Developing Focal Point Networks for State-Centered Genocide Prevention

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Acronyms

AAD - American Academy of Diplomacy
AC4 – Advanced Consortium on Cooperation, Conflict, and Complexity
AFRICOM – United States African Command
APC – Atrocities Prevention Committee
EGGP - Engaging Governments in Genocide Prevention
EU - The European Union
GPM - Government Politics Model (Allison & Zelikow, 1999)
GPTR - Genocide Prevention Taskforce Report
ICJ - International Court of Justice
MNC - Multinational Corporations
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO - “nonprofit organizations formally independent from government” (Bach & Stark, 2004, p. 102)
NNDB - Notable Names Database (Soylent Communications Ltd, 2002)
OBM - Organizational Behavior Model (Allison & Zelikow, 1999)
PKI - Communist Party of Indonesia
QDR – Quadrennial Defense Review
RAM - Random Actor Model (Allison & Zelikow, 1999)
SNA - Social Network Analysis
SOP - Standard Operating Procedure
SS - Schutzstaffel
UN - The United Nations
UNTWC - United Nations Tribunal on War Crimes
US - The United States of America
USDD – United States Defense Department
USHMM - United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
VIA – Values Into Action (Dupre, Gordezky, Spector, & Valenza, 2007)
VUE - Visual Understanding Environment (Tufts University, 2011)
Glossary

Conflict: conflict represents a “perceived divergence of interest, a belief that the parties’ current aspirations are incompatible” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, p. 7).

Culture and Perception: Brett (2000) defines culture as, “the unique character of a social group…cultural values direct group members’ attention to what is more and less important” (p. 99). Kimmel (2006) highlights that, “human beings participate in and shape their common culture” (p. 627) creating learned perceptions. These learned perceptions include “categories, plans and rules people employ to interpret their world and act purposefully in it” (Spradley & McCurdy, 1971, p. 2).

Feedback Loops: Positive feedback loops connect various elements necessary to continue a particular action. Negative feedback loops dampen or hinder the system dynamics that have been set in motion by positive feedback loops. In essence, a negative feedback loop will decrease the activation of relevant elements in the system, while a positive feedback loop will activate the relevant elements within a system (Nowak & Vallacher, 1998).

Emergence: Within a nonlinear social system, behavior at the system-level cannot be described by the sum of separate influences. Social systems can exhibit highly complex behaviors when elements interact over time. Large-scale (macro) behaviors and patterns emerge from the interior functioning of the nonlinear system; this is known as emergence (Nowak & Vallacher, 1998).

Networks: "forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p.8).

Power: Dahl (1968) defines power as involving, “an ability to get another person to do something that he or she would not otherwise have done” (p. 158). Coleman & Voronov (2003) utilize this definition and frame it as a, “special kind of influence of A over B” (p. 2).
Abstract

While genocide, at times, appears to be sporadic in its emergence; it, in fact, requires diligent planning, strategy, and execution; inferring potential prevention through effective response. Within the last decade, there has been an increased attention on the need for governments to respond effectively to potential genocides. One manifestation of this concern has been an effort to construct governmental systems that can foresee the development of such politics (early warning) and transmit this information for decision makers to respond effectively to the threat (early action).

Through qualitative data analysis of a United States’ case study, this paper explores the influences in the formation of the Genocide Prevention Taskforce Report (GPTR), and how its recommendations will help overcome factors (i.e. bureaucratic inertia, information siloing) that have made past policy less than effective. Data was acquired through interviews with GPTR contributors and text analysis of the GPTR. Using NVivo, a qualitative data analysis software, and network theory methodology, we will create a model of the relevant actors, resources, and knowledge involved in these two genocide prevention efforts. This network model will be analyzed through Allison’s (1999) three conceptual models: rational actor model, standard operating procedure model, and government politics model. This study will seek to extract generalizable lessons that can be applied to other countries’ experiences.

Keywords: genocide prevention, bureaucratic politics, social networks, government, information flow
Chapter 1 – Nature of the conflict

1.1 Background

Throughout history there have been acts of nature and humankind that resulted in mass killings (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003; Kiernan, 2007; Semelin, 2007; Valentino, 2000). This paper explores the involvement of people in the killings of large groups of people. While simple in appearance, this exploration is quite complex. In order to understand this properly, it is critical to understand the various literatures and definitions that have been created around this act.

After World War II, the United Nations (UN) was established as a collective whose directive was the prevention and removal of any threat to peace (United Nations Department of Public Information, 1990). The burden of conflict prevention in the form of preventative diplomacy, on behalf of the international community, fell upon this newly formed international organization (Lund, 1996).

When thinking about the word ‘genocide’, its meaning is never addressed in one’s mind. Instead, one recollects events that suit the word, such as the recent killings in Rwanda in 1994 and Bosnia in 1995, or one of the most infamous events that occurred over half a century ago, the Holocaust (1939-1945). Interestingly, when reviewing the etymology of the word ‘genocide’, we learn that it was created during World War II by Arthur Lemkin, a Polish-Jewish man with a strong legal background (1944).

Lemkin assembled the word genocide to signify “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves” (1944, p.79). His word progressed into a declaration set forth by the UN known as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNGC), which expanded the legal definition of genocide:
Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (United Nations, 1948)

While this is a comprehensive legal definition that permits international court acceptance (Hall, 1997, 1998), it lacks full recognition and application. For example, the term ‘mass killing’ has been popularized by political scientists. Valentino treats mass killings as a separate concept, defined as the “intentional killing of a massive number of noncombatants” (2000, p. 4). The appeal mass killing has over genocide is its inherent lack of definition regarding the classification of a group. There is no specificity of nationality, ethnicity, or religion; just the declaration of a large number of killings allowing the scope of the term to be larger than the legal definition set forth by the UNGC.

Regardless, it is important to have a working definition. Taking important concepts concerning mass killings, we can combine it with the UNGC’s terminology on genocide. With this understanding genocide can be defined as:

The deliberate killing of - or infliction of serious mental or bodily harm upon - a “significant number of members of any group of non-combatants” (Valentino, 2000, p.4) which may include the prevention of births occurring within the group, or the relocation of children from one group to another (United Nations, 1948).
With this in mind, we can consider the killing of political and non-ethnic groups to fall within our definition of genocide. For example, The White Terror (1974), a period when French royalist forces systematically eliminated radical Jacobins - political organization of the French Revolution - and their supporters (Dalberg-Acton, 2000) and, more recently, the systemic elimination of 500,000 Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) members in 1965 (Totten, 2004).

It is important to note that throughout human history genocide has been prevalent and resulted in the extermination of countless lives. Ending a life is a horrible thing, but at what point can we classify a group killing as genocide? In other words, how many lives does it take before a killing is considered genocidal? There are varying opinions on this, from the intent to eliminate an entire group of people (Katz, 1994) to any intentional event resulting in the deaths of 50,000 or more over a five year period (Valentino, 2000). While there is some merit to each position, there are some inherent flaws as well. Katz’s (1994) stance on the complete eradication of a group is next to impossible to actually undertake, nor is the mere intent to eradicate a group sufficient. While Valentino’s number is large in size and certainly deserves the label ‘mass killing’, it does not take into account certain unique situations, which still warrant our attention.

For example, recent news mentioned the passing of Boa Sr, the last woman of the Bo, an ancient Great Andamanese tribe (Singh, 2010; Survival International, 2010). Boa Sr was the last one, and without her, the Bo tribe no longer exists. While this seems to be nothing more than worthy news mention, looking back at the history of the Bo tribe we learn of the influences of British presence in 1858. During the colonization of the Archipelago, roughly 5,000 tribe members were killed by the British military, or died due to exposure to new western diseases. The British held surviving members captive in a location called Andaman Home. No children survived captivation and the tribe dwindled in size (Tarling, 1969). One can make the case that
the Bo tribe, which for lack of better words is now extinct, classifies as an act of genocide. There are certain factors at play, both with large and small numbers of killings, which cannot be ignored due to not fitting a specified mold. One of the primary concerns that arise out of any review on genocide is the question regarding the ability to prevent the loss of human life.

Very few historians, political scientists, psychologists, and philosophers have investigated, discussed, or even raised questions regarding genocide, mass killings, or mass murder (Smith, 1999). Since 1945, over 60 million people have had their lives taken due to acts of genocide (Kiernan, 2007; Smith, 1999). Staub (1999) stipulates that knowledge is required in order to prevent genocide, and there are preconditions within the social and political environment, culture, history of societal conflict, as well as dynamics from hostility and dehumanization to mass killings (Staub, 1989). In order to obtain the necessary knowledge, it is important that key organizations demonstrate motivation. We have started to see some forms of international activity within this area. For example, the United Nations Tribunal on War Crimes (UNTWC) convened over the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone (Schabas, 2006; Akhavan, 1998) genocides and post-genocide dynamics. However, genocide prevention should be the focus, because early warning and action may save countless lives.

Three US based NGOs collaborated to create the Genocide Prevention Taskforce (GPTR) designed to analyze numerous questions regarding genocide prevention from the US perspective (Albright & Cohen, 2008). These NGOs were the US Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), the US Institute of Peace (USIP), and the American Academy of Diplomacy (AAD). The GPTR had two goals in mind: (1) highlight genocide prevention as a national concern, prioritizing its concept within US foreign policy, (2) seek out and develop recommendations that enable the US government to respond and be aware of emerging threats of genocide (Woocher, 2009).
Through an understanding of the influences involved in the formation of the GPTR, we can examine how its recommendations strived to meet the goals of the taskforce and what the obstacles were in obtaining these goals. Through this analysis, we may gain an understanding into the US governmental structures surrounding genocide, which may be applicable to other nation’s governmental structures.

1.2 Conflict Map

Figure 1.2.1 (see appendix, p. 81) is a broad conflict map based on genocide dynamics described by Lemarchand, Powell, and Turner (Lemarchand, 2009; Powell, 2007; Turner, 2006). A detailed explanation follows in section 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5.

1.3 Actors

Within the conflict map, Figure 1.2.1, we can see three distinct groups of actors: the local, international, and unique international.

1.3.1 Unique International

Unique international represents the international corporations and communities. They are classified as unique since both groups have either specific interests or specific access to information. For example, while modern communication structures have given the individual far greater access to information (Shirky, 2008), most civilians still heavily rely on the international press for news information. Out of all US citizens who follow the news, only 23% access news online, and 53% of these individuals’ access online versions of traditional news sources (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2006). Thus, 67% of all news acquired by US citizens comes from traditional media. Therefore, perception of an international conflict is formed through the framed lenses of the international press.
The large multinational corporations (MNC) can at times play a role within the international political and economic systems (Graham, 1996). Policy set forth by different governments, oft play in the MNCs evaluations for endeavors, such as new factories and foreign trade. Due to these trends, we observe international corporations as having ties with international organizations, governments (local and international), press, and the civilian communities.

1.3.2 International

Within the international spectrum, there are three dominant groups: international organizations, international community (government), and international press. The international press is a very influential group. The way the news frame conflicts is often seen as a reflection of the power relations among politicians, the public, and the media, where the international press, who at times cannot be controlled by governments or special interest groups, can reflect upon international political decision-making during conflict (Touri, 2008).

The international community (government) is highly relevant within the conflict map. Countries often play a direct role in international conflict, as seen in the US involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, Philippines, Korea, Vietnam, and Somalia (Lane, 2004). However, sometimes countries collaborate within international organization structures that operate under specific directives. An example is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a political and military alliance involving the US and several European Nations (NATO, 2008).

Even though their involvement occurs after an act of genocide, NGOs also play a significant role (Fein, 1988). For example, in 1978, Amnesty International and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) submitted recorded evidence of human rights violations in Cambodia to the UN (Fein, 1988). NGOs, while not always effective, attempt to prevent future acts of
genocide by monitoring governments, in order to hold them politically responsible for their actions. NGOs often leverage their “sphere of influence... among their allies” (Fein, 1988, p. 44).

1.3.3 Local

The local actors are the key players within the conflict map. The local actor level consists of the state, military, general population, and paramilitary, among others (Adelman, 2007; Berglind, 1950; Wang, 2006; Nordstrom & Martin, 1992). Key players are those who actually commit actions surrounding genocide. Local level alludes to some form of geo-specific targeting. For example, we have learned that during the Rwandan genocide, the Interahamwe paramilitary group received backing from the local government, including the military. Moreover, the Interahamwe consisted of members from the local population, whose neighbors were often targeted and massacred (Des Forges, 1999; Gourevitch, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Staub, Pearlman, Gubin, & Hagengimana, 2005).

1.4 Structures

The conflict map has four principal structures: security, political, economic, and social. These four structures have a strong interplay and relation with the dynamics of the conflict map. For example, identity, seen as a dynamic within the conflict map, is strongly related to social structures (Ballet, Mahieu, & Radja, 2007). Economic structures heavily influence the conflict dynamics. For example, class segregation due to a polarization of income levels, between high and low income, helps polarize groups of people. In addition, international trade agreements and a country’s economic dependency on such agreements further influence the political structures.

Belgium’s colonization of Rwanda provides an example of the synergy between political and economic structures. At the time, several resources were available at an extremely low cost, namely land and labor, and soon coffee plantations were erected (Little & Horowitz, 1987).
Coffee became a major export for Rwanda and continued to grow during Habyarimana’s regime; the regime’s budget was directly correlated to the performance of the international coffee market (Verwimp, 2003).

Combining this with a political perspective, we can see that the power of Habyarimana’s regime is also determined by the loyalty provided by the population (Earle, 1997; Wintrobe, 2000), which was dependent on the prices that coffee producers offered the farmers (Verwimp, 2003). Therefore, there is a positive interdependence between Habyarimana’s political power, and the state of the Rwandan and international coffee economy. In the 1980s, the price of coffee fell in the global market, directly affecting the Rwandan economy (Talbot, 2004). Habyarimana switched over to “severe forms of repression to maintain…hold onto power” (Verwimp, 2003, p. 169). Political economists argue that these structural changes were the driving influences that led to the Rwandan genocide (Chussudovsky, 1998; Cook, 2006; Talbot, 2004; Verwimp, 2003).

1.5 Dynamics

There are three groups of dynamics within the conflict map: social, systematic, and historical. It is important to realize that there are more items within each group. For example, the historical group has listed identity, culture, and religion. Past historical events often transform the structures that are present through the lens of identity (Ballet, Mahieu, & Radja, 2007; Sewell, 1996). For example, a chosen trauma that was suffered by ancestors may be re-activated when a group feels their identity is being threatened and they are trying to support their identity, these types of dynamics often have destructive and powerful consequences (Volkan, 2001).

Systematic dynamics help explain how seemingly large atrocities (i.e. Rwandan genocide) can be seen as micro events that aggregate into a system-wide activity with inter and intra group behavior leading to polarization between ingroups and outgroups, and these events
often escalate systems of violence (Bhavnani, 2006). Systematic dynamics and social dynamics are strong drivers that directly influence the structures in the conflict map structures. An example of a social dynamic tying into a social structure is taken from Lemarchand (2009). Combined with our conflict map’s social dynamic and structure, this is visualized as a step-based model (Figure 1.2.2) in order to demonstrate the application of the conflict map within the dynamic.

We can take the cycle of violence model and apply it to a specific example highlighting the manifestation of historical dynamics, as shown in an autobiographical book about a boy soldier in Sierra Leone (Beah, 2007). During the war in Sierra Leone, there were several paramilitary actors, including the Rebel United Front (RUF). The RUF was a rebel army, originally formed under political motivations to overturn the Sierra Leonean government. Initially, the RUF gained significant popularity by applying concepts from historical dynamics (i.e. culture and identity) into their platform of anti-colonialism and Sierra Leonean identity. Their political campaign coined ‘Footpaths to Democracy’ had as a focal point, the slogan, “No More Slaves, No More Masters. Power and Wealth to the People” (Federation of American Scientists, 2003, p.3). The RUF specifically targeted the perceived social divisions between the Freetown upper class and the rest of the population. The upper class was partly created by the colonists who polarized different groups of people, causing strong social divisions feeding through social and systemic dynamics, as well as social and economic structures. As tension escalated, eventually the RUF was armed and used force to attempt to overthrow the government, causing a massive refuge outflow into neighboring countries. Eventually, refugee camps became recruitment locations for government and paramilitary entities, such as RUF, to acquire new soldiers. The RUF was one of many forces responsible for the genocide that occurred during the Sierra Leone Civil War (Beah, 2007).
1.6 Literature Review

In order to understand the feasibility of prevention, it is important to survey the literature on causes of genocide and possess the ability to recognize genocide. Valentino (2000) sets forth that there are three primary theoretical frameworks that provide explanations towards the emergence of mass killing and, hence, genocide: plural society theory, national crises, and democracy theory. Each theoretical framework lends itself towards a component in the understanding of genocide. Plural society theory concerns the causes, national crises concerns the factors, and democracy theory concerns political power and governmental structure (Valentino, 2000). The National Crises Framework discusses the influence crises have upon the occurrence of genocide, while Social Impact Theory concerns the influences within a group.

1.6.1 Intergroup Conflict

Plural society theory reviews the divisions that exist between groups and the impact their presence has in leading up to an act of genocide (Valentino, 2000). It is easy to mistake these divisions as being easily identifiable, such as a division by race or gender. It is important to realize that differences between groups can also exist in terms of “social power, access to resources, important life values, or other significant incompatibilities” (Fisher, 2006, p. 177).

With this in mind, we can see how a perception of conflict begins. Ethnocentrism of the ingroup awards other ingroup members, while rejecting and disparaging those in the outgroup (Fisher, 2006). It is important to realize that there may not be any objective goals obtained by one group or the other. In fact, the outgroup members are often not aware of their classifications (Johnson & Johnson, 2005). A perception of conflict can at times be sufficient to solidify the acceptance that conflict is actually occurring.
Interestingly enough, “groups in conflict tend to develop negative stereotypes of each other” (Fisher, 2006, p.181), which further widens and deepens the divisions between groups. This relationship between social division, intergroup conflict, and polarization of society can be understood as a positive feedback loop (Figure 1.1). Positive feedback loops connect elements necessary to continue a particular action (Nowak & Vallacher, 1998). Negative feedback loops dampen or hinder the system dynamics that have been set in motion by positive feedback loops.

In essence, a negative feedback loop will decrease the activation of relevant elements in the system, while a positive feedback loop will activate these elements. Self-regulation is the balance between a positive feedback loop that may have escalated (i.e. severity of intergroup conflict within the relational system of social division, intergroup conflict, and polarization of society) and the negative feedback loop, which would de-escalate the intergroup conflict. As long as there are negative feedback loops in the system there are potentially control mechanisms designed to alleviate and, perhaps, end the conflict. Without any negative feedback loops there would be no self-regulation and a loss of control (Vallacher, Nowak, & Miller, 2003).

While elegant in its explanation, plural society theory does not lend itself towards explaining protracted conflicts in a useful fashion. There is no objective universally defining moment when the critical mass of social division may lead towards genocide, nor is there an understanding of division and its size variance. Furthermore, the theory does not explain how genocides have occurred without any apparent division.

Krain conducted quantitative research regarding the factors that contribute to state-sponsored mass murder, and concluded that “neither marginalization nor ethnic fractionalization are significant…reject outright the hypotheses that either affect the onset of genocides or politicides” (1997, p. 346). There are several examples demonstrating this point. Valentino,
discusses how prior to the civil rights movement, African Americans residing in the South of the US did not experience any form of genocide even though they did experience “over discrimination, intense economic and political exclusion, dehumanizing hatred and violence by significant segments of society” (2000, p.10).

In assessing plural society theory, it is important to also consider whether or not any actual genocides have occurred where there was no form of division between groups within society. An excellent, and horrifying, example is the executions carried out by the communist government in the Soviet Union. Conquest (1970) reviewed the reasons behind certain groups being targeted and discovered that while they may have come from certain ethnic or national backgrounds, there were no significant divisions and rather these actions were due to a potential political resistance to the communist regime. Getty and Chase (1993) further elaborate on this by clarifying that within the Soviet Union numerous political figures were often extracted from the same social and political groups and executed or deported for their potential political affiliations.

Social division does not seem to always be a component in genocide, and hence it is not always a precondition. However, it should not be ignored as an indicator, as strong social divisions and perhaps dehumanizing attitudes may eventually lead to genocide (Freeman, 1991).

1.6.2 National Crises Theory and Framework

The national crises framework discusses the influence crises (i.e. economic depressions, revolutions, and calamities) have upon the occurrence of genocide. Dollard’s team and their work on frustration aggression theory suggests that people, be it individuals or groups, tend to respond aggressively if they feel that they are threatened or when they are not able to achieve their goals (Dollard, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939). Due to their nature, national crises may threaten certain individuals and impede their goals. From a social psychological perspective,
Staub discusses how scapegoat theory leads to an understanding of the relationship between national crises and genocide, highlighting that individuals may feel helpless on their own, and “turn to their group for identity and connection…they scapegoat other groups” (1989, p. 182).

Valentino highlights that national crises do not always lead to genocide. This highly valid, yet overlooked, point seriously undermines the validity of the national crises framework. This indicates that if the national crises framework is valid, then there must be unique descriptors regarding the society and culture, which predispose those states to commit such acts, as described by the scapegoat theory and eventually genocide. In fact, if this holds true, then social division is strongly tied into national crises. Scapegoat theory is symbiotic to social division, if as Staub (1989) describes, individuals turn towards their groups for identity, then this must further solidify any division that may already exist between groups.

This causal relationship would indicate that at a certain moment during the escalation towards genocide, assuming there is such a path, polarization occurs between different societal groups. According to scapegoat theory and the social division framework, the dominant group would unanimously support the use of violence to remove the other group from society. That is, there is near unanimous consent to commit genocide by the dominant social group.

Nevertheless, this is not always the case, as evidenced by The Holocaust. Heinrich Himmler the highest ranking officer in the German Schutzstaffel (SS) was adamant about hiding the horrendous acts that the Nazis were committing, both due to fear of international backlash, as well as disapproval from the German people who voted Hitler into power (Manvell & Fraenkel, 1965). However, one can argue that Nazi Germany came into existence due to the initial scapegoating of the Jews after a national economic crisis. The component of the theory that is questioned is the ability for variables like political opportunism to lead towards genocide.
1.6.3 Social Impact Theory

The initial two frameworks lead to questioning how social interactions can produce clustering and polarization of attitudes within a given social system. Social impact theory holds that influence within a group is defined by two functions: (1) the effect of a group of people influencing a single person and (2) a single person’s influence directed towards and divided across other people (Latané, 1981). Important variables include the number of people that are influencing or being influenced, the individuals’ strength (potential of influence), and the proximity of individuals to one another. Within the group there will be different attitudes; however, through intergroup communication, polarization will occur in the direction of the majority attitude. Since the group has a majority opinion, more majority than minority opinion individuals will fit the mold of an average individual (Nowak, Szamrej, & Latané, 1990).

1.6.4 Democracy Theory

Democracy theory explores the role of government and its societal role. Fein (1993) has argued that democratic governments, or at least governments with strong democratic form, have a significant tendency to have less genocide occurrences than non-democratic governmental systems. Furthermore, Valentino validates that “democracies engage in less mass killing of their own citizens than other forms of government is one of the most carefully documented findings of the theoretical literature on mass killing” (Valentino, 2000, p.19).

However, this correlation is misleading. A better framing of this statement is that democratic societies, most likely, will not kill its own citizens. This is mostly true of major colonizing democracies such as France, United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal, unlike the monolithic nondemocratic countries (Rummel, 1995; Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003). For example, France, a democratic society, committed mass atrocities, while trying to sustain peace
in its Algerian colony (Horne, 1977). To this day, the French government has not recognized that genocide occurred in Algeria. Furthermore, the US nearly brought its Native Americans to extinction, and the US Native Americans were never recognized as citizens under the Queen of England or the newly formed US government (Stannard, 1992).

We can see how further developments within the social division and national crises frameworks may lead to dehumanization of certain groups and a lack of national control and regulation. In the absence of negative feedback loops, self-regulation and control mechanisms may be disengaged. A slight provocation in a system with no self-regulation could result in extreme, perhaps, excessive response. The provocation could very rapidly escalate the system to unheard levels. While on a lesser plane than genocide, consider the riots that erupt after football (soccer) matches that result in excessive violence and vandalism, often due to a single verbal provocation of an opposing team fan. In these large anonymous group situations, people do not feel accountable for their individual actions, because they are lost within the group’s collective actions. In essence, this illustrates the removal of their self-control mechanisms.

Moreover, shortly after the US bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a public opinion poll indicated that less than five percent of all Americans felt that the bomb should not have been used. The poll’s most unexpected statistic was that twenty three percent indicated that additional bombs should have been dropped, prior to permitting Japan to surrender to the US (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 1994; Gallup Corporation, 1945). This example demonstrates how people were more likely to express negative or destructive opinions and remove their self-control mechanisms, due to the anonymous nature of the polls.

Considering the Gallup Corporation’s involvement in public polling since 1945, the realization that every work has its influences becomes ever more relevant. For example,
Lemkin’s work that resulted in the coining of the word ‘genocide’ was sponsored and published by a nonpartisan think tank that focuses on foreign policy known as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011). When the UNGC was ratified in 1951 as international law, the US did not sign the document (Fein, 1990). Furthermore, it is important to take into consideration that the dominant body of work concerning genocide research originates either in the US or US-educated scholars (Fein, 1990).

Throughout this brief review of genocide, it becomes apparent that while there is no uniform means to assess the potential occurrence of genocide, there are certain key factors that tend to be present in most genocide occurrences. With this in mind, it seems logical that if there is an early warning system in place, it may lead to early prevention. In other words, the existence of a genocide early warning system should be linked to a preventative action system.

1.6.5 International Politics and Preventative Diplomacy

The previously discussed theories can be used for the development of a risk assessment model. On a basic level, this potentially indicates that if certain key indicators are left unchanged, and “no countervailing international actions are taken, escalation can happen at any time” (Harff, 2008, p.63). Inherently, the terminology of ‘countervailing international action’ assumes both intervention and international presence. Thus, one cannot ignore the underlying theme of international politics, and hence preventative diplomacy. For example, through the lens of preventative diplomacy, Lund’s definition of conflict prevention is the actions that are undertaken which are necessary in order to “avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups” (1996, p.37).

Hamburg states that preventing genocide through preventative diplomacy requires several organizations, such as the UN, European Union (EU), regional organizations, and established
democracies, to be closely networked, in order to communicate with several regions, respond empathetically, and provide timely assistance and early action in the prevention of genocide (Hamburg, 2010). Interestingly enough, Hamburg also stated that “international leaders can help prevent deadly conflict by mediating disputes, mobilizing international coalitions and domestic constituencies in support of peaceful resolutions and military resources to make such resolutions stick” (Hamburg, George, & Ballentine, 1999, p. 971).

The implications of preventative diplomacy indicate that large governmental agencies need to be at play, in order to effectively prevent genocide. In addition, it is essential that the right type of network structure exist between the various institutions, departments, and, at the core level, people who need to communicate and share information with each other. Information sharing depends on the linkages that exist. Within network theory, network analyses state that “social structures are best characterized by the interactions or absence of interactions among the individuals who constitute them, rather than by the attributes of these individuals” (Piana, 2001, p.28). This suggests that a specific network structure can be classified by the existence or absence of interactions amongst the actors within the network.

1.6.6 Network Theory

In order to understand the implication of network theory upon genocide prevention, it is important to understand the definition of a network. Keck & Sikkink (year) define networks as, "forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange” (p.8). Due to their differential to hierarchical systems, networks tend be more responsive and, potentially, more capable of providing reliable information in an efficient manner (Powell, 1990).
It becomes apparent that networks exist to foster information sharing, and, hence, promote a certain information flow (Krebs & Holley, 2002). It is important to recognize that information has a quantity and a quality factor. Further, the quality factor consists of the type and validity of the information provided. Considering that “information does not just exist, it is created” (Keohane & Nye, 2000, p.219), it is important to understand the types of information, as well as the communication structures transporting information between different network actors.

Keohane and Nye (2000) identify three types of information: free information, commercial information, and strategic information. Free information is information that actors within the network are willing to acquire or produce and send onwards without any financial incentive. Commercial information is similar to free information, except actors require some form of financial incentive. Strategic information provides certain actors with a significant strategic advantage over other actors. Strategic information and its transmission have been widely covered through social game theory, often through the lens of strategic deception (Crawford & Sobel, 1982). Within the genocide context, understanding how information is shared lends itself to understanding the evolution from early warning to early action.

1.6.7 Complex Systems, Genocide Prevention Networks, and Political Will

Woocher (2001) discusses a model used for conflict and the three conditions that are required for action and prevention: knowledge of the imminent conflict, appropriate policy tools to address the situation, and political will to act and apply the tools. Woocher (2001) recognizes that this model is too simplistic and can only provide a high level overview of preventive action strategies. Its simplicity is its flaw. Knowing that in complex systems, such as genocide prevention networks, government action towards a specific issue is more a representation of the
different actors and their undertakings than a single, coherent, and hence unison governmental acts (Allison & Zelikow, 1999).

Certain authors contend that governments and “nonprofit organizations formally independent from government” (Bach & Stark, 2004, p. 102) – frequently took no action whatsoever to prevent genocide (Stanton, 2004). However, as both Woocher (2001) and Lund (1996; 2000) point out, there are numerous examples of action, including the UN Mission and US Embassy presence in Rwanda, but very few examples of effective action. This disagreement regarding international action stems from the complexities that surround political will.

One of the unique qualities of political will is that it “is not visible separate from some sort of action” (Brinkerhoff, 2000, p.241). The risk here is that assessments of political will are often only made following the action. Simply put, one cannot isolate and measure political will, instead one must measure some action in relation to political will. Within the simple model that Woocher (2001) discusses, he highlights that the third condition simply does not make sense. One cannot know the presence of the political will to act and apply the tools, if the action has not been undertaken. From a chronological perspective, the third condition as a preventative measure is nonsensical, at least in its current form.

1.6.8 The Genocide Prevention Taskforce: Three Major Findings

The GPTR led to three major findings regarding the US involvement, political will towards, and capabilities around genocide prevention. One of the most important findings is the recognition that genocide is a direct threat to US national interests (Woocher, 2009). Within the executive summary, the GPTR states that without the prevention of genocide crimes, “we inevitably bear greater costs – in feeding millions of refugees and trying to manage long-lasting
national crises” (Albright & Cohen, 2008, p. xv). With this understanding the GPTR is focused on making genocide prevention a national priority.

The second finding of the GPTR is that genocide can be prevented (Albright & Cohen, 2008). While previous discussion substantiates this claim, academic research does not necessarily translate into national or governmental awareness. Knowing that while genocide, at times, appears to be sporadic in its emergence; is, in fact, requiring of diligent planning, strategy, and meticulous execution; infers potential prevention through effective response. This may help align political will towards developing an effective response mechanism. We can see how efforts to construct governmental systems that can both foresee the development of such genocidal politics (early warning) and putting this information on the desk of the proper decision maker(s) may oblige them to effectively respond to the threat (early action).

The third finding is an exploration of the division between the US awareness and action in regards to its response systems during emerging genocide threats. In specific, a careful examination of the means in which the US needs to be more effective in handling such situations. The GPTR discovered that there is a lack of clarity regarding US policy on genocide prevention (Woocher, 2009). It requested the government to develop a new policy on a government-wide level, which involves the prevention and detection of genocide. Furthermore, recommendations were made to create highly specialized institutional mechanisms that can ensure effective action (Woocher, 2009).

Interestingly enough, one of the main focal points within the GPTR was intra-bureaucracy and the inherent inertia and caution within the governmental system (Woocher, 2009). High degrees of inertia within networks can severely restrict the flow of information between relevant actors and structures. An analysis of the types of network structures that exist
within the systems that created the GPTR may be an indicator regarding the GPTR’s uncovered findings. An interesting hypothetical would be that information flow is restricted due to a GPM limiting information flow, as a result of political influences within the system.

The lethargy that exists within the US system, and the influence of political will, or the lack thereof, is strongly present within US history. For example, the most widely discussed international body of work regarding the prevention of genocide still is the UNGC (United Nations, 1948). At this moment, it has been nearly sixty three years since the convention took place, but only twenty two years since the US ratified the treaty.

1.6.9 The Genocide Prevention Taskforce: Influence and Relevance

It is important not to look at the GPTR as merely a report that was produced, but we need to focus on how the report had an influence upon US policy. While members of the GPTR have noticed an increase in political debate regarding genocide prevention, the actions that should follow the debates are often non-existent or symbolic at best (Woocher, 2009).

By performing a network analysis of the GPTR and the actors, dynamics, and structures that were involved in its creation and promotion, we can uncover, unlike pure bureaucratic politics analysis, the different leaders within the network structures. Using Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) three conceptual models we can develop a framework on which to perform a social network analysis (SNA) which may lead us to: (1) explain changes within the system, and identify, define, and measure bureaucratic roles over time within the GPTR; (2) capture role differentiations and positions within the US bureaucratic structure (Piana, 2001); (3) take into account size differences within the US departments and organizations involved with the GPTR through isolating their communication networks in a visual manner; and (4) understand the interactions within the different bureaucratic structures and introduce some tools for analysis.
Although there have been shifts in the political and personality influences in US decision making regarding genocide, those shifts have still resulted in the US refusing to take any measures or risks towards preventing genocide (Power, 2003). In a post holocaust world, where political pressure on genocide prevention appears to be significant, there are still numerous examples of a lack of US intervention. On several occasions, policymakers have concluded that genocide did not endanger US interests, and refused to take measures that would prevent genocide or aid in its immediate de-escalation (Power, 2003). From a humanity perspective this is particularly frightening since, “in the rare instances that the United States did act, it made a difference” (Power, 2003, p. 507)

SNA allows us to create an understanding of these otherwise illogical actions and/or inactions. For example, the US held an arms embargo in Bosnia which prevented Muslims from defending themselves from the Serbs (Power, 2003). It is possible to use the OBM model to analyze the system; while performing a SNA on the US network that handled these actions (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). It is possible that after an analysis, the conclusion drawn is that the US operated under policies that were established to prevent further killings. The policy may have been very simplistic in its nature, with the understanding that guns equals deaths, so to prevent deaths one must prevent gun use. The US may have merely being executing an SOP. The question that emerges is, ‘why are the wrong SOPs being executed, and why is no one monitoring these actions?’ This is an important network question that will help us understand US policy and bureaucracy towards genocide prevention. This type of understanding will only come from analyzing select case studies of US behavior surrounding genocide, such as the GPTR.

1.7 Existing Frameworks
Within a network for genocide prevention, it is important to understand the potential determinants of political will. This paper uses the framework presented by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow in the second edition of *Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis* (1999). This framework consists of three models of bureaucratic politics used to understand political will and government behavior. Specifically, the three models are: rational actor model, organizational behavior model, and governmental politics model (Allison & Zelikow, 1999).

The Rational Actor Model (RAM) is a highly relatable framework for understanding government and large group actions, regarding foreign policy (Woocher, 2001). Actions or events are explained from the perspective of a singular actor who has various choices and attempts to maximize their return based on the theoretical results behind each action (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). The actor possesses an awareness of the goals and objectives, the alternatives to their preferred choice, the consequences of their preferred choice and the alternative actions, and the actual preferred choice he/she wants to undertake (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). Inherent within the RAM is the assumption of the actor’s rationality. This assumption seems to ascend the actor from human to another form of consciousness, where factors such as emotion and culture have little play (Adler, Rosen, & Silverstein, 1998; Lindner, 2006; Kimmel, 2006).

The Organizational Behavior Model (OBM) describes government action as the collective output of large organizations that operate under standard operating procedure (SOP). Most important, it stresses that “governments perceive problems through organizational sensors” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p.143). The large organizations operating under the government’s umbrella each hold a primary responsibility for a particular task. This is an example of siloing, in which each organization tends to its own special set of problems and to some extent acts “in quasi-independence on these problems” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p.143).
Relying on the independent output of several large organizations means that, within the
government network, a government leader may be able to influence each organization, but not
necessarily control their behavior or outputs. If there was a complex task at hand, such as an
international genocide prevention network within the US government, there would have to be in-
depth and sophisticated coordination amongst the individuals within each organization of the
government network. The SOPs provide the ability for large scale coordination; however, they
also bring an inherent inflexibility to any complex task, the coordination procedures are always
within the scope of the pre-established routines often orienting current policy options towards
outcomes established by the routines themselves (Woocher, 2001).

The Governmental Politics Model (GPM) is a re-examination of the OBM, and stipulates
that government behavior arises as a result of a sequence of bargaining games (Allison &
Zelikow, 1999). Unlike the OBM, the GPM assumes that there is no single leader group or actor,
but several actors each having their own strategic objectives, personal goals, organizational
goals, national goals, and other. The GPM model assumes that each individual player shares
power and holds different perceptions, influences, priorities, and preferences (Woocher, 2001).

1.8 Re-framing the research question, leading to data collection, analysis and interpretation

The GPM specifies that government decisions are not made by any singular rational
actor, but through the collective political bargaining efforts of many individuals. The acceptance
of irrationality and self-interest makes this a very compelling model for large governments (i.e.
the US) and their networks. International cooperatives between governments would be ascension
of complexity; especially, in the context of genocide prevention and the political will that is
involved sustaining such a network.
How do these models illustrate how to handle genocide prevention? A publication was made by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Political Affairs Division Human Security, and the Engaging Governments on Genocide Prevention (EGGP) group, on genocide prevention (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2009). Within this publication, Woocher (2009) made an analysis on the US involvement in genocide prevention:

Bush voiced frustration about the difficulty in making progress toward resolving the crisis – more than four years after declaring that it amounted to genocide. (p. 136).

This statement raises some key issues. Under the RAM, this would entail that the singular actor is incapable of successfully coordinating efforts within his/her network. If our assumption that the US has the inclination and resources to effectively involve itself in actively preventing genocide, then we need to further investigate how a high powered individual (i.e. the President) can feel frustrated and regretful due to the inability to prevent, remedy, or de-escalate genocide. The functional question is: how can we come to an understanding of the US and its network surrounding genocide prevention efforts, in order to find the means to better equip the US genocide prevention network to act in an effective and efficient manner? This in turn is translated into an understanding that the conflict is the bureaucratic infighting over who gets to define and respond to mass atrocities and who is accountable for preventative action.

Chapter 2 – Data

2.1 Methodology

Through qualitative, enhanced case study research (Creswell, 2007; Druckman, 2005), this paper examined the influences in the formation of the GPTR and how its recommendations contribute to overcoming factors (i.e. bureaucratic inertia, information siloing) that have made past policy less than effective. Data was acquired through interviews with GPTR contributors
and text analysis of transcribed evaluations and interviews from the EGGP organization. Using NVivo (QSR International, 2010), a qualitative data analysis software, and Kreb and Holley’s (2002) network theory methodology, we created a model of the relevant actors, resources, and knowledge involved in these two genocide prevention efforts. This network model was analyzed through Allison’s (1999) three conceptual models: RAM, OBM, and GPM. This study is considered to be a source on which insights are created and evaluated in a systematic way to extract generalizable lessons that can be applied to other countries’ experiences.

Data was obtained through a semi-structured set of interview questions (Appendix 1). The interview questions revolved around three main themes: network, attitude, and information. None of the themes had any definition, in order to avoid interviewee bias. The personal in-depth interview methodology allowed for a semi-structured interview with open-ended questions. This provided flexibility in accruing the data and variation within the dataset. As researchers, we are affected by participant responses; thus, this interview methodology allows the researcher to adjust and learn from the data collection process (Druckman, 2005). Due to its semi-structured nature, this type of data consists of, not only pre-determined open ended questions, but also additional information and feedback obtained through careful probing.

Interviews were conducted on-site in Washington, D.C. with a researcher and a GPTR analyst, including a senior taskforce member, among others. The interviews with the GPTR were taped and later transcribed. All names used within this report are fictitious in order to maintain anonymity amongst the participants. The audio recordings from the interview were analyzed and transcribed fully. Once transcribed, they were coded using the NVivo 9 platform (QSR International, 2010) and placed into a survey answer form (Appendix 1). The answer form was
processed and themes were identified and analyzed. Visual network diagrams were generated through both NVivo 9 (QSR International, 2010) and VUE (Tufts University, 2011).

2.1.1 NVivo 9 Qualitative Data Analysis Software

NVivo incorporates a hierarchal system for categorizing data, which can then be further classified. The data is considered to be source data (i.e. interviews and other data sources). A coding system can be created for a variety of user generated characteristics, such as open communication/closed communication and adaptable to change/set in ones ways. In NVivo, nodes can be created during the coding process and they can be classified either immediately or at another point in time. These nodes are perceived as digital containers which allow you to accumulate related material in one central location, in order to survey for emerging patterns and ideas (QSR International, 2010). Nodes are created and organized for themes, organizations, cases, or people. They can also be used to group evidence regarding the relationships between different data sets. This allows for flexibility across the coding process; since, it is no longer necessary to predefine the node structure before coding data.

NVivo provides the flexible node structure needed to analyze social networks. Particularly, it allows the researcher to decide whether or not to place the node within a hierarchal structure. Furthermore, the nodes can be described as entities, people, places, etc., providing increased flexibility. However, these characteristics do not have to be ascribed. Thus, a node can be created to connect different data sources or coding categories. Within NVivo, each node is assigned its own folder, permitting different folders (or nodes) to be created for different aspects of the research. The same data sets can be analyzed through different coding systems or variables. For example, mapping can be first made from a specific focal point (node A) and, once the mapping is complete, NVivo can remap the data with a new focal point (node B). Due to this
flexibility, the research data is stored in an efficient and organized manner, allowing researchers to use the data and store their own nodes and structures for future research projects.

Case Nodes, which are defined as a person or organization, can further specify the attributes for definitions, such as person or organization. Cases nodes are database fields (types of individuals or organizations), with further attributes such as area of interest, year they participated in GPTR, role within GPTR, etc. These coded fields are drawn from a list, defined as classifications, and store the descriptive information about the sources, nodes and relationships that have been formulated during the research. A grid system or ‘classification sheet’ within NVivo displays the attributes for all the items within a particular classification (QSR International, 2010).

Within NVivo, we can create our own group of attributes for each node to suit specific research. Consequently, we can use a different group of attributes for a node that represents an organization, and a different group of attributes for a node that represents a person. In this study, this feature was used to differentiate between a GPTR analyst and the organization that may have placed that person within the taskforce. Moreover, within NVivo, advanced qualitative data analysis can be performed, including Cluster, Word Trees, Tag Clouds, and Tree Maps analyses.

2.1.2 Visual Understanding Environment (VUE) Software System

VUE (Tufts University, 2011) is used to create visual diagrams, intended to enhance the research process through the visualization of actors, structures, and dynamics within research. Researchers use VUE’s basic mapping functionality by creating nodes within the program and manually drawing the basic linkages between these nodes. Generally, maps are created within the VUE program and are exported as Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPEG) images which can then be used in any digital text editing software (Joint Photographic Experts Group, 2007).
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For our research purposes, while NVivo provides the advanced qualitative data analysis portion of the research, VUE enabled us to present the data in a concise and comprehensive manner.

2.1.3 Relationship Classification System for VUE and NVivo.

Both VUE and NVivo use a relationship classification system between different nodes. The communication pathways between nodes are defined as different types of relationships: associative, one way, and symmetrical (Figure 2.1.3).

These relationship types allow us to describe not only the networks, but also causality within the networks. On a simplistic level we can use node relationship analysis to look at how John impacts Jane, and how Jane may be impacting another node, Jim. This allows us to map John’s impact on Jim. Since both NVivo and VUE use the same relationship system, there are no interoperability concerns between data analyzed in NVivo and data displayed in VUE.

2.1.4 Network Analysis Methodology

The network methodology from Krebs & Holley (2006) was applied in our data analyses. According to Krebs and Holley (2006), success emerges from the interactions within the network, and improved connectivity comes from knowing the network and knitting the network. Within the network analysis, the following Krebs & Holley (2006, p.2) questions were asked, modified for the GPTR: (1) were the right connections in place? Are any key connections missing? (2) Who are playing leadership roles in the network? Who was not, but should be? (3) Who were the experts in process, planning, and practice? (4) Who were the mentors that others seek out for advice? (5) Who were the innovators? Are ideas shared and acted upon? (6) Have collaborative alliances formed between different GPTR groups? (7) Which GPTR groups will benefit most from the GPTR – both for themselves and the community they are embedded in?
In addition the GPTR network was compared using the five general patterns frequently present in effective networks: (1) common attributes, goals, or governance, (2) diversity of connections within network, (3) several different paths between any two nodes, (4) certain nodes are more prominent than other nodes, and (5) short paths in the network (Krebs & Holley, 2006).

2.2 Data Collection

Data from GPTR was collected by converting the original digital publication into a simple text format (txt). The GPTR data was then imported into NVivo for coding and analysis. These analyses focused on whether or not there is a difference between the language used by the analyst and their thoughts, and how the GPTR language presents the final recommendations. A review of the GPTR was made from an organizational perspective, and an organizational actor map has been created (Figure 2.2.1) based on coded language from the GPTR. This map is solely based on the data presented within the GPTR, and has received no input from the interviews.

While there were three NGOs which were responsible for the main collaboration, an extensive network of actors was involved (Figure 1.2). For example, Humanity United was the organization that provided a significant injection of capital which, together with the Sudkoff Family, afforded Albright and Cohen to spend their time in collaboration with the GPTR team as co-chairs (Albright & Cohen, 2008). However, the GPTR group leaders provided significant coordination between the actors in play. Several assumptions were made during the interviews: (1) not show the interviewees the questions in advance, and (2) counter-factual questions are a good method for drawing out and highlighting assumptions. Qualitative analyses of the interviews were conducted through NVivo. The full transcribed interviews (available upon request) were coded for frequency of common themes in the interview responses. Furthermore, the entire GPTR was coded into NVivo and analyzed. These analyses enabled us to examine the
dominant language used within the task force report and to compare this to the language used by the interviewees. The expectations were that themes surrounding bureaucratic politics would emerge, predominantly within the OBM and GPM (Allison & Zelikow, 1999).

2.3 Data Analysis

For this research paper, the GPTR and interviews were analyzed using four NVivo methods data analyses, including: (1) Cluster Analysis, which identifies sources that contain similar concepts; (2) Word Trees, which provide the ability to display text search query results in a detailed extended form; (3) Tag Clouds that query word frequency within specified data sets; and (4) Tree maps, which compare nodes by the number of references included, and permit for cross-comparison between references and assigned attributes. Specifically, word trees and tag cloud analyses were performed on the GPTR data. This data was further examined through the NVivo modeling system. The modeling system allows us to do the following: (1) review initial ideas or theories, (2) visually represent the relationships between different items coded, (3) identify emerging patterns, theories, and potential explanations, and (4) provide a thorough and diligent record of the varying stages of the research (QSR International, 2010).

The word frequency analysis as shown in Figures 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 highlights the communication model adopted by the GPTR. Genocide and mass atrocities were the most frequently used words, a logical statistic. However, several of the most infrequently used words included: moral, safe, organized/organizational, impunity, negotiation, protecting/protect, and relationships.

The justifications provided by the GPTR are heavily focused on the consequences of genocides to the US itself. As evidenced by a qualitative word frequency search in NVivo of the GPTR, which shows that ‘national interest’ is mentioned over 123 times within the report, which
Interview data pulled from question 1-3 (Appendix 1) demonstrates that the creation of the taskforce started with a select group of individuals. Each of these individuals and groups was independently working in related tasks. For example, one individual interviewed developed a working group focused on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and atrocities prevention. During this time, a different organization was working towards developing a commission on genocide prevention. Through further collaboration, results show that the USIP and the USHMM collaborated holding a basic shared vision of a high level taskforce, consisting of former US officials who would explore the issue of genocide and US involvement, for a select period of time with expert support. The goal was to issue a consensus document with recommendations.

2.4 Data Interpretation

Considering the GPTR was created by a network of individuals, it is important to understand how the influence of the different network leaders steered the language used within the report, and hence solidified its focus. Adopting a lens of communication flow through “sociometric starts and gatekeepers…brokering information” (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003, p.17), we can see how understanding communication and information flow, helps us identify the type of liaison persons within the expert groups, and what type of individuals have no strong contacts outside of their expert groups, and are thus isolated nodes. With this information, we can attempt to uncover the network pattern, how the GPTR network ties into its particular social world, and how it relates to other important patterns like decision making (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003).

The low word frequency table (Figure 2.2.1) indicates that the writing was mainly done from a particular perspective and outside influences were minimal, since frequent word use
centers around a particular type of influence (Maat, 1992). The high frequency words are strongly focused on actionable items, such as: support, response, action, prevention, and warning. This is not surprising, considering that the GPTR is, to some extent, a bureaucratic policy paper. Moreover, the GPTR was potentially catering to its audience by using high impact, actionable words. Infrequently used words, such as moral, may at a first glance appear to be too subjective and questionable; however, the word ‘moral’ tends to evoke strong emotional responses often associated with high-impact style writing. Results from a study in writing styles used within public sector focused government policy papers indicated that respondents reading high-impact reports did not make statistically significant better decisions than those reading bureaucratic reports (Suchan, 1998). Even with such studies demonstrating that stylistic writing does not always lead to an enhance effect, the GPTR is strongly attempting to embed itself within the bureaucratic culture it is trying to change.

The GPTR’s places emphasis on recommendation, by using actionable words. This indicates that the GPTR network members had a strong focus on policy writing, involving recommendations focused on policy writers. This suggests that the actors involved in writing the GPTR had some exposure to structures such as the DOD, USAID, NSC, NAID, and ICC. An excerpt from the interview data supports this: “…the fourth group on military options clearly focused very much on DOD had most of the people who were most experienced with DOD, whereas the early prevention and preventative diplomacy groups, probably focused a lot more on State and NAID” (Interviewee, 2011). With the understanding that the social composition of the taskforce network is an emergent property of the choices and decisions made by interacting individuals (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003), we can conclude that the emergence of social composition
can partially be constructed from interview data, as well as an understanding of the power relations between the groups and individual actors.

Taking into account the different power relations, we can see that a power conflict between the groups and individual actors could occur “when each group wishes to maximize its influence and control in the relationship with the other” (Fisher R. J., 2006, p. 179). However, we need to consider that not all the actors necessarily want to maximize their influence and control, but the competitive teams or individuals most likely do, and over time “the dynamic of a mutual win-lose orientation becomes apparent” (Fisher R. J., 2006, p. 179). We might see a lack of communication between the individual actors and groups, since information sharing does not exist and tasks are completed by each person individually.

Merton’s (1952) self-fulfilling prophecy, as defined by Fisher, represents “defensiveness and mistrust motivate cautious or controlling moves, which elicit a defensive and hostile counteraction that is then perceived as justifying the initial action” (2006, p. 184). This can elucidate how actors will potentially behave. Competitive actors may start implementing tactics such as: deliberate deception, ambiguous authority, dubious intentions, less than full disclosure, creating stressful situations, personal attacks, and threats (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991).

When discussing group formation and strategy, one interviewee stated that one of the strategy positions discussed during the initial stages of the taskforce was to “…have a group that looks at state, a group that looks at DOD, a group that looks at the intelligence community, et cetera. I resisted that, because my argument was that part of what we were trying to do is promote greater integrated and coherent kind of US government strategies. So the initial idea was to have the groups be a little bit more, like a phased approach…in practice I think we are somewhere in between.” (Interviewee, 2011). Recognizing that the group constitutes an
assembly of individuals, it is crucial to appreciate the balance between concern for ‘other’ and concern for ‘own’. For example, if this interviewee was relatively apathetic and had low concern for other and self, the individual would most likely undertake an inaction strategy regarding their opposing thoughts to the group norm.

Considering our defined group norm, one realizes that the way the competitive and cooperative groups and leading actors distribute tasks among their members will be drastically different, since “competition evaluates and ranks people based on their capacity for a particular task, rather than integrating various contributions” (Deutsch, 2006, p. 30). This means that there is a discord within the GPTR network between competitive and collaborative practices.

Domenici and Littlejohn (2006) describe the three basic practices involved in collaboration. First, the teams will clearly identify the specific issues they want to address. Second, the team will find common ground among their competing goals. Finally, the teams will develop new interdependent goals that “incorporate and complement the competing ones” (Domenici & Littlejohn, 2006, p. 172). Our interview data shows that taskforce members may have initially had competing opinions or strategies, but, eventually, reached a compromise. It is important to stress that competition, in essence, is not inherently negative since “competition is a useful social mechanism for selecting those who are more able to perform the activities involved in the competition” (Deutsch, 2006, p. 30). With this in mind, we need to revisit intergroup conflict. Fisher (2006) argues that intergroup conflict is not only about misunderstanding, but also about power imbalance. Critical is the appreciation that there are “real differences between groups in terms of social power, access to resources, important life values, or significant incompatibilities” (Fisher R. J., 2006, p. 177). This creates a need to map the individual to their respective ingroup, in order to understand intergroup dynamics. Since strong interdependence
often leads to strong identification with the ingroup (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002; Deutsch, 2006), it is likely that “a change in the state of any member or subgroup changes the state of any other member or subgroup” (Johnson & Johnson, 2006, p. 288).

When reviewing the social power taskforce individuals, one can see how this directly affects the dynamics of the network and the focus of the individual expert groups. Appendix 2 has an excerpt from an interview demonstrating how an individual within the taskforce who has strong social power was able to impose a recommendation that the expert groups had to follow, even though there was strong resistance towards the concept. This led to some inconsistencies within the report, which lightly resembles passive aggressive behaviors (Perry & Flannery, 1982), indicating that frustrations existed within the working group, with no clear communication paths to express the frustrations (Appendix 3).

2.5 Bridge to Intervention Strategies

The GPTR made several key recommendations, including the creation of a new interagency committee and a new senior official in the Whitehouse to deal with atrocities prevention issues. This shifts the locus towards the national security staff and the NSC staff. The interview data demonstrated that internally the taskforce held discussions that solidified their center of gravity and, hence, create a recommendation focal point. The argument presented by taskforce members is that, from a network perspective, nowhere else would they have the ability to influence important government structure. Bureaucratic infighting emerges as a conflict that the taskforce had to address, while at the same time selecting the right focal point within the government only emerged through internal coordination among the taskforce members. A conflict analysis of the interplay and dynamics between these two systems will directly assist our
ability to not only assess the efficacy of the GPTR, but also understand how to effectively develop focal point networks for state-centered genocide prevention.

Chapter 3 – Intervention Strategies

3.1 Relevant Needs from Conflict Analysis

When discussing intervention strategies, it is important to understand the nature of the conflict. Depending on how the conflict is framed, the resolution will modify itself. We can argue that, within the US governmental system, the conflict is the bureaucratic infighting regarding who defines and responds to mass atrocities and how they respond. Thus, we can frame the conflict as being both inter-departmental and systemic.

The GPTR can be considered a conflict resolution technique that was implemented to resolve this conflict. Understanding that this was the purpose of the GPTR, we can begin to explain the actors’ motivations and concerns, by knowing that the report is an attempt to provide targeted actors with different options to act upon in a conflict environment. These assumptions can be applied towards understanding the use of networks for conflict prevention and to frame the GPTR as a proposed network intervention.

Within this chapter, we will first analyze the GPTR as a conflict resolution strategy and discuss the strategy’s appropriateness. Furthermore, we will look at recommendations for potential intervention methods that either enhance the GPTR strategy or build on its foundation. Part of this recommendation review, will focus on the concept of hegemonic stability theory often seen in economic politics (Keohane, 1980). With a discussion of focal points and the US as a hegemon within an international regime system (Krasner, 1982), we can begin to understand how the US can leverage itself through state-side focal points leading to an international presence in genocide prevention.
First, an assessment needs to be made applicable to any conflict resolution strategy; specifically, to the actors, structures, and dynamics within the conflict and how they interplay. In our assessment of the GPTR and its addressed government structures, we observed two critical components: information flow and bureaucratic inertia. Knowing that strong ties promote information flow within an organizational subsystem and weak ties promote information flow outside of the subsystem (Friedkin, 1982), we can see how the different ties manifest themselves in the various actors involved within the government structures addressed in the GPTR.

Bureaucratic inertia is a descriptor of the slow pace at which the highly complex US governmental system moves around the accomplishment of tasks and goals. Through our analysis of network structures, focal point developments, and policy creation an assumption emerges around having the US be an effective actor within the international genocide prevention scene assuming that the purpose is to limit bureaucratic inertia within the US governmental system and to provide effective means of information flow leveraging both strong and weak ties, which as a collective effort would promote early warning for genocide prevention. For this assumptive statement to be correct, information needs to be delivered to the right individuals and in the right fashion, in order to convert early warning into early action.

Within conflict resolution, improving methods are means designed to increase the operational efficiencies within organizational structures (Holman, Devane, & Cady, 2007). These methods allow for fundamental bureaucratic structures to remain relatively unchanged, while resolution experts are able to encourage significant developments within the processes, behaviors, knowledge, leadership, and relationships that surround the bureaucratic structures through collaboratively seeking, constructing, and promoting the effective developments (Holman, Devane, & Cady, 2007).
3.2 GPTR as a Resolution Strategy

When released, the GPTR was considered to be “a commendable effort, well-timed for the new administration, and long in the making” (Norris, 2009, p. 419). In order to understand the GPTR as a resolution strategy, we need to consider the concerns addressed by the report, the actors it speaks to, and the conflict environment it is attempting to focus on. The GPTR attempts to make a compelling argument that genocide prevention is in the national interest. Moreover, those in power, in specific the US president, need to make genocide prevention efforts a national priority (Albright & Cohen, 2008). This shows how awareness and prioritization are extremely relevant. Even when an early warning has been issued, there is not always a response from the international community, often citing government distraction and unwillingness to change policy (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005).

Emphasizing on increased funding for prevention and more comprehensive inter-agency cooperation and communication (Albright & Cohen, 2008), it is important to see whether the steps proposed by the GPTR are actually implemented. Interestingly, the GPTR heavily focuses on political leaders and the current US perceptions of interests, in attempting to overcome the existing deficit of will (Norris, 2009; Woocher, 2009; Allison & Hisashi, 1999). Understanding that political will is a broad based term describing the will to implement solutions, develop policies, construct plans, engage with environments, and discuss specific topics, we can appreciate that political will is a variable that can be applied to specific individuals and groups. Furthermore, the temporal nature of a US president, an actor who has a minimum term of four years and a maximum term of eight years, means that our two core components are volatile variables that need careful monitoring, development, and potential manipulation.
The US president is one of the main actor focal points within the GPTR. The report provides an understanding that the US cannot be an effective force in preventing genocide until the president involves the US public and effectively informs them regarding what is happening and what can be done to prevent it (Norris, 2009). Public awareness will help cultivate national sentiment towards genocide prevention, which will strengthen public opinion, leading to an eventual government policy response (Page & Shapiro, 1983). This does not infer that public awareness will legitimize the president’s decisions; it indicates that public awareness over time can contribute to changes in government policy. Using the Notable Names Database (NNDB; Soylent Communications Ltd, 2002), we can create a rough visual actor map of the current president, Barack Obama, as the focal point connected to Madeline Albright and William Cohen, who are both considered to have spearheaded the taskforce as co-chairs (Figure 3.2.1). Granted, from interview data we have uncovered that the co-chairs, while influential, were oft internally perceived as symbolic politically empowered actors; with the expert teams handling most of the actual research and work within the report.

Figure 3.2.1 highlights the complex interplay between some of the dominant actors (Cohen, Albright, Obama) involved with, or addressed by, the GPTR. The US government system is extremely complex, and involves not only government officials, but also corporations, special interests groups, political campaigns, and others (Figure 3.2.1). Therefore, we can see that one of the key issues becomes “mustering the political resources to make an appropriate early response” (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005, p. 114). The GPTR stresses that politics must shift at the leadership level (Albright & Cohen, 2008). Since the GPTR believes that historically enough evidence exists that “prevention is possible with sufficient interest and attention from the highest ranks of our government” (Albright & Cohen, 2008, p.17).
The GPTR emphasizes that a top-down approach is necessary starting from the President downwards, ideally at the start of the new administration. The report aims at emphasizing improvements in early warning systems, coordination between inter-agency meetings, and the formation of a task force focused on war crimes and a new national Security Council deputy focused on prevention (Norris, 2009). This leads to the question of whether or not improvements in indication systems and agency coordination lead to the US adopting a strong national interest in genocide prevention and how the US perceived their role within the international community.

The GPTR appeals to realpolitik as a means to prevent mass atrocities (Theriault, 2009). Realpolitik refers to forms of politics or diplomacy that have foundations in power and focus on practical factors, instead of ideological, ethical, or moralistic notions (Maogoto, 2004). These forms of politics and diplomacy directly address Allison’s framework, in particular the OBM and GPM systems and how organizational structure issues can be tackled within the taskforce itself.

Considering that OBM describes government action as the collective output of large organizations that operate under SOPs, and GPM stipulates that government behavior is dictated through the result of a sequence of bargaining games. We can see how different actors each having their own strategic objectives with no single leader group, or actor, can coordinate and assemble into various organizational structures providing a collective output. While this may be an over rationalization of the decision making elements of individual actors within a system, through broad based network generalization, we can begin applying some level of uniform treatment to the communication structures that exist between the different actor nodes.

At the actor level, we need to pay heed to the irrationality behind the actions, decision making, and emotions expressed by the actors. This concept was explicitly demonstrated in Rapoport’s research on self-defeating logic showing that in win-lose situations, such as the
classic prisoners dilemma “the illusion that increasing losses for the other side is equivalent to winning is the reason that the struggles are so prolonged and the conflicting parties play the game to a lose/lose end” (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965, p. 441).

The organizational structure of the GPTR was formatted to have five expert groups each addressing one of the GPTR core concerns: (1) early warning, (2) preventative diplomacy, (3) military options, (4) international action, and (5) early prevention (Woocher, 2009). Through this 5-pronged sequential exploration, the GPTR molded genocide prevention frameworks in a fashion that would appeal to US political and national interests and explicitly states its belief that, “preventing genocide is possible and that striving to do so is imperative, both for our national interests and for our leadership position in the world” (Albright & Cohen, 2008, p. 8). This language has been adopted by many of the individuals who were a part of the taskforce, “Genocide and mass atrocities threaten core U.S. national interests, as well as American values, and therefore preventing genocide must be made a national priority.” (Woocher, 2009, p.139)

This language translated into a proposition, which states that we need to undertake “a combination of creating systems to institutionalize effective early responses at the working level and demonstrating presidential priority to facilitate high-level attention when necessary” (Albright & Cohen, 2008, p.3). The GPTR is ambitious and, in essence, an umbrella style recommendation that attempts to cover all facets of US genocide prevention. However, we need to recognize that the report on its own is not a resolution strategy. The resolution lies within the potential intervention methods it describes, as well as the implementation of these methods.

3.3 Assessment of Types of Intervention Methods

Intervention methods allude to conflict resolution response. The Hourglass Model shows promise in highlighting the concept of time within conflict and its potential for transformation
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into resolution (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005). As seen in Figure 3.3.1, it addresses the fluctuations within the political space addressing conflict escalation and de-escalation. The fluctuations are indicators of timing regarding appropriateness for intervention methods, and even possibility of intervention (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005).

Applying this model shows that the ability to act and address conflict is most prevalent during the early stages of prevention, prior to the occurrence of violence (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005). The goal of this paper is not to assess particular methods of conflict prevention or de-escalation, but to understand potential methods that will enable the international community, in this case the US, to act upon early warning in ways that prevents severe occurrences of violence and war, in specific those that lead to genocide. This highlights that the GPTR is not necessarily a conflict resolution mechanism, due to the conflict environment being a holistic bureaucratic policy concept surrounding genocide prevention themes.

As the GPTR alludes in its subtitle, it is a blueprint designed to be used to develop systems that instill effective policy and action around genocide prevention. For the report to be effective, as the hourglass model indicates it is important that its recommendations are adopted at the earliest stages of a genocidal conflict.

In assessing the efficacy of the GPTR, we need to examine some of the changes that have happened since its release in 2008. While we cannot fully review all the micro-impacts that may have occurred, we can take a wide-angled approach and review the broad stroke impacts. This review is effective because the intent of the GPTR is to make broad-system wide changes. Therefore, a validation of this can be done on a macro-level.

It is important to realize, that this does not mean minority influences and changes are not significant; in fact, they are highly relevant. However, the scales on which those types of changes
occur are hard to detect until an effect is registered. In regards to the impact of the GPTR, Woocher (2009) discusses three main criteria for an assessment: (1) the extent to which the GPTR stimulated political and academic debate surrounding genocide prevention and US priorities, (2) the extent to which the GPTR recommendations improved government response performance in preventing genocide, and (3) the extent to which the GPTR recommendations are implemented. The last two criteria infer some form of objective measurement since the potential volume of data that qualifies for measurement is massive and lacks uniformity or standardization. This questions our ability to measure the criteria in an efficient, scalable fashion.

One method discussed with interviewees is to observe the type of language used by politicians regarding US military activity abroad GPTR centric topics. The current US presence in Libya exemplifies the active use of R2P language by government officials, media, and military (Hillstrom, 2011). Furthermore, articles highlighting how the US presence in Libya is due to at least the partial adoption of GPTR recommendation are being published. Vice President Joseph Biden has acknowledged the creation of a new White House position with the sole task of coordinating policies on preventing, identifying and responding to mass violence and atrocities in genocide (Woocher, 2011). A measurement of the rate of increase of these types of actions and word use will, however crudely, allow us to start observing the adoption rate of the GPTR recommendations and language.

As long as we recognize that the system is complex and that the large systemic changes that need to occur can only occur gradually over time, we can look at the GPTR goals and how they are being accomplished. It is important to recognize what goals truly are, and how they are constructed. A goal represents a controlled effort with directed aim towards a desired result. Goals often are achieved through interaction with the environment; this can be with, but is not
limited to, other people. Goal interdependence exists in negative and positive forms. This means that “if you’re positively linked with another, then you sink or swim together; with negative linkage, if the other sinks, you swim, and if the other swims, you sink” (Deutsch, 2006, p. 24). In order for such a complex system to slowly evolve, it is important to have positively interdependent goals with as many actors as possible; ideally, without compromising the aspiration of the goal. For example, negative interdependence between actors holding different levels of power and its deleterious effects can be seen through the lens of the limited-power theory approach. This theory holds power as a scarce resource causing a competitive orientation to power sharing (Coleman, 2006; Coleman, Bui-Wrzosinska, Nowak, & Vallacher, 2009).

One of the main focal points of the GPTR was the presidential administration. With the report being released in 2008, this means that, in specific, the Obama administration is applicable. In a speech at the Holocaust museum during the days of remembrance ceremony, president Obama (Office of the Press Secretary, 2009), directly referenced the need for prevention and action:

…we have an opportunity, as well as an obligation, to confront these scourges -- to fight the impulse to turn the channel when we see images that disturb us, or wrap ourselves in the false comfort that others' sufferings are not our own. Instead we have the opportunity to make a habit of empathy; to recognize ourselves in each other; to commit ourselves to resisting injustice and intolerance and indifference in whatever forms they may take whether confronting those who tell lies about history, or doing everything we can to prevent and end atrocities like those that took place in Rwanda, those taking place in Darfur. That is my commitment as President. I hope that is yours, as well. (p. 4)
Woocher (2009) made an assessment regarding some indicators emerging out of the
president’s office. Namely, personal appointments by the president dedicated to genocide
prevention, including individuals such as Susan Rice and Samantha Power (Wall Street Journal,
2008; The President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2009). Figure 3.3.2 demonstrates how one
actor, such as Susan Rice, can connect with different organizations, groups, and people ranging
from corporations to special interest groups. In addition, there are numerous public references by
senior administration personnel regarding genocide prevention: Vice President Joe Biden, US
Ambassador to the UN Susan E. Rice, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Assistant Secretary

While these political indicators from the presidential office are generally positive, it is
important to observe the transition from political indicators to policy action. The GPTR called
for the creation of an interagency Atrocities Prevention Committee (APC). Woocher (2009)
mentioned that the Obama administration was taking this under consideration. Abramowitz and
Woocher (2010) indicated that movements towards an APC were occurring. At the moment,
movements around an APC are still present, but there was no actual or formal attempt towards
creating one. This alone demonstrates how a perception of government lethargy may form.

In 2009, Dennis Blair, director of national intelligence, made a commitment to inform
policy and uphold the recommendations from the GPTR (Woocher, 2009). In February, 2010
during the annual threat assessment report for the Senate Select committee Director Blair (2010)
stated:

…mass killings are typically deliberate strategies by new or threatened elites to assert
state or rebel authority, to clear territory of insurgents, or to deter populations from
supporting rebels or antigovernment movements. Looking ahead over the next five years,
a number of countries in Africa and Asia are at significant risk for a new outbreak of mass killing. All of the countries at significant risk have or are at high risk for experiencing internal conflicts or regime crises and exhibit one or more of the additional risk factors for mass killing…a new mass killing or genocide is most likely to occur in Southern Sudan. (p.37)

Furthermore, Blair’s statement to congress was considered to be the beginning of several other politicians adopting GPTR language (Abramowitz & Woocher, 2010). The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), signed by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, was released shortly after Blair’s report and explicitly states that the US Defense Department (USDD) needs to be capable of “supporting and stabilizing fragile states facing serious internal threats, and preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities or large-scale natural disasters abroad” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2010).

While such positive behaviors are great indicators of potential policy change, it is important to note that these are but a few of the actors that need to be involved. The US president still has not made any significant public statement regarding action towards genocide prevention, except for acknowledgement of past genocide and a promise to address present genocide. However, the president has not pushed for transformative policy yet. While aware of the situation, Dennis Blair and Robert Gates have yet to make any significant policy changes that may accelerate US involvement in genocide prevention. Furthermore, Dennis Blair is no longer Director, having been fired from office by President Obama in May 2010 and replaced by James R Clapper (Miller, 2010; Gorman, 2010). Naturally, the question arises whether or not the effect the GPTR had on Blair transferred to Clapper and to what extent, at the moment there have been no notable literature indicating Clapper has absorbed the influence the GPTR had on Blair. This
rotation alone highlights the appreciation of the concept of a volatile actor. Volatile in the sense that the position held by an actor within the relativistic framework discussed in this paper is extremely short-lived. This is supported by the observation of speed within policy change causing, in relative terms, certain actor roles to be perceived as a mere flash of light.

This analysis is heavily weighted towards the structural intricacies of the governmental agencies and bureaucratic policies that surround the agencies. Most of the analysis is made with the president lacking significant public commitment. Wolf (1993), in his preliminary analysis of bureaucratic effectiveness within the federal government, measured several variables drawn from eight dominant theories surrounding bureaucratic effectiveness. Agency leadership was considered to have a significant positive effect, while presidential support combined with political autonomy provided to be statistically significant variables with high levels causing significant positive effect towards protecting agencies from volatility, while providing a strong sense of mission (Wolf, 1993). Strong presidential support of the creation of a government agency would enable key actors to solidify ties with a stratified inter-governmental body, reducing volatility surround actor changes and accelerating the rate at which the US government becomes active within the international structure of genocide prevention.

While the notion of saving lives is a noble cause, altruism is rarely seen in government foreign policy. Morality and economic policy oft play a more significant role in the form of double-standard ethics and narrow scope economic calculations. Knowing that government is an agent and not a principal, the primary obligations of government become the national interests of society and not the individual moral impulses that particular elements of society are experiencing (Kennan, 1985). Along these lines the government of a sovereign state, on a fundamental level, concerns itself with three core national interests: (1) its military security, (2) its integrity of
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political life, (3) well-being of its people (Kennan, 1985). We can see how there is an inherent lack of moral quality or standard, especially on the international plane.

Economic rationality allows government to quantify self-interest and justify specific foreign policy actions; oft leading to international double-standards in foreign policy. In effect, this is a management issue of intergovernmental interdependence. US involvement in international policy is at hegemonic levels. For example, the US hegemonic presence in the international political economy has directly affected international strategies surrounding foreign economic policy. The US has the ability to do so due to its relatively economic and military invulnerability, as demonstrated with the US initiated abolishment of the Bretton Woods systems in 1971; followed by the 1973 oil crisis, where the US decided to resupply the Israeli army following the Yom Kippur war (Katzenstein, 1977).

International interests do not only manifest themselves through the political lens. We have already seen that there are several variables influencing the emergence of genocide. Economics, as shown previously in the coffee production example, influenced Rwandan politics (Verwimp, 2003). Reviewing the supply chain, we come to understand that international corporations such as Nestle, a Swiss company, are dependent on the economic stability of Rwanda (Rego-Monteiro, 2008). This demonstrates that foreign policy often has a foundation originating from national interest.

US foreign policy is rooted within the core national self-interests. In comprehending both national and foreign policy originating out of the GPTR, it is critical to develop an understanding of those who were involved in its creation and the influences they had in forming the GPTR. This, in return, will provide us with an indication of how the effects of the GPTR will ripple within the US governmental system. Furthermore, to assess the potential within the US
governmental system and the role of the US in international politics, we need to understand the individual need and specific need present. This, in turn, will allow us to understand how the GPTR targeted the right US focal point network for state-centered genocide prevention.

3.4 Conflict Analysis: Individual Need

Dahl (1968) pragmatically defines power as “an ability to get another person to do something that he or she would not otherwise have done” (p. 158). Coleman (2006) takes a more relativistic approach by defining power as “the ability to make things happen or to bring about desired outcomes” (p. 121). It is important to understand the difference between these definitions, as it will highlight the difference between intergroup dynamics within the taskforce and dynamics between political leaders. Coleman stresses that through his definition we can avoid the “common misconception that power is fundamentally competitive and coercive, the belief that power holders gain only by using their power ‘against’ rather than ‘for’ others” (2006, p. 121). On the other hand, Dahl’s definition is quite strict and can be easily applied to define relational power. To soften Dahl’s definition, Coleman (2006) defines relational power as “the degree to which a person can favorably influence another person” (p. 122).

Under the GPM there are no single leader groups or actors, but several actors each having their own strategic objectives, as well as personal, organizational, and national goals. This entails that each node within the complex model will hold their own perceptions of power and may strive to protect their perception of the power they have. This ties in nicely with the RAM, where actions, and hence events, are explained from the perspective of a singular actor who is given a selection of choices and attempts to maximize return based on the theoretical results behind each action. If there is such a strong self-interest bias within governmental politics, then the individual need on the actor level is heavily influenced by a desire to stay relevant and in control. This may
partially explain when Blair was in office and genocide became a relevant topic Blair adopted the GPTR ideas. While now, these ideas might not be as relevant to Clapper, and as a result activity from the office of director of national intelligence may have subsided; this directly trends with the bureaucratic politics models Allison developed (Allison & Zelikow, 1999).

### 3.5 Conflict Analysis: Specific Need

In deciding the best strategy for each individual, it is important to understand the group goals and the dynamics that create system conflict. Lewicki et al. (2007) review of systemic justice can provide insight into understanding systemic conflict since “systemic justice is about how organizations appear to treat groups of individuals and the norms that develop for how they should be treated” (p. 201). Systemic conflict can arise from perceived injustices, those groups of individuals experience due to treatment by organizations, such as those within the US government umbrella, and the norms that are developed as to how they are treated. Using the Dual Concern Model (yielding, problem solving, compromising, inaction, and contending) shown in Figure 3.5.1 and an understanding of the system and the conflict situation, one can see the how the problem-solving (integrative) strategy emerges as a particularly interesting strategy to consider within system conflicts (Lewicki, Barry, & Saunders, 2007).

As all three frameworks of Allison verify, a single party cannot solve the problem by themselves. This means commitments from the other parties are necessary, as is a synthesis of ideas; not only to create better solutions, but also effectively solve old ones. In dealing with complex multiparty issues, time must be available for the groups to interact. According to Lewicki et al (2007), one situation in which the problem solving strategy is inappropriate is when “other parties are unconcerned about outcome” (p. 24). The GPTR stresses that genocide prevention is a national interest, where all parties are part of the necessary prevention
undertakings. Within the RAM framework, we can see how all actors within the focal point network are concerned about the outcome, as long as they are receiving an instant, direct benefit for a successful outcome.

3.6 Potential Intervention Methods

Intervention methods need to be focused around building comprehensive networks in which information can flow freely. At the same time, the individual actors within the networks need to have an aligned concern of outcome. If there are differing interests internally; then, the ability to effectively engage around genocide prevention would be unlikely. Any potential intervention method would be focused around the notion of evoking government to take action within its own community, while addressing global concerns.

A basic structure which has shown some promise within this space is the developments around Values Into Action (VIA; Dupre, Gordezky, Spector, & Valenza, 2007). VIA is a question-based meeting process that allows groups to explore their connections to both local and global issues (Dupre et al., 2007). VIA is mainly focused on connecting individuals with a particular issue and then exploring the resources, in order to reflect upon it as a group. Table 3.5.1 draws from VIA to highlight the core concepts that translate towards generating focal point networks for state-centered genocide prevention.

By using the VIA framework, individuals become instinctively aware of their role within any process. Furthermore, those individuals that hold similar interests will generate communal awareness leading to commitments among similar interests. While this is a serious assumption, to some extent one must assume that most individuals within the US government have a desire to preserve human life and prevent mass killings when they are aware that their actions can directly
influence the developments around genocide. It is this individual commitment level that provides for “a power catalyst for collective change” (Dupre et al., 2007, p. 531).

The inherent flaw in this logic is the potential lack of actual danger and loss of lives. Early warning means being aware of the developments within a system and acknowledging that if the system is left unchanged, its dynamics will lead to eventual acts of genocide. However, at the early stages there may only be vague indicators of violence, social division, national crises, societal polarization, and intergroup conflict; and these indicators that may or may not be present and are not always required to be present. The flaw becomes the lack of exposure individuals may have towards the notion of genocide until the system has developed past the early action stage, and as the hourglass model indicates into a stage of conflict containment. Creating learned perceptions through open discussion will help circulate early action interests among individuals.

Within the VIA system individuals engage in open collaborative group discussion. Kimmel (2006) highlights that, “human beings participate in and shape their common culture” (p. 627) creating learned perceptions. These learned perceptions include “categories, plans and rules people employ to interpret their world and act purposefully in it” (Spradley & McCurdy, 1971, p. 2). Through small group discussion that brings understanding to how an individual actor is part of a critical process, we are directly appealing to the RAM framework. If the small groups consist of policy makers, social leaders, experts and individuals performing relevant fieldwork within genocide prevention, it is possible to see how a discussion around dynamics will be framed differently by each individual. We are not eliminating bureaucracy from the process; we are merely acknowledging it within a group containing individuals who are part of the very bureaucratic system potentially needing change.
The VIA system by itself is not sufficient, it contains serious flaws within its ability to incentivize actors to engage in collaborate methods. The concept of the individual with the noble altruistic motivation of saving lives only advances one to a certain plane, as previously discussed many of the interests held by the various individuals and government agencies lack certain moral quality and standards. Furthermore, through containing individuals within segregated groups, we risk groupthink mentality which can cause errors in group decision (Janis, 1972). Groupthink has often manifested itself within faulty government decision making as demonstrated by the closed door arms-for-hostages deals negotiated by the US with Iran, causing a waterfall of erroneous decision making by the Reagan administration (Hart, 1990), or the Bay of Pigs fiasco where groupthink prevented alternative evaluations and views to play a role in the assessment of the feasibility of a US originated specialized group to overthrow the Cuban government (Janis, 1972). It is critical to try and reduce groupthink while engaging the actors participating.

Developing this concept further, we can use the VIA system and naturally bridge it with World Café change methodology (Brown, Homer, & Isaacs, 2007). The World Café methodology has a small group of four people conversing regarding a specific topic or issue, while other groups in the room do the same. Normally, the issues involve individuals’ life, work, or community (Brown, Homer, & Isaacs, 2007). We can use the topics and issues developed within VIA to hold a more focused conversation. After 20-30 minutes of conversation, the members within the group change tables, while one person stays at each table stays to retain and share past conversations (Brown, Homer, & Isaacs, 2007). World Café can take the realizations developed in VIA and grow and ripen new connections between individuals.

Considering the GPM framework and the idea of SOP, World Café allows for an increased collective intelligence, which is nurtured and grown through the innovation within the
individual relationships uncovered in World Café. Furthermore, through these intervention based discussions we can uncover which individuals have the ability to solve particular problems. Within bureaucratic structures this is highly relevant, since the individuals we may perceive to be in power are only part of much larger processes, and often other highly relevant and influential individuals are not apparent on an initial review. This is demonstrated in Figure 1.2, which shows an actor map of the GPTR. This map was constructed through an analysis of the GPTR itself. However, interview data demonstrated that some of the most influential people in the creation and operation of the taskforce are not even depicted within the actor map.

While we cannot discuss the particular actors due to confidentiality, the most influential actors were those who directed liaised with the expert groups, as well as the co-chairs and management board. In effect, the bridge nodes of the taskforce network exert the most influence upon the internal dynamics within the members. These actor nodes directly affect the efficacy, directive, and operation of the taskforce and its recommendations.

It is important to understand that utilizing VIA and World Café as a resolution strategy is not to directly resolve genocide or intervene when genocide is occurring, but to strengthen existing focal point networks that specialize in early warning and early action, and perhaps even encourage the emergence of new genocide prevention networks. To directly attempt to resolve genocide would be a naïve activity due to the inherent complexities, but looking at the systems surrounding genocide and in specific those that decelerate the conflict can provide tangible progress towards genocide prevention.

3.7 Unintended Consequences and Responsibilities

One critical component we have not explored yet is why the US should be one of the main countries within the international community that takes the initiative within genocide
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prevention. A lack of explanation on this end will also infer a lack of explanation to why individual actors have an incentive to participate in a hybrid VIA-World Café system. Our understanding of this question will help assess the GPTR’s concentration around the US government and its leaders as a genocide prevention focal point. Our question draws into play the concept of international regimes. International regimes are, “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (Krasner, 1982, p. 185). If the US sees itself as a leader within the international community, it is important to make commitments, be it political, economic, or military, that explicitly demonstrates the degree of seriousness the US government holds. Clinton, during a trip to Rwanda in 1998 spoke on behalf of the international community regarding acts of genocide:

The international community, together with nations in Africa, must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy as well. We did not act quickly enough after the killing began.... We cannot change the past. But we can and must do everything in our power to help you build a future without fear, and full of hope. (New York Times, 1998)

A year later, the NATO campaign led by the US in Kosovo was seen as the US signal of commitment and seriousness in being a leader within the international community focused around genocide prevention (Valentino, 2003). In actuality, the NATO campaign suffered due to the US obsession with avoiding American casualties by limiting the intervention to high-altitude bombing and leaving the local population exposed to Serb forces that were ground mobile; while the bombing may have provided pressure that furthered the Serbian withdrawal, they were ineffective in preventing ground forces from further engaging civilians (Valentino, 2003). In fact the Serbs killed roughly 10,000 Kosovo-Albanians and force relocated over 850,000 (Hosmer, 2001). While the US had the intention of intervening in order to prevent acts of genocide,
unintended consequences emerged from valuing American life over other life. While the fundamental logic of this concept is strongly grounded in national self-preservation, part of the responsibilities of being a leader within the international community is to appreciate the concept of a global society with global citizens.

3.8 Bridge to Sustainability

Naturally, it is unrealistic to expect a nation to neglect its core interests, in particular the well-being of its people. However through holding hybrid Via-World Café style meetings, it is possible to create awareness and accountability among various actors. The inherent risk in the sustainability of such an endeavor is the actors’ incentives within the various systems. Understanding how to develop incentive structures that enable actors, instead of having them feel their credibility and positions of power are challenged, will lead to a more sustainable system. This system will increase information flow within a state-based focal point network towards genocide prevention, as well as provide for the organic emergence of actor nodes that transform into social hubs and bridges between various government and non-government agencies.

Chapter 4 – Networking and Sustainability

4.1 – Introduction

Developing focal points for state-centered genocide prevention hinges on a variety of crucial components, including the ability to assess the network and the ability to identify the focal point. While this statement seems intrinsically explanatory, it is in fact a highly complex procedure, which has some significant weaknesses that directly compromise the sustainability of many globally-adopted systems, such as the GPTR and its intent to motivate US policy makers. In order to understand this inherent complexity, we need to refer back to the original conflict map from Chapter 1.2, Figure 1.2.1, where we can see three distinct groups of actors: the local,
international, and unique international. In assessing the network, it is important to understand the three actor groups are a very unique hybrid of national, international and special interests. This paper focuses on developing state-based focal points. Thus, our core focus is on a specific state, in this case the US government. With this understanding, we can see how the GPTR specifically targets government leaders, such as the US president, as central nodes within the US genocide prevention network. The GPTR is attempting to target the actor hubs and bridges that exist within the US government actor network.

The developed resolution strategy involves the implementation of a hybrid VIA-World Café system between the various actors within the focal point network. This system encourages various forms of coordinated behavior around particular issues, and most important personal points of interest. The recommendations stemming from Chapter 3 surround the need for coordinated behavior around an issue not only within a specific country, but also among the countries themselves. International regimes are often formed in response to a need for coordinated behavior (Krasner, 1982). The GPTR document never truly moved beyond the US and its global responsibilities. There were several reasons for this and almost all of them attest to the creation of a report that was intended to be both feasible in its approach and sustainable in its recommendations. Even so, the feasibility and sustainability of the GPTR still relies heavily upon developing the proper incentive structures for the various actors within the focal point network. These incentive structures directly define the effectiveness of the GPTR.

In our assessment of the efficacy of the GPTR and how the taskforce strives to develop a focal point network for state-centered genocide prevention, we have uncovered a highly complex system that engulfs a volatile network of actors and dynamics through several complex economic, political, social, and security structures. Realizing that our analysis was within the US
governmental system, we have yet to uncover how a US genocide prevention network would connect with the international community and the state in need of genocide prevention. Furthermore, within this state, there are the four main local actors that would need to also be addressed: local government, local military, local population, and paramilitary.

There are serious considerations we need to give towards religion, culture, and trade agreement, which all influence the potency of a US presence abroad. Even if we adopt part of the resolution strategy surrounding international regimes, we need to appreciate that those regimes are fundamentally social entities. Consequently, there are norms and identities that shape and are shaped by regimes (Brahm, 2005). In order to understand the sustainability of an international regime where the US has a central role, we would need to comprehend the network structure that surrounds this concept and the distribution of power that would be present within the regime.

As discussed previously the US has slowly adopted a hegemonic role within the international community. However, the role is strongly vested within US national interests. The resolution strategies involve actors from various government agencies to be willing to participate in an open form sharing values, interests, and power. This broad-based resolution strategy is dependent, at critical levels, on the willingness to participate. The willingness to participate is the threat towards the sustainability of the resolution strategy. Depending on the incentive structures of each respective actor within the focal point network, we will experience different degrees of participation in the resolution strategy. In understanding the network, we can begin to understand how to make the threat to the sustainability of the strategy as diminutive as possible.

4.2 – The Network

Figure 1.2.1 has taken a broad view of the actors involved and Figure 2.2.1 outlined the actors within the taskforce as defined by the taskforce itself, not the interviews. It is important to
understand the network behind the US government. In order to remain feasible, we have taken coded data from Nvivo and combined it with OrgScope’s (2010) US government data and software, in order to visualize the main actors within the US government (NetAge, 2010; QSR International, 2010). Figure 4.2.1 has been mapped with the executive branch, led by the president, as the actor focal point within the US government. We can see how all government entities tie into the executive branch through specific offices and departments. It is important to realize that within the focal point network, certain actors mapped in Figure 4.2.1 are not relevant since our focus is the actors and agencies relevant to genocide prevention. However, it is important to observe the overall connection structure of the US government actor nodes.

Knowing that the taskforce recognized that the Department of Defense (DOD) is a crucial actor within any US based genocide prevention system, we can look at how many degrees of separation departments, such as the United States African Command (AFRICOM), have through a DOD focus (Figure 4.2.2). AFRICOM has a three degree separation from the executive branch. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is a main node that bridges AFRICOM, through DOD, to the executive branch. Thus, the Secretary of Defense can provide a direct connection from AFRICOM to the president. Within our conflict resolution strategies, we need to understand what these various network structures mean within the context of genocide prevention.

We can see that this is a hierarchical network structure with the executive branch being a positional actor and parent node of the entire structure (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003). This is due to the relatively large scale of the network and the evidential clustering around particular actors (Ravasz & Barabasi, 2003). The nodes are relatively centralized around certain key controlling nodes. These are often individuals who directly report to the executive branch on behalf of a dedicated department. Due to the relatively close-knit hierarchical structure, we could have used
a tree-map to analyze the hierarchical structure of the network. This would have allowed us to quickly assess through how many nodes a communication needs to travel, which aids in defining information flow within the network.

All the network analyses done within this paper have violated graph hierarchy. Graph hierarchy is a measure and indicator of the extent to which an informal organizational system is hierarchical and the direction through which the nodes connect to authority (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003). Instead, we have heavily leveraged methodology from social society theory to indicate the various relationships between nodes; in specific, their reciprocity and transitivity. This was done in order to identify potential weak ties and demonstrate how weak influences can alter the dynamics of a particular system (Nowak & Vallacher, 1998).

This became apparent after interview data indicated that the taskforce was created due to no more than three individuals coordinating among themselves. However, these individuals then leveraged their own social networks in order to establish the taskforce and motivate actors who have high degrees of power within the US bureaucratic system. In order for these three individuals to be able to accomplish the creation of the taskforce it is important to appreciate the high degrees of social capital they contain. It is important to understand that they contained the right kind of social capital, which is crucial in understanding the sustainability within our VIA-World Café resolution strategy. Under the assumption of rational action theory, we can describe each actor as being in control of specific resources and interests in certain resource and event scenarios, social capital comprises particular form of resource available to the actor (Coleman J. S., 1988). This means that we can look at the social capital that the three particular actors held, and define it by its function.
The social capital held contained certain aspects of social structure, and facilitated certain actions of various actors within a particular structure in this case inter-organizational collaboration towards the development of a genocide prevention task force developing a report centric around a state-based focal point network. The social capital these three actors held was valuable in facilitating certain actions, but may very well become useless or even harmful in other situations (Coleman J. S., 1988).

The VIA-World Café system permits an exchange of social capital between actors; this is not an actual transference of social capital, but a creation of transparency regarding which actors holds what type of social capital, and to what scale or degree it is held. It is important to understand that within this system, actors can be considered to have insignificant social capital in one scenario, while in another scenario their social capital has high significance. This shows that sustainability comes in part from the recognition of minority influences within the network. This means, that regardless of the minority influences that are present within any focal point network, there are still key actors who act as hubs between various groups. We can quickly see how this evaluation infers that within the network structure there is a balance between its structural strengths and weakness.

4.3 – The Intervention and Challenges to Sustainability

The VIA-World Café intervention strategy exists in order to promote information flow, foster the organic emergence of efficient network structures and increase transparency between accountability, intent, and motivation around the interest of genocide prevention. The crux of this strategy is the assumption of a high degree of participation from the various actors within the relevant actor landscape. Without high levels of participation, we risk groupthink and inertia in
the development of effective government policy. In order to mitigate this risk as much as possible, we need to appreciate the difference between a strong and weak hierarchical system.

The benefit of a strongly hierarchical system that has social leaders is that one can quickly identify relevant nodes, and devise means of engaging the actors that compromise those particular nodes. In return these actors, in a hierarchical fashion, will become bridges to other actors causing a participation trickle effect. The weakness of such a system is that when a key actor is taken out of the network, the social bridge collapses, this means that under the surface the network is in fact weak; as demonstrated by the actor change between Blair and Clapper. When this is the case, the network is not sufficiently decentralized causes these poor dependency structures to exist. It is important to realize that the Blair-Clapper example is an isolated example of a highly centralized network structure, in this case, within the National Intelligence department. Ideally, the system properly decentralized exhibiting small-world network characteristics that permit for certain degrees of disorder, while still ensure flexibility and strength within the sporadic removal of particular nodes (Watts & Strogatz, 2006). Figure 4.2.3 shows the difference between a structurally strong and weak network.

These types of network characteristics directly define the sustainability of any initiatives undertaken within a focal point network. In return, this means that network characteristics intrinsically define the sustainability and efficacy of the GPTR. The main challenges within our intervention strategy is to identify the right actors that would provide for a strong network structure, while providing for appropriate incentives for actors to participate over an extended period, preferably indefinitely as long as the actors are in various positions of power.

4.4 – Strategies for Sustainability
The GPTR was a great platform from which to draw highly relevant recommendations. Furthermore, the blueprint style outline provides a step-by-step system of implementing the recommendations. However, the adoption of the report has been slow paced and rather limited. Part of the goal within the conflict resolution strategy is to provide an open forum in which relevant actors can engage in targeted and specialized discussion. Sustainability, in part, will arise through identifying the right actors. The network mapping shown previously demonstrates that this is a complex process involving diligent research into isolating relevant actor nodes and distinguishing between the different actor types. Sustainability is derived through providing the resources in order to continuously monitor the changing actor landscape and identify the different node structures emerging, as well as dissipating ones.

In order to effectively sustain in-depth monitoring, there are a variety of fiscal and political required resources. The ability to monitor the actor landscape requires human capital that needs financial support, in order to dedicate energy and time in the most effective fashion. Furthermore, there are legitimate security concerns that surround rigorous monitoring.

A monitoring agency, together with the GPTR recommendation of creating a steady centralized node in the form of a genocide prevention office would be the first step in the right direction. However, it is a continuous process, as is the sustainability of the initiatives taken. The more fixed and consistent the focal nodes are within the network, the stronger the genocide prevention network becomes and the closer the network is to obtaining critical mass that will attract new actors to participate within the network. Critical mass occurs when a created movement has reached a juncture point where, for example, enough individuals follow the belief of the movement, causing it to be a change in the social ethos (Lederach, 2005).

Chapter 5 – Discussions and Conclusions
5.1 - Summary of Results, Recommendations, and Sustainability

The results, consequent recommendations and discussion of sustainability all highlight the complexity of developing a focal point network for genocide development. The question becomes what would happen today if another genocide or mass atrocity were to occur somewhere across the globe? Unfortunately probably nothing, at least not until the fatalities grew to the scale of hundreds of thousands of lives, gaining international attention.

Knowing that it is difficult – and costly – to solve a crisis of genocidal magnitude. The report was able to show how US involvement leads to better serving national interests rather than adopting the status quo. The report was groundbreaking because it identified, for the first time, ways in which the US government could better prepare itself to prevent genocide. Furthermore, the recommendations were specific and tangible.

The GPTR is an ambitious umbrella style recommendation report that attempts to cover all facets of US genocide prevention. Recognizing that the report on its own is not a resolution strategy we understand that resolution lies within the potential intervention methods it describes, as well as the implementation of these methods. Through synergizing results, resolution strategy, and sustainability concerns, it becomes apparent that the crux lies at the ability to identify the right actors and devise methods to engage them in constructive dialogue. Through this understanding we can begin to extract generalizable methodologies applicable to developing focal point networks outside of the US governmental construct.

An important learning taken from this research is the appreciation of thinking in relativistic terms versus absolutist. This helps us realize that not all structures or dynamics need to be present for genocide to occur. Some can be, all can be, or none can be. Genocide prevention is a complex undertaking. It is the embracing of complexity, and the disregard for the
search for simplicity that allows us to accept that conflict is connected through the past, present, and future. If we can imagine an effective genocide prevention network, we can start the process towards social change that will solidify the imagination into a reality. The critical component in fostering an effective movement lies in the quality of the social change, instead of the quantity of the individuals involved in the movement, the root lies in “the capacity to locate the strategic set of people who could create such momentum” (Lederach, 2005, p.94).

5.2 – Next Steps and Future Research

Important steps in strengthening the analysis would be through the acquisition of more data from members who participated within the GPTR. Once additional data is acquired we will be able to perform a degree centralization analysis, which is a measure that indicates varying degrees of centralization, highlighting actor influence of leaders upon followers (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003). Furthermore this analysis will help us identify clustering and the potential emergence of minority influenced systems.

In order to develop generalizable methodologies we need to perform certain discourse analyses around the US governmental system and other governmental systems. To properly extract learned methods, we need to understand how some of the unique components surrounding the US government impede our ability to develop a rigorous system on which to develop focal point networks for state-based genocide prevention. Future research in analyzing several other governmental networks would prove to be effective in our analysis.

A system that can accurately identify the strategic actor set might not exist. However, it is possible to scan and detect actors who have a high likelihood of being part of the strategic set. Further research in applying a system of reverse engineering through Lederach’s concept of

Furthering along these lines, an anthropological study of various government cultures will directly aid the development of focal-point network methodologies. Knowing that “human beings are less driven by forces than submissive to rules, that the rules are such as to suggest strategies, the strategies are such as to inspire actions, and the actions are such to be self-rewarding” (Geertz, 1983, p.25) we can see how the amalgamation of Geertz’ interpretive anthropology findings and Allison’s bureaucratic politics models (Allison & Zelikow, 1999) can potentially provide a deeper understanding of actor behavior within the network, and help develop systems that promote high participation rates in information flow enhancing activities.
References


Gourevitch, P. (1999). *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families.* New York, NY: Picador.


Interviews. (2011, 4 1). GPTR Interview. (A. Hillel-Tuch, Interviewer)


Appendix

Conflict Map Figure

Figure 1.2.1 - Broad Conflict Map - Created using VUE (Tufts University, 2011)
Interview Protocol

Thank you for taking the time to speak with me today. I am doing a study on focal points within genocide prevention networks. This is part of my Master thesis at Columbia University; my Masters is within the field of negotiation and conflict resolution. This interview should take between 45-60 minutes. I would like to take this opportunity to make you aware that your participation in this interview is in the strictest confidence, and reference to your identity is for my records only. Your name will be modified within the research as to sever a link to your identity, and your position within the GPTR will be omitted. Is it okay if I record this?

(Consent/No Consent) Thank you. Before we begin, do you have any questions?

Opening question

1. What is your name and what is your academic background?

Intro question

2. What has your career path been like?

Transition question

3. How did you become involved in the Genocide Prevention Taskforce Report?

Key questions

4. What was your involvement with the GPTR project?
5. What types of procedures did you see as critical related to information flow or decision-making?

6. In any major policy initiative, some actors will see themselves as losing out. If your recommendations had been implemented, whose interests would be most impacted?

7. In the name of feasibility, whose interests did you seek to avoid impacting?

8. If you did not have to work around their concerns, what other proposals might you have made?

9. Which of your recommendations were you most surprised were not included in the final version of the report?

10. What parts of underlying analytic disagreement were reflected in these disagreements over what to recommend?

11. What were the areas of most heated discussion / disagreement amongst the analysts?

Ending Questions

12. What is your opinion on the reception that the report’s recommendations received?
13. Thank you for talking to us, is there anyone else you think we should be talking to?

14. Regarding what you discussed with us today, are there any documents that you can share that reflect your thinking on this?

This concludes this interview. Thank you very much for your time. Let us know if you want to review the transcript.

Appendix 2

“This was an idea that came directly from one of the task force members from one of the meetings we had…it was kind of given privilege as a result…there was definitely some resistance to the idea…because the people didn’t think …that there was really clear estimative question, and that it would spin up a whole bunch of work for the intelligence community without a lot of clear value, and there was some merits also noted, but there were some debates…this is more like some national intelligence assessment not a national intelligence estimate…the bolded recommendation [in the report] is, [to] prepare a national intelligence estimate, because NIE is [what] the taskforce member recommended and the thing that has…cache publicly, but then in the text below it, it says this could take the form analogous to the national intelligence assessment that was done on security threats related to climate change.”

- (Interviews, 2011)
Appendix 3

“the bolded recommendation [in the report] is, [to] prepare a national intelligence estimate, because NIE is [what] the taskforce member recommended and the thing that has…cache publicly, but then in the text below it, it says this could take the form analogous to the national intelligence assessment that was done on security threats related to climate change” - (Interviews, 2011).
Figures & Tables

Figure 1.1 - Positive Feedback Loop
Created using VUE (TUFTS University, 2011)

Figure 1.2 - GPTR High Level Actor Map
Created using VUE (TUFTS University, 2011)
DEVELOPING FOCAL POINT NETWORKS FOR STATE-CENTERED GENOCIDE PREVENTION

Figure 1.2.2 - Cycle of Violence initiated by exclusion (Lemerchand, 2009) - Created using VUE (Tufts University, 2011)

Figure 2.1.3

Figure 2.2.1 - High Word Frequency (GPTR)

Figure 2.2.2 - Low Word Frequency (GPTR)
Figure 3.2.1 - Rough actor map created using NDBB (Soylent, 2002)

Figure 3.3.1 - The hourglass model, redrawn from Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall (2005)
Figure 3.3.2 - A high level actor map with Susan E. Rice as focal point, using NDBB (Soylent, 2002)

Figure 3.5.1 – the Dual Concern Model (Lewicki, Barry, & Saunders, 2007)
### Individual Connection With Issue
- Who am I?
- What is my connection to the issue?

### Issue Dynamics/ Resources
- Why do I care about this issue?
- What are the dynamics of the issue?
- What actions are already making a difference?

### Reflection
- What do I find in my most deeply held values that inspires me?
- What makes me believe change is possible?
- What do I see myself doing?

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<th>Individual Connection With Issue</th>
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<th>Reflection</th>
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<td>What actions are already making a difference?</td>
<td>What do I see myself doing?</td>
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Table 3.5.1 – Values Into Action framework (Dupre et al., 2007, p. 531)
DEVELOPING FOCAL POINT NETWORKS FOR STATE-CENTERED GENOCIDE PREVENTION

Figure 4.2.2 - Actor map of DOD

Figure 4.2.3 - Network Structure - Created using VUE (Tufts University, 2011)