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Article
The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining : can it be good for efficiency?
Economics Letters
  • Artyom SHNEYEROV, Concordia University
  • Chi Leung, Adam WONG, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Document Type
Journal article
Publication Date
7-1-2011
Publisher
Elsevier
Keywords
  • Markets with search frictions,
  • matching and bargaining,
  • two-sided incomplete information
Disciplines
Abstract

We consider a private information replica of the dynamic matching and bargaining model of Mortensen and Wright (2002). We find that private information typically deters entry. But, the welfare can actually be higher under private information.

DOI
10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.016
E-ISSN
18737374
Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2011 Elsevier.

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Accepted Author Manuscript
Citation Information
Shneyerov, A., & Wong, A. C. L. (2011). The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: Can it be good for efficiency? Economics Letters, 112(1), 128-131. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.016