Appearances, Rationality, and Justified Belief

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One might think that its seeming to you that p makes you justified in believing that p. After all, when you have no defeating beliefs, it would be irrational to have it seem to you that p but not believe it. That view is plausible for perceptual justification, problematic in the case of memory, and clearly wrong for inferential justification. I propose a view of rationality and justified belief that deals happily with inference and memory. Appearances are to be evaluated as ‘sound’ or ‘unsound.’ Only a sound appearance can give rise to a justified belief, yet even an unsound appearance can ‘rationally require’ the subject to form the belief. Some of our intuitions mistake that rational requirement for the belief’s being justified. The resulting picture makes it plausible that there are also unsound perceptual appearances. I suggest that to have a sound perceptually basic appearance that p, one must see that p.

1. Introduction.

This paper centres on a puzzle. I will present a powerful argument that having an appearance that p (whether perceptual, mnemonic, or inferential) makes you justified in believing that p. While that conclusion is plausible in the case of perception, it is problematic in case of memory, and repugnant in case of inference. The puzzle is how to dissolve the apparent conflict of intuitions. Where did we make a tempting mistake?

Here’s the argument we’ll be concerned with.

G1. Suppose it appears to S that p, and S has no particular reason to think she is going wrong with regards to p (i.e. she has no ‘defeating’ beliefs).
G2. Given this, S would be irrational not to believe p (e.g. to suspend judgement towards p).

So,

G3. In the absence of defeaters, its appearing to S that p rationally requires S to believe that p.

So,

G4. S is propositionally justified\(^1\) in believing that p.

So,

G5. If S believes that p on the basis of that appearance, that belief is doxastically justified.

Call this the General Argument From Irrationality (AFI). It supports the view that every kind of appearance gives rise to prima facie epistemic justification. We start with an intuitive grasp of the notions the argument employs, which we will refine as the paper progresses. For example, I elucidate the relevant notion of ‘appearance’ in sections 2a and 3.

In section 2, I discuss Perceptual, Mnemonic and Inferential versions of the argument. I explain the problem with the conclusion in the cases of memory and inference. The AFI can’t be sound.

Section 3 develops a theory of justified belief that section 4 uses to refute the AFI. Not all appearances are created equal. If someone infers fallaciously, their inferential appearance is ‘unsound’. That is, the belief is unjustified because there is something wrong with the appearance. Yet if there are no ‘defeating’ beliefs (such as that one has a bad track record on such matters), it would be an error of reason to ‘block’ the formation of a belief from that appearance. I argue the same distinctions apply in the case of memory. Facts about the genesis of a mnemonic appearance can make it unsound, even though it would be irrational for the subject now to block the formation of an occurrent belief from it.

\[^1\] I gloss the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification in section 2c.
The AFI sets up a case in which it would be an error of reason to block the formation of a belief from an appearance. But that does not mean that the appearance is sound. If it isn’t, the resulting belief is not justified. G2 and G3 are true, but G4 and G5 do not follow. Section 5 shows this to be an instance of a broader truth discussed in the ethics literature (e.g. John Broome 1999). In general, being in a mental state that rationally requires you to F does not mean that you are justified in F-ing.

Section 6 answers three objections to my view, rebutting other arguments (more familiar than the AFI) that appearances suffice for justified belief. Section 7 considers the upshot for the debate between internalism and externalism about epistemic justification. Internalism about perceptual justification does not sit happily with my treatment of inference and memory. The previously attractive view that perceptual appearances make a belief justified now looks unappealing. The previously outlandish view that only seeing that p makes a basic perceptual belief that p justified now looks alluring.

2. The Arguments From Irrationality.

The General AFI supports the view that appearances of all types give rise to epistemic justification. Michael Huemer endorses this view (Huemer 2001, 2006, and 2007). He calls it ‘Phenomenal Conservatism’.

2 The official statement of his view is (PC).

(PC) If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. (Huemer 2007, p. 30)

A defeater is “countervailing evidence” the subject has (2001 p. 100). I take defeaters to be beliefs S has that cast doubt on p or S’s ability to know that p in that way. In the terminology of Huemer 2001, his claim is that all appearances give rise to prima facie

2 By contrast, Gilbert Harman’s ‘conservatism’ concerns rational change of belief, not which beliefs are ‘justified’ in the traditional sense (1986 p. 29).

3 Huemer adds this qualification to his 2006 and 2007 because a “weak and wavering” appearance does not make belief fully justified. A strong and consistent appearance does. (Huemer 2006 n. 5; 2007 p. 30 n. 1.)
justification, which can be defeated. When it isn’t defeated, there is overall justification
for the belief.\footnote{This sense of ‘defeater’ has nothing to do with the sense integral to the defeasibility
analysis of knowledge.} Huemer intends PC to account for inferential as well as non-inferential
justification (Huemer 2007 p. 30 n. 1). The view has some attractions. I focus on the AFI
because responding to it is the clearest way to motivate my positive view, not because it
is particularly prominent in the literature. Some more common arguments are considered
in section 6.

2a. Perception.

There are two things one might terms a ‘perceptual appearance’ of the visual kind. (Here
I follow John Pollock & Iris Oved 2005. I hope to explore these matters in more detail
elsewhere.) Firstly, one has a ‘visual image’, a map-like representation of one’s
environment. The visual image carries only a restricted kind of information: the
distribution of surfaces in three dimensions, a certain kind of colour distribution\footnote{I
agree with Pollock & Oved (2005) that the visual image and concepts such as RED
represent different kinds of property that we call ‘colour’. My visual image represents the
wall in front of me as varying in ‘phenomenal colour’—it is lighter near the window. I
conceptually represent the wall as of uniform ‘objective colour’—a shade of cream. I
don’t pick one patch of phenomenal colour, and judge it to be the true colour of the entire
wall. Rather, I judge the objective colour of the wall on the basis of its phenomenal
colour, which is information carried by the visual image.} on those
surfaces, maybe movement and a few other things. Let’s say that a visual image is a basic
perceptual appearance. On the basis of the information carried by a basic perceptual
appearance, one applies concepts, such as HAND, ZEBRA, and ALVIN GOLDMAN. In
so doing, one has a non-basic perceptual appearance that the thing is a hand, or a zebra,
or is Alvin Goldman.
We can ask whether an undefeated basic visual appearance that p makes you justified in believing that p\(^6\); and we can ask whether an undefeated non-basic visual appearance that p makes you justified in believing. The questions are distinct. James Pryor only claims that basic perceptual experiences justify belief, though he is uncommitted on how to draw the basic/non-basic distinction (Pryor 2000 pp. 538-9). Pollock & Oved argue that basic and non-basic appearances justify belief (2005 pp. 337-8).

Let’s focus on the case of basic perceptual appearances (that is, having a visual image). Intuitively (at least prima facie), the basic perceptual beliefs of a brain in a vat are still justified. The upshot seems to be that if someone has a basic perceptual appearance that p, then (in the absence of defeaters) they are justified in believing that p. (This formulation is neutral on whether the appearance is evidence for the belief.\(^7\)) Internalism about epistemic justification is tailor-made to deliver this result. Externalists have been troubled by the intuition. The ‘new evil demon problem’ for reliabilism is that the theory entails that if we were all brains in vats, our perceptual beliefs would not be justified. Intuitively they would be; so reliabilism is false (Stewart Cohen 1984). Alvin Goldman has taken this objection seriously, modifying his view with the aim of respecting the intuition. (Goldman 1979, 1986, 1988, 1992.) Ernest Sosa has also taken the intuition seriously, distinguishing a kind of justification which brains in vats have, from a kind they don’t. (Bonjour & Sosa 2003, pp. 156-161.)

The intuition can be supported by the Perceptual Argument From Irrationality:

\(^6\) One might worry that one can’t have a belief with the same content as a basic perceptual appearance, because belief is a conceptual representation, and the content of the visual image outstrips our concepts. I reply that ‘belief’ in the relevant sense need not be conceptual. One picks up the drink without spilling it because one knows exactly where the cup is. That’s information carried by the visual image. Knowledge entails belief. So in sense relevant to epistemology, one typically believes the information carried by the visual image. We can ask when such a belief is justified.

\(^7\) Feldman & Conee (1985) think an appearance that p is evidence that p. Pryor (2000 p. 519) resists this claim.
P1. Suppose Peter has a basic perceptual appearance that p, and has no defeating beliefs.

P2. Given this, Peter would be irrational not to believe that p.

So,

P3. Its appearing to Peter that p rationally requires him to believe that p.

So,

P4. Its appearing that p makes Peter propositionally justified in believing that p.

So,

P5. If Peter believes that p on the basis of that appearance, the belief is doxastically justified.

A word in support of P2 and P3. It would be crazy not to believe your eyes when you have no reason to think you are in danger of going wrong. It would be unjustified intellectual cowardice. Irrationality just means: it would be a failure of reason. However, if the reader insists on reformulating P3 in terms of rational ‘recommendation’ rather than rational requirement, he or she may do so without disrupting what follows.

2b. Memory.


Maria … has a clear apparent memory that Dean Martin is Italian and no current reason against the proposition that he is Italian. However, she initially formed this belief irresponsibly and unjustifiably, relying on the testimony of someone she knew to be untrustworthy. She has, however, forgotten that this is her source. (Feldman 2005 p. 282)
Greco intuits that Maria is not now justified in believing that Dean Martin is Italian, and alleges that internalism entails that she is justified.\(^8\) Feldman floats a way of defending the view that her belief is justified. (He does not commit himself to it.) I’ll set it out, using Feldman’s terminology. You’ll see it’s the Mnemonic Argument From Irrationality. There are only three attitudes one can take towards a proposition. Feldman says that (at least) one of these attitudes must be ‘reasonable’ for Maria to take. Suspension and disbelief are not reasonable, leaving belief as the only possibility.\(^9\)

M1. Maria believes on the basis of a clear apparent memory that Dean Martin is Italian. She has forgotten the terrible way in which she acquired that belief.

M2. Disbelief and suspension of judgment “are not reasonable options, given the situation she is in” (p. 282).

So,

M3. The only reasonable option is for Maria to believe that Dean Martin is Italian. (Believing is what reasonableness requires.)

So,

M4. The apparent memory makes Maria propositionally justified in believing that Dean Martin is Italian.

So,

M5. Maria’s belief is doxastically justified.

The conclusion is problematic.\(^{10}\) The view that Maria’s belief is not justified is even more appealing. Memory is how we store information. If you put a sow’s ear into storage, you should not expect to find a silk purse there when you return. In a slogan: garbage in,

\(^8\) Compare Goldman 1999 pp. 280-1.

\(^9\) Section 6c considers the different argument that since Maria is not propositionally justified in suspending or disbelieving, she is justified in believing.

\(^{10}\) Assume that it is no part of Maria’s basis for her belief that she normally believes truths. Thus such considerations are not relevant to whether the belief is doxastically justified.
garbage out. Maria’s belief remains trash; she just stops being in a position to tell by reflection that it’s trash. What matters to the evaluation of the belief is whether it is trash, not whether she can tell that it is. On this view, factual memory can preserve justification, but not create it.

2c. Inference.

Huemer says that PC captures the nature of inferential justification (Huemer 2001 pp. 112-3; 2007 fn. 1). If you know that p, and q appears to follow, then you are justified in believing that q. Consider the case of Ian, who is trying to construct a mathematical proof. His inferences are meant to be deductively valid. He is taking the due care over his work. He infers competently up to his deduction that p, but then goes wrong. He infers q from p, though it doesn’t follow. Huemer thinks that Ian’s fallacious inference does produce a justified belief. He claims this result is “not counterintuitive,” and he supports it with an argument (2001 p. 113; compare his 2006 pp. 10-11).

His argument is different from the AFI. Suppose two appearances are of the same strength. He argues that one is rationally required to respond to those two appearances in the same way. Hence (thinks Huemer) when one such belief is justified, so is the other. Ian’s belief that p is inferentially justified, and so his belief that q is too. What this argument has in common with the Inferential AFI is the thought that, given a certain perfectly justified previous mental state, having an appearance that q can rationally require the subject to believe that q, and so that belief is justified. For the sake of simplicity, let’s focus on the AFI.

I1. Ian knows that p, q appears to him to follow from p, and that appearance is not defeated by his prior beliefs.
I2. In such a situation, Ian would be irrational not to believe that q.
So,
I3. The inferential appearance rationally requires Ian to believe that q.
So,
I4. The appearance makes Ian propositionally justified in believing that q.
So,
I5. If Ian believes that q on the basis of the appearance that q, that belief is
doxastically justified.

The Inferential Argument From Irrationality is powerful. But it can’t be sound.
The rest of this section shows that it has a false conclusion. (The impatient reader may
read the next paragraph then skip to section 3.)

Beliefs can be held for good reasons, and for bad reasons. Actions can be
performed for good reasons, and for bad reasons. Actions can be justified or not, as can
beliefs. Maybe there was a good reason for you to F, though you F-ed for some other
reason, which was a bad one. In this case, you were deontically justified in F-ing, but
your F-ing was not evaluatively justified. In the case of belief, this is often (but
unilluminatingly) called the distinction between ‘propositional’ and ‘doxastic’
justification. Comparing epistemic and practical normativity plays a significant part in
this paper. Hence I will use the terminology of deontic and evaluative justification even
in the case of belief. I use ‘normativity’ as an umbrella for evaluation and deontology.
What is at issue in this section is whether fallacious inference produces an evaluatively
justified belief. I think it never does. The Inferential AFI concludes it will whenever the
subject has no defeating beliefs.

Here’s another bit of terminology. Ian reasons: “p, so q”. In the sense relevant to
this paper, it seems to him that q. p was his reason for believing that q. Let’s say that Ian
“took p to be a good reason” to believe that q. Don’t say that p “appeared” to him to be a
good reason—Ian did not have any thoughts about what reasons he had. When the will is
weak, one can act for a reason that one does not take to be a good one. However, we are
interested in fallacious inferences where the subject does take their reason to be a good
one.

The following two principles are extremely attractive, and together they entail that
a belief held only on the basis of a fallacious inference is unjustified.

(FALLACIOUS INFERENCE) If S directly fallaciously infers q from p, then S
believes q for a bad reason (namely p).
(BAD REASONS) If S Fs only for a bad reason, then S’s F-ing is evaluatively unjustified.

Intuitively, there is a normative truth about what is a good reason to believe what, independent of whether the subject takes it to be a good reason. Epistemic reasons for belief correspond to what is good evidence for what. Tommy takes the testimony of a friend to be good evidence that a miracle occurred, but that does not mean that it is good evidence. If p is a bad reason for S to F, and S’s reason for F-ing is that p, then S Fs for a bad reason. To defend the conclusion of the Inferential AFI by denying FALLACIOUS INFERENCEs, one needs that if Tommy takes the testimony of a friend to be a good reason for him to believe that a miracle occurred, then it is. Such subjectivism makes a mockery of the idea of trying to proportion your belief to the evidence. For if you try, then you are successful. This position destroys the distinction between good and bad reasons for belief. It is objectionable. Once one allows that Ian believes that q for a bad reason, it seems to follow that his belief is unjustified.

We can reinforce this by noticing that the analogous views are compelling in the case of action. Suppose Chloe is very aggressive, and attacked a man in a pub. Her reason for punching the stranger was that he looked at her pint funny. Surely that was a bad reason for doing so. There was no good reason for punching him. We cannot countenance the view that Chloe hit the man for a good reason merely because she took it to be a good one. Denying FALLACIOUS INFERENCEs is to hold that in epistemic case, if the subject takes p to be a good reason to F, then it is. In the practical case, it is clear that such a view obliterates the distinction between good and bad reasons. To admit this but take the opposite view in the epistemic case is not to take epistemic deontic normativity seriously. It would be a pitiful shadow of practical deontology. That combination is objectionable. We must accept that what one takes to be a good reason for action can fail to be, and having done so, accept the analogous view for beliefs. Ian believes that q for a bad reason.

Chloe punched the stranger in the pub for a bad reason. Given this, is undeniable that Chloe was unjustified in punching the stranger. This datum about being justified is as clear as can be. Common sense does not suggest that there is a (‘subjective’) sense in
which she is justified. When presented with the case, non-philosophers do not feel torn about whether Chloe is justified, resolving the tension by positing two senses of being ‘justified’. This contrasts with our attitude to certain questions about what one should do. For example, suppose Andrew ordered chicken in a restaurant. Unbeknownst to him, it is contaminated with salmonella. Should he eat the chicken? Here we want to distinguish a sense in which he should from a sense in which he shouldn’t. Not so when we consider whether Chloe was justified in punching the guy in the pub. BAD REASONS is true for actions.

Ian believes for a bad reason; Chloe acts for a bad reason. It is pretty bad to hold that Ian’s belief is justified. It is even worse to do so while recognizing that Chloe’s action is not justified. In other words, one cannot affirm BAD REASONS for actions but deny it for beliefs. Epistemic justification would be a pale imitation of practical justification. It would be utterly bizarre that we talk about ‘good reasons’ and ‘being justified’ in both cases.

I conclude that FALLACIOUS INFERENCEs and BAD REASONS are both true. Fallacious inferences produce evaluatively unjustified beliefs. In the inferential case, undefeated appearances need not produce justified beliefs.

3. Blocking Beliefs, Unsound Appearances.

The Arguments From Irrationality lead to an uncomfortable view of memory, and an untenable view of inference. This section presents a theory of overall justified belief which I use in section 4 to dissolve the apparent conflict of intuitions. I hope the framework will be appealing as I introduce it. It is also supported by its theoretical unity and ability to rebut the AFI. Sections 3 and 4 are mutually reinforcing.

When you think you are in danger of forming a false belief, you can block a belief from being formed in a particular way. For example, if you know that a Muller-Lyer figure produces a perceptual illusion, you won’t form the belief that one line is longer than the other. It will still appear to be. Suppose you have been getting 5/10 in your maths homeworks so far this semester, because you’ve been making a lot of fallacious inferences. You will still produce answers to your next homework—conclusions will still appear to you to follow from the premises, and you will write them down. But you can
block the formation of a belief in the conclusion, because you know you might well have
gone wrong. The (normally) belief-forming faculty still produces an appearance, or
‘verdict’. If one’s confident answers on the history tests so far this semester have often
been wrong, one will not believe the answers one writes down in the next test. But one
will still have the mnemonic appearance that Henry VIII became king in 1507, for
example. The appearance is what’s in common between the case in which the belief is
formed and the case in which it’s blocked. If one has an appearance that p and does not
block, then one forms the belief that p. That’s the sense of ‘appearance’ we’re concerned
with here.

The official terminology is that one blocks a belief from being formed from a token
appearance that p. Insofar as it picks out one token appearance that p, we can talk of
blocking the formation of a belief that p by a particular faculty, such as perception or
inference. The faculty produces an appearance or verdict, and if one does not block, it
thereby produces a belief. (When I refer the belief-forming faculties, I am referring to
memory as well. I sketch the special features of memory in section 4b.)

Saying that a belief is “formed from” an appearance could be mis-interpreted. I don’t
think belief-formation is a two-stage process, where perception or inference produces an
appearance or verdict, and then some other faculty forms a belief on the basis of the
appearance. (That seems to be the view of Sosa 2007 lecture 5.) Rather, belief-formation
is typically a one-stage process. When not interfered with (by blocking), perception and
inference produce beliefs, not merely appearances. The status-quo is that those faculties

Not blocking should not be confused with the mental act of trying to infer what follows
from what one knows. One can choose what to think about (with varying degrees of
success). One can choose to direct one's attention to a philosophical problem, and search
for a solution. Trying to infer what follows is what Galen Strawson calls a "prefatory",
"catalytic" or "priming" act of the mind. (Strawson 2003, esp. pp. 231-2.) There are cases
where one should not attend to a matter, though one should not block, and can form
knowledge. For example, I can come to know how many books there are on the shelf
above my desk, even though I should instead be attending to the philosophical problem I
am working on, or trying to get to sleep.
put representations directly into the belief-box. One can intervene, diverting the representation away from the belief-box and into the trash-box instead. In that case, I say that one ‘blocks’ the formation of a belief from the perceptual or inferential appearance. Maybe it would be more accurate to say that one blocks the verdict from being a belief.

Reason is the faculty that either blocks belief-formation or doesn’t. It is the job of reason to step in and disengage a faculty when appropriate. This ‘regulative’ or ‘higher-order monitoring’ function of reason is to be distinguished from the inferential function of reason. Regulative reason governs the belief-forming faculties, one of which is inferential reason. Reason is the rational faculty: a failure of reason is a failure of rationality, and vice versa.
Evaluating the blocking or not by regulative reason is one thing. Evaluating the operation of the belief-forming faculty in producing its verdict is another. Here are examples in which they come apart. Janet knows she has got 10/10 in her maths homeworks so far this semester. She believes the next thing she appears to prove, but makes a slip in her reasoning. Janet was justified in not blocking the inferential belief, but the inference was a poor one. She reasoned fallaciously, forming an unjustified belief. That she was justified in not blocking the inference is perfectly compatible with the resulting belief being unjustified because the belief-forming faculty worked improperly. Even though she did not infer properly, she would not be justified in blocking; two wrongs do not make a right. What the faculty of inference did wrong was produce that bad appearance. Her belief is unjustified because the inferential appearance is a bad one.

Here’s an example where the belief-forming faculty worked perfectly, but regulative reason did not. Belinda is taking the same maths class as Janet, but has been getting terrible grades. She should be blocking the formation of inferential beliefs when she is doing her homework. However, she is reckless and overconfident. She does not block when she starts her next assignment. Belinda is unjustified in not blocking. However, she reasons competently at every step. This time, she makes no mistakes. Her faculty of regulative reason did not work properly, but her faculty of inference did. Intuitively, Belinda’s belief is not justified either. Something went wrong in its production, namely that it wasn’t blocked. Belinda’s inference was competent. In that sense, her appearance is a good one. Her belief is unjustified because her failure to block it is unjustified.

Both Janet and Belinda have unjustified beliefs in their conclusions. The moral to draw is that overall inferentially justified belief requires both that the subject is justified in not blocking it and that the appearance is a good one. I will argue that these two requirements ground an enlightening gloss on the distinction between prima facie and overall justification.

Call beliefs you are justified in not blocking \( R \)-rational. (They pass the test of Regulative reason.)\(^\text{12}\) This is not rationality \textit{simpliciter}. The product of a fallacious

\(^{12}\) It is not clear whether the justificatory status of one’s previous beliefs matters for \( R \)-rationality. Cheryl has a justified belief that she got bad maths results last year, and an
inference is not normally called ‘rational’. It can be R-rational. Not only can you be justified in not blocking a belief, you can be unjustified in blocking it. Blocking would be a failure of reason in its regulative mode—it would be irrational. Intellectual cowardice is as much of a sin as intellectual hubris.

Any belief must be R-rational if it is to be overall justified, whether it is inferential, mnemonic, or perceptual. This re-casts a familiar claim. Philosophers have understood overall justification by means of the equation: a belief is overall justified iff it is prima facie justified and there are no defeaters. I claim that being justified in not blocking a belief is what it is for there to be ‘no defeaters’ for the prima facie justification. Consider perceptual, memory and inferential beliefs. We invoke the presence of ‘defeaters’ to explain why a belief is prima facie but not overall justified exactly when the believer is unjustified in not blocking it. So our equation becomes: a belief is overall justified iff it is prima facie justified and R-rational.

unjustified belief that she has been getting good maths results this year. She doesn’t block her mathematical inferences. Are her new mathematical beliefs overall justified, or do we invoke the ‘defeaters’ clause? I am neutral on this issue.

13 The terminology of ‘prima facie’ and ‘overall’ justification is often used to draw a different distinction, within non-deductive inferential justification. Let E be the set of one’s evidence, and E* a subset of E. It can be that E* justifies belief that H, but E does not. In such a case, evidence E* makes belief that H ‘prima facie justified’, but not ‘overall justified’. I will not use the words in this way.

14 The strength of counter-evidence needed to justify blocking can vary between belief-forming faculties. (One might say, appearances vary in their rational force.) The most extreme case would be that no amount of counter-evidence would make you justified in blocking that belief. That’s Descartes’ view of the force of some a priori insights. We need some terminological caution here. One might be tempted to talk about the ‘prima facie weight’ a belief has, to measure what it would take to make the subject justified in blocking it. But that concerns R-rationality, not prima facie justification. I use ‘prima facie justified’ in this way to preserve the idea that if prima facie justified belief is undefeated, i.e. R-rational, then it is overall justified.
If a belief that $p$ is unjustified, and not because it should have been blocked, then things had already gone wrong by the time it appeared to the subject that $p$. Someone with an unjustified but R-rational belief had already gone astray by having that appearance. So we can blame the appearance whenever the belief is R-rational but not overall justified. Label such an appearance *unsound*. In other words:

A belief is overall justified iff it is R-rational and formed from a sound appearance.

I re-label a belief’s being prima facie justified as: its being formed from a sound appearance. Here are two clear cases of an unsound appearance. When one infers fallaciously, the inferential appearance is unsound. That’s Janet’s situation. When one infers from an unjustified belief, the inferential appearance is unsound. Things went wrong before the conclusion appeared true to the subject, but the appearance inherits the problem.

We can evaluate appearances as sound, but not as being justified. There is nothing strange about that. For example, we can evaluate an archer’s attempt to hit the bullseye. The shot can be skilful, successful, and successful because skilful. (See Sosa 2007 lecture 4.) Maybe we can call a shot ‘justified’, but that would be a positive evaluation of the fact the archer attempted to hit the bullseye. It would not be a positive evaluation of the execution of that attempt. The natural ways of evaluating a shot as good or bad have nothing to do with whether it is ‘justified’. The evaluation of appearances is epistemically crucial, but is not a matter of their being justified.

4. Responses to the AFI.

Not all appearances are created equal. Some lead to an unjustified belief even if you are justified in not blocking it. These are the ‘unsound’ appearances. Yet blocking an unsound appearance can be failure of regulative reason, a failure of rationality.

This gives us a schema for responding to the AFI. Lines 2 and 3 are true: having the appearance that $p$ without believing $p$ involves blocking, and that’s irrational in the cases at hand. The AFI concludes from this that the belief formed from the appearance is justified. That does not follow. If the appearance is unsound, the belief will not be
justified. One such case is Janet’s. Another is competent inference from an unjustified belief. Sections 4a-c argue that while there are differences between inference, memory and perception, we should distinguish sound from unsound appearances in all three cases. So none of the AFI is sound. Along the way we see that not all unsoundness is grounded in a failure of rationality. Section 5 shows that this theory fits well with the understanding of ‘rational requirement’ found in the ethics literature. That line 3 of the AFI does not entail line 4 is an instance of a more general truth.

4a. Inference.

Ian’s case is the same as Janet’s. He fallaciously infers q from p, but has no reason to think he would go wrong. I2 in the Inferential AFI is true: it would be a failure of rationality for him to block that appearance. As I’ll explain in section 5, I3 is a good gloss on this. But Ian’s appearance is unsound. So the belief he forms is not justified. I5 is false. It does not follow from I3. The Inferential AFI assumes that any belief approved of by regulative reason is justified. This ignores the need for the appearance to be sound, for the belief-forming faculties to operate properly throughout. Not all R-rational beliefs are justified.

Ian’s evidence does not support q, it merely appears to him to do so. He is not deontically justified in believing that q. His total evidence actually supports suspending on whether q. Suspending is the deontically justified attitude. I4 is false; it does not follow from I3.

Ian’s belief is currently R-rational: he is justified in not blocking it now. But it is not currently Overall rational. His inferring q from p is an error of inferential reason. Define: a belief is currently O-rational iff neither regulative nor inferential reason now operates incorrectly in the subject’s holding the belief. Ian’s case shows that being R-rational does not suffice for a belief to be justified. Maria’s case will show that being currently O-rational does not suffice for being justified either.

4b. Memory.

Maria formed her belief that Dean Martin is Italian irrationally, but has now forgotten anything that would allow her to put that mistake right. Applying the framework of
section 3 yields a satisfying description of her situation. Maria’s belief is R-rational. In other words, she is justified in not blocking the formation of an occurrent belief from her mnemonic appearance. But her belief is not justified, because the appearance is unsound. It is unsound because it is the fruit of irrational belief-formation. The mnemonic appearance is unsound, not because of any current error, but because of Maria’s past error. (Plausibly, a mnemonic appearance is sound only if it constitutes the retrieval of a belief that was formed justifiedly.) As with Ian, M2 and M3 are true but M5 does not follow.

This characterization of Maria’s situation is compelling. Extending the distinction between sound and unsound appearances to the case of memory resolves the conflict of intuitions about whether Maria’s belief is justified. The intuition that her belief is justified goes away. Her belief is currently R-rational, indeed currently O-rational (inferential reason is not currently involved at all). That’s what the intuition that she is ‘justified’ gets at. The intuition is explained away as mistaking R- and O-rationality for justification. There is more to justified belief than current O-rationality, because there is more to the soundness of mnemonic appearances than that. Their soundness depends on what happened in the past.

We already discriminate between appearances, so as to deal with Ian’s case. Applying that framework to memory solves the intuitive problem with Maria. It is good to have a unified theory of the epistemic role of inferential and mnemonic appearances. Those are conclusive grounds for treating Maria’s case in this way.

Recall that Ian is deontically justified only in suspending judgement on his conclusion, q. Having an inferential appearance, whether sound or not, does not affect what attitudes you are deontically justified in holding. Let’s treat memory analogously, and say that Maria is deontically justified in suspending judgement on whether Dean Martin is Italian. That’s what her real evidence supports. Similarly, a non-inferential belief formed by wishful thinking is not part of your real evidence, does not affect what you are deontically justified in believing. (Section 6 answers worries about this.)

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15 Here are two views about non-inferential deontic justification for believing. First: One is mnemonically/ perceptually deontically justified in believing that p iff one has a sound
Maria’s belief is currently O-rational. She is not now making a mistake of reason in holding it. Define: a belief is historically O-rational if neither inferential nor regulative reason operated incorrectly at any stage in its production. Maria’s belief is not historically O-rational. Are all historically O-rational beliefs justified? In other words, is the unsoundness of an appearance always the result of a failure of rationality? Here’s a case that suggests that it is not.

Mark had forgotten that his school never had physics prizes. If he had tried to remember whether they did, he would not have come up with either answer. However, a week passes, and Mark’s dispositions change. Now if he tried to remember, he would say that his school did have a physics prize, and Julie won it. The change in Mark’s dispositions is not the result of his thinking about the matter, or receiving any relevant evidence. Mark acquired a dispositional belief out of thin air. Surely such a belief is not justified. Some garbage got into Mark’s store of beliefs. It was not put there by a belief-forming faculty. It got there by memory-formation working improperly. That faculty is meant to store inputted beliefs. There was no input belief in Mark’s case. We shouldn’t blame memory for storing unjustified input beliefs, like Maria’s. Things had already gone wrong for Maria before memory became involved. We can blame memory for allowing in beliefs like Mark’s, which was not inputted by a belief-forming faculty. Mark’s error was not one of rationality or reason, but of memory. (Huemer 1999 agrees.) Both Mark and Maria’s mnemonic beliefs are unjustified, but only Mark’s belief is unjustified because memory operated improperly. His belief is historically O-rational but not justified. Again, it would be weak to accept what I have said about Ian and Maria, but refuse the obvious extension to accommodate the intuitions about Mark.

Let me gesture at other ways in which a mnemonic appearance can be unsound. Memory consists of four sub-faculties, all of which can operate improperly. Memory-formation operates improperly in Mark’s case. Memory-retention operates improperly
when the dispositional belief that Bert owes you $20 warps into the dispositional belief that Bert owes you $30. Memory-retrieval operates improperly when you occurrently believe that Steve won the race until someone suggests that Tom did, which prompts you to remember correctly. These three kinds of failure lead to an unsound mnemonic appearance. I am not sure the fourth does. Memory-erasure operates improperly when new evidence makes you change your mind, but what remains in storage is your old belief. Suppose Nina knew that Ulan Bator is the capital of Mongolia, but revised her occurrent belief when her geography teacher misleadingly told her it wasn’t. A month later, Nina has forgotten the misleading evidence, and her original correct mnemonic appearance has survived. I want to say that Nina knows that Ulan Bator is the capital of Mongolia.

4c. Perception.

As noted at the beginning of section 3, we block perceptual beliefs in just the same way as inferential and mnemonic beliefs. When one knows about the Muller-Lyer illusion, one blocks the formation of a basic perceptual belief that the lines are of different lengths. When one knows that his twin brother is in town, one blocks the formation of a non-basic perceptual belief that that guy is Alvin Goldman. Let’s focus on the case of basic perceptual beliefs. Any belief is overall justified iff it is R-rational and formed from a sound appearance. Our present question is, When is a basic perceptual appearance sound?

For the AFI to be valid, basic perceptual appearances must automatically be sound. That is: the distinction between sound and unsound appearances would not apply in the basic perceptual case. That’s a very disunified view of the epistemic import of appearances. Surely perceptual appearances are not so starkly disanalogous to inferential and mnemonic appearances.16

16 Perceptual appearances are cognitively penetrable, i.e. affected by what you believe. Susanna Siegel (forthcoming) argues that if it appears to you that p because you already believed that p, the appearance does not make your belief that p more justified. Such appearances are unsound. The view I suggest below accommodates this point.
One might find this surprising and worrying. Intuitively (prima facie), the perceptual beliefs of a BIV are justified. The upshot seems to be that an undefeated perceptual appearance yields a justified belief. (That’s the ‘new evil demon problem’ for externalism, noted in section 2a.) My framework does not clash with that intuition—it removes it. A brain in a vat’s false perceptual belief is R-rational, indeed O-rational. I have no intuition that it has a further epistemic status, namely being overall justified. O-rationality captures what is to be said for the belief. It is easy to explain away the attraction of the view that basic perceptual appearances suffice for justified belief: it mistakes R-rationality and O-rationality for overall justification. We must endorse this manoeuvre, to explain away the intuition that Maria’s belief is justified.

Drawing the distinction between R-rationality and justification sharpens our intuitions. There’s nothing fishy about this. Drawing the distinction between metaphysical and epistemic possibility sharpens our intuitions about whether water could have been something other than H₂O.

The distinction between sound and unsound perceptual appearances should be analogous to that for inferential and mnemonic appearances. This rules out the view that a basic perceptual appearance is sound iff it would have been the same had the subject paid full attention, rather than just casting a quick glance. A subject can still infer fallaciously when paying full attention. However much attention Maria and Mark pay to what they now believe, they will still have their unsound mnemonic appearances. We should not treat perceptual appearances disanalogously.

I doubt that any internalist view of soundness will satisfy this test. Nor will a reliabilist view that says that if a faculty usually produces true beliefs, all the appearances it produces are sound. Memory and inference produce both sound and unsound appearances, and not just because the input beliefs were unjustified: one can misremember and mis-infer. The spirit of the position is to discriminate between proper and improper functioning of basic perception. I am inclined to the view that a basic perceptual appearance is sound iff it constitutes the subject’s seeing that p. You have to

17 There is a sense in which seeing that p requires believing that p, and a sense in which it doesn’t. I intend the latter.
be in that factive mental state to have a justified basic perceptual belief. Hence the belief has to be true to be justified. This is a very externalist position.\(^{18}\)

This view is supported by the analogy with inference. I argue via the intermediary case of a priori foundational belief. (I’m talking about belief in necessary truths, rather than introspection or the alleged contingent a priori.) Inferences where the subject takes the premises to necessitate the conclusion produce a justified belief only if the conclusion really is necessitated (and the inference is competent). We can think of a priori non-inferential belief as the result of a zero-premised inference of this kind. To be thus believed justifiably, the proposition must really be necessary. The zero-premised inference is competent iff the subject ‘sees a priori’ that \(p\). So one must see a priori that \(p\) to have a justified a priori foundational belief that \(p\). For instance, here are two ways to respect that being red is incompatible with being blue: inferring from the fact that the car is red that it is not blue; and forming an a priori non-inferential belief that the car is not both red and blue. Surely those two recognitions produce a justified belief under intimately related conditions. Plausibly, a priori and empirical basic justified belief work in analogous ways—by revelation of the fact. So basic perceptual justification requires the subject to see that \(p\).

Here’s a consequence of this view of when a basic perceptual appearance is sound. Perceptual beliefs can be formed from a sound appearance without being R-rational. There are cases in which one sees that \(p\), though one should be blocking, and so the belief is not overall justified. It is not the case that if \(S\) sees that \(p\) then \(S\) knows that \(p\), pace Timothy Williamson (2000 chapter 1.4). Knowledge requires R-rationality as well as a sound appearance (and some other things). Williamson does not distinguish those two, glossing over epistemic structure we need to delineate.

This view of perceptual justification is a speculative conjecture. It strikes me as more promising than the alternatives. I do not claim to have established it, as I boldly claim for \(^{18}\)A non-basic perceptual appearance that \(p\) can also constitute the subject’s seeing that \(p\). I am only addressing the case in which the subject has a basic perceptual appearance that \(p\). I am more sympathetic to a reliabilist component in what makes non-basic perceptual appearances sound.
the views of inference and memory. I review the status of internalist theories of justification in section 7.

Let me end this section with a tangential remark. Conservatism about perceptual justification says that one must have a prior justified belief that one won’t go wrong in order to form an overall justified perceptual belief. Liberalism denies this. In my framework, conservatism says that one must block unless one already has a justified belief that one won’t go wrong. Liberalism fits better with the psychology of blocking, and doesn’t raise the spectre of skepticism. Belief formation is like cycling downhill, as far as regulative reason is concerned. Stopping requires positive intervention by regulative reason; going ahead requires only the absence of intervention. The opposing view is that regulative reason must ‘pedal uphill’ if beliefs are to be formed. Trust in a faculty would be a positive act required for belief formation. It seems easier to be justified in refraining from intervening than in a positive act of trusting a faculty.

5. Rational Requirements.
When there is no reason to block, its appearing that \( p \) rationally requires the subject to believe that \( p \). That’s because it would be a failure of rationality to block the belief from being formed. But having an unsound appearance constitutes already having gone wrong on whether \( p \). Making a mistake can rationally require you to plough that mistaken furrow, doing things that are not justified. \( G_3 \) of the AFI does not entail \( G_4 \). This response to the AFI is further supported by being subsumed under a more general truth. The ethics literature finds it widespread that a mental state rationally requires one to do something one should not, something unjustified. (See e.g. Broome 1999, 2004, 2007; Dancy 2000 chapter 3; Kolodny 2005, 2007.) Here are three kinds of example from John Broome’s 1999 paper.

The first example is of inference from an unjustified belief. Graham has an irrational belief that \( p \). He notices that \( p \) entails \( q \). He would be irrational to believe \( p \), notice that \( q \) follows, but refuse to believe \( q \). Believing \( p \) and noticing that \( q \) follows rationally requires Graham to believe \( q \). But he is not justified in believing \( q \). His belief that \( p \) is not justified, and inference from it does not create justification. Graham should neither believe \( p \) nor believe \( q \), because they are not supported by his evidence. So
believing p rationally requires Graham to do something unjustified, something he should not.

Secondly, suppose Heather falsely believes that she should torture Tigger the kitten right now. She has Tigger in her grasp; there are no witnesses; the thumb-screw (paw-screw?) is ready. She would be practically irrational if she believed she should torture Tigger right now but failed to do so. Believing that she should now torture Tigger rationally requires Heather to do so. But she shouldn’t. She would be unjustified in applying the thumb-screw.

Thirdly, intending an end rationally requires you to intend what you believe to be the necessary means. It is irrational to intend to open more wine, believe that you need to get the cork-screw to do so, but not intend to get the cork-screw. But if you shouldn’t open more wine, you shouldn’t get the cork-screw, and you would be unjustified in doing so.

That a belief rationally requires you to do something is different from the belief being a good reason to do so. Believing that all psychiatrists are out to kill you rationally requires you to avoid them. That you believe that all psychiatrists are out to kill you is a good reason to go and see one. (The example is from Dancy 2000 p. 65.)

The official ideology is: being in mental states \{M_i\} rationally requires S to F. That notion is three-placed: it applies to triples of \(<\{M_i\}, S, F>\). It must be distinguished from the two-placed notion: S is all-things-considered rationally required to F. Return to the example of Graham, who holds an irrational belief that p, and notices that q follows. He is not all-things-considered rationally required to believe q; for he is rationally required not to believe p and not to believe q. Yet believing that p rationally requires Graham to believe q.

One might wonder whether it is possible to reduce the three-placed notion to the two-placed notion. There are two broad proposals for how to do so, namely the wide-scope and narrow-scope analyses.

(NARROW-SCOPE) \{M_i\} rationally requires S to F ⇔ If S is in \{M_i\}, then S is rationally required to F.
(WIDE-SCOPE) \{M_i\} rationally requires S to F ⇔ S is rationally required to [either not be in \{M_i\}, or else to F].

I am not sympathetic to either reduction. The important point is that the legitimacy of the three-placed notion does not rest on its reducing to the two-placed notion. The three-placed ideology regiments a perfectly good intuitive notion.\(^\text{19}\)

In Broome’s examples, beliefs and intentions rationally require some response. We have seen that another kind of mental state can rationally require something. Having an appearance that p, and no defeating beliefs that justify blocking, rationally requires the subject to believe that p. As before that does not mean that the subject is justified in believing that p. An unsound appearance constitutes having made a mistake, having messed up. That mistake rationally requires forming a belief. It rationally requires you to follow its mistaken path. When beliefs and intentions do the rational requiring, maybe they constitute ‘messing up’ iff they are unjustified. We can’t say this about appearances, which are not justified or unjustified. But as we saw in sections 3 and 4, we can identify the appearance as containing the subject’s error, as responsible for the belief’s being unjustified. Ian knows that p, fallaciously infers q, and is justified in not blocking that inference. Ian forms an unjustified belief that q. Ian did not go wrong in taking p as a premise. Ian did not make a mistake by not blocking the formation of that belief. It was in its appearing to him that q that Ian messed up. Hence that messed-up appearance will rationally require Ian to do messed-up things, like believe that q. Ian should not believe q, but should suspend judgement; for his evidence (namely p) does not speak to it. Believing that p does not itself rationally require Ian to believe that q.

The same principle covers Maria’s case: her unsound appearance rationally requires her to hold an unjustified belief. There is a difference with Broome’s examples. Maria’s error is not a current error of reason. It lies in her forgotten past. What it is

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\(^{19}\) When there are no defeaters, one is rationally required to fit one’s beliefs to one’s appearances. One cannot rationally fit one’s appearances to one’s beliefs. Niko Kolodny argues more generally that rational requirement is a non-symmetric relation (Kolodny 2005 esp. pp. 528-530, 2007).
rationally best for her to do now is believe that Dean Martin is Italian. She is now ‘all-things-considered’ rationally required to do so. In Broome’s examples, the subject does make a current error of reason. What it is rationally best for them to do now is spot and stop making that mistake, rather than following where it leads. That’s what they are now all-things-considered rationally required to do. For instance, Heather is now all-things-considered rationally required to stop believing that she should now torture Tigger. This difference between Broome’s examples and Maria’s case does not challenge subsuming them under the same explanatory generalization. Section 4b argued that Maria’s belief is not justified. Hence her mnemonic appearance is a mental state that rationally requires her to do something unjustified. That’s what’s going on in Broome’s examples too. Our view about Maria is supported by fitting nicely into a more general schema.

6. Objections and Replies.

6a.

My view entails that one can fail to be in a position to take an evaluatively justified attitude to a proposition. Maria’s mnemonic appearance that Dean Martin is Italian is the result of some long-forgotten irrational belief-formation. I say that her belief is unjustified, though she is justified in not blocking it. Suspending belief is the deontically justified attitude, because her justified beliefs do not support an answer. But she is unable to suspend in a justified way, as long as she has the unsound appearance. If she did suspend, it would be by blocking unjustifiably. Blocking unjustifiably leads to evaluatively unjustified suspension of belief, just as unjustifiably not blocking leads to evaluatively unjustified belief. While she has the unsound appearance, she cannot have an evaluatively justified attitude. But she can’t stop having that appearance in a justified way, given her current epistemic position. Maria would not be justified in erasing her belief that Dean Martin is Italian, thereby ceasing to have the offending mnemonic
appearance. So I must deny that one is always in a position to believe/act in an evaluatively justified way.\textsuperscript{20}

I don’t think this is a draw-back to my view. I deny that there is always something one can justifiedly do \textit{given that one has already gone wrong}. Given a mistake, such as having an unsound appearance, there may be no way of still doing the right thing in the right way. That seems correct, and no objection to my view.

Let me give a two-stage explanation of how one can fail to be in a position to have an evaluatively justified attitude. The first stage makes use of an analogy. Derek drove to the bar, but is now over the alcohol limit for driving home. He should get a cab instead—it’s the only safe way of getting home. He’s spent all his cash, and needs $20 to pay for the taxi. He should get $20 for the cab ride home. Luckily his friend is also at the bar, and she is perfectly happy to lend him the $20. However, Derek refuses to borrow the money from a friend. The only other way of getting $20 at that time of night is to mug somebody. Given he has ruled out borrowing the money, Derek cannot act in an evaluatively justified way. Making that mistake cuts Derek off from all justified action. He must get $20 for the cab (to avoid drink-driving), but is not justified in mugging someone for it. Refusing to borrow the $20 \textit{excludes} Derek’s acting in an evaluatively justified way. Having the unsound mnemonic appearance excludes Maria’s having an evaluatively justified attitude to whether Dean Martin is Italian. That’s the first stage in the explanation, partly legitimized by the analogy with Derek.

The second stage recognizes a disanalogy between the two cases. Derek is in a position to spot and justifiedly rectify his mistake. Derek is in a position to act justifiedly, by borrowing the money from his friend. But Maria is not in a position to put right the mistake she made when she formed the belief. She is not in a position to realize that her mnemonic appearance is unsound, and so justifiedly stop having the appearance that Dean Martin is Italian. But having that appearance excludes her having an evaluatively justified attitude.

\textsuperscript{20} This also follows from my treatment of perceptual and inferential justification. A creature might not be in a position to spot that a certain kind of inference it makes systematically is fallacious.
justified attitude to the proposition. Putting these last two points together, we see why Maria is not in a position to have an evaluatively justified attitude.

6b.

Ian is not justified in blocking the inferential appearance that q, but is not justified in believing q. In fact, he’s deontically justified in not believing that q (as long as his other evidence does not count in favour of it). Here’s a way of arguing that those claims are incompatible, suggested to me by Michael Huemer.

1. Ian is deontically justified in not believing that q.
2. Ian knows that, because it appears to him that q, blocking is the means necessary for not believing that q.
3. If S is deontically justified in F-ing, and S knows that G-ing is the means necessary for F-ing, then S is deontically justified in G-ing.

So,

4. Ian is deontically justified in blocking the appearance that q.

Here’s a parallel argument concerning section 6a’s belligerent drunk, Derek. Remember that Derek must find $20 to pay for a taxi home, but refuses to borrow the money from a friend. The only other way of getting the money at that time of night is to mug somebody.

1*. Derek is deontically justified in getting $20 for the cab ride home.
2*. Derek knows that, because he refuses to borrow it, mugging someone is the means necessary for getting the money.
3. If S is deontically justified in F-ing, and S knows that G-ing is the means necessary for F-ing, then S is deontically justified in G-ing.

So,

4*. Derek is deontically justified in mugging someone for the $20.
This argument has a false conclusion, and so is unsound. Here’s why. Just because Derek is justified in getting the $20, does not mean that any means to that end is acceptable. It is only because he has wrongly ruled out the proper means for getting the $20 that mugging someone is the only means left. Principle 3 is not true of such cases. When it is because [S has excluded the proper means for F-ing] that [G-ing is the means necessary for S to F], principle 3 does not apply.

Here’s the parallel response to the objection to my view. Ian should not avoid believing q by means of blocking. Things have already gone wrong by the time that question arises. Its seeming to him that q is where things went wrong, where Ian deviated from the proper way of not believing that q. It is because [Ian has excluded the proper way of not believing that q] that [blocking is the means necessary for Ian not to believe that q]. As the case of Derek shows, principle 3 is not true of such cases.

Let me forestall a possible confusion. 2 and 2* have false as well as true readings. On the false reading of 2, Ian can cease to have the appearance that q, and so blocking the appearance is not the only way for him to avoid believing that q. For example, shutting one’s fingers in the door frees one’s mind from most inferential appearances. The true reading of 2 holds fixed Ian’s having the appearance that q. Given that appearance, blocking it is the means necessary for not believing that q. Similarly, if we allow that Derek can stop refusing to borrow the money from his friend, 2* will be false. But we can also evaluate 2* while holding his refusal fixed, rendering it true. That’s how Derek would reason about the options open to him. There is no disanalogy here that threatens my parallel treatment of Ian and Derek.

There are other arguments in the vicinity which get a similar response. Here’s one suggested by an anonymous reviewer.

1. Ian is deontically justified in not blocking the appearance that q.
2. If Ian doesn’t block then he believes that q.
3. If S is deontically justified in F-ing, and if S Fs then S Gs; then S is deontically justified in G-ing.

So,

4. Ian is deontically justified in believing that q.
If we don’t hold fixed Ian’s mistake (viz. having the appearance that q), premise 2 is false. If we do hold it fixed, 1 and 2 are true but premise 3 is false. We show this by constructing an analogous argument that, since Derek is justified in not mugging anyone, he is justified in not getting a taxi home. Given Derek’s unjustified refusal to borrow the $20, the next best option is still unjustified—sleeping in the park is a silly idea.

6c.

Nicholas Silins (2005) argues that “internal twins” possess the same evidence. One passage (pp. 392-3) suggests the following argument that perceptual appearances suffice for justified belief (when defeating beliefs are absent). Roughly: Peter is not deontically justified in suspending or disbelieving p, so he is deontically justified in believing that p.

1. Suppose it appears perceptually to Peter that p, and he has no defeating beliefs.
2. If Peter is not deontically justified in either disbelieving or suspending judgement with regard to p, then Peter is deontically justified in believing that p.
3. Peter is not deontically justified in disbelieving that p.
4. Given that it appears to him that p, Peter would be evaluatively unjustified were he to suspend judgement with regard to p.

So,

5. Peter is not deontically justified in suspending judgement with regard to p. (from 4)

So,

6. Peter is deontically justified in believing that p. (from 2, 3, 5)

Here is the passage in which Silins argues via 4.

Suppose [Peter] did suspend judgment in the proposition that [p], despite the fact that it seems [to him that p], and despite the fact that no defeating evidence is available to him. I take it to be very implausible that [Peter] would be justified in suspending judgment in the matter. (Silins 2005 p. 392)
Silins takes this to show that Peter “lacks justification” to suspend judgement, i.e. he is not deontically justified in suspending. This step from 4 to 5 is where the argument goes wrong. Given he has an unsound appearance that p, Peter would be evaluatively unjustified were he to suspend judgement on p, for he would be unjustifiably blocking. Having the appearance rules out suspending in the justified way. The appropriate way of suspending has already been lost. But he is deontically justified in suspending judgement, for his genuine evidence is silent on the matter. (This is clearest in the inferential case: Ian is deontically justified in suspending on whether q.)

Returning to the analogy with Derek might help. Derek is deontically justified in getting $20 for the cab home. Here’s the parallel to the quoted argument from Silins.

Suppose Derek did get $20 for the taxi home, despite the fact that he refused to borrow the money from a friend, and the only other way of getting the money was to mug someone. I take it to be very implausible that Derek’s getting the $20 would be evaluatively justified—he mugged someone to do so. So Derek lacks justification for getting $20 for the cab ride home.

Derek’s refusal to borrow the money excludes him from the correct way of getting it. Given that error, were he to get it, he would do so in an unjustified way. Nevertheless, he is deontically justified in getting the money, so as to avoid drink-driving and sleeping in the park. Similarly, having an unsound appearance excludes you from holding the deontically justified attitude in an evaluatively justified way.

7. The Motivations for Internalism.
Let’s wrap up by considering the upshot of my arguments for the debate between internalism and externalism about epistemic justification. I review the standard motivations for internalism, noting problems with each. They do not look promising, given the views of inference and memory defended in this paper.

We should reject any version of internalism that gives the wrong answer about inferential cases. We must allow that there are unsound inferential appearances, and that
one can be justified in not blocking them. It would be perverse to refuse to apply these distinctions to resolve the conflict of intuitions about mnemonic cases. Thus a tenable internalism will accept that the beliefs of Maria and Mark are not justified (see section 4b).

This refutes two kinds of internalism. The first identifies justified belief with rational belief. It is compelling that rationality is an ‘internal’ matter, in some sense that would need to be spelled out. Let’s look at three precisifications of ‘rational’ belief. Firstly, justified belief is not just R-rational belief. Ian’s fallacious inference produces an R-rational belief that is not overall justified. Secondly, justified belief is not just currently O-rational belief. Our conflicting inclinations about Maria are satisfied by saying that her belief is currently O-rational, but not justified, because her mnemonic appearance is unsound. Thirdly, justified belief is not just historically O-rational belief. Mark acquired the disposition to have a particular mnemonic appearance out of thin air. Those appearances are unsound, and give rise to unjustified occurrent beliefs. Yet those beliefs are historically O-rational: reason did not go wrong in their production.

‘Access’ internalism is the second kind of view that goes wrong in mnemonic cases. It holds that one must be able to respond to whether a belief is justified, and that means that one must always have ‘access’ to whether it is. Allegedly, we could only have the right kind of access if justification is an ‘internal’ matter. Let’s distinguish two aspects to ‘access’. The first demands that when you have an unjustified belief you are in a position to realise this, and hence rectify the belief. I reject this demand. Maria is not now in a position to recognize and rectify the mistake she made when she irrationally formed the belief that Dean Martin is Italian; but her belief is still unjustified. The second aspect to ‘access’ demands that when you have a justified belief, you are in a position to justifiably believe that the belief is justified. This requirement is compatible with the position defended in this paper. It does not favour internalism. For example, suppose that a basic perceptual appearance that p is sound only if the subject sees that p. Combine this with the view that when one sees that p, one is in a position to be aware that one sees that p. That’s another factive mental state, and constitutes a sound appearance that one sees that p. Suppose that the conditions for blocking are also the same. This view is extremely externalist, yet it entails that basic perceptual belief satisfies
the second ‘access’ requirement. Only the first kind of access requirement could support internalism, and it gives the wrong answer about Maria.

The remaining kinds of internalism agree that Maria and Mark’s mnemonic appearances are unsound, but hold it is an internal matter whether a (basic or non-basic) perceptual appearance is sound. This view does not sit well with our treatment of inference and memory. There is a very strict condition on an inferential appearance’s being sound: the premise must really support the conclusion. The conclusion must thereby be conditionally likely to be true. I see no prospect of a demanding and truth-conducive internalist criterion for a perceptual appearance to be sound. Further, no straightforward intuition favours internalism. There is no intuition about when R-rational perceptual beliefs have the further status of being justified. Having explained away the intuition that Maria’s belief is justified, the same thought seems irresistible in the case of perception. The internalist intuition latches on to R-rationality, which is an internalist component in justified belief. This seems like internalism enough.

I will look at one motivation for internalism which admits that Maria and Mark are not justified. The thought is that errors of inference or memory can be attributed to the subject, but basic perceptual errors are to be attributed to the unkind environment the subject finds themselves in. Suppose Peter has an inaccurate visual image, either as the result of hallucination or a visual illusion. Ian, Maria and Mark messed up, but allegedly Peter did not—his false belief is supposedly not his fault. This is meant to motivate saying that Mark is not justified but Peter is justified. I remain unmoved. I have no intuition that Mark is more responsible for his false mnemonic belief than Peter is for his false perceptual belief. But even if there were such an intuition, there is independent reason to think that justification and blame come apart. Suppose it is morally wrong to beat your children, but everyone in Fred’s society thinks it is morally permissible. We might not blame Fred for beating his children, because it is not the case that he should have known better. But it is wrong for him to beat his children; he is not justified in doing so; the weight of reasons is against it. In the case of action, blamelessness and justification come apart. So an externalist about epistemic justification can accept that we blame the subject more when we locate the error in their processing rather than in a
hostile environment. Internalism about blame provides no grounds for internalism about epistemic justification. (This does not mean that epistemic blame is uninteresting.)

This paper has argued that appearances do not suffice for prima facie justified belief, and explained away the attraction of the Arguments From Irrationality. I presented a framework that resolves the conflict of intuitions about inference and memory. It undermines the view that perceptual appearances suffice for prima facie justified belief. A more promising view is that one must see that p to have a justified basic perceptual belief that p. 21

References


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