"Useful Knowledge-Ascriptions"BARSEA epistemology workshop, Cambridge (2017)
I’ll talk about how practical stakes affect people’s knowledge ascriptions, such as in the ‘bank case’ discussed by DeRose and Stanley. First I’ll summarize some related work in psychology, describing the situation-dependence of people’s evaluative judgements and their full beliefs. (e.g. Ledgerwood, 2014, “Evaluations in Their Social Context”.) Inspired by these empirical theories, I’ll suggest a psychological hypothesis about how people ascribe knowledge. The hypothesis is a good educated guess. It also predicts the findings of experimental philosophy in the area. But it predicts that people do not ascribe knowledge as demanded by any of the standard philosophical views (classical invariantism, interest-relative invariantism, contextualism). In my view, our metaphysical/semantic view should legitimize ordinary knowledge ascriptions. A bold approach is called for.
- Pragmatic encroachment,
Publication DateFebruary, 2017
Citation InformationAlexander Jackson. ""Useful Knowledge-Ascriptions"" BARSEA epistemology workshop, Cambridge (2017)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/alexander_jackson/21/