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Article
Local Equilibria in Economic Games
Economics Letters (2001)
  • Carlos Alós-Ferrer, University of Konstanz
  • Ana B. Ania, University of Vienna
Abstract

We study solution concepts for economic games that are resistant to local deviations. Strategy spaces are subsets of Rn and local deviations are small in the Euclidean metric. We define local Nash equilibrium and local evolutionarily stable strategy, and present applications to Walrasian outcomes in Cournot games and separating outcomes in screening models.

Keywords
  • Local Nash Equilibrium,
  • Local ESS
Disciplines
Publication Date
2001
Citation Information
Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Ana B. Ania. "Local Equilibria in Economic Games" Economics Letters Vol. 70 Iss. 2 (2001)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/alos/14/