Seeking rents through class actions and legislative lobbying : a comparisonEuropean Journal of Law and Economics (2011)
AbstractThis article analyzes class actions as a technology that groups may use in their rent-seeking activity, in addition to other rent-seeking methods such as legislative investment within the political market, when they seek to achieve favorable decisions from decision-makers—courts and legislators. It claims that groups may make their choice between various rent-seeking technologies according to their sensitivity to the problem of free riding. Therefore, it analyzes the effect of the legal instruments that facilitate class action lawsuits and collective litigation in most countries upon the rent-seeking strategies of groups, as compared to rent-seeking through legislation.
- Class action,
- Collective litigation,
- Free rider problem,
- Political market
Citation InformationAlain Marciano and Sophie Harnay. "Seeking rents through class actions and legislative lobbying : a comparison" European Journal of Law and Economics Vol. 32 Iss. 2 (2011)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/alain_marciano/31/