Judicial conformity versus dissidence: an economic analysis of judicial precedentInternational Review of Law and Economics (2004)
AbstractThe individual decision made by a judge does not only reﬂect his personal preferences about a case but also the expected response of the judicial community to the decision. We propose an analysis of judicial attitudes towards precedent based on the adoption externalities associated with legal rules. The situation is modelled as a coordination problem within a sequential game of two periods in which judges play a bandwagon strategy.
- Judicial conformity,
- Adoption externalities,
- Judicial insertion
Publication DateWinter December, 2004
Citation InformationAlain Marciano and Sophie Harnay. "Judicial conformity versus dissidence: an economic analysis of judicial precedent" International Review of Law and Economics Vol. 23 (2004)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/alain_marciano/24/