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Article
Judicial conformity versus dissidence: an economic analysis of judicial precedent
International Review of Law and Economics (2004)
  • Alain Marciano
  • Sophie Harnay
Abstract
The individual decision made by a judge does not only reflect his personal preferences about a case but also the expected response of the judicial community to the decision. We propose an analysis of judicial attitudes towards precedent based on the adoption externalities associated with legal rules. The situation is modelled as a coordination problem within a sequential game of two periods in which judges play a bandwagon strategy.
Keywords
  • Judicial conformity,
  • Adoption externalities,
  • Judicial insertion
Disciplines
Publication Date
Winter December, 2004
Citation Information
Alain Marciano and Sophie Harnay. "Judicial conformity versus dissidence: an economic analysis of judicial precedent" International Review of Law and Economics Vol. 23 (2004)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/alain_marciano/24/