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Non nation destabilizing eradication of opium cultivation in Afghanistan: A history backed analysis

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INTRODUCTION:

A successful and non nation destabilizing eradication of opium cultivation in Afghanistan, is contingent upon the mandatory countering of interconnected (a) economic obstacles, (b) sociocultural obstacles, and (c) political obstacles that are fueling and maintaining the illegal production and trade of heroin. This paper will explore and analyze the above mentioned interconnected obstacles, in order to present the complex issues that need to be addressed when it comes to dismantling the illegal opium bastion in Afghanistan. At a macro- level Foucault's triangular model that identifies the interconnectivity between the government, the population, and the political economy (1978) will be utilized as an overall investigative framework. This framework will enable the exploration and analysis of the interconnectivity of the economic, sociocultural, and political obstacles that must be overcome for the strategic eradication of illegal opium production within Afghanistan. At a micro level economic obstacles will be explored and analyzed in reference to the Marxist Philosophy, sociocultural obstacles will be explored and analyzed in reference to Merton's Strain Theory, and political obstacles will be analyzed and explored in reference to Cultural Criminology. In close Parsons AGIL scheme discussed by Trevino (2005) will be presented as a theoretical framework, in order to illuminate the national security benefits that will result from countering/ overcoming the economical, sociocultural, and political obstacles of non nation destabilizing opium eradication in Afghanistan.

CONCEPTUALIZATIONS:

Before proceeding with the research paper major concepts will be conceptualized, and Foucault's triangular model will be deconstructed in order to integrate the economic, sociocultural, and political obstacles faced by the government of Afghanistan into the triangular

model of interconnectivity. (a) Economic obstacles will refer to powerful factors that reinforce the necessity of the illegal opium economy (base) in Afghanistan, (b) sociocultural obstacles will refer to the Afghan peoples environmental plight in the event of an unilateral opium eradication agenda, (c) political obstacles will refer to the inactions of the Karzai government when it comes to not implementing social/ public programs /policy, in the event of opium eradication enforcement. In light of Foucault's triangular model, it is important to point out that three main concepts namely the government, the population, and the political economy are interconnected (1978). For the purposes of this paper the economic obstacles will be linked to the political economy concept, as the economy has a significant influence over government policy/ inaction as well as other aspects of the superstructure (Foucault, 1978; Marx, 1970, pg. 213, 220). The sociocultural obstacles will be linked to the population concept as government control over the population/ the people (Foucault, 1978) influences the sociocultural environment of a population, and this will be portrayed when the historic realities of Taliban rule are depicted. Lastly, the political obstacles will be linked to the government concept as the government is in charge of forming and enforcing laws in order to reinforce and maintain their sovereignty (Foucault, 1978), which may take the form of inactions that don't target issues (E.g. Social policy due to economic sovereignty).

BRIEF HISTORY: Taliban Rule & The Fatwa

When comparing the illegal opium drug enterprise in Afghanistan during Taliban rule and Karzai governance, illegal opium production was significantly less during the tail end of Taliban rule (Caulkins & Hao, 2008; Farrell & Thorne, 2004; Trace, 2005). When analyzing the control and power (governmentality) exerted on the Afghan population during Taliban rule, it is clear

that both a Hobbesian and Machiavellian model of biopolitics/ biopower was administrated (Farrell & Thorne, 2004; Trace, 2005). Biopower in essence refers to the ability to control people/ populations through the administration of population management governance, in order to exert government/ sovereignty (Stenson, 2005). The Machiavellian form of governmentality is concerned with power and control acquisition (mentality) through any biopolitical means (governance), that would reinforce and maintain sovereignty (Foucault, 1978). The Taliban and their leader Mullah, Omar the Machiavellian Prince implemented unlawful opium eradication policy namely the fatwa, and administered extreme and ruthless punishments (population management) as a means to enforce the fatwa and in turn legitimize their sovereignty internationally as well as locally (Farrell & Thorne, 2004; Trace, 2005).

In reference to the State as a Gang article by Rodgers (2006), it is important to point out that the fatwa can be conceptualized as a form of law preserving violence. Law preserving violence refers to laws that legalize violence in order to maintain order and ensure power/ sovereignty, and this can also be linked to Machiavellian governance which is violent and ruthless in nature (Foucault, 1978; Rodgers, 2006). The fatwa itself was a form of law preserving violence that legalized the Taliban's use of extreme and ruthless force, as international sanctions and/ or intervention by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) was not evident (Farrell & Throne, 2004; Fazey, 2005; Trace, 2005). In fact, the reality that the UNODC influenced the formation of the Taliban fatwa whether it was through diplomacy or coercion (Farrell & Throne, 2004; Fazey, 2005; Trace, 2005), frames the fatwa as a counter law that enabled a state of exception for the UNODC. For example, the UNODC did not act against the violence and the humanitarian crisis that the fatwa was fostering (Farrell & Throne, 2004; Trace,

2005) despite the fact that the UNODC being apart of the United Nations, is supposed to be concerned with addressing human right violations. Counter law can be seen as a law that legally overrides the principles and standards that are preexisting in current criminal law (Ericson, 2007). The fatwa as a counter law was able to legally override the principles and standards within U.N embraced universal human rights law, as the UNODC did not attempt to reactively police the fatwa that was producing a humanitarian crisis, and a Taliban induced status quo human rights violation climate within Afghanistan (Farrell & Throne, 2004; Trace, 2005). With that, Taliban rule can also be classified as a form of repressive deviance as the deviance/ crime exercised through the fatwa, was directly carried out by the offenders themselves referring to Taliban members (Trace, 2005), rather than indirectly through a 3rd party channel such as a private security corporation (Tittle, 2004).

State crime is conceptualized as illegal and socially harmful behaviour that provides benefits to a state or state agencies, rather than to a countries citizens/ populations (Kaularich, Matthews & Miller, 2001). Victims of state crime are conceptualized as individuals or groups that have experienced economic, cultural, or physical harm, pain, exclusion, or exploitation due to a nations behaviours or laws that contradict general human rights law (Kaularich et. al., 2001). In addition, victims of state crime are more likely to be poor and powerless (Kaularich et. al., 2001) just as Afghan opium produces were (Jelsma, 2005). The example of the Taliban enforced fatwa meshes with the above definition of state crime due to the Taliban's brazen and human rights violating methods of enforcement (Trace, 2005; Farrell & Throne, 2004), that were Machiavellian and Hobbesian in nature. The Taliban enforced fatwa/ counter law can be framed as a state crime because it solely benefited the Taliban's political agenda, and because it was

socially harmful as it violated human rights. For example, Farrell & Thorne (2004) stated that the Taliban wanted to adhere to the fatwa because it would provided them with international acknowledgement, which would legitimize their government within the international community. It has been hypothesized that between the years of 1994 and 2001 drug traffickers loyal to the Taliban had mass amounts of opium stock piles, that would significantly counter act the negative economic setbacks effecting the Taliban as a result of the fatwa (Caulkins & Hao, 2008; Fazey, 2005; Jelsma, 2005; Macdonald, 2005; Thoumi, 2005). Therefore the fatwa was a win- win operation for the Taliban who would not only be framed in a positive light within the international community, but who would also continue to reap opium profits from the trafficking of illicit opium stock piles (Macdonald, 2005). Therefore the political agenda associated with the fatwa solely benefited the Taliban government (the State) rather than the Afghan people (Citizens), which is characteristic of state crimes (Kaularich et. al., 2001). Secondly, fatwa enforcement was socially harmful since the Afghan population experienced malnutrition and death as a result of it (MacDonald, 2005). As a result of opium eradication the Afghan peoples primary source of income meaning opium production was demolished, their sociocultural routines were unrooted, and they experienced physical harm as a biopolitical technology/ punishment that ensured compliance to the eradication (Farrell & Throne, 2004; Fazey, 2005; Jelsma, 2005; Rubin, 2000; Trace, 2005). More specifically, the Afghan people were victims of domestic state crime which is when government (E.g. Taliban) behaviour (E.g. Fatwa enforcement) weakens/ threatens the social, economic, or political rights of their citizens (E.g. Plight of Afghan people) (Kaularich et. al., 2001).

Taliban rule during the fatwa is also reflective of a Hobbesian State, as the objective under a Hobbesian State is to ensure social order (E.g. Opium eradication) through the power of the sovereign or their will to power (E.g. Taliban), rather than through democratic governance or public input which the Taliban obviously did not exercise (de Lint & Virta, 2004).

GOVERNMENT CONTROL INFLUENCES SOCIOCULTURAL ENVIRONMENT:

The ban on opium production during Taliban rule between 2000 and 2001, resulted in a 90% decrease in opium cultivation in the areas that were under Taliban control (Caulkins & Hao, 2008; Farrell & Thorne, 2004; Trace, 2005). This in turn economically deprived Afghan farmers and forced them into a sociocultural plight, where they had to live in poverty and sell their daughters and livestock as a means to pay off debt and survive (Jelsma, 2005). In terms of sociocultural plight being a by product of government control namely the Taliban enforced fatwa, financial deprivation cause by the fatwa resulted in negative social consequences in the sense that children had to be sold as commodities and a humanitarian crisis erupted (Jelsma, 2005), and it resulted in negative cultural consequences in the sense that a way of life post-Soviet occupation was up rooted without an available alternative economy. The illegal opium economy (base) was the backbone that shaped and influenced the functional social and cultural livelihood of Afghan farmers, and it's eradication by the Taliban government produced a distinct negative sociocultural environment in Afghanistan. Therefore it is clear that government control/management does in deed shape the sociocultural environment of a a nation state.

MACRO- LEVEL THEORETICAL CONNECTION: FOUCAULT'S TRIANGULAR

MODEL

POLITICAL OBSTACLES & SOCIOCULTURAL OBSTACLES INTERCONNECTION:

The interconnection between the government (Political obstacles) and the population (Sociocultural obstacles) is evident within the Afghan context, when looking at the relationship between the Afghan people and the Karzai government. Foucault points out that the government itself is not the instrument that enables sovereignty to be reinforced, rather it is the population themselves that are an instrument that enables the government to garner sovereign status whether it be through fear (E.g. Taliban Rule) or consensus (E.g. Goal for Karzai government) (1978). Therefore political policies and agendas that do not foster a working and functional sociocultural environment for the Afghan people (E.g. Environmental plight), are sociocultural obstacles that will not influence populations to reinforce and legitimize the Karzai government. With that, action (E.g. Opium eradication) with inaction in terms of not providing community based programs to curb negative sociocultural effects, will not contribute to the successful and non nation destabilizing eradication of opium production. Inaction based political obstacles faced by the Karzai government reflect biopolitical technologies such as eradication laws, that please the international community but displease the Afghan population due to the negative sociocultural effects they pose (Based on Taliban history analysis). In addition, if these political obstacles are not overcome the Afghan government will not be able to produce a status quo pro- government mentality among the Afghan people, and this will hinder a successful and non nation destabilizing opium eradication agenda. This idea can be linked to Foucault's governmentality phenomenon, known as making up/ fostering free subjects (Garland, 1997). This phenomenon states that government officials and government technologies of power have an objective that entails shaping individuals to embrace goals, values, and standards that are identical to pro-government mentalities (Garland, 1997).

In essence, the government and population interconnection depicts that political obstacles and sociocultural obstacles are interconnected/ influence each other within the Afghan context. For example, sociocultural obstacles (environmental plight) are a result of not overcoming political obstacles (inactions), and political obstacles if not overcome will negatively influence the sociocultural environment (sociocultural obstacle) and in turn hinder the Karzai governments will to power.

POLITICAL OBSTACLES & ECONOMIC OBSTACLES INTERCONNECTION:

Under the Afghanistan context the interconnectivity between the government (political obstacles) and the political economy (Economic obstacles) is also a reality. For the sole purpose of analyzing the interconnectivity between political obstacles and economic obstacles, inactions will be redefined as the inaction of not eradicating the illegal opium economy. It is evident that the absence of stricter and legally deterring laws and initiatives that are geared toward the eradication of the illegal opium economy, are a result of powerful economic obstacles (the political economy). For example, the fact that the illegal opium economy currently contributes to half of Afghanistan GDP is a huge political and economic incentive against a contemporary fatwa (MacGregor, 2008; Ritter, 2006; Rubin, 2000) (Economic Obstacle). This reinforces the Marxist political economy notion that economic (base) benefits have a strong influence over the elements of the superstructure, such as political decision making (Marx, 1970, pg. 213, 220) which in this case has influenced the inactions linked to non eradication initiatives (Political Obstacle). Non eradication agendas (inaction) need to be overcome in order for Afghanistan to experience long term national stability, as the opium economy is negatively affecting the Afghan population physically and psychologically. As alcoholism is a major longer problem for Russia,

heroin addiction is a major long term problem for Afghanistan. Researchers state that the injection of heroin among drug users in Afghanistan is currently on the rise, and in 2005 the capital city of Afghanistan contained the highest number of heroin injection users in all of Afghanistan (Bayan, Rasult, Stanekzai, Stibich, Strathdee, Todd & Wardak, 2009). In addition, Kabul the capital city of Afghanistan did not have sufficient resources to house heroin addicts, and provide them with rehabilitative programs that would inhibit a turn to retreatism once they quit (Merton Link- Discussed in depth Pg. 12-16) (Bayan et. al., 2009).

A historical analysis during the Taliban enforced fatwa, provides significant economic information against unilateral opium eradication agendas. For example, as a result of the 2000 to 2001 fatwa one of the poorest countries in the world experienced economic plight, and sociocultural de- stabilization as mentioned above (Trace, 2005; Jelsma, 2005). Garland's concept of the experiences with crime state that crime control mechanisms changed over time from an welfare approach to a punitive approach, as a result of middle class elites (experts) being subjected to first hand experience with crime within their community (2000). In essence, experiences with crime changed the governmentality of the experts as they decided that governing crime was best achieved through incapacitation, and they decided that it was best to think about crime (mentality) as non rehabilitatable (Garland, 2000).

For the purposes of this paper Garland's concept will be reconfigured in order for the concept to applied to the Taliban -Afghan context. Garland's experience with crime concept framed the middle class elites as those who experienced crime first hand, and who in turn shaped future initiatives linked to crime control (2000). However, within the Afghan context the entire population of Afghanistan experienced crime first hand as a result of Taliban state crime, and the

population being a powerful force as a whole is shaping current non eradication policy (Political Obstacles/ inaction). The Afghan peoples negative experiences of state crime as a result of the Taliban fatwa which brought economic and sociocultural devastation (Jelsma, 2005; Trace, 2005), has influenced the Karzai governments inaction/ non opium eradication stance (Political Obstacle) as a repeat of Taliban fatwa linked history, is not a democratic political agenda to embark on. The government (political obstacles) and the political economy (economic obstacles) interconnection is a key component blocking opium eradication in Afghanistan, as the negative economic effects/ obstacles (E.g. GDP decrease, unemployment) have influenced lax anti- opium policy (inaction/ political obstacle).

ECONOMIC OBSTACLES & SOCIOCULTURAL OBSTACLES INTERCONNECTION:

The interconnectivity between the political economy (economic obstacles) and the population (Sociocultural obstacles) have been implicitly and explicitly discussed and proven from the above paragraphs, as all the obstacles (ESP) and components in Foucault's triangular model were shown to be interconnected as each influenced the other. In essence, under the Afghan context the population can not be governed through laws and policies that are unilaterally against the illegal opium drug enterprise, as this would spark an economic conflict and regenerate sociocultural plights that were present during the Taliban fatwa, and the Soviet occupation that unrooted the legal agricultural economy within Afghanistan (Farrell & Thorne, 2004; Jelsma, 2005; Rubin, 2000). Therefore the form of Karzai governance over the Afghan population can be seen as being influenced by the desire to prevent economic obstacles that would potentially lead to sociocultural plight, and this understanding can be linked to the influential player known as the political economy that influences sociocultural environments and

non eradication policy (Political Obstacles) through economic factors (Marx,1970). Therefore, the Karzai administration must overcome these economic, sociocultural, and political obstacles by exerting governance/ action (overcoming political obstacles) over the Afghan population in a manner that will foster a pro government population, reinforce government sovereignty and a positive sociocultural environment (overcoming sociocultural obstacle), and that will not send Afghanistan into economic plight as a result of opium eradication (economic obstacle).

Foucault states that it is necessary for a government to incorporate the economic culture into the way in which they govern (1978). With that, eradication policies that are carried out along side community based programs that are geared towards providing Afghan opium producers, with alternative means of survival and income are highly significant (Jelsma, 2005; Medler, 2005; Macdonald; 2005). Taliban- Afghan history has provided ample evidence of the negative consequences linked to unilateral opium eradication initiatives such as the fatwa (E.g. Sociocultural), and as a result the successful and non nation destabilizing eradication of opium must overcome economic, sociocultural, and political obstacles.

(A) SOCIOCULTURAL OBSTACLES & MERTON'S STRAIN THEROY:

Sociocultural obstacles refer to the sociocultural plight that the Afghan people will experience, in the event of an unilateral (no social policy- only drug policy) opium eradication agenda. Merton's Strain Theory in conjugation with Afghanistan's Taliban history will be analyzed to provide evidence, that unilateral eradication will foster sociocultural plight. Secondly, Merton's Strain Theory in conjunction with Afghanistan's Russian History will be analyzed in order to pinpoint meaningful difference, that will shed insight onto the complexity of the Afghan- opium phenomenon. Lastly, the Ecological Niche Perspective will be analyzed to

provide evidence against the fact that unilateral eradication will result in sociocultural plight. It is important to recognize that the Afghan- opium phenomenon is a complex issue that needs to be analyzed and studied in a non biased/ neutral manner. This will enable the holistic understanding of the Afghan- opium phenomenon and expose the complexity of Afghanistan's illegal economic bastion, namely illegal opium production.

When referring to the historical sociocultural plight of the Afghan people as a result of fatwa state crime committed by the Taliban, it is evident that the people of Afghanistan fell into Merton's Strain category of retreatism. Merton's Strain Theory grounded in sociological positivism, states that a society establishes acceptable cultural goals and purposes that foster positive feelings when they are achieved, and a society establishes acceptable/ legal institutional means for achieving established cultural goals (Merton, 1938). It is important to recognize that acceptable cultural goals (E.g. wealth) and legal/ acceptable mechanisms for achievement differ from one society to another, as a result of differing social structures that shape cultural goals and institutional means of achievement (Merton, 1938). For Merton, when individuals have embraced society backed cultural goals and have access to legal/ acceptable means to achieve the embraced goals, they can be classified as non criminals/ conformists (1938). However, during certain instances when individuals experience strain whether it be economic or emotional, they will adapt to the strain by either becoming criminals (Innovationists or rebellionist) or unproductive/ hopeless members of society (Retreatist) (Merton, 1938). Innovationists are individuals who have embraced society backed cultural goals, but who achieve cultural goals through non acceptable/ illegal means due to strain/ lack of access to positive means (E.g. heroin trade) (Merton, 1938). It is clear that at the present time the Afghan population which is engaged

in the illegal production of opium can be framed as innovationists, as their participation in the opium economy is illegal under UNODC standards (MacGregor, 2008; Trace, 2005), and because they are utilizing the illegal economy in order to achieve culturally acceptable capitalist goals such as feeding their children and paying their debt (Jelsma, 2005; Medler, 2005).

With respects to the retreatists category Merton asserts that these individuals are those who have abandoned all culturally acceptable goals, and who fail to participate in society whether it be legally or illegally as a result of strain (Merton, 1938). Research supports the claim that as a result of the economic strain that was forcefully induced through the fatwa during Taliban rule, Afghan populations who relied on the drug economy as a primary source of income experienced a sociocultural plight that influenced retreatism. For example, the fatwa caused Afghan farmers to sell their own daughters (E.g. Capitalist cultural goal to support family lost) due to the fatwa induced economic strain experienced (Jelsma, 2005), and the fatwa also negatively impacted the moral of the Afghan population (E.g. Influenced hopelessness) (Macdonald, 2005). Taliban History provides evidence that highlights the fact that unilateral opium eradication policy, is likely to force the Afghan people back to a retreatism form of self governmentality. Meaning a form of self/ individual governance and ways of thinking/ mentalities (Garland, 1997) reflective of unproductive self governance which might be reinforced by hopelessness linked mentalities. This in turn is a sociocultural obstacle resulting from a sociocultural plight linked to unilateral opium eradication, and it would hinder the successful and non nation destabilizing eradication of the illegal opium economy. Therefore political obstacles (inaction) that do not provide social programs or economic alternatives in

conjunction with opium eradication policy, will produce a sociocultural plight rather than national stability.

In light of Russian- Afghan history the Russian occupation and War that lasted from 1979 to 1989, destroyed/ took away Afghanistan's legal means (agricultural food production) of achieving cultural goals (Farrell & Thorne, 2004; Rubin, 2000), and as a result of this plight/ strain the Afghan people turned to the illegal opium economy (Rubin, 2000; Medler, 2005). There is a significant difference between Taliban- Afghan and Russian- Afghan history, and it is important that the difference is exposed and addressed for policy and future oriented thinking implications. A major difference between both historical outlooks is the fact that prior to the Taliban fatwa, the Afghan population was already exercising innovationism. With that, the Afghan population was forced to stop practicing opium cultivation/ their negative means to achieve, which in turn led to retreatism meaning a move from Innovationism ---> Retreatism (Sociocultural Obstacle). Prior to the Russian occupation the Afghan people were exerting conformity, as they not only held culturally acceptable goals but they were also engaged in a legal means to achieve (E.g. Agricultural economy) (Farrell & Thorne, 2004; Rubin, 2000). The shift as a result of Russian occupation was from conformist ---> innovationist, and a sociocultural plight that emerged during Taliban- Afghan history did not emerge/ become a reality with such a shift. Therefore, one cannot look back to Russian- Afghan history and claim that the unilateral uprooting of a primary means of income, will not negatively impact the Afghan people. Therefore, looking back onto Taliban- Afghan history will yield reliable predictive results as the Afghan people are currently innovationists, who are engaged in the illegal economy and who hold culturally acceptable goals (MacGregor, 2008; Medler, 2005).

In terms of the Ecological Niche Perspective, MacGregor (2008) states that drug use is a social fact and a reality across many different societies, and prohibition will never be able to achieve policy objectives. For example, the ecological niche perspective states that initiatives geared toward eliminating opium fields and opium production, will inevitably cause criminals/ drug traffickers to find another source of methamphetamine that they can exploit and the drug problem/ illegal economy will continue. The Taliban- Afghan historical reality is in conflict with the ecological niche perspective, however, in light of a venn diagram it is evident that both have realities that the other misses and policy makers should critical analyze both sides of the debate. This will enable the Karzai government to implement policy that will prevent the emergence of both sociocultural obstacles, and the emergence of a new illegal drug economy within Afghan borders.

(B) POLITICAL OBSTACLES & CULTURAL CRIMINOLOGY:

Political obstacles refers to the inactions of the Karzai government when it comes to not providing community based programs along side eradication policy, in the event of opium eradication enforcement. The application of the Cultural Criminology perspective within the Afghan- opium context, provides a theoretical basis for the importance of overcoming Karzai government inactions in the event of eradication enforcement. Cultural Criminology is geared toward looking at the context behind the activities/ behaviours society has defined as criminal/ a crime (Presdee, 2004). With that, Cultural Criminologists view crime as a social behaviour which is a by product of an interaction between an individual/ population, and the social order they are embedded within (Presdee, 2004). For instance, when individuals/ populations within society experience power differentials to the extent to which resistance is provoked, a crime (E.g.

Violence) will be committed as a means of exerting power against the current social order and alleviating negative feelings (E.g. Depression) associated with a lack of power (Presdee, 2004). Taliban- Afghan history regarding the fatwa which was forced (power differential) on the people of Afghanistan, does not seem to support this theoretical claim by Cultural Criminology. However in defense of the Cultural Criminology perspective it can be stated that the fatwa was only a draconian Afghan reality for only a year (Trace, 2005), and there wasn't ample time for tensions among Afghan retreatists to rise and foster resistance/ violence against the Taliban social order.

Overcoming political obstacles is of significant importance as opium eradication enforcement must co exist with a new means of production (Medler, 2005), and Taliban- Afghan history provides further evidence supporting Medler's claim due to the humanitarian crisis caused by the unilateral fatwa (Farrell & Throne, 2004; Trace, 2005). In addition, opium eradication occurring without the development of new institutions that will provide poor opium farmers with new financial channels, may potentially instigate a revolt (Jelsma, 2005). Jelsma (2005) doesn't provide an explanation for a potential revolt, but it is logical to assert that a revolt is more likely to occur under Karzai governance due to a lack of Machiavellian and Hobbesian styled Taliban rule. Apart from social/ community based policy linked to providing economic alternatives to the drug trade, researchers have also stated that community based policy linked to education is equally important (Farrell & Thorne, 2004; Rubin, 2000). Currently there is a lack of educational opportunities for the future generation of Afghan children, and so the government needs to provide more educational institutions for both male and female children (Rubin, 2000). The 1979 to 1989 War between Russian forces and the Mujahidin rebels of Afghanistan,

unrooted both Afghanistan's legal agricultural economy as well as their educational system (Farrell & Thorne, 2004). This in turn forced Afghan youth to attend fundamentalist Islamic religious institutions which negatively shaped their lives, as students from these institutions were one node that formed the Taliban (Farrell & Thorne, 2004). Therefore if the Karzai government intends on fostering free subjects meaning pro government citizens (Garland, 1997), it is important that they rejuvenate the educational sector of Afghanistan. It is important for the Karzai government to overcome Political Obstacles by providing the Afghan people with economic alternatives and educational opportunities. This action in tandem with opium eradication policy will overcome sociocultural and economic obstacles that will prevent the people of Afghanistan from turning to retreatism as was evident during Taliban rule, and it will prevent potential violence against anti- opium social order based on Cultural Criminology predictions.

(C) ECONOMIC OBSTACLES & MARXIST PHILOSOPHY CONNECTION:

Economic obstacles refer to powerful economic incentives that reinforce the necessity of the illegal Afghan opium economy (base). After the U.S- led invasion of Afghanistan illegal opium production significantly increased in 2002 during Karzai governance (Trace, 2005), since poor farmers who relied primarily on opium production for income, survival, and security, turned back to opium cultivation and production though it was still illegal (Farrell & Thorne, 2004; Fazey, 2004; Trace, 2005). 50% of Afghanistan's GDP (Gross domestic product) is a direct result of the illegal opium economy (base), which in turn makes it a highly valuable commodity and employment industry for the Afghan people (Lewis, 2001; MacGregor, 2008; Rubin, 2000). With that Okun's law can be used to predict that as unemployment decreases the sociocultural

(superstructure) plight of the Afghan people will become less intense (Sutton, 2004), and with that preventing unemployment is an economic incentive against opium eradication. In addition to the opium economy providing illegal employment and in turn preventing increased unemployment rates, it also produces income that financially stimulates legal businesses operating within Afghanistan (Lewis, 2001). However it is important to state that opium profits are much higher for those actually trafficking the heroin, when compared to the profits acquired by the producers of opium such as the Afghan farmers (Lewis, 2001). Therefore it is vital that the Karzai government address these economic incentives (Economic obstacles) that are preventing opium eradication, when and if they decide on strictly implementing and enforcing opium eradication legislation. This means that the Karzai government must legalize new productive policies and intervention initiatives that are non Machiavellian and non Hobbesian in nature, in order to counter opium production (Mason & Johnson, 2007), prevent unemployment rates from rising, and to produce an alternative economy/ means of production that will continue to stimulate pre existing legal business. Marxist Political Economy philosophy which discusses concepts such as the base (economy) and the superstructure (Elements of society) (Marx, 1970, pg. 213, 220), convey the importance of overcoming economical obstacles in order for the successful and non national destabilizing eradication of the Afghan opium economy. Marx's political economy optics can be utilized as a mechanism for validating the economic incentives that are strongly influencing anti- opium eradication agendas, and the negative economic effects that will result from such an unilateral agenda (E.g. Unemployment, Sociocultural obstacles). For instance, Marx asserts that the economy (base) which in this case is the illegal opium economy, influences every aspect of life (superstructure) which in the Afghan context reflects the

environment (Sociocultural obstacle) and the government (political obstacle) (Marx, 1970, pg. 213, 220). This means that the negative treatment of the illegal opium economy will result in the Afghan population experiencing a negative sociocultural environment. Therefore it is important for the Karzai government to recognize this and do all it can to medicate the superstructure through social policy, when they decide to embark on a successful and non nation destabilizing war on opium production. Secondly, they must also recognize that the base is controlling them as it is restraining them from opium eradication through economic incentives. With that, the Karzai government needs to medicate the base through positive and viable economic alternatives, that will counter the negative withdrawal effects that will result from Afghanistan not experiencing the economic benefits of the illegal opium economy (E.g. Employment, GDP). It is evident that the opium economy at large has shaped the current sociocultural environment and political agenda of Afghanistan. Therefore, it is important that the eradication of an economy such as the opium bastion, is strategically and logically dismantled in a step by step public policy based manner, in order to prevent an environment plight (Sociocultural obstacle) and Afghan destabilization.

CONCLUSION:

Parson's AGIL scheme can be applied to the Afghan context as a means to comprehend the significant national security benefits linked to overcoming the economic, sociocultural, and political obstacles for the successful and non- nation destabilizing eradication of the illegal opium economy in Afghanistan. Parson identified adaptation (A), goal attainment (G), integration (I), and latency (L) as the 4 functional elements that a society requires in order for functionality and stability (Trevino, 2005). Adaption is a nations/ societies ability to produce and

distribute the resources needed to ensure stability and functionality (Trevino, 2005), which in this case reflects the formation of social institutions that will counter/ overcome the sociocultural obstacles associated with the eradication of opium economy. Goal attainment is a nations/ societies ability to form goals and achieve those goals (Trevino, 2005), which can be seen as overcoming political obstacles/ inactions through the formation of a legal economy that the Afghan population can actually participate in. Integration is a nations/ societies ability to ensure coordination among the institutions present within a society as means to promote social cohesion and functionality (Trevino, 2005), which in this case can be seen as the governments ability to ensure stability through overcoming all the obstacles (ESP). Lastly, latency is the ability of a society to maintain and reinforce the status quo/ sociocultural behaviours that will prevent strain and ensure societal stability (Trevino, 2005), which can be associated with overcoming the sociocultural obstacles of opium eradication. The Karzai government must be able to develop institutions that will aid in overcoming economic and sociocultural plights due to opium eradication, while at the same time exerting strong/ legitimate governance (Mason & Johnson, 2007). The population in Afghanistan must have the tools/ means to shift back to a post- Soviet invasion agricultural economy or a new productive economy (E.g. Horticultural), when and if opium eradication is on the Karzai governments political agenda. It is important for Commanders and Generals leading NATO forces in Afghanistan to recognize that though the illegal opium economy is a war economy, that is financially fueling the Taliban insurgency (Lewis, 2001; Rubin, 2000), the national security of Afghanistan is dependent on the national stability and functionality of Afghanistan as illustrated by the AGIL scheme. Therefore unilateral eradication of opium production will not bring economic stability, sociocultural stability, and political

stability to the Afghan nation which in turn will not contribute to Afghan national security, and viable strategic depth between the Western worlds and terrorist organizations operating and recruiting within Afghanistan. Afghan national security and the success of NATO counter insurgency strategy and tactical operations within Afghanistan, depend on the successful and non nation destabilizing eradication of the illicit opium enterprise. This is contingent upon overcoming the economic obstacles, sociocultural obstacles, and political obstacles fueling and sustaining Afghanistan's illegal opium bastion.

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