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Article
The Effects of Political Action Committee Contributions on Medical Liability Legislation
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (2007)
  • Amy M Wolaver, Bucknell University
  • Christopher S Magee, Bucknell University
Abstract

This paper examines representatives' voting on the HEALTH Act of 2003, which proposed a limit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice lawsuits. The estimates show that the more campaign contributions a representative received from law firm PACs, the less likely he or she was to vote for the bill, while money from insurance and health care industry PACs increased the likelihood of an aye vote. These effects remain after controlling for the endogeneity of campaign contributions. Other factors affecting voting decisions include party affiliation, representative ideology, whether or not the representative was an attorney, the change in state malpractice premiums and payouts, and the change in the number of doctors in the state. There is no strong evidence that the AMA's strategy of naming certain states as being in "crisis" increased the probability that representatives from those states supported the bill.

Keywords
  • politics and economics,
  • medical malpractice
Publication Date
January, 2007
Citation Information
Amy M Wolaver and Christopher S Magee. "The Effects of Political Action Committee Contributions on Medical Liability Legislation" The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy Vol. 6 Iss. 1 (2007)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/amy_wolaver/1/