How To Formulate Arguments From Easy Knowledge, and Maybe How to Resist ThemAmerican Philosophical Quarterly (2018)
Arguments from ‘easy knowledge’ are meant to refute a class of epistemological views, including foundationalism about perceptual knowledge. I present arguments from easy knowledge in their strongest form, and explain why other formulations in the literature are inferior. I criticize two features of Stewart Cohen’s presentation (2002, 2005), namely his focus on knowing that one’s faculties are reliable, and his use of a Williamson-style closure principle. Rather, the issue around easy knowledge must be understood using a notion of epistemic priority. Roger White’s presentation (2006) is contaminated by the so-called lottery puzzle, which is best kept separate. Distinguishing basic from non-basic visual contents limits the force of the examples discussed by Cohen, White, and Crispin Wright (2007). Finally I present a new strategy for resisting even the best-formulated arguments from easy knowledge.
- easy knowledge,
- epistemic priority,
- transmission failure,
- Stewart Cohen.
Publication DateFebruary, 2018
Citation InformationAlexander Jackson. "How To Formulate Arguments From Easy Knowledge, and Maybe How to Resist Them" American Philosophical Quarterly (2018)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/alexander_jackson/17/