"Africa-U.S. Partnership in the 21st Century,"

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The Chimera, monster of Greek mythology, part lion, part goat, and part dragon, is a symbol for fantastic ideas and “the creation of imagination.”
Publisher’s Note

Welcome to the anniversary issue of Chimera. Since our founding, the USA/Africa Institute has sought to improve the environment for exchanges between Africa and the United States. Chimera is our platform for exchanging ideas, stimulating discussion and encouraging engagements on both continents. We have had a very successful year and look forward to an even broader audience this year. To enhance our electronic distribution, we have been selected by a number of indices and have engaged web based aggregation services. This has significantly expanded our opt-in-only subscriber list. We have enjoyed the ever increasing downloads of Chimera from the Internet. Due to the overall popularity of Chimera, distribution of the printed version has also been increased.

This issue is no exception to our history. We have selected authors who represent the knowledge, wisdom and experience that our readers have come to expect.

Since its inception in 1945, the United Nations has been concerned with dismantling colonialism. More than 80 nations whose peoples were under colonial rule have joined the United Nations as sovereign independent states. This is especially true in Africa. From 1945 through the 1970’s, Africa gave birth to several nations. Due to the cold war and its considerations, several of these were stillborn. The continent is afflicted with the vestiges of both colonialism and the cold war. More recently, African nation states created their own path to the future by organizing the African Union. Like its European counterpart, the African Union is aggressively adapting a number of institutions to assist in its mission of achieving Pan Africanism in the shortest time possible. They have formed a Pan African Congress and adopted a Code of African Leadership.

In our first article, Yvette Stevens, Director of the UN Office of the Special Advisor for Africa reviews past initiatives and outlines a path forward utilizing the African Union and its New Partnership for African Development. One of the institutions adopted is that of democracy, which in turn depends upon elections. Drs. Steven Block, Karen Ferree and Smita Singh review political economic cycles and the implications for democratic transitions and the compatibility of economic and political reform in nascent democracies. As Africa develops political parties and political leadership, this article provides significant guidance to both groups as well as the global African Diaspora and policy makers worldwide, in designing successful strategies.

The World Health Organization has produced a highly successful model in Africa for managing disease. Sevim Ahmedhov not only evaluates the model, but also duplicated it successfully in Florida creating a valid basis for global evaluation and management of curable diseases. To further highlight international relations, Dr. Amadu Jacky Kaba reviews the history of European and Unites States’ relations with Africa and provides statistical support for the proposition that USA/African partnerships are the way forward. Drs. Chinua Akukwe, Sidi Jammeh and Melvin Foote provide the anchor to this special anniversary issue by elucidating on issues related to African engagement of the Diaspora. As we look to another year, the Institute plans to engage the Diaspora and the African Union. We hope that you will too.
Africa’s Development on the United Nations Agenda

By Yvette Stevens

Historical Context
The economic recovery and development of Africa was identified as one of the priorities of the United Nations since the 1980s. A number of initiatives were adopted by Africa and the international community to address African development, but these have not yet yielded the desired results.

A recent independent review of such initiatives that were taken in the 1990s revealed that they never became the framework for African development as they were expected to be. Perhaps their most significant positive contribution was to help keep Africa on the international agenda, especially at the level of the United Nations General Assembly, and to institutionalize the notion that the continent’s development rested on a series of partnerships. While the debate in the General Assembly had been intense, beyond the United Nations, few governments, whether African or donor, actually assumed ownership of the initiatives. Little attempt was made to translate them into national policies. All those who had supported these initiatives failed to fulfill their responsibilities, and thereby failed to remove the many obstacles to development that plagued the continent.

From the recent review, a number of lessons could be drawn for future United Nations system engagement with Africa. These lessons:

1. The experience over the decade has shown that conflict and development are mortal enemies and that the resolution and prevention of conflicts in Africa are crucial to ensure development of the continent.
2. International development cooperation in support of Africa’s accelerated development will need to be based on a major revision of the dominant thinking that had guided multilateral and bilateral programmes in Africa over the past two decades.
3. Commitments need to be met. It is essential that if the desired goals of initiatives are met, all actors should take steps to internalize them in their policies, strategies and actions to address the development of the continent.
4. There is a need for continued global advocacy for African development.
5. The United Nations system should pool its efforts and resources to give coordinated and comprehensive support to Africa.
The Millennium Development Goals

At the Millennium Summit in New York in 2000, world leaders identified global poverty as the most daunting of all the problems facing the world in the new century, and resolved to tackle it by creating “an environment - at the national and global levels alike - which is conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty”. In order to measure progress in addressing this problem, the Millennium Declaration included a number of time-bound targets, which were subsequently consolidated as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These goals, many of which had been adopted in various intergovernmental fora before 2000, cover a wide range of issues, including poverty and hunger, health, education, environmental sustainability and building a global partnership for development. The Millennium Development Goals have provided a common framework for global development, as they have been embraced by both developed and developing countries, multilateral institutions as well as civil society. The United Nations system has launched a Millennium Development Goals campaign to spread awareness and build global support for this program; instituted a process of national reporting on progress towards reaching the goals and, developed a Millennium Project which brings together hundreds of policy makers, practitioners and experts from a wide range of institutions and countries to determine how progress can be accelerated and sustained.

The Millennium Declaration singled out Africa for special attention. Section VII of the declaration makes an undertaking to support the consolidation of democracy in Africa and assist Africans in their struggle for lasting peace, poverty eradication and sustainable development, thereby bringing Africa into the mainstream of the world economy and member states resolved:

- To give full support to the political and institutional structures of emerging democracies in Africa.
- To encourage and sustain regional and sub-regional mechanisms for preventing conflict and promoting political stability, and to ensure a reliable flow of resources for peace-keeping operations on the continent.
- To take special measures to address the challenges of poverty eradication and sustainable development in Africa, including debt cancellation, improved market access, enhanced Official Development Assistance (ODA) and increased flows of Foreign Direct Investment, as well as transfers of technology.
- To help Africa build up its capacity to tackle the spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other infectious diseases.

The Situation of Africa in Relation to the MDGs

In his report to the General Assembly in 2003, the Secretary General reviewed progress towards achieving the MDGs. The statistics showed that sub-Saharan Africa was faring badly when compared to other regions of the world in all of the goals. Indeed, it was the only region in which the poverty and hunger targets had deteriorated rather than improved between 1990 and 1999/2000.
when compared to other regions of the world in all of the goals. Indeed, it was the only region in which the poverty and hunger targets had deteriorated rather than improved between 1990 and 1999/2000. For instance, the percentage population below US$1 purchasing power parity per day had increased from 47.4 per cent in 1990 to 49 per cent in 1999. Other indicators show values for Sub-Saharan Africa to be significantly worse than those for the world or for all developing countries combined.

Link between peace and development in Africa
One of the reasons for the current situation in Africa is the incidence of armed conflict and insecurity in the region. Although the link between conflict and development was well known, it was not until 1998 that the report of the Secretary General on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable and Sustainable Development in Africa detailed the historical legacies; defined the internal and external factors and the economic motives that are the causes of conflict in Africa; outlined the implications of such conflict for African development; established concrete recommendations to address peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and, building durable peace and promoting economic growth. Since 1998, a number of United Nations actions in Africa have been in line with the recommendations of the report, although a lot still needs to be done.

Instability can be seen as both the cause and effect of poverty and under-development. Civil conflicts result in high human, social and economic costs and are a major impediment to economic growth, without which development is inconceivable. Conflicts in Africa are largely intra-state and the causes of such conflict are complex and multiple. It is thus obvious that, in order to tackle the problem of poverty in Africa, significant efforts need to be made to resolve existing conflicts and mitigate new ones.

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)
African leaders have taken the lead in articulating regional development initiatives. In July 2001, the African Heads of States, in their Summit in Lusaka decided that the Organization of African Unity will be replaced by the African Union, in a bid for greater economic, political and institutional integration of the continent. They also adopted the New African Initiative, later renamed the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), a continental initiative developed by African leaders. This initiative, which is centered on African ownership and partnership with the international community, is directed towards the achievement of the sustainable development of Africa in the twenty first century.

NEPAD was presented to the United Nations General Assembly in 2002. In the Declaration which followed the plenary debate, widespread support for NEPAD was expressed and NEPAD was unanimously endorsed in a General Assembly resolution which stipulated that it should become the “framework for international community support to Africa.”

There is a commitment in NEPAD to achieving several of the MDGs as this represents an important link with the United Nations Millennium Declaration. In addition, NEPAD fully reflects the priorities for meeting the special needs of Africa in the Millennium Declaration as outlined above.

The Road Ahead
From the above discussions it is obvious that the Millennium Declaration, the African Union Charter and NEPAD will form the basis for UN support to Africa in the foreseeable future. The “Road Map towards the implementation of the Millennium Declaration”, which was presented to the United Nations General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session in 2001, outlined strategies to be adopted by the international community, including the United Nations, to assist Africa in moving forward. These were formulated under each goal stated above and briefly discussed below.

Strategies to support political and institutional structures of emerging democracies in Africa included support to the democracy and governance programmes of NEPAD, which includes targeted capacity building focused on public sector management, administrative and civil service
reform and strengthening parliamentary oversight, as well as encouraging governments to nurture democratic values, ideals and institutions to develop independent judiciaries and the media.

In order to encourage and sustain regional and sub-regional mechanisms for preventing conflict and promoting political stability, and to ensure a reliable flow of resources for peacekeeping operations on the continent, strategies include maintaining the engagement of the international community in peacekeeping in Africa; supporting peacekeeping in Africa through assistance to specific operations or through incremental steps to enhance peacekeeping operations generally in Africa; providing more funds to allow the African military officers, particularly those serving with the OAU and sub-regional organizations to participate in training and short-term exchange opportunities, and encouraging further cooperation by African States within the United Nations standby arrangements.

**Additional Strategies**

For special measures to address the challenges of poverty eradication and sustainable development in Africa, strategies include:

1. Helping Africa seek increased ODA flows and reforming ODA delivery systems to ensure that flows are more effectively utilized by African countries.
2. Supporting the establishment of measures that reduce risk in order to attract and sustain foreign direct investment and technology transfers.
3. Helping Africa to secure further debt relief.
4. Assistance with ensuring active participation in the world trading system through open and geographically diversified market access for its exports.
5. Helping the continent diversify its production and providing assistance to secure and stabilize preferential treatment by developed countries.

Strategies to help Africa build up its capacity to tackle the spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other infectious diseases include:

1. Promoting global public goods for health by mobilizing commercial enterprises, especially pharmaceutical companies.
2. Giving high priority to measuring improvements in health in African countries, particularly the least developed countries.
3. Supporting capacity building in the least developed countries, to collect and analyze data on agreed health indicators and to share information at the regional and global levels.
4. Supporting African governments in their efforts to reduce death and disability from the major diseases affecting the poor, such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and other infectious diseases.

Under NEPAD, African leaders are taking ownership of their own development and are seeking partnership with the international community. The United Nations system is tailoring its activities to provide support in the areas covered by the respective mandates of the agencies.
mandates of the agencies. The Secretary General’s report to the General Assembly on the Final Review and Appraisal of UN-NADAF, highlighted the modalities for the United Nations system support to NEPAD at the national, regional and global levels. These modalities of United Nations future engagement with NEPAD are based on the following premises:

- Promoting peace and development in Africa remains a priority of the United Nations;
- The primary responsibility for implementing NEPAD rests with Africa, its government and peoples. This is consistent with the principle of African ownership and leadership of NEPAD and one of the lessons learned from the UN-NADAF. The role of the United Nations is to support African efforts;
- The agencies and organizations of the United Nations system have accumulated tremendous experience in contributing to Africa’s development, which they will bring to bear in supporting the implementation of NEPAD;
- NEPAD is an integrated framework that links the issues of peace and security with governance and development. As such, the United Nations system response to its implementation requires a comprehensive approach that encompasses peace and security, humanitarian, human rights, economic and social issues. The Millennium Development Goals provides the basis for the entire United Nations system to work coherently towards a common end.

**Some Concluding Remarks**

While a number of impressive developments that have the potential to improve the situation in Africa have recently emerged, it remains to be seen whether the means to translate plans and good intentions into action are forthcoming. At the International Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002, leaders from both developed and developing countries started to match the commitments on human rights, good governance and democracy with resources for development. The understanding that emerged was that sustained political and economic reforms by African countries would be matched by direct support from the developed world in the form of aid, trade, debt relief and investment.

One thing that is clear is that substantial financial support is required by African countries to enable them to reach the Millennium Development Goals or achieve the goals of NEPAD. In addition, success is required in the areas of conflict resolution and prevention. Furthermore, African countries need to put in place sound political and economic reforms that would lead to good governance. Indeed, data already suggests that unless significant progress is made in these areas, a large number of African countries are unlikely to meet these goals. There are also fears that the situation might worsen as a result of recent developments attracting world attention elsewhere.

The United Nations system will work with civil society and other stakeholders to support the implementation of NEPAD and the Millennium Development Goals through enhanced advocacy, undertaking technical cooperation for capacity building, mobilizing resources, monitoring and reporting on the activities undertaken by African countries and their development partners and strengthened cooperation.

Ms. Yvette Stevens is currently the Director at the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, having served as the Special Coordinator for Africa and the Least Developed Countries in the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs from 1999 to 2003. The Office of the Special Adviser for Africa, which was created on 1 May 2003, has a primary responsibility for global advocacy for African development, including the promotion of peace and security that impact on development, as well as for preparing reports on Africa for the United Nations General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. Ms. Stevens is a Sierra Leonean national.
Introduction
How do political structures affect the selection of economic policies? This is one of the central questions arising out of recent work on the political economy of development. In the 1990s, its significance was driven home by research and development experiences in Africa. Investigations revealed that African governments’ policy choices mattered, and furthermore, we needed to understand the political structures that produced them. Such issues are particularly critical to the extent that politically-motivated economic policies may conflict with the objectives of economic reform.

“Political business cycle (PBC) theory” provides a useful analytical window into these issues. PBC theory suggests that incumbent politicians facing election may have incentives to create business cycles timed around elections, typically pumping up their economy prior to the election to improve their chances of re-election, resulting in post-election recessions. The extent to which this is true, however, likely depends on context. Competitive elections may generate stronger incentives to manipulate. Strong institutions and savvy electorates may reduce incumbents’ capacity to do so. Elections in nascent democracies - such as commonly found in Africa - provide opportunities to test these conjectures. They vary in terms of their degree of competition. Furthermore, initial elections are likely to differ from later ones because incumbent authoritarian leaders are less constrained and uncertainty surrounding electoral choice is higher. Thus, studying elections in these countries may provide new insights to previously ignored empirical questions and may help illuminate the connections between political institutions and economic policy. Such illumination is
Our primary hypothesis, then, is that we should only see evidence of political business cycles in elections with rules allowing competition. In other words, there should be a significant difference in the occurrence of political cycles between multiparty and single party elections.

particularly important given the emphasis of late on democratization in developing countries.

With these questions in mind, we extend the empirical testing of political business cycles theory in two ways: first by explicitly testing the effect of the absence of multi-party competition on the realization of political business cycles, and second by allowing the magnitude of political business cycles to vary as a function of whether a given election is the country’s first competitive election. Sub-Saharan Africa, with its rapid increase in the incidence of elections with multi-party competition (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997) as well as its relative lack of institutional development, provides the ideal testing ground for our proposed extensions of the empirical testing of political business cycle theory. Indeed, our results strongly confirm not only the existence of political business cycles in Africa, but the importance of considering explicitly the introduction and effects of multi-party electoral competition in empirical analysis.

Our primary hypothesis, then, is that we should only see evidence of political business cycles in elections with rules allowing competition. In other words, there should be a significant difference in the occurrence of political cycles between multiparty and single party elections.

Political business cycles are by their nature dynamic processes, yet empirical testing has ignored temporal effects across elections. In the developing world - Africa in particular – with its many nascent democracies, this question takes on added significance. There are various reasons why founding elections may be associated with special circumstances around political business cycles.ª

First, in transition elections, we would expect authoritarian leaders to have greater discretion in manipulating pre-electoral economic policies. From the standpoint of incumbent politicians, initial competitive elections offer the incentive to deter entry by future challengers. By raiding the state coffers to shower constituents with pre-electoral spending, incumbents may attempt to scare off potential challengers and solidify their bases of support before the opposition has any influence on the policy-making process. Furthermore, in founding elections, they may face fewer institutional constraints in the form of legislatures, independent central banks, and a free press, thus making available a potentially wide range of fiscal and monetary policies as tools of manipulation.ª

Moreover, as countries introduce competitive, multi-party elections, both incumbents and voters are thrown into a new world of uncertainty. The uncertainty driving political business cycles has a temporal as well as an institutional component. There are differences in voter’s information sets between founding elections and later elections. Voters may be the least “savvy” to electoral manipulation in the first election,
providing incumbents with additional incentives to induce cycles. With no prior experience to temper their assessments relating prospective performance to pre-electoral performance, voters can evaluate candidates on only the available evidence - the pre-electoral surge in spending. This reasoning suggests a secondary hypothesis: “We should see evidence of larger opportunistic political budget cycles in “founding elections.” Between 1980 and 1995 (the period of our analysis) African countries experienced 22 founding elections. With these hypotheses in hand, we move to a discussion of data and empirical testing.

Data
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the macroeconomic aggregates used in the analysis. The dependent variables with which we test for political business cycles include real GDP growth, government consumption (as a share of GDP), nominal money growth, and nominal exchange rate devaluation. Detailed definitions and sources of these data are provided in the footnotes to Table 1.

The second political variable is an indicator of electoral contestability, introduced by Ferree and Singh (2002). This scale measures the level of competition that occurs during the executive selection process. Unlike other commonly used measures (i.e., Gastil’s political and civil liberties indices) that aggregate many considerations into an overall score, the executive scale captures a single, highly central component of electoral competitiveness - the presence or absence of competition within or between parties. While other factors also affect competition (for example, freedom of the press), they are more difficult to measure. Thus, the scale opts for specificity and clarity over trying to capture and test all aspects of competition that might matter.

Ferree and Singh identify six levels as follows:
- Level 1 — No executive exists
- Level 2 — Executive exists but was not elected
- Level 3 — Executive is elected, but was the sole candidate
- Level 4 — Executive is elected, and multiple candidates competed for the office
- Level 5 — Multiple parties were also able to contest the executive elections
- Level 6 — Candidates from more than one party competed in executive elections

For the purposes of this analysis, the relevant distinction is between Level 6 (multiparty elections) and Levels 3 and 4 of the scale (single party elections). There are 33 multi-party elections in our data set and 32 single party ones. Table 2 provides a mapping between election dates and the scale of electoral competitiveness permit...
Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Presidential Election Dates (Executive Scale Rating)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1 December 1991 [3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>31 August 1984 [3]; 1 June 1993 [6]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>17 February 1991 [6]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>9 November 1986 [4]; 5 December 1993 [6]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>15 October 1985 [6]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>17 May 1994 [6]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>7 December 1994 [6]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1 October 1985 [3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>23 December 1986 [3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>14 April 1983 [3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>(RR. Congo) 28 July 1984 [3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>March 1990 [6]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

us to explore the impact of multiparty competition in shaping the incentives for opportunistic politicians to engage in pre-electoral macroeconomic intervention. If multiparty electoral systems produce business cycles but single party systems do not, we will have uncovered an important channel through which political institutions affect economic policy-making and therefore, performance.

**Results and Conclusions**

The results presented in this section provide generally strong support for our primary hypotheses that political business cycles are intensified by multi-party electoral competition; yet, we find more moderate support for our secondary hypothesis that this effect will be further intensified in “founding” elections. In particular, we test for election-motivated interventions in real GDP growth, government consumption, real money growth, and nominal exchange rate devaluation.iii

In sum, our statistical analysis sustains our hypothesis that incumbents’ incentive to create political business cycles in nascent democracies is strong, but contingent on multiparty competition. We find evidence of electorally-timed interventions in fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policy exclusively in the cases of competitive elections. Further, we find evidence of larger monetary interventions and more suggestive evidence of greater cycles in fiscal policy interventions, in the special case of founding elections. In contrast, we do not find robust evidence of election-related effects on real GDP growth. Our finding of substantial electorally-motivated policy distortions without associated impacts on real GDP suggests that African economies pay the costs of political business cycles but realize none of the benefits. On the fiscal side, this could reflect election-year increases in transfers targeted to politically important groups.

In no case do we see evidence of political business cycle behavior in non-competitive elections (indeed, we find suggestive evidence of the opposite behavior with respect to both fiscal and monetary policy in non-competitive systems). Further, the occurrence of founding elections magnifies the effect of multiparty competition in the cases of both money growth and exchange rate policy, thus providing at least limited support for our secondary hypothesis.

Our results also permit some broader generalizations about the effect of electoral accountability in non-election years. For instance, we find that countries with competitive electoral systems tend to devote a smaller share of GDP to government consumption, (at least suggestively) experience slower growth in their real money supplies, and face reduced rates of currency devaluation as compared with countries lacking competitive electoral systems. In this context, it may be reasonable to interpret the competitiveness indicator as a broader proxy for the effects of greater accountability of incumbents to voters. This suggests the possibility that while electoral competitiveness fosters political opportunism in the short run (e.g., during election years), greater electoral accountability is associated with healthier macroeconomic policy—more generally.

**PBC theory suggests that incumbent politicians facing election may have incentives to create business cycles timed around elections, typically pumping up their economy prior to the election to improve their chances of re-election, resulting in post-election recessions.**
Dr. Steven A. Block is an Associate Professor of International Economics at Tufts University, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He has written extensively on political business cycles, economic and agricultural issues related to Africa. His recent writings include: “Political Business Cycles, Democratization, and Economic Reform: The Case of Africa,” Journal of Development Economics (2002); “Does Africa Grow Differently?” Journal of Development Economics (2001); “The Recovery of Agricultural Productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Food Policy (1995), in addition to several technical reports for USAID. Dr. Block also serves as a Consultant to the World Bank and USAID on numerous technical assistance missions in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. He holds a Masters Degree in Public Policy and PhD in Political Economy both from Harvard University.

Dr. Karen E. Ferree is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, Department of Political Science. Dr. Ferree has researched comprehensively the politics of democracy, elections, and ethnicity, particularly in the context of the developing countries of Africa. She has done field research in South Africa twice, the results of which are presented in her dissertation, Voters and Parties in the Rainbow Nation: Race and Elections in the New South Africa. Dr. Ferree also is working on several papers that look at the political economy of elections in Africa and has interests in political methodology, particularly ecological inference and time series cross sectional analysis. She earned a PhD from Harvard University in Comparative Politics, Policies of Democracy and Elections.

Dr. Smita Singh is the Special Adviser for Global Affairs at The William & Flora Hewlett Foundation. Dr. Singh is a recognized scholar and researcher in the areas of international development, growth and political institutions. Some of her recent writings include: “The Political Economy of Kinship Societies” and “Organizing Violence” with Bates, Robert H., Avner Greif, et.al. She is also a PhD graduate of Harvard University.

References and Endnotes


ii We apply the definition of founding elections proposed by Bratton and van de Walle (1997), in which “...the office of head of government was openly contested following a period during which multiparty politics had been denied.” (p. 196)

iii These are noted characteristics of the politics of many African countries. As we point out below, this is one of compelling reasons to use African data for empirical tests of our hypotheses.

iv Note that money supply and exchange rates are not controlled directly by member governments in the French West African Currency Union. CFA zone countries are thus excluded from our preliminary estimations.
New Model for Evaluating Tuberculosis Surveillance, Performance and Cost: The Common Experience of Tanzania and Florida

By Sevim Ahmedov

The Tuberculosis (TB) Challenge:
With the introduction of the first effective antimicrobial drugs in the 1950s for treatment of tuberculosis (TB), the possibility for eradication of this deadly disease seemed within reach for public health officials. Fifty years later, the attainment of that goal appears to be at a critical juncture, and TB is once again on the rise in the world. TB continues to kill approximately two million people each year, and the epidemic is gaining momentum, fueled by the swift spread of HIV/AIDS, mass migrations of people, the breakdown of public health infrastructure systems, especially in the poor and developing world, and the emergence of multi-drug resistant strains of TB.

Burdened by increasing HIV/AIDS numbers, Sub-Saharan Africa also faces about two million additional cases of TB per year. The lethal combination of HIV/AIDS and TB extracts a heavy social and economic toll in that part of Africa.

Although TB has been on the decline in the US, the country’s continued efforts toward eradication face critical challenges stemming from declining financial resources, complacency and benign neglect. In Florida, 2003 was the ninth consecutive year of declining TB incidence. However, with 1,046 new cases, the state is ranked an unenviable fourth in the nation. With an incidence rate of 6.1 per 100,000, it is still well above the national average rate of 5.1 per 100,000.

It is becoming increasingly clear that in order to reach our intermediate goal of 3.5 cases per 100,000 persons, decisive action needs to be taken. “Smart” tools need to be re-engineered and developed in our arsenal for TB elimination in Florida, the US and the world. During this paradigm shift process, the evaluation of the current interventions both on the program performance and cost-benefit side are becoming an integral and crucial part of our efforts. Evaluating the performance of public health surveillance and response performance activities...
Improving the Environment for Intercontinental Exchanges

and measuring the costs are necessary to ensure that health events are surveyed and acted upon effectively and efficiently. Underlying the importance of evaluation, it now has become a core component of public health practice, especially as TB control programs strive toward disease elimination, while seeking to integrate evaluation into daily function and managementiii. Leading the way in those efforts, the Florida Department of Health, with financial and technical support from the Centers for Disease Prevention and Control (CDC), is piloting a TB evaluation model that was initially tested by the Africa Bureau of the World Health Organization (WHO) in the United Republic of Tanzania in 1998iv.

Innovative Approach to Disease Intervention Evaluation: The model is based on a public health action-led conceptual framework, which looks at public health surveillance and action as an integrated process and promotes "public health action-led" rather than "surveillance (data)-led" evaluation strategy. The model is comprised of eight core activities (detection, registration, reporting, confirmation, analysis, feedback, and acute and planned responses) and four support activities (communication, training, supervision, and resource provision)v (Figures 1 and 2).

The three main components consist of 12 distinct activities, which are defined as follows:

**Component 1-Surveillance**
1. Detection: identifying a suspected TB case.
2. Registration: entering specific descriptive variables of a suspected TB case in the public health record.
3. Reporting: moving public health surveillance data from one level of the health system (e.g., county level) to another (e.g., state) level.
4. Confirmation: using epidemiological, medical or laboratory information to verify the status of a registered, suspected TB case.
5. Analysis: examining and interpreting surveillance data, including data presentation and the development of indicator targets for triggering public health action.
6. Feedback: feeding data, information, and messages back to original reporting sources.

**Component 2-Action**
7. Acute (epidemic-type) response: taking direct, reactive, and immediate public health actions designed to stop the ongoing transmission of disease (e.g., TB care coordination, contact investigation, targeted testing, or outbreak investigation).
8. Planned (management-type) response: taking long-term actions and a systematic approach to future needs identification, such as prevention, community education, or reallocation of staff and resources in response to emerging disease trends.

**Component 3-Support**
9. Communication: exchanging information; conveying, receiving, interpreting, and agreeing upon the meaning of data, information and messages.
10. Training: providing staff with job-related knowledge and skills; instructing or coaching in a mode of

TB continues to kill approximately two million people each year, and the epidemic is gaining momentum, fueled by the swift spread of HIV/AIDS, mass migrations of people, the breakdown of public health infrastructure systems, especially in the poor and developing world, and the emergence of multi-drug resistant strains of TBii.
behavior or performance.

11. Supervision: directing and guiding staff’s work and job performance.

12. Resource provision: ensuring availability of funds, trained personnel, or other tangibles such as communications infrastructure, electricity, rent, and medications.

Results: By applying the evaluation model, the group of researchers assessed the structure and performance of five infectious disease systems in the United Republic of Tanzania. By analyzing the core and support activities of surveillance and response, they identified certain gaps with regards to supervision, standardized case definitions, and improvements in the quality of reporting, analysis, and feedback. The findings from the assessment were used to develop a 5-year plan of action to improve the infectious disease surveillance and response system in the country.

In a similar vein, the conceptual framework was implemented in Hillsborough County, Florida, in 2001, allowing for a measurement of TB surveillance, performance and cost. The systematic evaluation strategy revealed missed opportunities and programmatic gaps in detection and confirmation of TB cases. The cutting edge cost-analysis showed that of the $1.08 million annual budget, 22% was spent on surveillance, 49% on action and 29% on support activities. This year, the initial study is being expanded—the number of performance and response indicators has been increased from 24 to 144—both to validate the preliminary results and broaden the scope of the evaluation model. The model is to become the foundation upon which an up-scaled and user-friendly monitoring and evaluation strategy will be built, allowing for increased effectiveness and efficiency of the state TB control program, and ultimately for the elimination of this curable disease.
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Endnotes


Introduction

People of African descent are witnessing an unprecedented economic and political partnership between the United States and Africa in the beginning of the 21st century. Never before has the United States and Africa entered into such a positive and important relationship that has the potential to move the world in the right direction. Before this period, especially after World War II, the United States actually had a policy of allowing the continent of Africa to remain Europe’s sphere of influence. That includes Europe using Africa’s natural resources to rebuild its destroyed countries, while the United States focused on East Asia. By the year 2000 however, the United States had realized that it needed Africa more than it might have expected. African Americans, whose population is now nearly 40 million, have been the driving force behind this new partnership between Africa and the United States. Africans themselves have welcomed the United States and have shown their willingness to work with America on many important issues.

This article explores the new partnership between the United States and Africa in the beginning of the 21st century. It examines the types of political, economic and social endeavors...
that the two entities have undertaken and promise to undertake in the years and decades to come. It also shows that this new policy of the United States towards Africa goes beyond political parties (Democrats and Republicans), which is why many people across the world have been surprised to see a Republican president and government showing support for these new ties with Africa. I will briefly highlight some of the developments of this new relationship between the United States government and Africa. And, will also examine the reaction of Europe pertaining to its future relationship with Africa, especially as that continent begins to redirect its friendship towards the United States. The role that African Americans play in influencing the United States government in all of these developments will also be examined. Moreover, examples of African Americans’ personal efforts to contribute to the development of Africa will be provided.

**Shifting Relationship Between Africa/U.S. and Europe in the 21st Century**

Africa’s natural and human resources are very vital to the United States and Europe, and they have always remained the focus of their partnerships. Gordon et al. pointed out that: “Mineral and metal deposits in Africa are among the most important in the world. South Africa alone produces nearly one-quarter of the world’s gold and holds 84 percent of the world’s total reserve base of the platinum minerals. Africa also remains the source of many minerals strategic to the United States: 54 percent of the world’s cobalt, 32 percent of bauxite, 52 percent of manganese, 81 percent of chromium stocks.”

Ungar: “After Harry Truman succeeded to the presidency on Roosevelt’s death, Byrnes [James Byrnes] was named secretary of state and U.S. policy in Africa was brought back in line with European thinking. Truman tended to follow Churchill’s lead, and Dean Acheson, the man who later became Truman’s secretary of state, saw Africa as a pawn in the Cold War, but one that was Western Europe’s job to control.” After almost half a century, while trade between East Asia and the United States has
contributed significantly to the rise in the living standards of East Asians, trade between Africa and Europe has not been as successful. Prof. Ali A. Mazrui, Albert Schweitzer Professor in the Humanities, State University of New York at Binghamton, also lamented on this emerging rivalry for influence in Africa between Europe and the United States. Prof. Mazrui notes that the “…first stage in Africa’s economic development [is] the ‘Euro-African’ phase of African capitalism. The question which then arises is whether there is an Americo-African phase of African capitalism.” Many African countries are turning to the United States for stronger and successful economic partnerships. In a January 28, 2003, New York Times article, Somini Sengupta wrote of the West African country of Senegal, a former French colony, “…cozying up to the Americans and, not coincidentally, threatening the French with a loss of influence.”

Economic Relations Between Europe/United States and Africa

It has been widely noted that following World War II, South East Asia and Africa were on the same economic level, but their trade relations with the United States has resulted in the improvement of lives, while Africa’s trade relations with Europe has failed to produce any significant improvement in the lives of Africans. According to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), South East Asia is the recipient of an estimated $53 billion in U.S. direct investments and it is the third largest overseas market for U.S. exports. Two-way ASEAN-U.S. trade was estimated at $120 billion in 2001. Research by this author shows that as of 2001, the total population of Southeast Asia was 540 million.

“To hear President Yoweri Museveni tell it, AGOA is the best thing the West has done for Africa since independence.”

Africa’s total population as of July 2003 was estimated at 857 million, 13.5% of the world’s total. In 2001, the European Union’s merchandise exports to Africa were $59.3 billion, representing 2.6% of all of its merchandise exports during that year. Its merchandise imports from Africa in 2001 was $72.2 billion, representing 3.1% of its total imports. In 2001, over half (51.7%) of Africa’s total merchandise exports went to Western Europe. Some have argued that if Europe pays Africans a fair price for their resources, that continent would be better off economically today. Due to such unfair trade policies, Africa ends up in debt because it cannot afford to pay Europeans for the goods and services that it buys from them. According to the advocacy organization, Debt, AIDS, Trade in Africa (DATA), Africa owes nearly $300 billion in debt, and that Sub-Saharan Africa spends $14.5 billion dollars annually to repay its debts to rich countries. Of the world’s Gross World Product (GWP, PPP) of $47 trillion in 2001, Africa’s share was only $1.737 trillion (3.7%). As individual countries the United States is the largest importer of goods and services from Africa. According to the 2002 United Nations Economic Report on Africa, in 2000, the United States imported $27.64 billion of goods and services from Africa. In 2002 merchandise trade between sub-Saharan Africa and the United States was $27.8 billion.

It has also been reported that the United States is discussing free trade agreements with a number of African countries. According to the U.S. Department of State: “In November 2002, U.S. Trade Representative [Robert] Zoellick notified Congress of the President’s intent to initiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with the five member countries of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU):
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland. The proposed FTA is in keeping with AGOA, which encouraged the pursuit of free trade agreements with sub-Saharan African countries. The SACU represents the largest U.S. export market in sub-Saharan Africa. Last year [2002] sales topped more than $3 billion,” writes Mora McLean. Also, Elizabeth Becker reported on January 22, 2003 that the United States and Morocco had entered into discussions for a free trade agreement, but that European nations were concerned about such a trade agreement. According to Becker: “The competition between the United States and Europe over trade with Morocco, a country that imports $11 billion worth of goods a year, blew up into a surprising diplomatic quarrel during March 2004 meetings. French officials were said to have raised questions about Morocco’s ability to have free trade with both the United States and Europe. Ambassador Zoellick [Robert B. Zoellick, U.S. Trade Representative] responded with a riposte he repeated today, accusing France of refusing to recognize that Morocco is no longer its colony.

In 2000, with major efforts by the Congressional Black Caucus (a group of over 35 African American Democratic legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives) and other organizations that lobby for Africa, the United States Congress passed a trade bill, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which was signed by President Bill Clinton. About 38 African countries with good governance are qualified to participate in AGOA. The African Growth and Opportunity Act reduces or eliminates tariffs on over 1,800 items shipped from Africa to the United States. Marc Lacey reported for the New York Times on November 14, 2003, that for many African countries, AGOA has been a lifesaver. Lacey writes: “To hear President Yoweri Museveni tell it, AGOA is the best thing the West has done for Africa since independence.” Many Africans support that claim, which is why blacks in the United States must be proud of what AGOA is accomplishing and must also never underestimate their rising international influence. Lacey goes on to point out that because of AGOA: “Kenya has projected 50,000 AGOA-related jobs. Lesotho estimates it has created 10,000 new jobs in the last year, most of them going to young women. Uganda has seen its exports to the United States increase from a minuscule $32,000 in 2002 to $909,000 in the first nine months of this year, an increase that will widen by year’s end.”

In an effort to reduce its dependence on Middle East crude oil, the United States is said to be in the process of building two pipelines from Nigeria and Chad to transport oil from Africa to the United States, which is said to have 8% of the world’s known reserve. “The West African pipeline will link the Escravos gas field in Nigeria with the Ghanaian market. West Africa, mainly Angola and Nigeria, now supplies about 15 percent of U.S. oil imports to the United States, and U.S. officials project African oil could account for 25 percent of their country’s crude imports by 2015.” Timothy Burn reported in the Washington Times on September 28, 2003, that the American oil company, ChevronTexaco, has plans to invest up to $20 billion in West and Central African oil production. The United States government has also set up an annual $5 billion account known as the Millennium Challenge Corporation, that will be distributed to African nations with good governance. Also, during his 2003 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush pledged $15 billion in the next five years to be used to fight HIV/AIDS in Africa and other parts of the world. No other American, European leader or administration had ever made such a pledge in the history of the West’s relationship with Africa. The Guardian (UK) reported on June 3, 2003, that Britain’s Prime Minister, Tony Blair conceded that the European Union would fall short of meeting the $1 billion pledge it had made to match the United States pledge to help fight AIDS and other diseases in Africa.

African Americans and Their Efforts in Helping Africa Develop

African Americans are playing a vital role in America’s new partnership with Africa. Melvin P. Foote, President and CEO of the Constituency for Africa, wrote in the New York Newsday newspaper...
pertaining to this issue of blacks in the United States coming to the aid of Africa: “The degree to which the United States comes to respond to Africa, economically, politically and on a humanitarian basis, will depend largely on the lobbying efforts of African Americans. It stands to reason that if African Americans are seen not to care about Africa - then why would the Irish, Polish, Jewish, Italians and the myriad of hyphenated-Americans care? On the other hand, if African Americans can successfully demonstrate why Africa does in fact matter, then the potential for U.S. engagement with the continent in a meaningful way to promote progress and development is unlimited!”xxiii

Julianne Malveaux, columnist for USA Today newspaper, also calls for blacks in the United States to pay attention to Africa. She writes that: “The link between African-Americans and our brothers and sisters is too often a sentimental connection, with gifts and goodwill, kinship and kente cloth being exchanged... African-Americans can be advocates for the African continent, for debt forgiveness and economic development. Absent our involvement, we can sit by and watch Africans get caught up in the prevailing anti-American sentiment that our country represents 6% of the world’s population but uses a disproportionate share of its resources.... If African-Americans do not begin the dialogue, it is likely it won’t take place.”xxiv African Americans were also among those Americans who strongly urged the Bush administration to intervene in the 14-year civil war in Liberia and stop that war in the summer of 2003.xxv

Individual African Americans are also helping Africa in their own special ways. For example, Oprah Winfrey, an African American billionaire is reported to have established a $10 million “Oprah Winfrey Leadership Academy for Girls” in South Africa. She is also reported to have spent $6 million on a program called “Christmas Kindness” in South Africa.xxvi African American actor,
Denzel Washington and his wife Pauletta were reported to have donated $1 million to the Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund. Moreover, due largely to efforts by African Americans, an increasing number of Africans are now immigrating to the United States.

Today African immigrants can be found teaching at colleges and universities, and conducting research at America’s great research centers (including, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA), all across the country. As of 1998, a black African from Mali, Dr. Cheick Diarra, was NASA’s Manager, Mars Exploration Program Education and Outreach Office for Pathfinder Jet Propulsion Laboratory, in Pasadena, California. In an online interview with the public, Dr. Diarra was asked: “What part do you play in designing future Mars missions?” His answer was: “As a Navigator, I design the strategy to go from Earth to Mars and the results of the strategy determine the size of the tanks for example.”

In France, for instance, it is reported that “...there are more than 50 professions closed to non-EU citizens,...” Andrew England reported in a Washington Times article on March 20, 2003, that Mr. Noah Samara, an Ethiopian immigrant in the United States, in 1999 launched a WorldSpace satellite radio orbiting above the Earth, broadcasting daily educational programs to remote areas in Africa including Mandera, Kenya. The satellite radio known as XM Radio, also broadcast many American and foreign programs including NPR, CNN and the BBC. According to England: “In one of the few cases of technology being delivered to consumers in Africa before those in the United States, Africans were able to receive satellite Radio in 1999. American listeners got their first taste in September 2001, when XM Satellite Radio went live.” Writing about why most young Senegalese crave coming to the United States, Sengupta writes: “Among ordinary Senegalese, the resentment against all things French is based on the one thing they know best: the difficulties of getting a visa to study or work in France. (They have not had as much experience with the American immigration bureaucracy.)” The irony is that, it is European countries who invest large sums of money in the U.S., which in turn U.S. banks or credit cards loan to immigrants in the country to run their businesses or to pay for their education, and they go on to help America create a huge gap with Europe. So Europe is indirectly paying for the education of the same Africans that they deny entry to their countries. According to Robert J. Samuelson of the Washington Post: “At the end of 2001, foreigners owned $1.7 trillion of U.S. stocks and $3.2 trillion of government and corporate bonds... Japan and Europe don’t absorb all their own savings. The surpluses get invested in the United States, propping up the demand for dollars and explaining the huge foreign holdings of U.S. stocks and bonds.” That is a combined total of $4.9 trillion, almost 50% of the $10 trillion GDP of the United States in 2001.

Conclusion
We have briefly examined important developments in the new partnership between Africa and the United States. With satellite television and the emergence of the internet, and cell phones, more and more people all across the world are now seeing what is happening in the international system. Also, European and developed countries are now closely monitored in how they treat Africa and other developing countries. Africans see their fellow compatriots successful in the U.S., while in Europe, they lack any real chance for upward mobility. While it is very possible in the next decade that diverging worldviews, especially between the United States and the European Union, have the potential to result in another Cold War. The United States currently seems to have an advantage partly because of the 38 million African American population.

In the beginning of the 21st century, blacks in the U.S. have more financial capital or access to it than blacks in Africa, but blacks in Africa have excess useful land and abundant natural and human resources. It has been reported that the buying power of blacks in the United States in 2002 was $646 billion and it is projected to increase to $853 billion in 2007. These groups need to find a way to merge these assets and begin to produce and establish themselves as major producers of useful products.
and knowledge for the whole world. Speaking of the beginning of this new relationship between Africans and blacks in the United States, Prof. Mazrui writes: “The 21st century also may see the emergence of a new relationship between African people and African-American people.... Much still has to be done to solidify this relationship, but recognition of Africa’s importance by African Americans is a positive step toward building a lasting solidarity with African people.”

One must not forget that the total area of Africa is almost 11.7 million square miles. According to the 2002 World Almanac and Book of Facts, Africa’s share of the world area is 20.5 percent. Africa’s total population is projected to be a billion in 2015. Numbers are always important in world politics. We now know that as of the beginning of the 21st century, every major discovery of land on earth has been completed, and that Africans own over 95% of their continent. That fact must not be underestimated. African Americans and the United States stand to profit enormously in this new partnership.

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Endnotes


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Endnotes (continued)


http://www.washingtontimes.com/specialreport/20030928-123431-1449r.htm


http://politics.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0%2C9061%2C981884%2C00.html.


xxv For example, Colin Powell, the first black U.S. Secretary of State was said to have used his influence to convince President Bush to send troops to Liberia. Farley et al. reported that: “State Department officials, including Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, argued that the United States needed to demonstrate leadership and commit troops to end a conflict that was destabilizing the entire region. But Pentagon officials strongly resisted, saying the military could not afford a risky and vague mission at a time when U.S. troops are spread thin around the world. With the decision to send 200 U.S. Marines, who arrived in the country last week, the White House has found a sort of compromise between the two sides.” (Maggie Farley, Ann Simmons and Paul Richter, “Team in Liberia Sought Fast Aid,” Los Angeles Times, August 17, 2003).


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Africa and Its Diaspora: Organizing and Institutional Issues

By Dr. Chinua Akukwe, Dr. Sidi Jammeh, and Melvin Foote

Organizing Issues in the Africa-Diaspora Partnership
The need to organize a durable partnership between Africa and its people in the Diaspora is so obvious as to warrant little discussion. However, every partnership, even among blood relations, requires a clear raison d’etre. Why should a Brazilian-African become interested in South Africa’s politics or economy? Why should a Nigerian unemployed university graduate believe that it is in his best interest to nurture a relationship with the Diaspora in the Caribbean? Why should a Senegalese-French citizen pay attention to the status of African-Americans in the United States? Why should a recent immigrant in the United States become involved in Africa-Diaspora partnership issues? Why should an inner city Diaspora family in the United States or Britain show interest

in the political reforms in Kenya?

These questions are neither rhetorical nor amenable to easy responses. At the core of the organizing issue in Africa-Diaspora partnership is the need to define a clear, unambiguous reason for this relationship.

“Why” Africa-Diaspora Partnership?
We believe it is fundamental for Africa and its Diaspora to agree on why they should work together. What is the value-added either Africa or the Diaspora brings to the partnership? What are the clear goals and priorities of the partnership? What are the potential pathways for achieving desired goals and objectives? We do not believe the process to agree on mutually beneficial objectives will be easy since each partner has expectations that need to be fulfilled. These expectations exist despite the powerful emotional need for the same people to reconnect and work together.

Africa is likely to expect technical and financial resources from the Diaspora, access to industrialized markets, and assistance in mitigating the effects of brain drain in Africa. The Diaspora is likely to expect increased business opportunities in Africa, the opportunity to fulfill
professional dreams through meeting the needs of the underserved, and the chance to trace familial roots for those who left from unknown shores of Africa hundreds of years ago. The Diaspora is also likely to dream of a powerful united Africa that can become an economic and political juggernaut, comparable to the United States of America and the European Union.

Neither Africa nor the Diaspora can unilaterally impose its own strategies, policies or goals on the other. The Africa-Diaspora partnership will likely lead to realignment of priorities and organizational responsibilities in the African Union as well force the Diaspora to get better organized.

To move the process of identifying common goals and objectives, we propose that the following issues could become useful starting points for rational discussion on Africa-Diaspora partnership:

1) The need for Africans and the Diaspora to collaborate on accelerated development of Africa and progressive improvements in the economy of Diaspora communities within a specific time frame (15-25 years).

2) The need for Africans and the Diaspora to build specific, political and economic structures that would benefit Africa and its people in the Diaspora;

3) The need for collaboration between Africans and the Diaspora to tackle development issues such as HIV/AIDS, governance, universal primary and secondary education, brain drain, rule of law, private sector growth, increased role for civil society in Africa, and, increased political and economic progress by Diasporians in their adopted countries;

4) The need for jumpstart Africa into the information technology age and create career opportunities for Africans and Diasporians.

It is crucial for the benefits of an Africa-Diaspora partnership to be mutually beneficial. It is unrealistic to expect a partnership where one partner is a designated recipient. Africa and the Diaspora have a lot to give and receive from each other.

“The critical” partners in this process are (1) African Union, (2) the Diaspora, and (3) African governments. These critical partners have the dual role of initiators and facilitators of the partnership.

“How” to organize the Africa-Diaspora Partnership: We believe that there are “critical” and “important” partners in the partnership between Africa and the Diaspora. The “critical” partners in this process are (1) African Union, (2) the Diaspora, and (3) African governments. These critical partners have the dual role of initiators and facilitators of the partnership.

The “important” partners include Western nations, especially those that ran colonies in Africa; the United Nations system and other multilateral agencies who wield enormous influence on Africa’s development; Africanists comprising individuals and families of non-African ancestry who have spent many years working and raising families in Africa or serving as African experts in their home countries; the organized private sector, especially global conglomerates with operations in Africa and; specific civil society organizations in the West who continue to toil for better development policies towards Africa in the corridors of power of their home countries.

We briefly discuss the critical partners since they have the role of initiating the development of a durable Africa-Diaspora partnership.

The African Union is not only a critical partner but also an indispensable
player in Africa-Diaspora partnership. Without the African Union’s political blessings, a comprehensive Africa-Diaspora partnership is not likely to be successful. The AU should adopt the Diaspora as the sixth region of the continental body to set the ball rolling on building a durable partnership. This adoption should in principle be subject to the Diaspora organizing itself in such a way as to be accorded formal recognition and participation in AU activities.

To play a critical role in initiating the process for a durable Africa-Diaspora partnership, the AU should have a clear policy on the Diaspora and set firm indicators for making the Diaspora the sixth region of the organization. To meet the enormous responsibilities of being an indispensable player in Africa-Diaspora partnership, it is likely that the new AU commission will critically evaluate the Organization of African Union’s approach to Diaspora issues, and realign its priorities to meet the present challenge of developing and institutionalizing the Africa-Diaspora partnership. We anticipate that ultimately, AU’s role in the Africa-Diaspora partnership will be to create enabling environments for successful collaboration between Africa and the Diaspora, promote the partnership throughout Africa and the rest of the world, and implement evaluation mechanisms for tracking the activities of the partnership.

The Diaspora will have the daunting task of either organizing itself as one entity or by geographic regions, nations, professional interests and linguistic ties. We anticipate that initially, the Diaspora in the United States, Britain and France will be the first groups to begin discussion on partnership issues with the AU since many organizations in these areas have active relationships with African nations and institutions. However, to move this process forward, we envisage that AU will begin a formalized process with a small group of Diaspora organizations, expand the dialogue to involve all geographical regions, and then reach consensus on partnership issues with the Diaspora from all regions around themes, professional interests, and specific programs. A major organizing challenge of the Diaspora is to meet the inevitable frameworks and indicators that would be set by AU. These parameters are likely to focus on indicators that provide assurances that the Diaspora is better organized, inclusive, and transparent.

African governments represent the practical reality of the Africa-Diaspora partnership. The Africa-Diaspora partnership is unlikely to come to fruition without the creation of enabling environments in African nations. These enabling environments include rule of law, right to political opinion and association, sustained macroeconomic growth, right to private property, stable policies for private entrepreneurship, and public policies that promote social progress. We anticipate that a major focus of the Africa-Diaspora partnership will be the need for accelerated regional integration in the continent to create economies of scale, facilitate exchange of technical expertise across national boundaries, and nurture multilateral, multinational initiatives in such financial and labor intensive sectors such as power supply, road networks, and telecommunications.

Regarding “how” to organize the Africa-Diaspora partnership, we envisage a series of steps, some of them simultaneous. First, we expect the African Union to develop a strategy on Diaspora. Second, we expect the AU...
The Diaspora will have the daunting task of either organizing itself as one entity or by geographic regions, nations, professional interests and linguistic ties.

to initiate regular dialogue with the Diaspora on partnership issues and how it could become the sixth region of the AU. We anticipate that the Diaspora in the various regions will organize and begin to reach consensus on partnership issues with Africa.

Third, we anticipate that the dialogue on Africa-Diaspora partnership will reach a consensus on EXPECTATIONS, STRATEGIES, PROGRAMS, DELIVERABLES, MONITORING MECHANISMS, and POTENTIAL RESPONSIBILITY CENTERS FOR EACH ADOPTED ACTION STEP. Unlike some romanticized view of the relationship between Africa and the Diaspora, we anticipate a period of intense discussion and negotiations on why the two entities should work together. These discussions and dialogue will likely revolve around ideas and themes for development among the constituencies of both partners. Finally, the ultimate goal of these interactions is to develop a strong institutional framework for the Africa-Diaspora partnership. This framework requires a strong foundation in planning and strategy formulation, a process that had not featured prominently in past efforts to organize Africa-Diaspora partnerships.

“What” are the Organizing Issues in Africa-Diaspora Partnership

We strongly recommend that the envisaged Africa-Diaspora partnership should go through a rigorous planning process that articulates a common vision, a unifying mission, and, shared goals and objectives. We believe that Africa and the Diaspora must conduct systematic Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analyses to determine their needs and value-added to the partnership. We also recommend that during dialogue on partnership issues, participants should conduct futuristic scenario planning regarding the state of the partnership and its constituents, 10, 20, 30 and 50 years from now. This process often serves to temper expectations and provides focus on cost-effective strategies.

A scenario planning approach also has the potential to focus on the logistics of implementing specific or targeted programs, the role of today’s youth but future leaders, and the definition of monitoring and evaluation indicators for tracking progress. We also believe that the role of the Diaspora in NEPAD and other future African conceived and led initiatives, and the role of the “important” partners in Africa’s development will figure prominently in any serious planning process.

At the end of the planning process, the AU-Diaspora partnership should have common vision, mission, goals and objectives. These shared attributes should be evaluated at regular intervals or in response to emergency situations.

The Africa-Diaspora partnership is unlikely to come to fruition without the creation of enabling environments in African nations.
Institutionalizing Africa-Diaspora Partnership

The ultimate goal of organizing a durable Africa-Diaspora partnership is to institutionalize the relationship through structures that can stand the test of time. The United Nations today is a symbol of international cooperation and collaboration. Despite inevitable hiccoughs, the UN is still a testament of international resolve and action because of careful attention paid to institutional issues by its founders. These institutional issues include the concept of interrelatedness, the role of specialized agencies for specific functions, the concept of collective legality, and the ever-present threat of sanctions for bad behavior. We believe that the AU-Diaspora partnership could eventually metamorphose into an entity that reaffirms the bond and common aspirations of Africa and its people around the world.

We envisage initially the establishment of an AU-Diaspora Commission that will enjoy all rights and privileges of other commissions in the continental organization and will be active in Africa and the Diaspora. Eventually, we believe that the AU-Diaspora Commission will metamorphose into a political and economic institution, lean, progressive and focused on specific objectives of the Africa-Diaspora partnership. In addition, this entity could become a major platform for unleashing the creative energies of both Africans and their brethren in the Diaspora.

CONCLUSION

Africa and its Diaspora have the major challenge of developing and sustaining a durable partnership. To build a durable partnership, Africa and its Diaspora must reach a consensus on why they should collaborate, where and when they should work together, and how they should manage the process. Although the destinies of Africa and its Diaspora remain united by blood relations and the common struggles for economic and social progress, no serious attempt has been made to determine specific areas of collaboration and partnership. We believe that the time is now ripe for durable Africa-Diaspora partnership anchored on common vision and mission, and shared goals and objectives.

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