Raise the Proof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense

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Almost everyone agrees that indigent defense in America is under-funded, but workable solutions have been hard to come by. For the most part, courts have been unwilling to inject themselves into legislative budget decisions. And when courts have become involved and issued favorable decisions, the benefits have been only temporary because once the pressure of litigation disappears so does a legislature’s desire to appropriate more funding. This article proposes that if an indigent defense system is under-funded, the state supreme court should impose a default rule raising the standard of proof to “beyond all doubt” to convict indigent defendants. The legislature would then have the opportunity to opt out of this higher standard of proof by providing enough funding to bring defense lawyers' caseloads within well-recognized standards or by providing funding parity with prosecutors' offices. Such an approach will create an incentive for legislatures to adequately fund indigent defense without miring courts in detailed supervision of legislative budget decisions. At the same time, because courts can check once per year to determine whether there is funding parity with prosecutors' offices or compliance with caseload guidelines, there will be constant pressure on legislatures to maintain adequate funding in order to avoid the higher standard of proof.

Indigent defense in America is woefully under-funded.1 Due to a lack of resources, many public defenders are forced to carry hundreds of cases, far in excess of recommended standards.2 Jurisdictions that appoint lawyers on an

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1 For the most comprehensive in a long line of articles chronicling the under-funding of indigent defense and its consequences, see Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 Hastings L.J. 1031 (2006).

2 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 Ann. Survey Am. L. 783, 816 [hereinafter Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just].
individual basis often pay them trifles to defend serious felonies. And to add insult to injury, defense lawyers in many jurisdictions are paid substantially less than their prosecutor counterparts. Each year, the states spend more than $5 billion on prosecuting criminal cases, plus additional billions of dollars on police and crime labs that are used to assist prosecutors, compared with less than $3 billion for indigent defense.

The results of under-funding indigent defense are not surprising. Poor defendants receive inadequate representation, wrongful convictions occur, longer prison terms are meted out to indigent defendants, and confidence in the criminal justice system is decimated. In short, unlike other areas of law,

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6 Scholars have recognized that most problems with indigent defense systems stem from the lack of funding. See Kyung M. Lee, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders, Indigent Defendants, and the Right to Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 373 (2004) (“Funding is conceivably related to every other problem in indigent defense”); Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Grieving Criminal Defense Lawyers, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1615, 1620 (2002) (“Poor training, perverse incentives, and massive caseloads (among many other consequences) all stem from the lack of resources devoted to criminal defense.”); Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just, supra note 2, at 816 (“The most fundamental reason for the poor quality or absence of legal services for the poor in the criminal justice system is the refusal of governments to allocate sufficient funds for indigent defense programs.”).

everyone is in agreement: the under-funding of indigent defense is a serious problem.8

There is no shortage of proposals for dealing with the problem. The American Bar Association and legal scholars have advocated requiring funding parity between prosecutors and defense lawyers.9 White-shoe law firms have brought litigation that demands increased funding, removal of caps on the fees paid to appointed lawyers, and judicial supervision of the criminal justice system.10 Still other observers have suggested making it easier to establish ineffective assistance of counsel on post-conviction review.11

Unfortunately, while some of these efforts had initial success, the improvements were short-term and already have dissipated.12 And the successes have been the exception, not the rule. More often than not, reform efforts have won praise from local newspaper editorials, but failed to convince the judiciary to intervene.13 In refusing to get involved, courts have pointed to abstention

8 See Lee, supra note 6, at 370 (“A survey of the literature unearths many scholars and practitioners criticizing, and lamenting, the state of indigent defense. Their conclusions are more or less the same: our indigent defense system is in a state of crisis.”); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L. J. 1, 10 (1997) [hereinafter Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship] (“Those familiar with the system agree that the story these numbers tell is generally true: Public defenders are terribly overburdened.”).

9 See ABA TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM (2002) (“There [should be parity] between defense counsel and the prosecution with respect to resources . . .”); Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219 (2004) (arguing for resource parity but suggesting it may come from legislative action without court intervention); Wallace, supra note 4, at 14 (“The U.S. Department of Justice endorsed the concept of parity in the same year that Gideon v. Wainwright was handed down.”).

10 See infra Part II.


12 See Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1736 (2005) [hereinafter Effectively Ineffective] (“[T]hese decisions have ultimately had less of a practical, sustainable impact than many had hoped.”).

13 Compare Editorial, Passing the Buck on Defendants’ Rights, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, May 6, 2003, at B4 (criticizing the lack of funding for Mississippi public defenders) with Quitman County v.
doctrine, separation of powers concerns, and the general fear that courts should not be in the business of micromanaging legislative budget decisions.\textsuperscript{14}

The challenge therefore is to offer a reform proposal that steers clear of courts’ concerns about micro-management and over-reaching. To effect sustainable change, the judiciary should not, by itself, attempt to fix foundering indigent defense systems. Rather, the courts should seek to motivate the legislatures to fix the problem by imposing an unattractive default rule that will operate in the absence of legislative action.\textsuperscript{15} The default rule should be simple, bright-line, and unequivocally within the province of the judiciary. Such criteria eliminate the most common proposals for remedying the indigent defense crisis, such as the suggestion that courts undertake the traditionally legislative task of ordering the expenditure of particular sums of money.\textsuperscript{16} Similarly, proposals that involve long-term judicial monitoring of indigent defense systems are neither bright-line rules nor, as experience has taught, simple.\textsuperscript{17}

There is an easier way. A bright-line and classically judicial solution would be for courts facing under-funded indigent defense systems to create a default rule raising the standard of proof in all criminal cases against indigent defendants. Rather than the traditional “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, the prosecution would shoulder the burden to prove indigent defendants guilty under a higher “beyond all doubt” standard. Because the “beyond all doubt”

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\textsuperscript{14} See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{15} See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 780, 827 (2006) (discussing the concept of “a default rule that is unattractive by design, so that politicians have an incentive to pick an appropriate conduct rule themselves”).

\textsuperscript{16} For an early article analyzing such judicial involvement, see Jerry Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 715 (1978).

\textsuperscript{17} See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1015, 1052 (2004) (explaining that “[c]ourts found they lacked both the information and the depth and range of control to properly formulate and enforce command-and-control injunctions” and that they have instead moved to experimentalist methods). Scholars disagree about the extent to which courts are continuing to impose structural injunctions. For a helpful summary of the literature and an argument that such injunctions have not died but, rather, become more focused, see Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 550 (2006).
standard of proof would be a default rule, legislatures would be free to opt out if they adequately fund their indigent defense systems. And to keep matters simple, legislatures could demonstrate adequate funding in either of two (and only two) bright-line ways: (1) the caseloads of government-funded defense lawyers do not exceed the recommended guideposts set by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, or (2) the funds appropriated for indigent defense are equal to the funds appropriated for prosecutors’ offices.18

Legislatures would be free to decide how to achieve either (or both) of these scenarios. They could appropriate more money for indigent defense, or they could encourage (or even require) prosecutors to charge fewer defendants, thus reducing the caseloads of government-funded defense lawyers. While the possibilities for implementation are numerous, the outcome should be predictable: prosecutors hostile to a higher standard of proof will lobby the legislature to ensure adequate indigent defense funding, and legislators seeking to be tough on crime will move quickly to ensure that an unnecessarily high standard of proof will not remain intact.19 Put simply, a default rule imposed by the judiciary will create a strong incentive for the key players in the criminal justice system to provide adequate funding for indigent defense.

This article begins with a brief overview of the under-funding of indigent defense in the United States and the massive problems it creates. Part II then reviews the litigation efforts that have been made to solve the funding crisis. Part II discusses why most of the proposals have failed outright or resulted only in short-term successes. Part III then examines the traditional proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard and argues that it would be permissible for the Court to impose a higher standard in cases involving indigent defendants. Part IV then

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18 Other scholars have advocated variations of these proposals, though not as a default rule linked to a heightened standard of proof. See GIDEON’S PROMISE UNFULFILLED, supra note 7, at 2073 (noting in passing that imposing the ABA caseload guidelines would require “little judicial inventiveness or lawmaking” and “would require little ongoing judicial management”); Wright, supra note 9 (arguing for resource parity but suggesting it may come from legislative action without court intervention).

19 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 534 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological Politics] (explaining that “at the most basic level, elected legislators and elected prosecutors are natural allies. Both need to please voters in order to survive, and for both, pleasing voters means essentially the same thing: punishing people voters want to see punished”).
advocates that the higher standard of proof operate as a default rule. Legislatures could opt out of the higher standard of proof by ensuring that caseloads remain within accepted guidelines or by funding defense resources at the same level as prosecution resources. Part IV explains that such a solution has the virtue of maximizing institutional competence. The proposal calls on the judiciary to serve its traditional function of imposing legal standards, while asking the legislature to fulfill its typical job of funding and implementing public policy.

I. The Indigent Defense Funding Crisis

A. The Under-funding Problem
There is no serious dispute that indigent defense is under-funded. As one commenter recently explained, “state and federal governments allocate over half of their criminal justice spending to the investigation and prosecution of crimes but only about two percent to indigent defense.”20 For instance, in 1998, the federal government spent nearly $5.5 billion to fund the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the U.S. Attorneys’ offices, but less than $400 million on indigent defense.21 Matters at the state level are no better. In a typical year, the states spend more than $5 billion to prosecute criminal cases compared with less than $3 billion for indigent defense.22 A 2000 report by the Department of Justice concluded that indigent defense “is in a chronic state of crisis” in large part because funding “has not kept pace with other components of the criminal justice system.”23

Unfortunately, the under-funding problem is national in scope. A review of Harris County, Texas – which has been the scene of legendary stories about


21 See id.

22 See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 5, at 13-14. As one noted observer has explained, “poor defendants receive only an eighth of the resources per case available to prosecutors.” DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 123 (2004).

sleeping and drunk lawyers—revealed that the highly capable District Attorney’s office spent $26 million in 1999, compared with $11.6 million for indigent defense. In Louisiana, a recent study found that prosecutors outspent government-funded defense lawyers by a three-to-one margin, and those figures did not account for the extra support prosecutors receive from police investigators and state crime labs, which are funded separately. In 2000, Mississippi spent more than $16 million to prosecute felony cases while less than $9 million was spent on indigent defense. As one observer recently detailed:

As late as 2000, defenders in one Georgia county were paid an average of $49.86 per case. Indeed in some states, teenagers selling sodas on the beach can earn more than court appointed counsel. In Wayne County, Michigan, assigned counsel made, after deducting overhead, $6 to $12 per hour . . . Minnesota’s 386 full-time public defenders worked 35,000 unpaid overtime hours in 2002, essentially meaning that part-time lawyers worked full time, and

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24 See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, Lawyer’s Fast Work on Death Cases Raises Doubts About System, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at 1 (describing the late Joe Frank Cannon, a lawyer in Harris County who repeatedly was appointed to handle capital cases even though he had 10 separate clients sentenced to death and reportedly fell asleep during a number of their trials).

25 See Bob Sablatura, Study Confirms Money Counts in County Courts: Those Using Appointed Lawyers Are Twice as Likely to Serve Time, HOUS. CHON., Oct. 17, 1999, at A1. The imbalance is not quite as big as it appears however. Throughout the United States, approximately 20% of criminal defendants hire private attorneys. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES (Nov. 2000) (stating that 80% of felony defendants are indigent). Thus, while the District Attorney’s office needs funding to prosecute 100% of crimes, the indigent defense system only needs funding to defend 80% of the cases. Nevertheless, the funding difference in Harris County is still far out of balance.

26 See Catherine Beane, Gideon Shattered: Justice Stands Still in Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana, CHAMPION, Mar. 27, 2004, at *8; NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF TRIAL LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN LOUISIANA 40 YEARS AFTER GIDEON (Mar. 2004) [hereinafter NLADA, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE].

full-time lawyers worked nights and weekends to get the job done.\textsuperscript{28}

While there have been improvements in certain localities, for many jurisdictions the situation is becoming worse.\textsuperscript{29} The City of Pittsburgh cut funding for twelve of the city’s fifty-seven public defenders even though the judge heading the criminal division had recommended against such cuts.\textsuperscript{30} Due to budget shortfalls, Connecticut reduced funding for more than half of 51 attorneys and support staff that had recently been hired as part of a settlement to litigation challenging excessive caseloads.\textsuperscript{31} In many jurisdictions, state governments contribute little or no money to indigent defense, requiring county governments to shoulder the entire burden themselves.\textsuperscript{32} In counties with tight budgets, it is nearly impossible to find the necessary funding.

\section*{B. The Results of Under-funding}

The most obvious problem caused by the under-funding of indigent defense is that jurisdictions cannot hire a sufficient number of lawyers, leaving existing staff with excessive caseloads. The excessive caseloads in turn lead to a host of additional problems. Because lawyers are overwhelmed, they lack the time to promptly meet with their clients, leaving indigent defendants to languish in jail for egregiously long periods of time without ever speaking to a lawyer. When lawyers do meet with their clients, they often pressure the defendants to plead guilty irrespective of the merits of the case because of the lack of time to prepare for and conduct a trial. Those defendants who do insist on proceeding to trial are handicapped with inexperienced, overwhelmed, or

\textsuperscript{28} Lee, \textit{supra} note 6, at 375-376 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{See}, e.g., Stuntz, \textit{Uneasy Relationship, supra} note 8, at 9-10 (“[S]pending on indigent defendants in constant dollars per case appears to have declined significantly between the late 1970s and the early 1990s.”).

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{See} Bright, \textit{Neither Equal Nor Just, supra} note 2, at 817 (citing Jan Ackerman, \textit{Public Defenders Feel Betrayed by Heavy-Handed County Axing}, \textit{PITT. POST-GAZETTE}, Feb. 27, 1996, at B1).


\textsuperscript{32} \textit{See}, e.g., Everett, \textit{supra} note 27, at 224 (“With the exception of death-penalty cases, the State of Mississippi does not contribute one dollar towards the representation of poor defendants.”).
incompetent lawyers who lack the funds for basic litigation resources such as investigators and expert witnesses. The hurried plea bargains and rushed trials result in convictions of some factually innocent defendants and in harsher sentences than those meted out to comparable non-indigent defendants. As explained in more detail below, the under-funding of indigent defense pervades every step of the criminal justice process.

1. Excessive Caseloads
First, the lack of funding for indigent defense means that most public defenders (and many appointed counsel) are handling excessive caseloads. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals – a national body established by the Department of Justice to implement recommendations from the President’s 1968 Crime Commission – has recommended that public defenders handle no more than 150 felonies or 400 misdemeanors in any year. The National Legal Aid and Defender Association has endorsed these guideposts, and the American Bar Association has cited them approvingly multiple times. Commentators have recognized that these caseload standards “have been widely adopted and have proven quite durable.” Yet, public defenders in Connecticut sometimes each handle more than 1,000 cases per year. A recent study of Virginia’s indigent defense system found that in most local jurisdictions public defenders were carrying between 100 and 200 open cases at any given time, far in excess of recommended standards. One overwhelmed lawyer explained that because the public

33 See Lee, supra note 6, at 377-378.
36 See, e.g., GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 5, at 17-18; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, KEEPING DEFENDER WORKLOADS MANAGEABLE 8 (2001).
38 See Wagner, supra note 31.
39 See SPANGENBERG, VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 27-29.
defenders have so many open cases, “we let things slide. We cannot help it. We don’t have time for investigation or research.”

A Minnesota public defender recently quit his job after handling 135 felony cases, nearly 400 misdemeanors, and nearly 200 other matters in a single year. He was doing the job of at least two full-time lawyers. In a seven-month period, a single public defender in Louisiana represented 418 defendants. A more recent Louisiana study found that a part-time public defender in Avoyelles Parish was paid $19,200 to handle all of the jurisdiction’s 1,008 misdemeanor cases and 256 juvenile cases. Without taking into account the felony arraignments he was expected to staff and the additional private cases he also maintained, the “part-time” public defender was handling four-and-a-half times as many cases as national caseload guidelines recommend. In another Louisiana parish, public defenders, in addition to defending private clients, carry an average open caseload of 590 felonies and 150 misdemeanors, far in excess of national guidelines. And so the story goes throughout the United States.

2. Lengthy Delays Before Meeting With Lawyers

Because of their crushing caseloads, many defense lawyers lack the time to meet with their clients, instead spending almost their entire workday in triage, negotiating guilty pleas on the eve of trial and, in worst-case situations, actually trying cases. Under these circumstances, over-burdened public defenders have little time for the “less important” task of visiting their clients in jail and pushing

40 Id. at 28-29.

41 See Conrad DeFiebre, Public Defenders Seek Lighter Load: With Its Attorneys Overworked, the Board of Public Defense Has Asked the State’s High Court for Help, STAR TRIBUNE, Aug. 30, 2003, at 1B. The average Minnesota public defender handles more than 900 cases per year. See Backus & Marcus, supra note 1, at 1056.

42 See State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780, 784 (La. 1993)

43 See Beane, supra note 26, at *12-13.

44 See id. at *13.

45 See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument From Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 809 (2004) (discussing the rationing of scarce resources); Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just, supra note 2, at 790 (discussing “triage”).
for speedy bail hearings. For instance, a study of Calcasieu Parish in Louisiana found that public defenders who represented 85% of the inmates made 31 jailhouse visits, while private lawyers who represented 15% of the inmates made 236 visits during the same time-period.\textsuperscript{46} The American Bar Association recently reported that defendants in Montana remain in pretrial detention for up to six months without any contact from an attorney.\textsuperscript{47} In Mississippi, a woman who was arrested for stealing $200 spent eight months in jail without ever seeing a lawyer.\textsuperscript{48} Eventually she gave up hope of receiving a lawyer and pled guilty to time served simply to get out jail.\textsuperscript{49}

The problem is just as serious in jurisdictions that utilize appointed counsel systems. Because many jurisdictions cap the total fees that appointed counsel recover, defense lawyers reap diminishing returns for each extra hour they work on a case.\textsuperscript{50} This creates a strong disincentive to make extra trips to the jail to meet with indigent clients prior to their arraignments. The fee caps imposed by the Commonwealth of Virginia are instructive. Virginia pays appointed lawyers at a rate of $90 per hour, but caps the payment for serious felonies at $395.\textsuperscript{51} Thus, after four-and-a-half hours of work, the appointed lawyer is working for free, hardly an incentive to take time-consuming trips to the local jail to meet promptly with new clients. As a result, many appointed lawyers behave strategically and wait until they have been assigned a substantial number of new clients before going to the local jail to meet with any of them. As one appointed

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\textsuperscript{47} See \textit{Gideon’s Broken Promise}, supra note 5, at 23.

\textsuperscript{48} See id.

\textsuperscript{49} See id; see also Backus & Marcus, supra note 1, at 1032-34 (recounting other egregious stories)

\textsuperscript{50} See Stuntz, \textit{Uneasy Relationship}, supra note 8, at 10 (“The real key to the statutory fee schedules, however, is not the hourly amounts but the caps on total fees. Most states have such caps.”).

\textsuperscript{51} See Va. Code sec. 19.2-163. The statute actually authorizes $445 per felony charge, but the legislature has not provided adequate funding. See SPANGENBERG, VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 48.
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lawyer candidly explained, “[I] will wait three to four weeks after appointment to visit in-custody clients so [I] can visit six or seven in the same trip to the jail.”

3. Assembly Line Guilty Pleas

When indigent defendants do meet with their lawyers they are often afforded assembly-line justice. Because defense lawyers have more cases than they can handle, they have a strong incentive to plead the cases out, and to do so quickly. The problem is particularly vexing in jurisdictions that subject appointed counsel to fee caps, because each additional hour worked provides diminishing returns or no payment whatsoever. As one appointed lawyer explained, “in court-appointed cases [we] spend as little time as possible on appointed cases . . . because if we want to make a living we have to get rid of the case as quickly as possible.” Not surprisingly, a study of New York City found that government-funded lawyers filed substantially fewer motions than retained counsel.

The situation is actually worse in jurisdictions that use low-bid contractors for their indigent defense cases, because such lawyers have no incentive to do anything other than plead defendants guilty. For instance, McDuffie County, Georgia, assigned all of its indigent defense cases to a lawyer who offered to

52 See SPANGENBERG, VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 51.

53 See Sablatura, supra note 25 (quoting Professor David Dow saying that “[p]art of the problem is that indigent cases pay so little that a court-appointed attorney needs a lot of cases to make a living . . . [and] the only way for attorneys to handle a large number of cases is to plead out as many clients as they can as fast as they can”).

54 See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 922 (2006) (“[D]efense lawyers who receive flat or capped fees can earn more if they have high turnover. The press of large caseloads and limited funding and support staff also pushes many lawyers and judges to settle quickly, before investing much work.”).

55 SPANGENBERG, VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 50.

56 See Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581, 767-770 (1986-87); see also Daryl K. Brown, Defense Attorney Discretion to Ration Services, 42 BRANDeS, L.J. 207, 212 (2003) (“Attorneys are assigned more cases than they can plausibly handle, so that each client has representation, but the quantity and quality of representation is constrained. Attorneys forgo motion practice, investigative options, and witness preparation.”).
handle the cases for about half as much payment as any other bidder.\textsuperscript{57} Over a five-year period, that lawyer encouraged hundreds of defendants to plead guilty while conducting only two jury trials and filing only seven pre-trial motions.\textsuperscript{58} Needless to say, the lawyer conducted no factual or legal investigation of his clients’ cases, and in most instances met with them only moments before they plead guilty.\textsuperscript{59}

The American Bar Association has reported that over a five-year period in Quitman County, Mississippi, 42\% of indigent defense cases were resolved by guilty pleas when the defense lawyer first met the defendant at his arraignment.\textsuperscript{60} The defense lawyer did not conduct a thorough interview with the client, meet the witnesses or visit the crime scene. In Clark County, Nevada, which employs seventy lawyers, approximately 99.5\% of cases are resolved without trial.\textsuperscript{61} Worse yet, a Montana lawyer who had a contract to handle all of a county’s indigent defense cases “once bragged to the chief prosecutor that ‘he got out of the 1990s without a trial.’”\textsuperscript{62}

4. Incompetent and Under-Resourced Trial Lawyers

Because funding for indigent defense is so low, competent lawyers usually refuse to take appointed cases. As a Virginia prosecutor explained:

Very few experienced attorneys are on those [court-appointed] lists, and the reason is, they can’t afford to be on them. So you either have very inexperienced attorneys right out of law school for whom any money is better than no money. Or you have people

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\item \textsuperscript{57} See Note, Margaret H. Lemos, \textit{Civil Challenges to the Use of Low-Bid Contracts for Indigent Defense}, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1808, 1809 (2000).
\item \textsuperscript{58} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{59} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{60} See \textit{Gideon’s Broken Promise}, \textit{supra} note 5, at 16.
\item \textsuperscript{61} See id. at 19.
\item \textsuperscript{62} See id.
\end{itemize}
who are really bad lawyers who can’t make a living except off the court-appointed list.63

Moreover, even though some appointed lawyers and public defenders are competent lawyers, these attorneys often lack the tools to provide a competent defense. While prosecutors have access to police investigators and forensic labs, most defense lawyers lack the funding for similar resources.64 At most, the typical public defender office has one or two investigators struggling to work on thousands of cases per year.65 Due to a lack of resources, many courts either refuse funding for expert witness or only allot a trivial amount of money.66 Additionally, government-funded lawyers often have inadequate access to basic legal tools such as law libraries, internet access, fax machines, and clerical support.67 For instance, a recent investigation of Louisiana found that one prosecutor’s office had recently undergone an $850,000 renovation and

63 Laura LaFay, Virginia’s Poor Receive Justice on the Cheap: Rock-Bottom Pay for Court-Appointed Lawyers Undermines System, Lawyer Says, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 15, 1998, at A1; SPANGENBERG, VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 52 (quoting lawyers as saying that “[n]o attorney with any self respect will do these [appointed] cases any longer than he has to.”).

64 See, e.g., THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, INDIGENT DEFENSE IN GEORGIA: A STUDY FOR THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S COMMISSION ON INDIGENT DEFENSE 65 (2002) (“[E]ven attorneys who feel an investigator or an expert would help in their cases are reluctant to file motions securing investigative help a) because it will be a waste of time, as such requests are routinely denied and /or b) because it might annoy judges.”).

65 See, e.g., Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 739, 781 (explaining that most indigent defendants “have little or no investigation done on their cases”); State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780, 784 (La. 1993) (explaining that 3 investigators were responsible for handling 7,000 cases per year); SPANGENBERG, VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 38 (reporting that there are a total of 26 investigators to handle all of the indigent defense cases in the Commonwealth of Virginia and that “the vast majority of cases receive no investigative work”); Beane, supra note 26, at *13 (explaining that in Calcasieu Parish “the District Attorney’s Office has 14 staff investigators as well as investigative assistance from local law enforcement, [but] the public defender’s office has only two staff investigators”).

66 See Backus & Marcus, supra note 1, at 1099-1100; GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 5, at 10-11.

67 See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 5, at 10; SPANGENBERG, VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 36-38.
“exude[d] professionalism,” while the indigent defense board was in “disarray,” with no receptionist and papers and casefiles piled in the hallway.68

5. Wrongful Convictions, Unjust Sentences, and Defaulted Appeals

When indigent defendants proceed to trial they are often represented either by incompetent lawyers, attorneys handling too many cases to perform satisfactorily, or competent lawyers who lack the resources to put forth an adequate defense. Not surprisingly, these indigent defendants are almost always found guilty at trial.69 And while most criminal defendants are in fact guilty, wrongful convictions occur, and innocent indigent defendants are at greater risk than those with retained counsel. The Innocence Project, which has helped to free scores of innocent felons over the last fifteen years, identifies the lack of funding for indigent defense as one of the prime reasons for wrongful convictions.70 In one recent case, DNA technology exonerated a man who had served more than fifteen years for child rape. At trial, his appointed lawyer did not attempt to exclude an equivocal eyewitness identification, filed no pre-trial motions, undertook no investigation, presented no expert testimony, and failed to even file an appeal.71 The apparent reason for the appalling representation (and the wrongful conviction) was that the lawyer had a flat-fee contract with the county and received the same minimal compensation, regardless of whether he prepared adequately or not.72 Countless other innocent victims surely languish

68 NLADA, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 54.

69 See Dean J. Champion, Private Counsels and Public Defenders: A Look at Weak Cases, Prior Records and Leniency in Plea Bargaining, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. 253, 258 (1989) (concluding that defendants represented by public defenders have fewer trials and a greater number of convictions than defendants represented by private counsel).


71 See Lefstein, supra note 3, at 860.

72 See id.
in prison due to the inadequate representation they received as a result of the under-funding of indigent defense.73

Wrongful convictions are not the only problem however. Studies demonstrate that defendants represented by under-funded defense lawyers are sentenced to longer prison terms74 than their non-indigent counterparts.75 Because most defendants plea bargain, sentencing is often determined by the attorneys’ deal-making skills. Given that the extremely complicated federal and state sentencing guidelines (and the cases interpreting them) are thousands of pages long, savvy and hard-working lawyers have considerable room to negotiate during plea bargaining, thus ensuring better sentencing deals than those procured by inexperienced or over-worked lawyers.76 In this respect,

73 See BARRY SHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS FROM EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000); Lefstein, supra note 3, at 858-60 (describing the prospect of thousands of wrongful convictions each year and explaining that “[n]either the number of mistakes attributable to defense counsel errors nor the exact number of wrongful convictions can ever be known”). On the problem of innocent defendants pleading guilty to avoid the risks of trial with a poor defense lawyer, see Uphoff, supra note 65, at 796-802.

74 See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman et al., An Empirical Study of Public Defender Effectiveness: Self-Selection By the “Marginally Indigent,” 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 223 (2005) (finding that Denver public defenders achieved worse sentencing outcomes for their clients than private defense counsel, but cautioning that the results may be due to “marginally-indigent” defendants who know they have worse cases opting for public defenders rather than scraping together the money to pay private counsel in a losing battle); Sablatura, supra note 25 (“Criminal defendants in Harris County represented by court-appointed attorneys were twice as likely to be sentenced to jail or prison than defendants with money to hire their own lawyers.”); Champion, supra note 69, at 261 (studying 1,175 cases and finding that for plea agreements secured by public defenders “the incarceration periods were significantly longer compared with lengths of incarceration contained in plea agreements involving private attorneys”).

75 Moreover, because some of the most appalling representation occurs in capital cases, indigent defendants face greater risks of being sentenced to death. For instance, the infamous Joe Frank Cannon – the late Houston lawyer who repeatedly was appointed to cases even though he had been drunk or slept through prior trials – saw ten of his clients go to death row. See Barrett, supra note 24; Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just, supra note 2, at 789; see also David R. Dow, The State, the Death Penalty, and Carl Johnson, 37 B.C. L. REV. 681, 694-695 (1996). Courts continue to appoint inadequate lawyers – even in death-penalty cases – because the funding appropriated for indigent defense is far too low to attract better lawyers.

76 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2483-84 (2004) [hereinafter Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow] (explaining that “[c]omplexity favors intelligent, savvy repeat players who build up expertise and who pool information” whereas “[g]uidelines neophytes, in contrast, may be ignorant of these opportunities”).
indigent defendants represented by public defenders (who are repeat players) may be better off than defendants represented by appointed lawyers. Yet, even the hardest working public defenders -- many of whom are quite savvy -- are handicapped by a lack of time to explore and research potentially helpful sentencing issues. Additionally, as Professor Stephanos Bibas has pointed out, because mandatory minimum and maximum sentences pervade criminal law, “[k]nowledgeable defense lawyers who act quickly may strike early charge-bargains before a grand jury indict its” thus guaranteeing substantially lower sentences.77 By contrast, overwhelmed government-funded lawyers typically do not meet with their clients until well after indictment and therefore have no opportunity to utilize this tactic in the hopes of securing a lower sentence.

Finally, indigent defendants suffer on appeal as well. A recent review of defaulted appeals in Virginia found that public defenders and court-appointed lawyers were responsible for more than 70% of the defaults.78 Either because these lawyers were too busy or too incompetent, they failed to file the simple piece of paper necessary to preserve an appeal. More disheartening, judges continued to appoint these lawyers to represent indigent defendants, including one lawyer who defaulted six appeals in a single year.79

In sum, because the fees paid to appointed lawyers are so low, quality lawyers refuse to take the cases and judges have no choice but to re-appoint incompetent or overwhelmed lawyers. Indigent defendants suffer during pre-trial discovery, at motion practice, during trial, at sentencing, and on appeal.

II. The Reform Attempts: Failure or Fleeting Successes

Frustrated with the lack of indigent defense funding, public defenders, criminal defense associations, and law firms working in pro bono capacities have brought litigation to demand increased funding for indigent defense. The results have been disappointing. As detailed below, many efforts have failed at the outset, with courts dismissing the litigation outright. In other cases, legal

77 Id. at 2484.


victories have been achieved in court, only to see the improvements vanish over time.80

A. Outright Defeats

For more than a generation, the most obvious avenue for vindication of criminal defendants’ rights has been in federal court.81 Not so with indigent defense however. Federal courts have rejected systemic challenges to state indigent defense systems on abstention grounds.82 Applying Younger abstention, courts have held that so long as there is an available remedy in state court, federal courts should not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings.

Many state courts also have been unsympathetic to systemic challenges because the plaintiff bringing the case cannot personally point to inadequate representation. For instance, when a Minnesota public defender sought a declaratory judgment that the indigent defense system was unconstitutional because the lack of funding resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel, the state supreme court rejected the challenge because the indigent defendant could not demonstrate that his particular lawyer was sub-standard.83 Likewise, the Virginia Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to fee caps that limited attorney recovery to less than $400 per case because the lawyer bringing the challenge had “vigorously” represented his client.84 Similar litigation efforts have failed in Alabama,85 Iowa,86 Michigan,87 New Jersey,88 Utah,89 and Vermont.90

80 For the best analysis of the failed litigation efforts, see Wright, supra note 9, at 244-48.

81 For the classic article praising the ability of federal courts over state courts to protect individual rights, see Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). While the perception of federal superiority has long existed, scholars have questioned whether it is in fact true. See Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457 (2005) (discussing the literature).


83 544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996).

84 See Webb v. Commonwealth, 528 S.E.2d 138, 142 (2000). The focus on “actual injury” is a particularly vexing problem because the lawyers who typically raise challenges to the underfunding of indigent defense are themselves hardworking and effective, even in spite of their crushing caseloads. For instance, the lawyer who had the courage to bring the challenge in Webb – Steven Benjamin – has served as President of the Virginia Association of Criminal Defense
More creative challenges have failed as well. In Mississippi, clever lawyers tried to attack the lack of state indigent defense funding by using a county – rather than a criminal defendant – as the plaintiff and naming the state as a defendant. Although a high-powered legal team represented the county pro bono for more than five years, the Mississippi Supreme Court flatly rejected the claim.91

B. Settlement Victories . . . Or So They Seemed

Not all litigation has failed outright however. In a handful of cases, litigation has led to compromise legislation that has been lauded by the media and some reform activists. Ultimately, however, the results of the legislation have been unsatisfactory.

In 2003, the New York County Lawyer’s Association (NYCLA) convinced a trial judge that the rates for assigned counsel – $40 per hour for in-court work and $25 per hour for out-of-court work – were so low as to deny effective representation.92 Recognizing that it “does not have the capacity or the resources, nor it is it in the best position to provide a comprehensive solution,” the court nevertheless ordered that rates be raised to $90 per hour.93 The court

Lawyers and won the prestigious Lewis F. Powell pro bono award. See http://www.lawyers.com/benjamin&desportes/jsp2209433.jsp

85 See Ex Parte Grayson, 479 So.2d 76 (Ala. 1985).
86 See Lewis v. District Court, 555 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1996).
87 See Wayne County Criminal Defense Bar Assoc. v. Chief Judges of Wayne Circuit Court, 663 N.W.2d 471 (Mich. 2003). Notably, earlier litigation efforts in Michigan had proved successful, but sufficient benefits did not materialize. See Recorder’s Bar Ass’n v. Wayne County Court, 503 N.W.2d 885 (Mich. 1993).
91 See Quitman County v. Mississippi, 910 So.2d 1032 (Miss. 2005).
92 See New York County Lawyer’s Assoc. v. State, 763 N.Y.S.2d 397, 400 (N.Y. Sup. 2003).
93 Id. at 410.
encouraged the legislature to get involved, explaining that it is in “a better position to investigate, hold hearings, formulate, debate, [and] identify funding sources . . . to best meet the needs of the assigned counsel scheme.”94 Perhaps fearing a reversal,95 the County Lawyer’s Association accepted a settlement whereby the legislature agreed to new rates of up to $75 per hour to take effect in 2004.96

Most observers counted the NYCLA case as a victory for indigent defense,97 yet the victory was hollow. As part of the compromise, the legislation provided for a task force to be created to review the sufficiency of assigned counsel rates and issue a report to the Governor and the Legislature by January 15, 2006. Yet, no one was appointed to the task force and no report was ever issued.98 Accordingly, as one observer recently remarked, “the rates will not be readjusted or even reviewed” as was intended by the compromise legislation, and “the state seems again on a path where counsel rates remain stagnant for years as basic living expenses or attorneys increase.”99

Even more problematic, the increased fees for appointed counsel resulting from the NYCLA litigation has actually made representation for most indigent defendants worse.100 Many New York jurisdictions rely on both appointed

94 Id.

95 Within a few weeks of the favorable court ruling, the City filed a notice of appeal which prevented the judicially ordered rate increases from taking immediate effect. See Susan Saulny, Court Appeal Puts Off Raise for Poor Clients’ Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2003, at B3.


97 See Susan Saulny, Lawyers’ Fees to Defend the Poor Will Increase, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2003, at B1 (quoting NYCLA Vice President’s response to the legislative compromise as a “major breakthrough” that is “having a ripple effect on indigent-defense systems across the country”); Susan Saulny, Judge Orders Rates Doubled for Lawyers for the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at B3 (quoting NYCLA Vice President response to the court ruling as “this is great news”).


100 See id. (“The hard fought effort to increase assigned counsel rates . . . actually had a negative impact on indigent defense representation.”).
counsel and public defenders, and the NYCLA decision only mandated higher compensation for the former. Because the State of New York did not provide sufficient funding to cover the higher fees for appointed counsel, cash-strapped jurisdictions turned to cheaper and already over-burdened public defenders to handle even more cases.101 The Legal Aid Society, which already provided the bulk of indigent defense representation in New York City, was called upon to handle more cases, yet it did not receive additional funding to deal with those cases. To the contrary, budget shortfalls forced the Legal Aid Society to layoff 25% of its support staff in 2004.102

Thus, three years after the NYCLA decision, a report by a nationally recognized indigent defense expert concluded that “New York’s indigent defense system is in a serious state of crisis and suffers from an acute and chronic lack of funding.”103

A similar turn of events recently occurred in Massachusetts. In 2004, the Massachusetts Supreme Court concluded that indigent defendants’ constitutional rights were being violated because the state paid attorneys so poorly—as little as $30 per hour—that it could not attract enough lawyers, leaving defendants to languish in jail.104 The Court did not raise lawyers’ hourly rates, but instead ordered that if defendants were not provided with counsel within seven days of their arrest they would have to be released.105 About one year after the Court’s decision, the legislature raised rates by $7.50 per hour,106 and various groups declared victory.107 Yet, the victory was short-lived. Within

101 See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN NEW YORK: A STUDY FOR CHIEF JUDGE KAYE’S COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES 153, 156 (2006).

102 See id. at 132, 163.

103 Id. at 155.


105 See id. at 911. A handful of defendants were released because appointed lawyers refused to provide representation. See Conor W. Daly, Avoiding a New Willie Horton Problem: Creating a Better Public Counsel System in Massachusetts, 18 GEO. J. L. ETHICS, 679, 684 (2005).


107 See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, INDIGENT DEFENSE IN MASSACHUSETTS: A CASE HISTORY OF REFORM 1 (2005) (“On July 29, 2005, the Massachusetts Legislature made significant changes to
a year, the Massachusetts’ indigent defense commission ran out of money to pay its bills (including its lawyers and investigators), and in the next budget session legislators attempted to cut the funding necessary for the rate increases.\textsuperscript{108} In any event, even the nominal rate increases were not enough to satisfy local attorneys and there continues to be a shortage of lawyers to handle appointed cases.\textsuperscript{109}

\textbf{C. Litigation Victories . . . Or So They Seemed}

More celebrated than the compromise legislation adopted in New York and Massachusetts are the handful of decisions in which courts have clearly ruled in favor of indigent defendants. Once again however, these successes are less than meets the eye.

In the most famous decision, \textit{State v. Peart},\textsuperscript{110} the Louisiana Supreme Court considered the plight of a defendant who was represented by a public defender who had represented more than 400 defendants in a seven-month period and had a felony trial scheduled for every trial date on the docket.\textsuperscript{111} The Court labeled the indigent defense system a “crisis” and called on the legislature to act.\textsuperscript{112} In the interim, the Court imposed a presumption that all indigent defendants in an under-funded jurisdiction were receiving ineffective assistance of counsel, and it placed the burden on the government to rebut the ineffectiveness presumption.\textsuperscript{113} The Supreme Court further instructed trial judges that if they were not satisfied with the level of representation they “shall

\textsuperscript{108} See Noah Schaffer, \textit{Funding for Indigent Defense Representation Appears to be in Limbo in MA Legislature, MASS. LAWYERS WEEKLY, July 17, 2006 (“[T]he increase for private counsel slated to go through this year was stripped from the fiscal 2007 budget that recently came out of a conference committee.”).}


\textsuperscript{110} 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993); see also \textit{GIDEON’S PROMISE UNFULFILLED, supra} note 5, at 2073 (discussing rebuttable presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel).

\textsuperscript{111} See \textit{Peart}, 621 So.2d at 784.

\textsuperscript{112} See \textit{id.} at 790-91.

\textsuperscript{113} See \textit{id.} at 791.
not permit the prosecution to go forward until the defendant is provided with reasonably effective assistance of counsel.”114 Finally, the Court threatened that if “legislative action is not forthcoming and indigent defense reform does not take place” the Court “may find it necessary to employ more intrusive and specific measures.”115

At least initially, the Court’s decision in Peart had its desired effect. The State of Louisiana increased funding for public defenders by $5 million and created a task force to study the situation.116 The progress was short-lived however. Judges presented with clearly guilty defendants have been reluctant to enforce the Peart rule and possibly set guilty criminals free.117 More importantly, the rebuttable presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel has not encouraged the legislature to enact further funding increases, thereby allowing compensation rates to stagnate.118 As one of the dissenting Justices in Peart complained, the Court’s decision “failed to set forth any standards to give the legislative and executive branches guidance in bringing the system into constitutional compliance.”119

Thus, although the legislature provided some additional funding in the wake of the Peart decision, in subsequent years the funding did not keep up with inflation or continually increasing caseloads,120 and Louisiana’s indigent defense

114 Id. at 792.
115 Id. at 791.

117 As one Louisiana appellate judge has remarked, releasing defendants under ineffective assistance of counsel theories “likely will result in heightening public distrust in the bench and bar. Releasing defendants, who potentially represent a threat to the public, to solve an ill in the system is a remedy far too risky to embrace when alternative solutions are available.” Cooks & Fontenot, supra note 46, at 213.

118 See id. at 209 (describing the local funding of indigent defense more than a decade after Peart and explaining that the State of Louisiana contributes less than $2 per case); Wright, supra note 9, at 251 (“The heartening victory in the Peart litigation unraveled in less than a decade.”).

119 Peart, 621 So. 2d at 795 (Dennis, J., dissenting).

120 See Effectively Ineffective, supra note 12, at 1737-38; Wright, supra note 9, at 250-51 (describing Peart as a “temporary solution”).
system is still in tatters. The trial court recently “expressed its frustration with the continued lack of funding and the fact that it faces some version of the same funding dilemma in virtually every criminal case before it.” The trial court ordered the parish to set aside hundreds of thousands of dollars for indigent defense, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the courts lacked authority to issue such an order to the parishes. The Supreme Court was left once again to threaten the legislature, this time suggesting that if adequate funding is not appropriated, defendants will be given the option to file motions to halt the prosecution and possibly go free. Much like the rebuttable presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court’s new threat to allow trial judges to halt prosecutions is a flawed remedy because it shifts the burden onto trial judges to analyze individual cases, rather than creating a sufficient incentive for the legislature to act.

A similar problem bedeviled an otherwise promising decision by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. In State v. Lynch, the court relied on its “inherent power to define and regulate the practice of law” to hold that a cap on fees for appointed counsel violated the Oklahoma Constitution. The court called on the legislature to address the problem, but in the meantime it increased fees for appointed counsel to be equivalent to the hourly rate for prosecutors. As in Louisiana, the Supreme Court’s action initially led the legislature to appropriate more funding and to create a supervisory indigent defense board. Shortly

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121 See Beane, supra note 26; NLADA, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 26. Matters have been made even worse by Hurricane Katrina. See Gwen Filosa, Judge Blasts Financing for Indigent Defense, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 24, 2006 (describing how Hurricane Katrina caused more problems for an already overburdened system); Leslie Eaton, Judge Steps in for Poor Inmates Without Justice Since Hurricane, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2006, at A1 (“The criminal justice system in New Orleans was notoriously troubled long before the storms, and if anything, it is now worse.”).


123 See id. at 336.

124 See id. at 338.

125 796 P.2d 1150, 1163 (Okla. 1990).

126 See id. at 1161. The Court also required compensation for reasonable overhead expenses. See id.

127 See Effectively Ineffective, supra note 12, at 1739.
thereafter, however, Oklahoma moved to a low-bid contractor approach to indigent defense, and funding for the indigent defense board began to dry up. As one observer remarked, “while the [Lynch] decision inspired change, it was unable to sustain it.”

The same problem occurred after a promising decision by the Supreme Court of Arizona. In *State v. Smith*, the defendant contended that his appointed lawyer, a contract attorney who was responsible for all of the county’s cases, was so overwhelmed that he did not have more than a few hours to devote to a burglary and sexual assault case. The Court looked to the guidelines recommended by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association – 150 felonies or 300 misdemeanors per year – and found Smith’s lawyer to be well in excess of those standards.

Without finding that Smith in particular had received ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court held that the lawyer’s caseload was excessive and unconstitutional under the United States and Arizona Constitutions. The Court further stated that for future defendants represented by over-burdened, low-bid contract lawyers, there would be a presumption that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, which the government would have the burden of disproving.

Like *Peart* and *Lynch*, the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in *Smith* was initially successful. The county adopted a new system for hiring counsel and it began to pay them more. As with the other cases, however, the benefits were

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128 *Id.* at 1740.


130 *See id.* at 1380. Of the systemic efforts to improve indigent defense funding, the *Smith* decision is the closest parallel to the proposal I advocate in Parts III and IV because it tied funding to case limits and imposed a default rule in the absence of legislative action. The *Smith* approach suffered from two flaws that should not plague my proposal however: (1) it offered no way to measure continued compliance with caseload standards; and (2) it embraced a case-by-case inquiry for ineffective assistance of counsel, rather than a bright-line rule, thus putting the onus on trial judges rather than the legislature. For a discussion of these problems, see *infra* Part IV.C.

131 *See id.* at 1381.

132 *See id.* at 1384.

133 *See Effectively Ineffective, supra* note 12, at 1741.
ephemeral, with caseloads rising and attorney compensation remaining stagnant in subsequent years.\textsuperscript{134} 

To be sure, there have been cases in which litigation has succeeded in improving indigent defense. In particular, a handful of courts have held statutory caps on appointed counsel’s fee recovery to be unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{135} Yet, the larger story is that many litigation efforts have proven unsuccessful, and that even the cases lauded as “successful” efforts have ultimately proven to be failures.\textsuperscript{136}

III. Raising the Standard of Proof

Because prior proposals have failed to motivate legislatures to improve indigent defense funding, I suggest an alternate approach that focuses on a bright-line rule that is particularly within the province of the judiciary: a higher standard of proof. After briefly reviewing the history of the reasonable doubt standard, I argue that state courts should respond to the under-funding of

\textsuperscript{134} See id.

\textsuperscript{135} See Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770 (Ark. 1991); Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1986); State v. Robinson, 465 A.2d 1214 (N.H. 1983). These decisions support one of the premises of this article: the best chance for ameliorating indigent defense through the courts is if the judiciary makes bright-line rulings in their traditional areas of competence, such as striking down particular statutory provisions as being unconstitutional. See infra Part IV.C. For other smaller-scale victories, see Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1989) (holding that failure to compensate attorneys for representing indigents amounts to a taking); DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 O.2d 437 (Alaska 1987) (same). Additionally, a handful of other states have adopted legislation in an effort to improve the provision of the right to counsel. As scholars cautiously have observed however, “[s]ince these changes are still in their infancy, their efficacy cannot easily be measured.” Backus & Marcus, supra note 1, at 1103.

\textsuperscript{136} There also have been thought-provoking scholarly proposals that have not been adopted by courts. For instance, Professor Richard Klein has suggested that trial judges hold a pre-trial conference to review, \textit{inter alia}, pre-trial discovery, the number of times the lawyer has met with his client, and the legal issues that need to be researched. In the alternative, Professor Klein suggested that judges require lawyers to complete a written worksheet indicating what steps they have taken during the representation. See Richard Klein, \textit{The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The Impact on Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform}, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531, 580-82 (1988). As Professor Klein recognized, the likely reason this proposal has not been adopted is that holding such conferences or reviewing worksheets would be time-consuming and would “meet resistance in an already over-burdened system.”
indigent defense by adopting a default rule that raises the standard of proof to “beyond all doubt” for cases involving indigent defendants.

A. The Long History of the Reasonable Doubt Standard

Since the earliest days of American history, courts have required proof beyond a reasonable doubt to convict criminal defendants.\(^{137}\) And although no specific clause of the U.S. Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court implicitly has accepted the formulation for decades.\(^{138}\) Finally, in 1970, after a lower court tried to utilize a lower standard of proof in cases involving juveniles, the Supreme Court specifically held that there is a constitutional guarantee for the “accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”\(^{139}\)

Despite its long history the reasonable doubt concept has not remained entirely static however. Scholars have demonstrated that the language used to describe “reasonable doubt” has softened, thus arguably lowering the standard of proof.\(^{140}\) In the founding period, reasonable doubt was equated with “moral certainty.”\(^{141}\) Today some courts continue to instruct juries that they must find the defendant guilty to a moral certainty, but the Supreme Court has frowned on

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\(^{139}\)In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)

\(^{140}\)See Erik Lillquist, *Absolute Certainty and the Death Penalty*, 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 45, 52 (2005) [hereinafter Lillquist, *Absolute Certainty*] (“[B]oth the standard of proof stated by judges and the standard of proof applied by jurors appear to be weaker than what was understood to be required by proof beyond a reasonable doubt at the beginning of the nineteenth century.”) (emphasis omitted); Sheppard, supra note 137, at 1239 (“Over time, the loss of our understanding of moral certainty and the increasing acceptance of articulability as a basis for reasonableness underscored a great shift in thinking about judgment by a juror. The courts have moved the jurors’ goal from a vote for the state if the state can convince them of a fact to a vote for the state unless the defense can convince them of a certain type of doubt.”).

such instructions.\textsuperscript{142} In the absence of clear guideposts from the Supreme Court, different jurisdictions have embraced varied terminology to instruct juries on the meaning of reasonable doubt.\textsuperscript{143} Yet while there has been great variation (and difficulty) in defining reasonable doubt, the use of the standard itself is largely uncontroversial.\textsuperscript{144}

While the reasonable doubt standard remains largely unquestioned, a handful of commentators have suggested imposing a higher “no doubt” standard (or some variation) in capital cases.\textsuperscript{145} This “no doubt” standard was recently endorsed by the Massachusetts Governor’s Council on Capital Punishment, which had been empanelled to recommend a fair and accurate death-penalty system.\textsuperscript{146} A primary justification for the “no doubt” standard in

\textsuperscript{142} See Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990) (per curiam); see also Victor, 511 U.S. at 37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the “moral certainty” terminology because it could lead jurors “to believe that they could base their decision to convict upon moral standards or emotion in addition to or instead of evidentiary standards”).

\textsuperscript{143} See Larry Laudan, Is Reasonable Doubt Reasonable?, 9 LEGAL THEORY 295, 301-17 (2003) (discussing the different definitions courts use and that some courts do not define reasonable doubt at all).

\textsuperscript{144} See Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 112-117 (2002) [hereinafter Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt] (“The complete lack of controversy that surrounds the reasonable doubt standard implies that we are pretty happy with the way the standard operates.”).


\textsuperscript{146} See Massachusetts Governor’s Council on Capital Punishment, Final Report 22 (2004) (available at http://www.mass.gov/Agov2/docs/5-3-04%20MassDPReportFinal.pdf) (“[T]he jury should be required, as a prerequisite for imposing a death sentence . . . to find that there is ‘no doubt’ about the defendant’s guilt.”). For a discussion of the problem associated with raising the standard of proof in capital cases, see the thoughtful commentary by the Council’s co-chairman and noted death-penalty scholar, Joseph L. Hoffmann, Protecting the Innocent: The Massachusetts’ Governor’s Council Report, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 561, 573 (2005) (“[A]ny further shifting of the balance in favor of the capital defendant inevitably will produce even more ‘false negatives’ than it will eliminate ‘false positives.’”).
capital cases is that it would serve to minimize the number of wrongful convictions.147 As explained below, a higher standard of proof to convict indigent defendants also could reduce the risk of wrongful convictions, while at the same time serving to create incentives to increase funding for indigent defense.

B. The Argument for Raising the Standard of Proof in Indigency Cases

1. The Proposal

The proposal to raise the standard of proof to convict indigent defendants calls for action at the state-court level. When litigators challenge indigent defense systems they often ask courts to make factual findings or legal conclusions that the indigent defense systems are unconstitutionally under-funded.148 For courts that have made such a finding, the next step is to determine a remedy. Rather than ordering the legislature to provide more funding or subjecting the system to a structural injunction, courts could impose a blanket rule raising the standard of proof to “beyond all doubt” for all indigent defendants prosecuted from that day forward. In recognition of the fact that indigent defendants receive far less funding (and far less attorney competence) to support their defenses, the government would face a tougher standard to convict them. As I lay out below in Part IV, the higher standard of proof would be a

147 Other commentators have argued for less drastic revisions of the standard of proof in criminal cases. Professor Lawrence Solan, while not advocating the abandonment of the reasonable doubt standard, has argued that it does not focus sufficiently on the government’s burden of proof, therefore making it easier for jurors to convict defendants in weak cases that should probably result in acquittals. See Solan, supra note 141, at 132. Accordingly, he suggests that courts should re-direct focus to the government’s case by instructing jurors to be “firmly convinced” rather than focusing on doubts that support the defendant. See id. at 145-47. Similarly, the Federal Judicial Center has proposed defining proof beyond a reasonable doubt as proof that leaves you “firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt,” a standard that has been endorsed by such prominent judges as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Judge Jon O. Newman. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 17-18 (1988); Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Jon O. Newman, Beyond “Reasonable Doubt,” 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 991 (1993).

148 See, e.g., Quitman County v. Mississippi, 910 So.2d 1032 (Miss. 2005) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that indigent defense was under-funded).
default rule that the legislature could opt out of by providing adequate funding.\(^{149}\)

2. Why a Higher Standard of Proof Passes Constitutional Muster

Critics might complain that a higher standard of proof is unconstitutional because the Supreme Court explicitly recognized in 1970 that the Constitution requires the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases. This objection is without merit though. In constitutionalizing the reasonable doubt standard, the Court adopted a floor, not a ceiling.\(^{150}\) There is nothing in the United States Constitution to prohibit judges from requiring a higher standard of proof in cases where they believe it is necessary.\(^{151}\) Indeed, the Constitution does not explicitly provide any particular standard of proof, and the Court imposed the reasonable doubt standard to satisfy due process guarantees. Given that it is now clear that indigent defendants are not receiving adequate protections from their appointed counsel at trial, the Due Process Clause could be construed to require a heightened standard of proof. Moreover, even if state judges did not believe that the United States Constitution served as a basis for imposing a higher standard of proof, they easily could rely instead on their state constitutions because there is no requirement that state constitutions be interpreted co-terminously with the Constitution of the United States.\(^{152}\)

Furthermore, the proposal does not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. While wealthy defendants (who retain their own counsel) will be treated less favorably than poor defendants – by being subjected to a lower standard of proof – wealth is not a suspect classification.\(^{153}\) Thus, the rule would be subjected to

\(^{149}\) In certain respects, the proposal resembles the inverse of certain provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which encourages states to opt into a more favorable procedural posture by providing funding for counsel during state habeas corpus proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2261. I am grateful to Toby Heytens for making this point to me.

\(^{150}\) See Adam M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 IND. L.J. 571, 585 (2005) (explaining that “the Constitution acts as a floor that limits certain state experimentation”).

\(^{151}\) See Sand & Rose, supra note 145, at 1362-63 (explaining that courts have long recognized, consistent with the Constitution, various standards of proof and that “the more important the interest, the more certainty required in the accuracy of the adjudication”).


rational basis scrutiny and would survive review so long as there is a legitimate governmental purpose and the rule is rationally related to that purpose.154 Ensuring that indigent defendants are adequately represented and receive a fair opportunity to demonstrate their innocence is certainly a legitimate governmental purpose. And increasing the burden of proof to convict those defendants is rationally related to that goal.

Not only would the “beyond all doubt” standard be constitutional, it would also make sense as a matter of remedies jurisprudence. Notably, the proposal does not require courts to impose a higher standard of proof in all cases or in a vacuum. Rather, the “beyond all doubt” formulation would not be imposed until a state court first makes a finding that an indigent defense system has been unconstitutionally under-funded. Courts long have embraced more flexibility when remedying long-term misconduct. For instance, in affirmative action cases, courts are far more likely to permit racial preferences if there has been a history of discrimination than if the preferences were adopted in the abstract.155 The same approach applies here. The proposal to raise the standard of proof would not be advanced because courts think it is an abstractly useful idea, but rather to remedy the long-standing problem of under-funding indigent defense in particular jurisdictions.

C. Anticipating Objections to a Higher Standard of Proof

While a proposal to raise the standard of proof to convict indigent defendants is constitutional, there are serious objections that can be raised. First, as Professor Erik Lillquist recently has argued in the context of death-penalty cases, there is reason to believe that “the existing reasonable doubt jury instructions

154 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Furthermore, while it is true that the great majority of indigent defendants are African-American, and thus white defendants will be disproportionately saddled with the less rigorous reasonable doubt standard, disparate effects are not enough to nullify a governmental action. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Rather, there must be a discriminatory purpose, and none is demonstrated here.

155 See Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 505-509 (1989); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987) (“It is now well established that governmental bodies, including courts, may constitutionally employ racial classifications essential to remedy unlawful treatment of racial or ethnic groups subject to discrimination.”); see also Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (authorizing busing to remedy discrimination by explaining that “[o]nce a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad”).
have almost no impact on jurors’ decision-making.” 156 Studies demonstrate that a substantial percentage of jurors already wrongly perceive a higher standard of proof than the reasonable doubt standard requires. 157 By contrast, other jurors mistakenly apply a lower standard of proof even after being read the reasonable doubt instruction. 158 More alarmingly, studies demonstrate that jurors might be less likely to convict under the lower clear and convincing standard of proof than under the reasonable doubt formulation. 159 And still more social science research demonstrates that jurors simply do not understand substantial portions of what they are being told at all. 160 Moreover, when we consider that jurors come to court with preconceived notions based on what they have read in the newspaper or watched on “Law and Order,” a “beyond all doubt” instruction would have a

156 Lillquist, Absolute Certainty, supra note 140, at 47, 78-84.

157 See Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Jury Comprehension Project, 23 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 401, 414 (1990) (studying 600 actual jurors and finding that a majority of “uninstructed jurors revealed a belief that any doubt (or, alternatively, anything less than 100% certainty) is equivalent to reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt instructions apparently did little to improve jurors’ understanding that absolute certainty is not required.”).

158 See Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field Test Using Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 Land & Water L. Rev. 59, 98 (1998) (finding that nearly 10% of recent criminal jurors believed the burden of proof on prosecutors was “more likely than not” and that another 6% were “not sure” whether that was the correct standard of proof).

159 See Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions of Standards of Proof, 9 Law & Hum. Behav. 159, 172 (1985) (finding, inter alia, that California jury instructions led sample jurors to convict more easily under the reasonable doubt standard than the clear and convincing evidence standard); L.S.E. Jury Project, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 Crim. L. Rev. 208, 218-19 (same).

160 See Amiram Elwork et al., Making Jury Instructions Understandable 12 (1982) (concluding that jurors in some states understand only about half of the legal instructions presented by a judge); Alan Reifman et al., Real Jurors’ Understanding of the Law in Real Cases, 16 Law & Hum. Behav. 539 (1992) (determining that jurors understood less than half of the instructions they received at trial); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One, 52 Law & Contemp. Problems 205, 219 (1989) (same); Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 Law & Soc’y Rev. 153, 179-81 (1982); see also Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt, supra note 144, at 112-117 (discussing sources demonstrating that jurors do not perceive reasonable doubt to be a high, fixed standard).
lot of baggage to overcome.\textsuperscript{161} Accordingly, critics have some basis to contend that imposing a higher standard of proof might have limited effect.\textsuperscript{162}

However, while the social science research is startling, it does not demonstrate that a “beyond all doubt” instruction would be ineffective. Indeed, any competent defense lawyer would harp on the instruction during her closing argument and point out that it is higher than the traditional reasonable doubt standard.\textsuperscript{163} As even a skeptical observer has conceded, “the very novelty of the no-doubt standard will make it more salient and thus perhaps more likely to be heard and/or understood by the jurors.”\textsuperscript{164}

Assuming that a higher standard of proof would have an effect on jurors’ decisions, critics could next complain that the standard will result in setting free more guilty defendants.\textsuperscript{165} There is some merit to this objection because freeing the guilty carries a high cost.\textsuperscript{166} If the higher standard of proof resulted in droves of guilty defendants going free and only a handful of innocent defendants (who would otherwise have been convicted) being exonerated, the benefits might not outweigh the costs. Yet, the calculus is difficult to analyze because there is no

\textsuperscript{161} See Lillquist, \textit{Absolute Certainty}, supra note 140, at 82.

\textsuperscript{162} See id. at 47 (contending that a higher burden of proof would have (“little or no effect in real world cases”). \textit{But see} Norbert L. Kerr, et al., \textit{Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept Definition and Assigned Decision Rule on the Judgments of Mock Jurors}, 34 \textit{J. PERSONALITY \\& SOC. PSYCH.} 282 (1976) (studying mock jurors and finding that a less rigorous description of reasonable doubt led to higher conviction rates while a more stringent definition of reasonable doubt led to fewer convictions).

\textsuperscript{163} The very premise of this article casts some doubt on this point however, because we cannot assume that unimpressive or over-worked appointed attorneys will do an adequate job during closing arguments. \textit{See} Lillquist, \textit{supra} note 140, at 80, n.138. The counter-argument is that even the worst criminal defense attorneys can point out that the standard of proof is the very high “beyond all doubt” standard.

\textsuperscript{164} \textit{Id.} at 84, n.153.

\textsuperscript{165} \textit{Compare} In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“If, for example, the standard of proof for a criminal trial were a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, there would be a smaller risk of factual errors that result in freeing guilty persons, but a far greater risk of factual errors that result in convicting the innocent.”).

\textsuperscript{166} See Lillquist, \textit{Absolute Certainty}, \textit{supra} note 140, at 66 (“Advocates who wish to justify a higher standard of proof [in capital cases] . . . need to be clearer about why the harms are so much higher in capital cases that they justify a much higher standard of proof.”).
data on the number of guilty defendants who would go free under a beyond all doubt standard, nor on the number of innocent defendants who would be saved from wrongful convictions.

However, if the social science evidence discussed above is to be believed, the standard of proof, while having some effect on jurors’ decisionmaking, may not have a dramatic effect. Accordingly, the number of wrongful exonerations may well be low. Conversely, in assessing the benefits of the higher standard of proof, we must consider not only exonerations linked to the beyond all doubt standard, but also the systemic benefits that will result from states opting out of the higher burden of proof. As explained below in Part IV, the beyond all doubt standard would be a default rule that legislatures could opt out of by ensuring adequate indigent defense funding. Although it is unclear whether the higher standard of proof would make prosecutors’ jobs dramatically more difficult, that will certainly be the perception by the public and by most prosecutors. Accordingly, legislatures will be under pressure to opt out of the rule by properly funding their indigent defense systems. And by properly funding indigent defense, legislatures will improve representation for indigent defendants, thus reducing the risk of wrongful convictions, while conferring other benefits on the criminal justice system.

Third, critics might ask why is indigent defense special? If a higher standard of proof is to be applied in indigent defense cases, then why not in capital cases, or complicated securities fraud prosecutions, or cases in which there is no eyewitness or no DNA evidence? Put simply, why should indigent defendants be afforded a more beneficial standard than other defendants?

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167 See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.

168 By “other benefits” I mean to suggest that there is more at stake than simply convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent. For instance, a properly funded judicial system confers greater legitimacy on the conviction and imprisonment of individuals, demonstrating that the United States is an advanced democracy that takes criminal defendants’ rights seriously.

169 See Newman, supra note 147, at 998-1000 (arguing for “heightened scrutiny” in cases involving eyewitness testimony and uncorroborated testimony of accomplices because of the heightened risk of wrongful conviction, not “simply to tilt the balance of the criminal justice system a share more favorably toward defendants”).

170 See Lillquist, Absolute Certainty, supra note 140, at 70 (questioning why a higher burden of proof would be applicable in capital cases but not other criminal cases).
There are two possible responses. First, indigent defense systems are in such crisis that additional procedural regulation is merited. While securities fraud cases might be more complicated or death-penalty cases might be more important, those defendants are already protected in other ways. There are already a myriad of procedures in place in death-penalty cases. By contrast, without a higher standard of proof, there is little to protect indigent defendants represented by overworked or incompetent government-funded lawyers. No defendant can receive adequate representation when his lawyer has nearly 200 other open cases and no time to devote to preparing a defense. Second, the sheer magnitude of the problem merits special attention. Upwards of 80% of criminal defendants are indigent. In jurisdictions where indigent representation is in crisis, that means that up to 4 out of 5 defendants are being denied a fair shake. Such terrible numbers merit additional attention from the judiciary.

Finally, critics might complain that imposing a higher standard of proof would not address the core problem with the under-funding of indigent defense, because the vast majority of criminal cases are plea bargained and never proceed to trial where the standard of proof would matter. This objection is without merit however because imposing a “beyond all doubt” standard of proof would change the parameters of the plea bargaining process. Defendants who are

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171 Of course, scholars have argued convincingly that the extra procedural rules in death-penalty cases offer little actual protection to defendants. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 375-76 (1995) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s death penalty law [creates] an impression of enormous regulatory effort while achieving negligible regulatory effects.”).

172 See Jerold H. Israel et al., White Collar Crime: Law and Practice 9 (2003) (citing Kenneth Mann, Defending White Collar Crime (1983)) (“The white collar crime defense attorney, in contrast, enters the picture substantially before the government has completed its investigation and sometimes before the investigation has even begun . . . Counsel’s first line of defense accordingly is ‘information control,’ which entails keeping documents away from and preventing clients and witnesses from talking to government investigators, prosecutors, and judges.”).

alerted to the heightened standard of proof will be more likely to expect exoneration at trial and therefore less likely to plea bargain. A higher standard of proof therefore would force prosecutors to offer more favorable plea bargains or to take more cases to trial. Accordingly, the heightened standard of proof would have a significant systemic impact. As explained below, that impact would spur improvement in indigent defense funding.

IV. The Default Rule Solution

Having argued in favor of raising the standard of proof to deal with the crisis in indigent defense funding, it is prudent to leave a wide escape hatch that encourages the legislatures to opt out of the judicial remedy. Courts have made clear that they do not want to be in the business of supervising indigent defense systems or ordering particular sums of money to be spent, and legislatures no doubt agree. And whenever possible, it is preferable to encourage legislators to take a policymaking rule, rather than relying on courts. Accordingly, designing a default rule that allows legislatures to control their destiny by opting out of the “beyond all doubt” standard of proof is preferable.

A. Two Options for Opting Out of the Higher Standard of Proof

The default rule would operate as follows: In the first indigent defense case of the calendar year, a state court, upon motion by the defendant, would consider whether the indigent defense system is unconstitutionally under-funded. If the court were to find the system to be under-funded, it then would

174 See Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow, supra note 76, at 2499 (“If one side overestimates the chances of winning at trial, it is likely to make unreasonable settlement offers and to reject reasonable offers.”).

175 See infra Part IV.C.

176 See Wright, supra note 9, at 252 (“Courts also shy away from remedies that dictate to the legislature a method of addressing a legal violation, particularly when they require the legislature to appropriate public money.”). Professor Stuntz has argued that if the judiciary ordered money to be spent on indigent defense “[n]o judicial micromanagement would be necessary.” Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 8, at 71. Courts and legislatures do not appear to agree however.

177 An alternative, though less attractive, approach would be for a criminal defendant to file a civil action seeking a declaration that the indigent defense system is unconstitutionally under-funded and requesting that the standard of proof be raised to remedy the problem. Such an
impose a remedy whereby all indigent defendants could be convicted only upon proof beyond all doubt. Assuming that the trial court’s decision were upheld on appeal, legislatures thereafter would have the option to opt out of the higher standard of proof by demonstrating either that: (1) the caseloads of government-funded defense lawyers do not exceed the recommended guideposts set by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, or (2) the funds appropriated for indigent defense are equal to the funds appropriated for prosecutors’ offices.

1. Keeping Caseloads Under Control

The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals has recommended that defense counsel not handle more than 150 felony cases or 400 misdemeanor cases per year. This guidepost is widely accepted and has been endorsed by the National Legal Aid Defender Association and cited approvingly by the American Bar Association.

To bring caseloads within the National Advisory Commission’s guideposts, legislatures would have a number of options. They could appropriate more funding, thus making it possible for public defender offices to hire adequate staff as well as enabling courts to pay higher rates that would attract greater numbers of appointed counsel. Another possibility would be for legislatures to keep indigent defense funding static while providing incentives for prosecutors to reduce the number of criminal charges they bring, thus reducing defense

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See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. While the National Advisory Commission caseload standards are widely cited, they are far from perfect. They do not appear to have been derived from any empirical formula, and instead approximate a “best guess” of what reasonable caseloads should be. Nevertheless, in the absence of more authoritative standards, I rely on them as the best existing source.
caseloads. Alternatively, legislatures could decriminalize high volume offenses (such as drug possession), which would reduce the number of criminal cases and, in turn, the need for defense counsel. In a political world that prizes being tough on crime, these latter solutions seem implausible. In all likelihood, caseload guideposts with some teeth would encourage legislatures to (grudgingly) appropriate more money for indigent defense so that more defense lawyers could be hired.

Once a court has tied the standard of proof to caseload limits, the next problem becomes ensuring that there is compliance with the guideposts. The judiciary has neither the time, the resources, nor the ability to adequately analyze entire indigent defense systems on a regular basis. And courts will not want to be in the business of holding numerous fact-finding hearings to determine whether lawyers are actually following the caseload guideposts. Fortunately, many states already have organizations with the time and expertise to review defense lawyers’ caseloads: indigent defense commissions.

More than three-quarters of the states have created commissions or boards to recommend best practices for the defense of the poor.180 The members of the indigent defense commissions are typically appointed by the Governor, the state supreme court, and the legislature, and they come from a wide array of the community, including the judiciary, the executive branch, the criminal defense bar, and sometimes the business world.181 Although many of the commissions lack the budget to effect much change, some of them do succeed in improving funding, reducing caseloads, and creating standards for indigent defense. There is near universal consensus that such indigent defense commissions are a force for good.182 Accordingly, they would be well-suited to making an objective determination whether caseloads are in compliance with the National Advisory Commission guidelines, filling a role akin to a special master.183

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180 See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATEWIDE INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS (2005) (describing the commissions’ makeup and responsibilities). For jurisdictions without indigent defense commissions, the default rule would provide a strong incentive to establish such commissions.

181 See id.

182 See Malia Brink, Indigent Defense, CHAMPION, May 2005, at 30, 31 (explaining that indigent defense commissions serve to establish eligibility and qualification requirements, attorney performance standards, while managing the indigent defense system).

183 See Effectively Ineffective, supra note 12, at 1750 (suggesting that courts appoint special masters to order funding and review caseloads).
Here is how the commission would work: During the year, the commission could study caseload compliance and then -- perhaps on the anniversary of the court’s decision finding the indigent defense system to be under-funded -- the commission could certify in writing whether there has been compliance with the caseload limits. If there has been compliance, the court would then return the standard of proof to the reasonable doubt standard, where it would remain for the next year. The commission would then repeat its inquiry the following year, and report to the court again. Should the commission find that the jurisdiction has fallen out of compliance with the caseload standards, the court would then re-instate the higher standard of proof, which would remain intact until another year had expired.  

2. Funding Parity

In addition to caseload compliance, courts could establish funding parity as a method to opt out of the higher burden of proof. Put simply, if legislatures provide the same funding for indigent defense counsel that they do for prosecutors, then the higher burden of proof can be eliminated. Yet, for funding parity, the devil is in the details. Legislatures do not simply appropriate $100 million for prosecutors and $70 million for indigent defense and call it a day. Rather, the investigation, prosecution, and defense of criminal activity is funded in a host of manners though numerous budget lines. Money is appropriated not only for prosecution and public defender offices, but also for police departments, crime labs, appointed counsel, and sheriff’s departments. And to make matters more complicated, many jurisdictions receive supplemental funding from federal, state, and local governments.

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184 One downside of relying on a numerical measurement such as caseloads is that it can be manipulated through other outlets. For example, judges who want to leave the conventional standard of proof intact might be more aggressive in asking defendants if they want to waive their right to counsel. In the alternative, judges might be more rigorous in ensuring that defendants meet the statutory definition of indigency before appointing free lawyers. See Gershowitz, supra note 150, at 583-84 (discussing the extremely low-income levels statutorily required for the appointment of a free lawyer in many states). I am grateful to Ron Wright for raising these points.

185 See Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 8, at 70-71 (“Unlike prison cases, testing compliance with judicial decrees [to provide funding for defense lawyers] would seem to be easy: Either the required appropriations were made or they weren’t.”).
Moreover, prosecutors and defense lawyers are not in identical postures. Prosecutors must handle all criminal activity, whereas public defenders or appointed counsel deal only with the roughly eighty percent of criminal defendants who cannot afford private lawyers.\textsuperscript{186} In that respect, there is a need for greater funding for prosecutors. At the same time however, it is prosecutors, not government-funded defense lawyers, who are likely to benefit from extra budget lines such as the separate funding of police (who pursue leads for prosecutors)\textsuperscript{187} and crime labs, which not only investigate but also provide crucial trial support to prosecutors in the form of testifying witnesses and expert reports.\textsuperscript{188} Moreover, it is prosecutors, not defense lawyers, who are likely to receive additional funding from federal, state or local governments.\textsuperscript{189}

\textsuperscript{186} See \textit{Harlow}, supra note 25.

\textsuperscript{187} While prosecutors benefit from investigative work conducted by police agencies, it would be a gross overstatement to suggest that prosecutors have control over those agencies. For an analysis of the complexity of these relationships, see Daniel Richman, \textit{Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors}, 103 \textit{COLUM. L. REV.} 749 (2003).

\textsuperscript{188} See Douglas W. Vick, \textit{Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences}, 43 \textit{BUFF. L. REV.} 329, 395 (1995) (“\textit{Funding for the support services essential to the preparation of the prosecutor’s case-police investigation, FBI and local crime labs, and state and local forensic experts-does not come out of the budget for the prosecutor’s office, while analogous expenses by the defense must be paid out of the money provided for defense services.”).\textsuperscript{189} See \textit{Gideon’s Broken Promise}, supra note 5, at 42 (“[V]irtually no federal funds are allocated for defense services in the fifty states.”); \textit{Carol DeFrances, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS} 4 (2001) (“Over a third of the [prosecutors] offices indicated that some portion of their budget came from grant funds.”); \textit{NLADA, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE}, supra note 26, at 54 (explaining that a Louisiana prosecutor’s office funded an “$850,000 renovation, including all new computers with high-speed internet access” primarily through federal grants, whereas the indigent defense office received no comparable funding and was in “disarray”); \textit{Spangenberg, Virginia Report}, supra note 4, at 35 (“Many Commonwealth’s attorney offices receive supplemental funds from local governments” whereas “just two public defender offices in the state receive local support.”); Wallace, supra note 4, at 17 (“Congress appropriated $100 million for fiscal year 2001 to allow states to hire ‘community prosecutors.’ Though the amounts of proposed federal support are very substantial, the proposals never include matching funds for the constitutionally mandated provision of legal representation services in the new cases which will be filed by the new prosecutors.”). To make up for the lack of funding for indigent defense, many jurisdictions have turned to recoupment and application fees that require indigent defendants to fund their appointed lawyers, at least in part, either before or after their cases are resolved. See Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, \textit{The Political Economy of Application Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense}, 47 \textit{WM. & MARY L. REV.} 2045 (2006).
In the end, the best we can hope to achieve is rough parity, whereby the extra cases handled by prosecutors (but not government-funded defense lawyers) are offset by the extra resources that prosecutors receive from separate budget lines. As such, and once again in the interest of simplicity, parity should entail equal funding between prosecutors’ offices on the one hand and the amount spent on public defenders’ offices and appointed counsel on the other hand. \textsuperscript{190} At the granular level, this should mean identical salaries for public defenders and district attorneys. At the macro level, it should mean identical appropriations for prosecution funding and defense funding. \textsuperscript{191}

B. Would the Legislature Opt Out of the Default Rule?

A default rule that raises the standard of proof in the absence of legislative action will create a vastly better incentive structure than prior judicial decisions that have attempted to improve indigent defense on a case-by-case basis. Prosecutors will see the beyond all doubt standard of proof as a threat to their ability to attain convictions, and they will pressure legislators to take whatever steps are necessary to eliminate the higher standard of proof. And even in the absence of such pressure, legislatures acting out of self-interest will want to take credit for removing an undesirable legal rule that will hinder the incarceration of criminals.

\textsuperscript{190} Although the goal is bright-line rules, courts will have to dig into at least some of the details to ensure that legislatures are not playing games with the budget to make it falsely appear that defense funding is equal to prosecutorial funding.

\textsuperscript{191} Identical funding would be easier to accomplish from a logistical standpoint if all jurisdictions used public defenders to provide indigent defense, because legislatures could then simply provide equal funding for both prosecutor and defense offices. However, a substantial number of jurisdictions assign appointed counsel on an individual basis in lieu of public defender offices. See Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, \textit{Indigent Defense Systems in the United States}, 58 LAW \& CONTEMPO. PROBS. 31 (1995). And given that demographics and traditions vary by jurisdiction, a one-size fits all public defender approach might not be the best option for all jurisdictions.
1. Prosecutors’ Incentives to Lobby for Opting Out of the Default Rule

First and quite simply, no litigator wants to lose. Prosecutors, perhaps even more so than civil litigators, are aggressive lawyers who value their reputations, believe in their cause, and want to win. Prosecutors will likely view a higher standard of proof in 80% of their cases as unfairly stacking the deck against them. Thus, in the abstract alone, prosecutors likely will lobby the legislature to remove what they see as an injustice.

More importantly, the incentive for prosecutors to lobby the legislature goes beyond mere philosophical objections. Most district attorneys are elected and must answer to the voters. In their re-election campaigns, prosecutors often stress their conviction rates and highlight their high-profile prosecutions. Voters respond well to such posturing, demonstrating that their prime desire is for convictions and punishment. A higher standard of proof endangers prosecutors’ grandstanding because convictions will be harder to come by. Not only will it be harder to prove defendants guilty “beyond all doubt” at trial, but defendants who are alerted to the heightened standard of proof will be more likely to expect exoneration at trial and therefore less likely to plea bargain. Because 95% of defendants plea bargain under the current system, any significant reduction will have serious repercussions. Fewer guilty pleas will force prosecutors to bring more cases to trial, further diffusing already limited resources and thus making it harder to prevail at trial. In the alternative,

392 See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 19, at 534.

393 See Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow, supra note 76, at 2472 (“Prosecutors are particularly concerned about their reputations . . . [and] [l]osses at trial hurt prosecutors public images.”).

394 See CAROL DEFRANCES & GREG W. STEADMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS 1 (1996) (explaining that more than 95% of chief prosecutors are elected).


396 See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 19, at 533-34.

397 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.

prosecutors would have to dismiss more charges, or offer defendants better plea deals to entice them to abandon the hopes for success at trial that they developed as a result of the higher standard of proof.\textsuperscript{199}

Put simply, the result of a higher standard of proof likely will be more losses at trial, an increased number of voluntary dismissals, and fewer favorable plea bargains. That translates into less grandstanding and more negative publicity about dangerous criminals beating the rap, which in turn endangers prosecutors’ re-election prospects. Accordingly, prosecutors will either need to work much harder to overcome the obstacles created by the higher standard of proof or, more likely, they will lobby to have the offending rule removed.\textsuperscript{200}

And when prosecutors lobby to remove the higher standard of proof, legislatures are likely to listen. First, legislatures are inclined to give prosecutors what they want because their interests are aligned.\textsuperscript{201} Just like prosecutors, legislators want to highlight convictions and punishment that occurred on their watch. Second, legislators will listen to district attorneys’ demands because they will fear the consequences. Prosecutors frequently seek higher office, and the

Prosecutors bear the burden of proof and therefore must invest more in digging out and presenting evidence.”). Indeed, as Professor Stuntz has observed, docket and funding pressures already result in “prosecutors in most jurisdictions hav[ing] more cases than they have time to handle them.” William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2555 (2004).

\textsuperscript{199} See Frank O. Bowman III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of Declining Federal Drug Sentencing, 87 IOWA L. REV. 477, 544 (2002) (examining national drug sentencing statistics and concluding, \textit{inter alia}, that “increased [Assistant United States Attorney] caseload correlated with decreased average drug sentence[s]”); Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow, supra note 76, at 2473-75 (arguing that caseloads and many factors other than the strength of the evidence affect the amount and the generosity of plea bargains).

\textsuperscript{200} See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 19, at 537-38 (explaining that prosecutors lobby for legislation that “makes it cheaper for prosecutors to do their job”).

\textsuperscript{201} See id. at 534 (“If police and prosecutors want some new criminal prohibition, they likely want it because it would advance their goals. Advancing police and prosecutors’ goals usually means advancing legislators’ goals as well.”); But see Wright & Logan, supra note 189, at 2069 (explaining that there are “more complex settings” in which the interests of prosecutors and legislators are not aligned). With respect to a higher burden of proof, there is little question that prosecutors and legislators would be unified in their opposition.
failure of legislators to eliminate obstacles to convicting defendants will provide a good campaign issue for the district attorneys.202

2. Legislators’ Independent Incentives to Opt Out

Even without lobbying by prosecutors, legislators will independently desire to eliminate the higher standard of proof. Because voters do not have a nuanced view of the intricacies of criminal law and procedure, they look to high-profile cases or prominent and comprehensible criminal procedure rules to assess the state of criminal justice.203 When bad news occurs – usually in the form of high-profile crimes – the voters demand action. In response, politicians signal their bona fides through tough-on-crime rhetoric and symbolic legislation.204 As Professor Bill Stuntz has explained, the legislative response usually takes the form of creating new crimes “to give voters the sense that they are doing something about it.”205

There is every reason to believe this general paradigm will apply to a default rule raising the standard of proof. While voters might not understand the nuances of judicial decisions affecting the federal sentencing guidelines or procedural default rules for habeas corpus proceedings, they will understand headlines trumpeting “Court Raises Standard of Proof in Most Criminal Cases to ‘Beyond All Doubt’ But Invites Legislature To Intervene.” And it is not difficult to predict the public’s response. Most voters will equate a higher standard of proof with more criminals going free and escaping punishment, the exact opposite of their preference for more convictions.

202 Think of Arlen Specter, John Cornyn, Elliot Spitzer and Rudolph Guliani, to name just a few prominent examples. See Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow, supra note 76, at 2472 (collecting additional examples).

203 See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 748-49 (2005) (“Cognitive psychology teaches that when voters think of crime and sentencing, they tend to think of examples of crimes that are most salient. Because most voters have no direct experience with crime, their impressions are formed largely from the media.”). For a detailed analysis of the reasons behind public misperception of crime, see Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do With It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23 (1997).

204 See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 19, at 531.

205 Id. at 532.
Responding to public opinion, legislatures will move quickly to opt out of the beyond all doubt rule. Legislatures would be more than happy to enact a symbolic statute that returns the standard of proof to the traditional reasonable doubt formulation. They could name it the “Restoring Justice Act” or the “Lower Burden of Proof Act” and reap political dividends.\(^{206}\) Moreover, the political costs\(^{207}\) of enacting the statute – funding parity with prosecutors’ offices or caseloads conforming to National Advisory Commission standards – are minimal because the public is unlikely to be outraged by the prospect of equal funding for indigent defense or manageable caseloads.\(^{208}\)

Additionally, legislatures will be likely to opt out of the higher standard of proof because, practically speaking, it will be easy to do so. The default rule offers only two legislative options for eliminating the higher standard of proof: funding parity or compliance with caseloads guideposts. With only two approaches, legislators should find it easy to draft the legislation.

\section*{C. A Solution That Avoids Prior Pitfalls}

After so many unsuccessful efforts to improve indigent defense, the final question should be: Why is this proposal likely to succeed where others have failed? The reason is that, unlike other efforts, the judiciary’s involvement is limited while the incentives for the legislature to act are more direct and more pronounced.


\footnote{207 See, e.g., \textsc{National Legal Aid and Defender Association, Developing a National Message for Indigent Defense: Analysis of National Survey 5} (2001) (finding that a majority of the public believes indigent defendants should receive a free “lawyer with a small enough caseload to provide the time necessary to prepare a defense for each person”).}

\footnote{208 Of course, the public will be outraged if the increased funding for indigent defense results in less funding for education, healthcare, and environmental protections. See Brown, \textit{Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements}, supra note 45, at 809 (“Even legislators who conceded indigent defense is worthy and important must still rank its priority for marginal budget dollars relative to funds for medical care for the poor, foster care services, improvement of substandard schools, or toxic clean-up of grave environmental health risks.”).}
Imposing a higher standard of proof to convict indigent defendants is a bright-line rule that eliminates any need for the judiciary to look case-by-case at each defendant. Every indigent defendant will be subjected to the higher standard of proof in the absence of legislative action -- no exceptions. Accordingly, unlike the Peart decision in Louisiana -- which saddled trial judges with case-by-case responsibility to determine whether the presumption of ineffectiveness had been surmounted\textsuperscript{209} -- trial judges’ hands will be tied unless the legislature acts. With all responsibility channeled to the legislature, it will not be able to punt its obligations to trial judges and will instead have no choice but to improve funding or take responsibility for the higher standard of proof associated with its inaction.\textsuperscript{210}

Moreover, while the higher standard of proof imposes direct pressure on the legislature, it does not embroil the judiciary in time-consuming and cumbersome supervision that is so often associated with structural reform litigation. While judicial monitoring of indigent defense will continue each year, the judiciary’s responsibilities will be minimal. Once per year, the state court will review the indigent defense commission’s analysis of caseload compliance or the legislature’s budget to see whether there is funding parity. If everything is in order, the court will impose the reasonable doubt standard until the following year. If caseloads are excessive or the legislature has failed to provide funding parity, then the court will increase the standard of proof to “beyond all doubt” and invite the legislature to do better the following year. Regardless of which standard of proof the court imposes, its work will be complete until the following year. Constant, vigilant oversight will not be necessary. Rather, the vast amount of planning, thinking, and policymaking will remain with the

\textsuperscript{209} The Peart rule further taxed busy trial courts by forcing them to have “Peart hearings” to assess whether the individual lawyer in the case at bar could provide effective representation. See NLADA, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 3 n.9 (noting that “there is a significant number of Peart motions being litigated across the state”). Yet, because trial judges are under pressure to keep their dockets moving and to see that guilty defendants are convicted, the Peart rule has caused more headaches, rather than enabling trial judges to affect systemic change. Accordingly, today Louisiana in general, and New Orleans in particular, are among the nation’s most under-funded indigent defense systems. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{210} There is a large body of psychological literature demonstrating that when responsibility is diffused individuals are less likely to take socially responsible actions. See, e.g., Bibb Latane & Steve Nilda, Ten Years of Research on Group Size and Helping, 89 Psych. Bull. 308 (1981). Accordingly, a rule that channels responsibility to the correct actor – here, the legislature – is preferable.
Raise the Proof

legislature – exactly where it belongs. Such an approach maximizes institutional competence.

Furthermore, at the same time that the judiciary’s involvement will be minimal, the framework stands a much better chance of success than prior efforts. In the handful of prior cases where lawyers successfully have challenged the under-funding of indigent defense, the benefits stemming from the litigation have been temporary.211 After successful litigation, legislatures typically respond promptly by appropriating more funding, but in subsequent years the legislatures take no action, allowing salaries to remain stagnant while caseloads climb.212 Put simply, the public attention and pressure wrought by the litigation are temporary, and once they disappear so does the legislatures’ incentives to provide adequate funding. By contrast, because the proposal advocated in this article imposes annual monitoring, it is less likely that funding will stagnate while caseloads creep upward. Each year, the legislature must provide funding parity or convince the indigent defense commission that caseloads are within accepted guidelines. Failure to do so will result in a higher standard of proof that will be unpopular not just with prosecutors but the public at large. Put simply, unlike the failed prior decisions, this proposal calls for the legislature to be under pressure, year-after-year, to maintain adequate funding.

Conclusion

Indigent defense in America is in crisis. While prior reform efforts have been valiant, they unfortunately have been unsuccessful. For the most part, courts have been unwilling to inject themselves into legislative budget decisions. When courts have become involved and issued favorable decisions, the benefits have been only temporary because once the pressure of litigation disappeared so did the legislatures’ desire to appropriate more funding. A successful approach to improving indigent defense must assuage courts’ concerns about micro-managing budget decisions, while simultaneously imposing continuous pressure on legislatures to ensure proper funding. By imposing a higher standard of proof as a default rule, courts can create an incentive for legislatures to opt out

211 See supra Parts II.B and II.C.

212 See Wright, supra note 9, at 249 (explaining the “[a]fter a judge orders or convinces the state or local government to fund indigent defense at prevailing rates for the time, the world moves on. Inflation immediately starts eroding salaries of the attorneys and greater numbers of arrests and charges erode the gains in caseload. Over time, the old difficulties for defense attorneys return.”).
by properly funding their indigent defense systems. And by limiting the ability to opt out to bright-line annual benchmarks, courts can ensure that improvements will not dissipate in subsequent years.