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Article
Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable
Games and Economic Behavior
  • Artyom SHNEYEROV, Concordia University
  • Chi Leung, Adam WONG, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Document Type
Journal article
Publication Date
6-1-2011
Publisher
Elsevier
Keywords
  • Nonparametric identification,
  • auctions
Disciplines
Abstract
Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specific, unobservable sets of potential bidders.
DOI
10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.011
E-ISSN
10902473
Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Inc.

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Citation Information
Shneyerov, A., & Wong, A. C. L. (2011). Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable. Games and Economic Behavior, 72(2), 574-582. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.011