails, individuals may nonetheless be deterred from pursuing wrongdoing by the anticipated unpleasantness of the resentment their wrongdoing would elicit).

64 I do not mean to endorse here the part of Jasper’s account that leaves the experience of metaphysical guilt to the individual’s conscience. Nonetheless, the term “metaphysical guilt” may well be apt for cases in which one views oneself as culpable in a wrong for which one is not causally responsible.

65 See, e.g., Morris, supra note 31 at 137 (describing the experience of non-moral guilt as “a feeling of shame, perhaps before God, because of the evil done by any human being, as if some defect in us were revealed by what any human being did.”); May, supra note 29 at 155 (“moral shame or taint may be the appropriate moral feeling” in instances “when a person’s causal agency is not in question, or at least when the causal role one played did not make a difference in the world.”)

66 See, e.g., Strawson, supra note 44 at 56-57 (referring to resentment and indignation as “kindred” reactive attitudes, and to guilt as the “correlate” of these two); BERNARD WILLIAMS, SHAME AND NECESSITY 89 (1993) (“What arouses guilt in an agent is an act or omission of a sort that typically elicits from other people anger, resentment or indignation.”). R. Jay Wallace has argued that the reactive attitudes should consist only of guilt, resentment and indignation. R. Jay Wallace, Emotions and Expectations, in FREE WILL: CONCEPTS AND CHALLENGES 136, 145 (John Martin Fischer ed., 2005).

67 Strawson, supra note 44 at 57.

68 See, e.g., Stephen Darwall, (Modern) Moral Obligation and the Will 25, available at http://weblaw.usc.edu/academics/assets/docs/darwall.pdf (“Guilt feels like the (second-personal) response to blame: an acknowledgment of one’s blameworthiness that recognizes both the grounds of blame and, more importantly for us, the authority to level it (even if only to God). To feel guilt, consequently, is to feel as if one has the requisite capacity and standing to be addressed as responsible.”). Cf. R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility, in FREE WILL: CONCEPTS AND CHALLENGES 185 (John Martin Fischer ed., 2005) (“blameworthiness does require the belief that some reactive emotion would be appropriate. Without at least this degree of connection, we lose the idea that judgments of blameworthiness are … ways of holding a person morally responsible.”).