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Article
Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information
Games and Economic Behavior
  • Artyom SHNEYEROV, Concordia University
  • Chi Leung, Adam WONG, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Document Type
Journal article
Publication Date
5-1-2010
Publisher
Elsevier
Keywords
  • Matching and bargaining,
  • search frictions,
  • two-sided incomplete,
  • information,
  • Diamond's paradox
Disciplines
Abstract
We study equilibria of a dynamic matching and bargaining game (DMBG) with two-sided private information bilateral bargaining. The model is a private information replica ofMortensen and Wright (2002). There are two kinds of frictions: time discounting and explicit search costs. A simple necessary and sufficient condition on parameters for existence of a nontrivial equilibrium is obtained. This condition is the same regardless whether the information is private or not. In addition, it is shown that when the discount rate is sufficiently small, the equilibrium is unique and has the property that every meeting results in trade.
DOI
10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.005
E-ISSN
10902473
Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2009 Elsevier Inc.

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Citation Information
Shneyerov, A., & Wong, A. C. L. (2010). Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(2), 748-762. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.005