Federalism and Conflicts over principalship. Some insights into the American constitutional historyConstitutional Political Economy (2004)
AbstractThe article provides an economic interpretation of Kelsen’s theory of decentralized governments. It helps to distinguish different forms of federalism and in particular the corresponding conflicts of principalship inside the governmental structure. The model is applied to the early American constitutional history and shows how opposed views of agency relationships in the constitution foreshadowed what would later end up in a civil war.
- American constitutional history,
- agency theory,
- strategic behavior
Citation InformationAlain Marciano and Jean-Michel Josselin. "Federalism and Conflicts over principalship. Some insights into the American constitutional history" Constitutional Political Economy Vol. 15 Iss. 3 (2004)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/alain_marciano/26/