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Knowledge, Power and Order:
Charles E. Lindblom in the History of Economic Thought

I. The Interdisciplinarian as Economist

Is it strange to contend, as I shall here, that the scholarly contributions of a man who
has served as president of the American Political Science Association and whose life's
work has been respectfully given its due in the history of that discipline¹ should be
recognised as an important part of the history of modern economic thought? If so, this is
but a reflection of Charles E. Lindblom's uneasy relationship with economics, the field in
which he took his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago in 1945 and against whose insti-
tutional biases and professional tunnel vision he has struggled for some fifty years.² For
amongst the economists, as Lindblom wrote from bitter experience in 1956,

a tradition in recruitment has grown up through which those who will be
happy within the limitations of economics are admitted to the brotherhood and
others are commonly turned away. In the best training centers, with few
exceptions no one can become an economist who does not come to value
formal economic theory. Moreover, the boundaries of economics have been
marked out with careful attention to those tasks to which theory can be ap-
plied [so that] economics has come close to defining an economist as one
whose professional ambitions are limited to those for which formal economic
theory is not seriously frustrating (Lindblom 1957: 252-253).

But from the beginning, Lindblom's own ambitions have pushed him well past the limits
of this increasingly confining definition. Free of the sterile abstraction and fascination
with optimisation and equilibrium that dominate modern economics, his work has always
had a strong interdisciplinary flavour, probing the artificial boundaries separating economics from political science and exploring the relationship between human knowledge and values and the central problems of social organisation. Over the years, it has taken him ever further from the optimistic, laboratory environment of neoclassical theory, a world of mathematical certainty and free, perfectly informed beings in full command of their own desires, toward the imperfect, imprecise world of exchange and power where real people live, a more threatening realm of radical ignorance and uncertain interests, hostile manipulation and bureaucratic authority.

Still, for most of his career Lindblom has seen himself explicitly and, I think, correctly as an economist, extending his discipline to address problems and phenomena not a part of its modern research agenda. If, as Woodrow Wilson (1887) believed, politics is the search for the common good in human affairs and political theory the reflection of this search in the domain of analysis, then Lindblom reveals himself to be an economist in his consistent denial of a meaningful or intelligible collective interest and his corresponding commitments to political and methodological individualism. He is, moreover, an economist in Friedrich Hayek's (1967) sense as well, focusing inquiry on the patterns created by harmonising processes of spontaneous order rather than the particular outcomes they produce. Like Hayek and his own teacher Frank Knight, Lindblom is deeply impressed with the prodigious feats of organisation achieved in the face of imperfect, widely dispersed knowledge by 'mutual adjustment,' the spontaneous reconciliation of conflicting values through self-interested behaviour. But he significantly deepens their analyses of economic catallaxy (Hayek 1976: 107-132) by illuminating the coordinating power of mutual adjustment not just in a variety of political contexts across the ideological spectrum, but in the social creation of values and beliefs themselves.

In this, as in his lifelong focus on the actual institutions that direct and constrain social life, the historical significance of Lindblom's economics is best seen in the context of the great 'calculation debate,' the passionate conversation on the feasibility of large-
scale economic planning initiated by Mises (1920), carried on by Hayek (1935, 1948), Lange (1938), and Bergson (1948) and resolved, if at all, only by the collapse of Marxist socialism in Eastern Europe. A persistent theme in Lindblom's work has been the contrast between the invisible hand of spontaneous mutual adjustment and the conscious grasp of central planning and control, between 'epiphenomenal' problem solving through the decentralised play of interests and the rationalist ideal of 'synopsis,' the faith that 'there are men in the society wise and informed enough to ameliorate its problems and guide social change with a high degree of success (Lindblom 1975; 26).' In a life's work that can usefully be divided into two distinct but interrelated areas of substantive concern, Lindblom has developed the implications of this crucial dichotomy in directions uncharted by others, and in the two parts to follow, I consider the variations he has played on the theme of order and planning in both of these areas.

The first encompasses Lindblom's early discussions of incremental decisionmaking and mutual adjustment and their application to political problem solving, and in Part II, I argue that this work fruitfully extends and syntheseses the complementary ideas of Hayek and Herbert Simon, economists similarly disrespectful of traditional disciplinary boundaries. All three share the conviction that economic theory is of little scientific value unless it accounts for the nature and limitations of real human beings as decisionmakers, and each dismisses optimisation on epistemological grounds, for Hayek in a denial of the possibility of rational central planning by the state, for Simon in a critique of the neoclassical theories of the consumer and the firm, and for Lindblom in a rejection of the synoptic method of public policymaking. But Lindblom's interlocking analyses of incremental, sequential decisionmaking by interdependent political actors and the adjustments they undertake over time to harmonise their decisions go much further, seeing in mutual adjustment not just a coordinating device but a spontaneous process of goal formation and global decisionmaking of immense practical value in a democracy. Values, interests and outcomes become the simultaneous, unplanned results of a complex interplay of partisan
opportunism, accommodation and consent despite the cognitive limitations of its participants, and mutual adjustment an invisible maker of hard choices made tolerable by the absence of credit or blame.

Hayek's critique of planning assumes that individuals are not motivated to cooperate with the planners, a lack of alignment between rulers and ruled that denies the planning agency the information it needs to determine what the desired allocation of resources is and the steps needed to achieve it. But as Lindblom has always understood, planning can succeed even in a free society in the event of war or similar emergency where the necessary alignment of goals exists, and effective planning even without war is possible given citizens who, like Mao's 'new man,' identify so completely with the objectives of the planners that they act as required without being told to do so. From the outset, Lindblom has emphasised the ubiquity in industrial society of centralised economic and political hierarchy, public and private, and the distortions introduced into various processes of mutual adjustment by the inequalities of power and wealth these islands of planning create. He has thus been able to expand the critique of planning beyond that done by the state itself and to address not just the economics of large, bureaucratic systems of authority but the political attitudes and values that must be inculcated in the citizenry in order to ensure their success as well.

The principal result of this second line of substantive inquiry has been the highly controversial Politics and Markets (1977), a pessimistic, angry portrait of the American political economy in which the managers of large corporations enjoy a privileged position of authority and influence in all areas of public life and the people have been so deeply indoctrinated with the values of the ruling elite that they have largely surrendered to it whatever control they might once have had over their own destiny, unaware that they have even done so. Like the distinguished jurist Louis Brandeis a half-century before him, Lindblom is understandably repelled by these shallow, materialistic values. But unlike Brandeis, Lindblom sees the gradual subordination of ordinary Americans to industrial
hierarchy in the economic sphere and to the leadership of an elite dominated by business in the political as evidence of a kind of trick, a corrupt, shrouded effort on the part of that elite to make the people believe and desire things they wouldn't otherwise. In Part III, I consider this claim alongside the contrasting view of Lindblom's distinguished predecessor and argue, with Brandeis, that the nation's economic history since 1870 makes clear that Americans have been neither tricked nor manipulated into choosing these values, but have done so on their own, with open eyes.

But in recent years Lindblom too has explored the implications of his unsettling hypothesis and offered a different perspective, drawing heavily on his earlier work and lending his intellectual career a satisfying unity and (perhaps premature!) sense of closure. Venturing still further from the traditional territory of economics, he has turned his attention explicitly to the complex of social processes that govern the production of knowledge and culture, and in Inquiry and Change (1990), has come to see this indoctrination as part of a larger phenomenon he calls 'impairment' of individual inquiry. If it is clear that all social life demands some degree of consensus on fundamental values, Lindblom makes equally plain that the socialisation that produces this consensus also imprisons our perceptions and blinds us to the liberating potential of values different from our own. Seeking to free our minds from impairment and our social life from debilitating pathologies we can neither diagnose nor address, Lindblom is drawn back to the contrasting ideals of centralism and pluralism. In a competition of ideas possible only in the latter, he finds the one, faint hope of intellectual and political liberation.

II. Economic Politics

Consider the neoclassical firm, an abstraction with a problem. More precisely, two problems: first, how to transform the inputs it buys into the output it sells, and then to determine how many units of each kind of input to buy and thus how many units of output to produce. What makes these questions 'problems' is that the firm has a specific objective
it wants to achieve in answering them, so that the degree to which this goal is met determines which of the many possible answers to the questions is the 'best' solution to the problem posed by the governing objective. The range of possible objectives is wide; the firm might, for example, try to maximise sales or market share, or maximise the wages paid to its workers, or earn a reputation for producing only the highest quality goods. But the objective ascribed to the neoclassical firm is maximising profit, selecting both the technology of production and the level of output that make the difference between the cost it pays for its inputs and the revenue it receives for its output as great as it can possibly be.

In making these decisions, the firm commands a great deal of relevant knowledge. It knows the state of the technological art and the price of each input, so it can choose from among all the available technologies the one that minimises the cost of producing output and thus calculate the most favourable array of marginal costs, and it knows the price at which it can sell every unit of output it makes, so it can superimpose a marginal revenue function on the schedule of marginal costs. In the powerful light shed by this 'clarity of objective, explicitness of evaluation,...high degree of comprehensiveness of overview, and...quantification of values for mathematical analysis' (Lindblom 1959b: 173), the firm can see just how much profit it will earn at every possible level of production, so that achieving its objective becomes a simple matter of mathematics, finding the output at which marginal revenue and marginal cost are the same.

In a series of related works published through 1965, Lindblom has come to call this ideal of rational problem solving 'synopsis' (1962a: 198; 1963: 37-57; 1965: 137-143).

To adopt the term is to assume that a problem is solved by understanding it. Understanding requires a comprehensiveness of information and analysis. It is also to assume that one cannot be rational without first knowing what one wants and proceeding only thereafter to a comprehensive examination of alternative means to the attainment of what one wants (1965: 138).
But as both Ronald Coase (1937) and Chester Barnard (1938) had recognised in rather different ways before 1940, the difficulty with the synoptic method is that the real business firm is not an 'it' but a 'who,' subject to all the many imperfections of the human condition as it goes about trying to formulate and achieve its objectives. By 1947, Herbert Simon had identified the cognitive obstacles to synopsis he would later call 'bounded rationality' (Simon 1947: 68-70, 80-84), limitations Lindblom also saw as rooted in

the plain fact that, like Winnie-the-Pooh, [man] is an animal of very little brain. The number of alternatives man would need to consider in order to act rationally is very often far beyond his limited mental capacity [and] it is difficult to use such foresight as feeble brain and personality might otherwise permit because often one cannot judge between present goal achievement and future--partly because one cannot always know what he wants until he has tested the goal; concrete experience often is the only adequate test (Lindblom 1953: 60-61).

The interrelated inabilities of real men and women to specify in advance of the moment of decision the values and objectives that are to guide their choices and then to gather and assess the information needed to 'optimise' have thus been a major theme in the work of both Simon and Lindblom. But where Simon's interest in administration as such drew him toward a theory of 'satisficing,' in which the question of value selection is resolved by assuming that the decisionmaker is able to identify outcomes that will be 'good enough' and attention focused instead on the difficulties of securing the requisite information (Simon 1957: 204-205), Lindblom's lifelong interest in the intricacies of political organisation and behaviour, and more specifically in the day-to-day operation of the decentralised, interlocking public and private institutions that govern the creation of public policy in a democracy, has led him in a different direction.

Policymaking, Lindblom argues, ordinarily contemplates only a range of alternatives that differ slightly from one another and the status quo (1958a: 300). It proceeds both
incrementally, taking 'existing reality as one alternative and compar[ing] the probable gains and losses of closely related alternatives by making relatively small adjustments in existing reality' (1953: 82), and sequentially, so that each policy increment 'is tried, altered, tried in its altered form, altered again and so on' (1958a: 301). This is so because the preconditions of democracy itself, 'widespread consensus on fundamental values [and on] the general direction and character of desired social change,' demand it. 'When an individual lives in a society marked by the kinds of consensus referred to and when he is dubious about the predictability of large-scale change, his demands upon political leadership and his response to their appeals to him will have the effect of buttressing incremental policies' (Lindblom 1958a: 301).

The consensus to which Lindblom refers relates not to the short-term objectives of particular policies but rather to such fundamentals of democracy as a recognition that only those who have fairly prevailed in free elections can legitimately claim to rule, a broad tolerance of conflicting opinion, and a preference for persuasion and agreement as against violence or revolution (Lindblom 1953: 294-302). But experience makes clear that even within such a consensus, pluralism and vigorous partisanship usually flourish. People differ greatly in their preferences with respect to the specifics of policy despite their agreement on the fundamentals. How to allocate the budget? Where to put the new airport? Lower the gasoline tax? Raise the minimum wage? Questions like these, it might be said, could be resolved simply by reference to 'the public interest.' But 'there is no one public interest, as we all know.... No social goal can be anything more than a compromise of conflicting individual goals' (Lindblom 1955: 157).

Politics is not an art or science pursued by philosopher-kings who find the public interest in the sky, but is a craft practiced by negotiators who know that the public interest can never be anything else but the common goals of different people.... Hence, within a certain range the public interest is represented by an agreement among partisan interests, which is the way bar-
gainers see it, not a goal or state of affairs having some validity other than as a practical bargained compromise (Lindblom 1955: 155-56, 158).

As in the firm, then, problem solving in the realm of everyday public policy must always contend with the cognitive limits imposed by human frailty. But Lindblom distinguishes the firm from the policymaking agency in three crucial particulars. First, where the firm is free to make the radical changes in scale and organisation that separate the short run from the long, the democratic consensus demands that public policy be made at the margin, in successive small steps. Second, where the pursuit of at least some positive profit confronts decisionmakers in the firm with an easily appreciated, quantifiable organisational objective sufficiently compelling to motivate Simon's arguments for satisficing behaviour, the absence of an analogous, clearly defined public interest in the case of policymaking makes resolution of the question of which particular values are to be served by policy a critical element of the problem itself. And finally, if hierarchy and managerial technique make centralised decisionmaking at least a plausible aspiration for the firm,

we can describe American national policy-making as fragmented rather than unified. It is a process much like the market process in important respects. Various groups, each viewing policy from a limited point of view, make decisions that reinforce or counter one another's.... A series of mutually countering and reinforcing moves between...groups can stimulate each to find that position in which a relatively high degree of goal attainment is possible without stimulating the other group to further countermoves. Because in a series of such moves each group often explores its own values at the margin, the moves themselves are necessary to the achievement of a mutually acceptable solution, and a centrally contemplated policy could not always find so satisfactory a solution.... Fragmentation would seem to substitute politics for brains in problems of
co-ordination that run beyond human intellectual capacity (Lindblom 1958b: 536-37).

Thus, the broad dispersal in all democratic systems of the effective power to influence, block or react to decisions made elsewhere among a host of public agencies and private organisations requires that all policy be to some extent the undesigned result of explicit accommodation and compromise of diverse partisan interests rather than the product of synoptic attempts at global problem solving in the service of a single, collectively defined objective.

Policies are set as a resultant of...conflict, not because some one policy-making individual or group achieves an integration but because the pulling and hauling of various views accomplishes finally some kind of decision, probably different from what any one advocate of the final solution intended and probably different from what any one advocate could comfortably defend by reference to his own limited values (Lindblom 1959a: 174).

Given consensus on the basic rules of the game, fragmentation in the political arena operates to produce policy in the face of conflicting interests precisely as the analogous decentralisation operates in the market to allocate resources to competing ends given consensus on the fundamental principles of private property and free exchange. Both adapt to bounded rationality by allowing consensual solutions to large, complex problems to emerge epiphenomenally from the efforts of each decisionmaking centre to solve its own smaller, simpler ones. No one need solve, or even see, the big problem, with its enormous number of variables and its myriad of conflicting values; each centre confronts only the far smaller set of variables that touch its own narrow interests and seeks to promote them through a series of incremental adjustments conditioned by the similar actions of the others.

The sequentiality of adjustments, moreover, the play of move and countermove, allows the inevitable omissions and errors made by individual centres in calculating their
interests and predicting the consequences of their decisions to be revealed and, in Lindblom's phrase, 'mopped up' (1965: 151) over time: 'Values neglected in one group's limited view of its problems often become central to the interests of other groups; and around important values felt to be neglected by all existing groups new groups form...' (Lindblom 1958b: 536). Like the market process, mutual adjustment becomes a 'discovery procedure' (Hayek 1979a), a source of powerful motives to mobilize information and analysis on the relations among possible decisions. To be sure, no one decision maker is motivated to undertake the comprehensive investigations envisaged by the advocates of an overview, but, taken together, a group of partisan adjusters may generate a great deal more information and analysis than will a central coordinator (Lindblom 1965: 174).

As in the market, then, initiative and self-reliance thus become important determinants of success for the individual; if there are interests touched by the problem at hand but overlooked or ignored by those currently engaged with it, new problems are created for those who hold them, and like competitors in a market where new technology has created new costs and new opportunities, they hold back from the fray only at their peril (Lindblom 1959b: 183-85).

In much the same way that Adam Smith had illuminated the coordinating powers of the invisible hand a full century before the marginalist revolution was able to offer a theory of individual behaviour consistent with his larger insight, Lindblom had himself identified mutual adjustment as the 'hidden hand of government' (1955) some years before he was able to formulate the theory of 'disjointed incrementalism' that lay beneath it. But by 1959, he had, in perhaps his best known essay, systematised the pragmatic technique of problem solving characteristically employed by real public administrators as 'the science of muddling through' and defended it as a system, 'not a failure of method for which
administrators ought to apologize' (1959b: 188). Twenty years later, he offered this summary of its most salient features:

(a) limitation of analysis to a few somewhat familiar policy alternatives; (b) an intertwining of analysis of policy goals and other values with the empirical aspects of the problem; (c) a greater analytical preoccupation with ills to be remedied than positive goals to be sought; (d) a sequence of trials, errors, and revised trials; (e) analysis that explores only some, not all, of the important possible consequences of a considered alternative; (f) fragmentation of analytical work to many (partisan) participants in policy making (Lindblom 1979a: 239).

Time and again, Lindblom denies the synoptic postulate that values must be known before rational choices can be made, and stresses the 'intertwining' of the two, not just in policymaking but, more strikingly, in his interpretation of the paradigm of synopsis itself, the neoclassical theory of the consumer. 'The value problem is...always a problem of adjustments at the margin. But there is no practicable way to state marginal objectives or values except in terms of particular policies' (Lindblom 1959b: 177).

The way in which we economists can, for our own professional purposes, conceptualize consumer choice obscures the great difference between what the consumer can be conceived of as having done but does not actually do--ascertain a function, then choose so as to maximize it--and what he actually does--simply compare policies at the margin and choose directly the preferred policy. Like the consumer, the incremental decision-maker in governmental affairs does not make use of a utility function[or] a social welfare function.... He can hardly be said to know even a point or two on such a function because he does not think in terms of alternative social states; and, if he can be said to value one social state higher than another, this fact is more to be inferred from
his choices than said to control them. He makes specific choices, as does the consumer, at the margin' (Lindblom 1961: 307).

Thus, neither the consumer nor the administrator need 'try to analyze any values except the values by which alternative policies differ and need not be concerned with them except as they differ marginally. His need for information on values or objectives is drastically reduced as compared with [synopsis]; and his capacity for grasping, comprehending, and relating values to one another is not strained beyond the breaking point' (Lindblom 1959b: 178-79).

With the task of articulating the substance of disjointed incrementalism and developing its philosophical implications completed (with the help of David Braybrooke) in A Strategy of Decision (1963), Lindblom sought to close the circle of this 'large-scale model of democracy' (1962b: 59) with an exhaustive analysis of mutual adjustment in politics in The Intelligence of Democracy (1965). From the outset, he had shown his solicitousness for the spontaneous order of the market (1949: 15-21, 215-27) and made clear his conviction that in politics too, 'though we perceive it only obscurely, private vice may be public virtue' (1955: 140). Now, unsatisfied with the relatively vague notion of coordination set forth in his earlier discussions of fragmentation, he would substantially deepen this inquiry by undertaking 'a systematic comparative analysis of centrality and partisan mutual adjustment among various kinds of political officials and leaders as competing methods for rational coordination of governmental decisions' (1965: 9). In so doing, he would again replay the history of his discipline in the microcosm of his own career. The elaboration of the behavioural insights of marginalism into the modern notion of general equilibrium after 1871 had encouraged the welfare economists of the 1930s to replace Smith's qualitative description of the organisational wonders worked over time by an invisible hand that never stopped with a mathematically precise analysis of allocative efficiency in the stasis of general equilibrium. Similarly, with the behavioural theory of disjointed incrementalism in hand, Lindblom would lend greater rigour to his claim that
decentralised mutual adjustment could coordinate the decisions of a multitude of political actors, but unlike the welfare economists, he would reject the seductive but artificial mathematics of equilibrium to focus, like Smith and his modern successors, on the process of mutual adjustment rather than its outcomes.

Lindblom's earliest attempts to evaluate the results of mutual adjustment focused on the fact of agreement itself in an environment of conflicting but unchanging interests and objectives. Under synopsis, he wrote in 1959,

a decision is 'correct,' 'good,' or 'rational' if it can be shown to attain some specified objective, where the objective can be specified without simply describing the decision itself.... But what of the situation in which administrators cannot agree on values or objectives...? What then is the test of 'good' policy? For [synopsis], there is no test. Agreement on objectives failing, there is no standard of 'correctness.' For [incrementalism], the test is agreement on policy itself, which remains possible even when agreement on values is not... In an important sense, therefore, it is not irrational...to defend a policy as good without being able to specify what it is good for (1959b: 179-81).

The virtues of such a test, he went on, are not to be slighted. Stable democracy requires a continuing consent to its procedures that can often be won only by conceding to every interest whatever price it demands for its agreement to the policy at issue. In this sense, mutual adjustment can be seen as 'a process in which, when the intensity of frustration of group interests threatens democratic consent, the fact is plain; and the option is open to other groups to pay the necessary price. This is an aspect of mutual adjustment much to be prized....[even though] inconsistency in government programs is thus inevitable and part of the mechanism of partisan mutual adjustment' (1961: 317, 324).

But by 1965, Lindblom's normative claims for mutual adjustment had become considerably stronger, particularly when the alternative was the imposition, in the name of rationality, of a single organising objective on a large number of independently motivated
political actors. In The Intelligence of Democracy, the relatively simple notion of coordination implied by the fact of agreement on specific policies at specific times was expanded to encompass the entire chain of actions and adaptive reactions required to formulate policy in a world in which objectives and the means to achieve them are constantly changing. 'In incremental analysis,' Lindblom had written in 1959, 'values are not simply formulae for the guidance of policy choices but interact with policy choices in such a way that each unendingly alters the other as more is learned about both values and appropriate policies from the results of each incremental alteration in policy' (1959b: 309). But this, as he now realised, calls the fundamental idea of policymaking as problem solving itself into question, for it makes little sense to see the outcomes of mutual adjustment as 'solutions' if fluid values and shifting opportunities continuously redefine the 'problems' they are meant to address (1965: 148-49). Individual agreements on specific policies, small islands of consensus between temporary coalitions that solve the problems of the moment, thus take on a very different significance than they had when values and objectives were assumed to be stable. No longer ends in themselves, they become, like the countless individual transactions in the market whose particular terms are conditioned by the transient circumstances of time and place under which they are made, simply way stations in a larger process that continually creates new interests and new possibilities for exchange with no apparent purpose or destination in sight.

In partisan mutual adjustment some strong tendencies toward Pareto optima are present in pairs of decisions or other sets of decisions. In his relations with some Y's every X is motivated by his own interests to ask whether there is a possibility of mutual gain, or at least gain to X without loss to Y.... The freedom of participants in partisan mutual adjustment to undertake partisan discussion, compensation, and negotiation sets in motion a never-ending and detailed, even if highly fragmented, search for possibilities of benefiting a multiplicity of X's without disadvantage to a multiplicity of Y's. For what is
negligible detail to a central coordinator is motivating self-interest to X (Lindblom 1965: 195).

But the very fluidity that makes this process of mutual adjustment 'never-ending' precludes the achievement of equilibrium. Like the market order, in which individual contracts are constantly formed, dissolved and formed again in a kaleidoscopic environment that continuously shows participants new opportunities and constraints but reveals no purpose or direction of its own, the process of spontaneous mutual adjustment continuously produces new values, new problems, and new agreements that propel it toward an open-ended succession of outcomes no one could possibly have predicted or characterised before the operation of the process itself. This suggests not only the futility of synoptic planning but also that, in the absence of static equilibrium, normative claims for the superiority of such equilibria, analogous to the welfare economists' timeless mathematical analysis of Pareto-efficient allocation, cannot be sustained. Instead, the critical roles of sequential decisionmaking and reactive 'mopping up' emphasise the centrality of time in the analysis of spontaneous order and turn attention away from the properties of transient, unstable outcomes and toward the dynamic processes that first produce them and then render them obsolete.

Just as Hayek (1945) had argued with respect to the market, then, in mutual adjustment one 'cannot show directly that its outcomes are superior to other outcomes. As with most social processes, we argue the superiority of the outcome from the process, not the process from the outcome' (Lindblom 1961: 323). And so, when he came at last to evaluate mutual adjustment as a means of rational decisionmaking in politics, the points he chose to emphasise were procedural rather than substantive. First, mutual adjustment achieves coordination in the sense that 'the adverse consequences of any one decision for other decisions...are to a degree and in some frequency avoided, reduced, counterbalanced, or outweighed,' even though we cannot say 'just when, where, which, and whose adverse consequences ought to be taken care of as a condition of calling a set of decisions
coordinated' (1965: 154). Second, it is self-regulating in the sense that the most acceptable rules for repairing or restructuring the process in light of perceived defects are most likely to be ones produced by mutual adjustment itself (1965: 300-02). And finally, to those who would damn mutual adjustment for its 'conservatism,' Lindblom, again echoing Hayek (1979b: 18-22), replies, 'Is [it] not prepared for a world of unremitting change...? Once launched...on a course of changing policy, where is the stopping-place? Is there any limit to the changes to which it might lend itself? (1963: 108).

In 1975, Lindblom brilliantly summarized the arguments sketched in this Part as he posed the dichotomy between the 'intellectually guided' society, with its commitment to reason and planning, and the 'preference guided' society, with its commitment to decentralisation and mutual adjustment. The real issue between them, he said, was 'an opposing set of views on the maximum role of reason...in social organization and social change' (1975: 24). But if his task there was 'not to debate the merits of alternative views but to clarify' them (1975: 25), his arguments nonetheless underscored a truth he, like Hayek and others, had made explicit many years before:

Reason runs out, cannot bear the burdens imposed on it, therefore has to be employed in light of its limitations. A general prescription to employ reason in decision-making, however persuasive, is less wise than a prescription to use reason in establishing such decision-making machinery as reduces the the demands made on reason and achieves a coordination of only partly reasoned decisions through processes of adjustment other than those that go on in the human mind (Lindblom 1961: 320).

III. Planning and the Politics of Values

Consider the neoclassical firm once again. This time, assume that the problems of Part II have been solved, that the firm's unitary 'brain' has successfully determined the best production technology and calculated its profit maximising output. Now, however, a new
problem arises. How can the 'brain' be certain that the 'fingers' will do its bidding? How, that is, can the firm achieve the internal coordination and control over its various human constituents necessary to ensure that the production plan will be faithfully carried out? For production organised in the market, of course, there is no plan; order is created by the spontaneous mutual adjustment, mediated by flexible prices, of men and women with no common goal, and the absence of a single, guiding objective obviates the need for conscious control over production altogether. But in the firm, order means planning, the subordination of diverse individual interests to the specific objectives of the firm and the harnessing of effort in the service of those ends, and must therefore be achieved in some other way. How this is to be done might be called the 'planner's problem,' and for some forty years, Lindblom has recognised its ubiquity and importance for capitalism and socialism alike.

Long ago, Lenin (1943: 84) dreamed of a time when 'the whole of society will have become one office and one factory,' with the requisite tools of control 'within the reach of anybody who can read and write and knows the first four rules of arithmetic' because a new consciousness had brought the objectives of the planners and the self-perceived interests of every citizen into perfect alignment. But, as Lindblom suggested in Politics, Economics, and Welfare (1953) and the rapid industrialisation of the Soviet Union after Lenin's death confirms, successful large-scale planning needn't await the higher phase of communism or the creation of Soviet Man. All that is necessary is the power and the will to enforce the effective suppression of individual interests in favour of such relatively simple organising objectives as 'the development of productive capacity' (Lindblom 1953: 394-402), 'the crude growth of physical output,' or a rough 'balance' between the principal sectors of the economy (Lindblom 1966: 69-71). Where allocative efficiency expressed in terms of consumer preferences is not an issue, the demands of production can determine the particulars of consumption and the price mechanism be largely dispensed with. Not even the concessions to individual interest implicit in Lange's (1938) socialism are
required, for just as 'in a capitalist economy, in this kind of market socialism the consumer remained sovereign--at a time when most socialists, planners, and Communists were looking for ways to effect collective purposes and national goals, rather than individual preferences' (Lindblom 1966: 70).

Nor must a free society rely on markets in every circumstance, for in time of war a people may well agree to substitute commands for prices so that the common objective of victory can be achieved without the delays and the unacceptably divisive distribution of burdens and profits the market would produce even in so rare an atmosphere of sacrifice and shared purpose as this (Lindblom 1953: 402-412). Still, all of these arguments, like those of Mises and Hayek in the calculation debate, contemplate an unrealistically simple world of just two alternative modes of economic organisation, the polar cases of atomistic markets on the one hand and comprehensive state planning on the other. But modern capitalism is far more complex than this, and as the success of the huge private firms that dominate it makes clear, it is a mistake to associate central economic planning exclusively with the state. Islands of purposeful planning in a sea of imperfect competition, within their boundaries these firms too must somehow solve the planner's problem, but they, unlike the crumbling economies of state socialism in recent years, seem to have found a way to do so. But if concentrating solely on the economics of state planning has blinded Hayek to the relevance of his otherwise telling and prescient critique to large-scale planning in the private sector, the question of how the modern capitalist firm has achieved the degree of internal coordination and control it has without compulsion or war has been a major focus of inquiry for Lindblom. In extending the critique of centralism to address the realities of corporate planning, moreover, he has from the outset been drawn from the economics of prices and information to the politics of bureaucracy and authority and, more recently, to the political psychology of indoctrination and impairment.

One possible answer to Lindblom's question lies in the idea of profit maximisation itself. The more profits there are, the more that can be distributed to owners, managers,
and workers alike, so it might plausibly be said that larger profits serve the independent interests of all the firm's many constituents. If so, this in itself would create a general alignment of purpose from top to bottom that is likely to induce general consent to the control exercised by the firm's planners, each individual seeing in the policy of profit maximisation a means to his or her own unique ends. As Lindblom has stressed in the context of policymaking, if individuals with otherwise conflicting values each see their interests served in different ways by the same policy, agreement on that policy is likely despite the divergence of ultimate ends (1959b: 180). But though its underlying logic bears strong resemblance to that of this simple response, Lindblom's own explanation of how the modern corporation has solved the planner's problem, proposed first in Politics and Markets (1977) and elaborated in a series of pessimistic essays published in the early 1980s, has been a more complex, profoundly more disturbing one.

Lindblom's rich and far-reaching critique of American corporate capitalism defies brief summary. But the aspects of it that bear most directly on the planner's problem are encapsulated in the related notions of a 'privileged position of business' in the political economy of democratic capitalism and a 'circularity' in the operation of its institutions. A largely unappreciated consequence of the system of private ownership, Lindblom argues, is its extensive delegation to unelected managers of corporate enterprises of the power to decide matters of crucial importance to the great mass of citizens. Every society must somehow determine whether new investment is to be undertaken and how to finance it, how new technology is to be developed and deployed, how the work force is to be organised, how big plants will be and where they'll be located, and how executives are to be compensated; indeed, it is decisions like this that ultimately determine the entire structure of an industrial economy, from the configuration of its cities to the bureaucratisation of its workplaces, and so they are 'public' questions, whoever is given the authority to answer them. But the prerogatives of private ownership mean that it is neither the people directly nor the government they elect who decides, but 'business.'
Because public functions in the market system rest in the hands of businessmen, it follows that jobs, prices, production, growth, the standard of living, and the economic security of everyone rest in their hands. Consequently, government officials cannot be indifferent to how well business performs its functions. Depression, inflation, or other economic distress can bring down a government. A major function of government, therefore, is to see to it that businessmen perform their tasks.... [But] although governments can forbid certain kinds of activity, they cannot command business to perform. They must induce rather than command. They must therefore offer benefits to businessmen in order to stimulate the required performance....

Every government in these systems accepts a responsibility to do what is necessary to assure profits high enough to maintain as a minimum employment and growth..... Any government official who understands the requirements of his position and the responsibilities that market-oriented systems throw on businessmen will therefore grant them a privileged position.... He simply understands, as is plain to see, that public affairs...are in the hands of two groups of leaders, government and business, who must collaborate and that to make the system work government leadership must often defer to business leadership (Lindblom 1977: 172-175).

All of this is premised on a broad public consensus in favour of the material wealth and growth that lie largely within the discretion of business leaders to create. Without it, elected officials have nothing to fear from a failure to meet the incessant demands of business for inducements to produce and invest; with it, sluggish investment or rising unemployment put every official at risk. But as every successful American politician has understood for decades, precisely this consensus is the single most important feature of the political landscape; the electorate does not hesitate to hold government at all levels responsible for the performance of the economy. In Lindblom's view, the pattern of
individual desires that produce this consensus are in every case a personal combination of principle, appraisal, judgement and opinion far too complex to be captured in the neoclassical economist's notion of 'preference.' Preferences are simply tastes, automatic responses at moments of choice for which no active thought is required and no reasons need be offered. For every individual, they are just 'there,' waiting to be revealed and not to be criticised: De gustibus non est disputandum. But to understand the dispositions behind the consensus for growth in this way is to impoverish our thinking 'by imprisoning it in an unsatisfactory model of preferences taken as given' (Lindblom 1982: 335). More than mere preferences, they are created, not discovered. They are the products of active intellect, 'complex choices on which deliberation is both possible and practiced,' not objective facts to be found but 'emergent acts of will' that express not an uncritical self-interest, but a sense of how things ought to be (Lindblom 1977: 135).

Lindblom calls them 'volitions,' though it is clear that they are very much like the 'values' that played so important a role in his earlier work, and has made them and their origins a major focus of inquiry. But, as Adam Ferguson might say, to call them the results of human action is not to call them products of human design. Are they 'grown,' unintended outcomes of spontaneous processes, or 'made,' creatures of purposeful design? And if they're made, who makes them? Is each person the sovereign creator of his or her own volitions, or are they created for us, and we manipulated into holding them so that interests of which we may not even be aware can be served? In the case of the volitions that support the consensus for growth, Politics and Markets offers a clear and deeply unsettling set of answers. They are made, Lindblom argues, but not by a free and informed citizenry. They are instead the handiwork of 'business,' and we hold them not in our own interests, but in those of a ruling corporate elite.

'A key element of much democratic theory is the informed, active, rational participant, a point on which democratic theory can be suspected of being a form of wishful thinking' (Lindblom 1977: 132). Those who would see clearly must therefore consider
the ominous specific possibility that popular control in both market and
government is in any case circular. It may be that people are indoctrinated to
demand--to buy and to vote for--nothing other than what a decision-making
elite is already disposed to grant them. The volitions that are supposed to
guide leaders are formed by the same leaders (Lindblom 1977: 202).

These leaders 'undertake a steady propaganda designed to reduce any fundamental popular
hostility to business needs.... both by teaching popular attitudes favorable to business and,
more commonly perhaps, by teaching and in other ways inducing political acquiescence or
docility' (Lindblom 1983: 128; 1977: 203-06). And it has worked:

If the business message is getting through...we should expect a somewhat
narrowly constrained set of volitions that does not much question business
enterprise, the corporation, private property, and other fundamentals. Just so
(1977: 208). Most thoughtful men now give some significant credence to
Marx's argument that life in market societies powerfully affects the kind of
personalities formed. Hence, if a man feels free, it is often because he has
been shaped into just such a personality as he wishes to have and do what the
market system permits him to have and do (1980: 97). Take care to un-
derstand my argument. I do not point to measurable flows of indoctrinating
communications, messages, indoctrinations, and then claim to judge their
effect from the observed magnitudes. Instead I infer from the existence of a
pattern--a pattern of agreement--that a pattern of indoctrination must have
established the agreement. How else could it have come about? I can find no
other explanation (1983: 134).

In corporate capitalism, then, the planner's problem is solved not at the level of the
individual firm, but in the political economy as a whole. Submission to the managerial
control that must be exercised within the firm is won not by coercion, but by inculcating in
every ordinary man and woman a personal identification with the corporate planners'
pursuit of profit. And this identification is achieved not by a common desire to prevail in war or by the invocation of some great collective purpose, but by the purposeful creation of a citizenry so committed to the shallow ideal of ever increasing material wealth that they willingly surrender their moral, economic and political autonomy to an elite and a system that promises to give it to them. Lindblom sees in all of this much cause for contempt, and understandably so. But in his anger at what he sees as the manipulation of the masses by the captains of industry and their allies in government, he seems to imply that had the people been truly free to form their own volitions, they would surely have chosen other, nobler values. Better, perhaps, to believe this than the alternative, that not liberty but wealth is what the people really want.

Louis Brandeis took a different view. First as 'the people's attorney' in a variety of causes and then, for twenty-three years after his appointment by Woodrow Wilson in 1916, from his seat on the Supreme Court, Brandeis put his considerable powers of analysis and advocacy in the service of Jefferson's vision of free, self-reliant citizens joined in small institutions that placed a measure of responsibility in each of them, nurturing their talents and developing their capacities. 'Remember,' he wrote in 1922, '...that always and everywhere the intellectual, moral and spiritual development of those concerned will remain an essential--and the main factor--in real betterment.'

This development of the individual is, thus, both a necessary means and the end sought. For our objective is the making of men and women who shall be free--self-respecting members of a democracy--and who shall be worthy of respect. Improvement in material conditions of the worker and ease are the incidents of better conditions--valuable mainly as they may ever increase opportunities for development (Brandeis 1978: 45-46).

But the rapid growth of huge, hierarchically organised industrial firms after 1870 posed a grave danger to this development, threatening to create what Brandeis called 'a nation of slaves,' men and women who were little more than cogs in a mass production machine
driven by corporate bureaucrats. 'The proposition that mere bigness can not be an offense against society is false, because...our society, which rests upon democracy, can not endure under such conditions' (McCraw 1984: 109). Rather, Brandeis believed,

by the control which the few have exerted through giant corporations individual initiative and effort are being paralyzed, creative power impaired and human happiness lessened; that the true prosperity of our past came not from big business, but through the courage, the energy, and the resourcefulness of small men; that only by releasing from corporate control the faculties of the unknown many, only by reopening to them the opportunities for leadership, can confidence in our future be restored and the existing misery be overcome; and that only through participation by the many in the responsibilities and determinations of business can Americans secure the moral and intellectual development which is essential to the maintenance of liberty (Liggett v. Lee 1933: 580).

For Brandeis, then, the 'curse of bigness' was the threat it posed to the values that he, like Lindblom, held most dear, the moral development of the individual and the ideal of participatory democracy. He would not hesitate to use the full powers of government to reverse the trend toward bigness, shunning its material rewards for the developmental advantages of individual empowerment and small scale. Still, Brandeis understood that free men and women are never mere spectators of an autonomous drama that forces bigness upon them against their will. It is always within their power, as workers and consumers on the one hand and citizens on the other, to decide otherwise and manifest a volition for smallness either in the market or in popular legislation. But although the long, bitter struggle over the Sherman Act betrayed a widespread uneasiness with the advance of large-scale organisation and the desire for material comfort that drove it (Letwin 1965), by 1920 it was apparent to Brandeis that Americans had made their peace with them. Reflecting on his differences with Wilson, he said, 'In my opinion the real curse was
bigness rather than monopoly. Mr. Wilson (and others wise politically) made the attack on lines of monopoly—because Americans hated monopoly and loved bigness' (Brandeis 1978: 482). Their unthinkable swap of personal autonomy for mass production had turned responsible, self-reliant Americans into 'consumers,' whom he contemptuously described to George Soule as 'servile, self-indulgent, indolent, ignorant' (Brandeis 1978: 92). 'It's clear, I think,' he told Felix Frankfurter in 1925, 'that the gentle enslavement of our people is proceeding apace...& that the only remedy is via the individual. To make him care to be a free man & willing to pay the price' (Brandeis 1978: 193). But the people seemed to want the material bounty of corporate bigness more than the elevating rigours of liberty, and a short time later, he angrily captured the essence of the matter:

Isn't there among your economists some one who could make clear to the country that the greatest social-economic troubles arise from the fact [that] the consumer has failed absolutely to perform his function? He lies not only supine, but paralyzed & deserves to suffer like others who take their lickings 'lying down.' He gets no worse than his just deserts (Brandeis 1978: 207).

Lindblom has described the displacement of the small firms of the nineteenth century by the corporate giants of our own in words he might just as easily have used to describe the covert triumph of the materialist values that have made it possible:

Never much agitated, never even much resisted, a revolution for which no flags were raised, it transformed our lives during those very decades in which, unmindful of what was happening, Americans and Europeans debated instead such issues as socialism, populism, free silver, clericalism, chartism, and colonialism. It now stands as a monument to the discrepancy between what men think they are designing and the world they are in fact building (1977: 95).

But if this were ever true of Europe, the tortuous history of the antitrust movement in the United States and the fruitless, frustrated struggles of those, like Louis Brandeis, for whom opportunity and self-reliance were still the animating ideals of the American ex-
periment make clear that the decision for bigness in this country was made by a people fully aware of the choices before them. That Americans do believe the things the mass production of consumable wealth requires them to believe, that they have largely traded the independence and acceptance of personal responsibility Tocqueville admired for the narrow political vision and readiness to do as they're told that both Lindblom and Brandeis properly despise, is not a sign that their democracy has denied them what they want. It is rather a sign that their economy has given it to them. As Brandeis knew, the world we live in has not been forced on us, nor have we been manipulated into wanting it. For good or ill, unwilling to sacrifice our material interests in consumption and employment for the older virtues of autonomy and responsibility, we and our predecessors in this century have chosen to create it.

But whatever one might believe about how the volitions we hold have come to be what they are, the relevant question now is how they can be changed, how we can come to realise the extent to which our perceptions about social life and our inquiries into its possibilities have been impaired and, in so doing, to bring about the general intellectual liberation needed to make meaningful social change possible. In *Politics and Markets* itself, still wed to the idea that volitions are 'made,' Lindblom flirted briefly with the possibility that they might be *remade* by a charismatic, ideologically driven leadership and the energies thus released put to work at the task of achieving truly revolutionary social change. Just such an attempt, he said, had been a hallmark of Mao's China and, to a lesser extent, of Castro's Cuba. Lindblom called this the 'preceptoral' ideal,

a system of social control through highly unilateral governmental persuasion addressed not to an elite or to a bureaucracy alone but to an entire population. It is also a system for moving toward centrally desired aspirations, not a system for widespread participation in the establishment of social goals.... Persuasion, information, indoctrination, instruction, propaganda, counseling, advice, exhortation, education and thought control constitute the range of
methods used to induce the desired responses.... [The system] is aimed first...at the creation of the 'new man,' [one] 'with no selfish interests, heart and soul for the people,'.... who will 'autonomously' serve collective interests, that is, who will do on [his] own initiative what in other societies [he] must be commanded or induced to do (1977: 55-56, 277). 8

Fully aware of both its practical difficulties and its potential for 'ferocious oppression,' Lindblom argued nonetheless that

some credence has to be granted to some conspicuously humane elements of the preceptoral vision of social organization.... Maoist thought puts its emphasis on human spontaneity and consciousness rather than on technology. It is difficult to dismiss Mao's 'Of all things in the world, people are the most precious,' as mere rhetoric. On some counts as humane as any other great vision of man in the history of human aspiration, the vision of an 'educated' citizenry is appealing on many counts [and] on some points more so than the vision of market man (1977: 61-62).

But in the end, Lindblom could scarcely square this vision with either his head or his heart. As his own frank evaluation of the Chinese and Cuban experiments (1977: 56-59, 276-90) made clear, the 'centrally desired aspirations' at its core and the radical concentration of power over men's minds it entailed both implied claims for the potential of synopsis that cannot be sustained in practice, and Lindblom is in any case far too critical and independent an intellect to be deceived about the kind of life the 'new man' would (and did) actually live under such a regime. And so he began to explore an alternative conception of volitions, one in which they are 'grown,' not 'made.'

As early as 1958, Lindblom had distinguished the creation of knowledge about the social world from the active solution of problems, but saw both as governed by closely analogous processes of disjointed incrementalism and mutual adjustment (1958b). Now, building on ideas about the powers and limits of social science first expressed in Usable
Knowledge (1979b), he began to ask "Who Needs What Social Research for Policy Making (1984)?" His response reflected his lifelong denial of the possibility of analysis and policymaking in the public interest, the erroneous assumptions that correct policy can be known and that, once known, it can be put in place by a unitary decisionmaker. It was that everyone, and most especially dissidents ordinarily denied access to serious analysis, needs thoughtful, explicitly partisan analysis of social issues, and that once we have it, the search for truth itself can be committed to mutual adjustment, to the spontaneous, unpredictable give and take of the competition of ideas. 'All major social reforms, all great improvements in the welfare of humankind come from dissidents,' and to do their work they need the services of professional researchers who will 'acknowledge and display their selection of values and interests—in short, their partisanship—and give up any pretense or appearance of speaking from Olympus, or as neutrals, or as representing a nonpartisan integration of interests that is for the good of all and injurious to none' (Lindblom 1984: 313, 316). Only partisan analysis can foster the vigorous competition of ideas essential to pluralism and, as in a court of law, only in the intellectual thrust and parry of partisans can 'usable truth' emerge. 'Imperfect as the process is, indeed there is no feasible better alternative way of reaching an approximation to truth for social problem solving' (Lindblom 1984: 321).

But partisanship presupposes interests, and interests presuppose volitions. If the competition of ideas is to flourish, there must first be competing volitions, a state of affairs Lindblom had come by 1987 to see as precluded by 'a historical and continuing process of impairment of thought and discussion by indoctrination, as well as impositions that range from gentle intimidation to coercion, through which advantaged segments of society have sought, though usually not conspiratorially, to protect their advantages against slow erosion' (1987: 12-13). Probing the 'pattern of agreement' that so disturbed him in Politics and Markets, he broadened and softened his analysis of indoctrination in Inquiry and Change (1990), incorporating it within a larger, normatively more ambiguous
phenomenon, 'impaired' thought and inquiry that affected everyone, everywhere and at every moment in history. To be sure, conscious manipulation and indoctrination are important causes of our inability to recognise and solve social problems, but a deeper, more pervasive influence is 'socialisation,' the mental glue that holds society together. The concepts, rules and interpretive perspectives that comprise culture itself are communicated and enforced by a range of institutions, including family, school and church, and socialisation succeeds precisely because it impairs critical inquiry and the creation of new volitions. The result is a 'convergence' of attitudes, values and beliefs that need not amount to consensus but that must to some extent limit the competition of ideas (Lindblom 1990: 59-77).

To what degree this convergence must be preserved, and conversely to what degree it must be disturbed in order to promote the creation of new volitions and the competition of ideas, are questions that no single intellect can answer. And so they too must be committed to mutual adjustment, to a process of stimulation and probing of diverse alternatives that 'requires the participation of vast numbers of people [and] pervasive sustained inquiry at many levels of competence broadly distributed in the society' (Lindblom 1990: 233). In the end, it is mutual adjustment, the decentralised, unpredictable competition of ideas itself that not only determines how far it will be permitted to extend and thus how much freedom people will be given to create their own volitions, but that also generates the very multiplicity of volitions that sustains the competition.

If all social theorists and practical men in public life acknowledge at some level the indispensability of both central and mutually adjusitive transformation of diverse volitions, a great cleavage separates those who rely largely on centrality from those who rely largely on mutual adjustment. The conflict between the two positions poses a fundamental issue about social organization, and thus for the future of humankind (Lindblom 1990: 249).
Casting his lot here, just as he did in addressing the problems of policy, with those who would use reason only to create 'such decision-making machinery as reduces the demands made on reason and achieves a coordination of only partly reasoned decisions through processes of adjustment other than those that go on in the human mind' (1961: 320), Lindblom brings his intellectual journey full circle. His work, not unflawed, is a gift of real and lasting value to the new world struggling to be born as these words are written, a coherent vision of the good society in the great tradition of political economy.
ENDNOTES

1 See, for example, Anderson (1978), Premfors (1981), and Gregory (1989).

2 In an introduction to a collection of his essays, Lindblom briefly recounts some of the professional difficulties he encountered at Minnesota and Yale early in his career as a result of his scholarly interests and reflects, with no little regret, upon the distortions he sees them as having introduced into his work. Lindblom (1987: 15-19).

3 On the debate, see also Murrell (1983), Lavoie (1985) and Heilbroner (1990).

4 Compare Lindblom (1965: 137-38) and a very similar formulation in the context of individual utility maximisation by James March and Herbert Simon (1958: 137).

5 A much fuller exposition of these points is (Lindblom 1963: 81-143); at 82, Lindblom explicitly likens disjointed incrementalism to Karl Popper's earlier notion of 'piecemeal social engineering.'

6 Compare Hayek (1944: 56-71).


8 Compare Brandeis' enthusiasm for a strikingly similar 'new man' (Adelstein 1989: 646-55).