Free Markets of Islamic Jurisprudence

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 1488

I. INTERNAL SCHOLARSHIP .................................................. 1493
   A. Beyond Organized Religion ....................................... 1494
   B. Historical Fiqh Markets ........................................... 1496
   C. Solemnity of Markets ............................................. 1498
   D. Markets and Madhabs .............................................. 1501
   E. Markets and Governments ........................................ 1502
      1. Shift from Jurists to Juristic Institutions ............... 1504
      2. Shift from Extraction to Approval ......................... 1506
   F. Diversity and Plurality of Rules .............................. 1507
      1. Differing Cultures ............................................. 1507
      2. Differing Methods of Legal Reasoning .................... 1508
   G. Universal and Timeless Rules ................................... 1509
   H. Reopening Settled Rules ......................................... 1511
      1. Interpretation of Authoritative Sources ................. 1511
      2. Arguments Drawn from Analogy (Qiyas) ..................... 1514
      3. Rule-Selectivity (Tarjih) ................................... 1515
   I. Tainted Opinions .................................................... 1516
      1. Positional Consciousness and the Tainting of Believers 1517
      2. Believers and Non-Believers ............................... 1520

II. EXTERNAL SCHOLARSHIP .................................................. 1520
   A. Scholars of Faith ................................................ 1521
   B. Two Islamic Principles in Dealing with External Scholarship 1523
      1. Gracious Engagement (D’awah) ............................. 1525
      2. Disengaged Scholarship .................................... 1528
   C. Historical Contexts ............................................... 1529
      1. Scholarship on the Qur’an ................................ 1530
      2. Scholarship on the Prophet ............................... 1535

III. BORDERLINE SCHOLARSHIP ........................................... 1540
   A. Scholarship on the Sunna ...................................... 1541
   B. Scholarship on Borrowing ..................................... 1547

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And they said, “What sort of a messenger is this, who eats food, and walks through the markets?”

—Qur’an, Sura al-Furqaan 25:7

INTRODUCTION

Since the emergence of Islam in the early seventh century (610-632), Islamic law has developed through the free markets of jurisprudence, which may be called iswaq al fiqh. A jurisprudence (fiqh) market consists of jurists (mufti), scholars (mujtahid), and followers (ashab). This Article describes muftis and mujtahids as opinio-jurists. When a new legal issue arises that cannot be resolved under the existing body of Islamic law, Muslim jurists offer legal opinions consistent with the Basic Code, that is, the Qur’an and the Sunna. These opinions, known as fatawaa, compete in the jurisprudence markets to win over Muslim followers. Each competing opinion may receive some following. An opinion (fatawa) that gains the most Muslim followers becomes a rule of Islamic law. Even minority opinions

1. In 610, Prophet Muhammad received the first revelation. In 632, the Prophet died. During this period, the Qur’an, revealed in small portions at a time, was completed. The Sunna, that is, the Prophet’s traditions, deeds, sayings, gestures, silence over issues, was also completed. The Basic Code, consisting of the Qur’an and the Sunna, was thus gradually completed over a period of a little more than 22 years (610-632). Ali Khan, The Reopening of the Islamic Code: The Second Era of Ijtihad, 1 U. St. Thomas L.J. 341, 349-54 (2003) [hereinafter Khan, Second Era of Ijtihad].

2. In this Article, iswaq al fiqh, the fiqh markets, markets of Islamic law, and similar expressions are used synonymously unless the context suggests otherwise.

3. Both muftis and mujtahids issue opinions. A mujtahid is a Muslim scholar trained in the science of ijihad, that is, the offering of new rules of Islamic law. A mujtahid devotes his life to understanding the interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunna, Islamic history, jurisprudence, the Prophet’s life, logic, and legal methods. A mufti (jurist) is also a well-read, practicing Muslim who issues opinions on legal questions facing a community or an individual. Often, the distinction between mujtahid and mufti is one of degree. A mufti through regional or universal recognition may rise to the higher station of the mujtahid.

4. I introduced the phrase in Khan, Second Era of Ijtihad, supra note 1. The phrase is used for no other reason than for brevity.

5. Fatawaa is the Arabic plural of fatawa, which means opinion. Fatawas is also the Anglicized plural of fatawa.
with substantial followings are treated as rules of Islamic law. Each opinion is binding on the followers.

No new opinion, whether held by a majority or a minority, is binding on Muslims who decline to accept it. The option to follow or not to follow a new juristic rule is the defining attribute of Islamic law. An important exception exists, however: no option is available with respect to mandatory rules of the Basic Code, which all Muslims must obey. Hence, Islamic law is a combination of the fixed and the flexible. It contains the immutable, one divine law (the Basic Code) and mutable, pluralistic juristic precedents (fiqh). Free fiqh markets, therefore, may not be confused with the free markets of ideas. Fiqh markets shun the speculation of free thought. They function freely but within the parameters of shared faith, the God’s Qur’an, and the Prophet’s Sunna.

The concept of following is critical to understanding functionality of the fiqh markets. Following does not mean mere intellectual approval of an opinion or showing respect for the opinio-jurist who issued it, nor does it require that followers be students of the opinio-jurist or that they formally belong to the school of fiqh the opinio-jurist may have established. Following a legal opinion is essentially behavioral. It occurs when a sizable group of Muslims, or an entire Muslim community, acts in accordance with the rule for “people are Allah’s witnesses on earth.” An opinion that fails to produce compliant conduct (amal) in any Muslim community is an odd pronouncement. It is a paper opinion. It might even be blasphemous. Even if not blasphemous, an opinion without voluntary compliance has no room in the theory or practice of Islamic law.

6. This is the reason why Islamic law is also known as personal law rather than territorial or tribal law. See generally L. Ali Khan, A Theory of Universal Democracy 36 (2003).

7. Qur’an, Sura al-Hazab 33:36 (translated by author).

8. Sahih Bukhari, Vol. 2, Bk. 23, No. 448, available at http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/023.sbt.html. This hadith narrates that the people’s comments on the deceased’s funeral indicate what might be in store for the deceased in the next world. Good comments suggest that the deceased was destined for the paradise. This hadith, along with others, has been interpreted to argue that the agreement of the community embodies divine approval. See Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Death, Funeral Processions, and the Articulation Religious Authority in Early Islam, 93 Studia Islamica 27, 57 (2001).


10. This concept is close to the definition of customary international law. A custom is a state practice accompanied by opinio juris. Mere state practice without a sense of legal obligation is not custom, and mere prescriptive announcements without practice fall short of the definition of custom. A custom is said to exist when both state practice and a sense of
The *fiqh* markets incorporate a fundamental distinction between *mu’miniin* and *munkiriin*. *Mu’miniin* are Muslims who believe in the Qur’an and the Prophet’s Sunna. Their scholarship, which is anchored in faith (*iman*), does not contravene the basic beliefs of Islam. By contrast, *munkiriin* are persons who may deny the existence of God, Muhammad’s prophethood, or the Qur’an’s revelatory authenticity. Per the Qur’an: “Those who disbelieve say: ‘This (the Qur’an) is nothing but a lie that he (Muhammad) has invented, and others have helped him at it.’”¹¹ In their scholarship, *munkiriin* may not accept all constraints of the Islamic faith.

So divided, *mu’miniin* and *munkiriin* rarely influence each other. They engage in what Jane McAliffee has called two parallel conversations, one rooted in faith and deference and the other in doubt and skepticism.¹² *Munkiriin* may or may not be the scholars of faith. Generally, however, they are the critics of Islamic law. They often challenge the authenticity of Islamic sources. As such, they do not shape Islamic legal methods or Islamic law.¹³ The Islamic law markets are essentially the phenomenon of *iman* (trust in Islam), and not of *inkar* (mistrust of Islam). This Article calls the works of *mu’miniin* the internal scholarship, and those of *munkiriin* the external scholarship.¹⁴ Some scholars, though non-Muslims, nonetheless research and write within the parameters of the Islamic faith. Their scholarship shares many attributes with the internal scholarship. This Article treats all scholarship written by non-Muslims as the external scholarship, because writing within the Islamic faith is not a matter of scholarly strategy; it is an act of existential honesty in which the scholar’s heart and mind function together without any contrived separation. If a scholar is not a Muslim, he or she cannot pretend to be one for scholarship purposes. Such pretension receives little credibility in *fiqh*.


¹¹ Qur’an, Sura al-Furqan 25:4 (translated by author).

¹² See generally Jane Dammén McAliffee, Encyclopaedia of the Qur’an, viii (2001).

¹³ See text infra Part III.A.

¹⁴ In contemporary moral philosophy, internalists are distinguished from externalists. Internalism argues that there exists a direct connection between action and belief in that a person’s behavior is determined by his beliefs. Externalists do not see any such necessary connection between belief and action. See Externalism About Mental Content, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2003), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-externalism/ (last visited May 11, 2007). Islam takes a more developmental approach toward the distinction: Internalism is a gradual and dynamic process. Our beliefs become gradually solidified; and only when the state of mind is fully matured in the power of belief is the action is correspondingly caused and strengthened. For example, the reason for revealing the Qur’an to the Prophet in pieces rather than as a whole was so that “(God) may strengthen your heart thereby.” Qur’an, Sura al-Furqan 25:32 (translated by author).
Therefore, the *fiqh* markets presume that the scholar’s situated consciousness is inseparable from the contents of scholarship. *Mu’miniin* and *munkiriin* seldom share the same situated consciousness. Situated consciousness is composed of one’s personal facts, including one’s spirituality, state of knowledge, piety, geographical residence, racial consciousness, and religion. The *fiqh* markets evaluate all scholarship for its research methodology, analytical soundness, logic, and verifiability. But the question remains whether the scholar’s personal beliefs, religious background, piety, and state of spirituality are also relevant. Can a Jewish or a Christian scholar write a credible piece on the exegesis of the Qur’an? Is a Hindu as qualified as a believer in expounding the oneness of God? The realm of possibilities will answer these questions in the affirmative. The *fiqh* markets, however, do not subscribe to any such objectivity. They presume that the externalists will research and analyze from a situated consciousness that, despite its objectivity and intellectual prowess, lacks the Islamic faith.15 The markets may disqualify or discount the scholarship situated in *inkar*.16 In matters of Islamic exegesis, the quality of person is as important as the quality of his research.17

To further clarify a scholar’s situated consciousness, *munkiriin* who deny the authenticity of Islam may not be confused with those who deny the essence of religion. Some *munkiriin* believe in no religion, denying the existence of God, the concept of prophethood, and the authenticity of revelation. Such *munkiriin*, in the language of the Qur’an, are *kaafiriin*.18 The distinction between *kaafiriin* and *munkiriin* is crucial. Christians, Jews, and other peoples of the book are *munkiriin*. They are not *kaafiriin*. *Munkiriin* do not believe in Islam, while *Kaafiriin* do not believe in God. Because one does not know a person’s inner state of belief—nor should one intrude in this zone of spiritual privacy—it is inappropriate to designate any persons as *kaafiriin*. Such blatant labeling of others is contrary to the principles of Islam.19 Persons are free, however, to declare themselves as *kaafiriin*.

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15. Even translations, let alone exegeses, of the Qur’an by non-Muslims are unacceptable to the *fiqh* market. AHMED VON DENFFER, ULUM AL QURAN, ch. 6, available at http://www.islamworld.net/UUQ/6.txt (last visited May 11, 2007).
16. The external scholarship in Islamic theology may be disqualified on the ground that the scholar is a non-Muslim; but the external scholarship in Islamic history may not be discounted if it illuminates historical events without undermining the basic beliefs of Islam. See id.
17. See id. (listing the qualities of an exegete, including a firm belief (*aqida* in Islam).
18. Qur’an, Sura aal-Imraan 3:100, Sura al-Ma’idah 5:102, Sura al-Anaam 6:130, Sura al-A’raf 7:37 & 7:93, Sura an-Naml 27:93, Sura al-Ahqaf 46:6. The Qur’an also uses another word *Kaafiraun*, which appears a number of times and which is the plural of *kaafir* (translated by author).
19. Qur’an, Sura an-Nisaa 4:94 (Say not to the people in foreign lands: “you are not believers.”), Sura al-Anaam 6:108 (Do not curse even false gods) (translated by author).
The ideology of self-declared kaafiriin completely discounts the value of faith. It disentangles reason from faith and reason from revelation in which the kaafiriin do not believe. The kufr (complete denial of God) ideology sees God as Man’s invention and religion as a social construct to exercise power over others. It promotes a rigid wall of separation between laws of the state and laws of religion, presuming that laws of religion are unworthy concoctions. It rejects all notions of life after the worldly life. The kufr ideology constructs a view of law through material formula, excluding the intangible world of religion. Because of diametrically opposite viewpoints, Muslims and kaafiriin may never come to terms with each other. Therefore, the Qur’an separates the two groups by the principle of disengagement, called “Lakum Diinukum wa li-ya Diin (To you be your Way, and to me mine).” Self-declared kaafiriin, however, continue to attack the sources and substance of Islamic law.

In contrast to kufr ideology, Islamic law affirms a unified experience in which reason and faith, reason and revelation, judgment and emotions, the material and the spiritual, and this life and the next are all fused together. All things submit to One God, and therefore the kufr ideology cannot comprehend Islamic legal methods or Islamic law. Kufr is the opposite of Islam. Kufr denies the revealed truth. It is no surprise, then, that the kufr ideology challenges the authenticity of every source that nurtures Islamic law. Much of the external scholarship on Islamic law draws its inspiration either from inkar or kufr. The denial of both Islam and God generates dubitancy about Islamic law. The kufr-inspired scholarship may also

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20. Even some believers may approve the separation of state and religion but their reasons are respectful of religion. Imad-ad-Dean Ahmed, American and Muslim Perspective on Freedom of Religion, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 355, 364 (2006) (arguing that separation of church and state is good for religion).


22. Perhaps, the best articulation of this concept is available in the writings of Shah Wali Allah (1703-1762) who used the ihatiq methodology to fuse the intellectual with the intuitive to reach the underlying unity of what appears to be fragmented on the surface. See Marcia K. Hermansen, Shah Wai Allah of Delhi’s Hujjat Allah al-Baligha: Tension Between the Universal and the Particular in an Eighteenth-Century Islamic Theory of Religious Revelation, 63 STUDIA ISLAMICA 143 (1986).

23. Qur’an, Sura aali-Imraan 3:5-6, Sura Az-Zumar 39:42. Some external scholars argue that Islam’s One God is arbitrary and that Muslim theology is occasionalist in that there are no causes and no effects and that everything happens because God arbitrarily makes it happen. See Elie Kedourie, Islam and Orientalists: Some Recent Discussions, 7 BRIT. J. SOC. 217, 218 (1956). This external views fail to appreciate that the Qur’an presents a universe perfectly ordered and balanced without arbitrariness. See, e.g., Qur’an, Sura al-Hijr 15:19 (and the earth is spread out with firm mountains and in which everything grows in a balanced manner), Sura ash-Shura 42:17 (God has revealed a book of truth and a sense of balance for behavior) (translated by author).

aim at bringing down the edifice of Islamic legal history and Islamic law. Daniel Pipes, an avowed critic of Islam, welcomes such scholarship as the scholarship of termites. Ironically, though, the kufir scholarship has the least effect on the fiqh markets because Muslims decline to take it seriously, dismissing it under the principle of disengagement.

This Article examines both internal and external scholarships and their respective contributions to the fiqh markets. It first explains that the fiqh markets are sustained through internal scholarship that shapes the rules of Islamic law. It later examines the role of external scholarship that might influence these markets. Although the fiqh markets are essentially Islamic, the external scholarship may offer clarifying insights and constructive criticisms. Such external scholarship may not directly influence the development of fiqh, but its indirect impact on the fiqh markets cannot be ignored. Finally, the Article discusses the disengaged scholarship that manufactures disrespect against the Qur’an and the Prophet. It also highlights external scholarship that paints Islamic law as a system founded on fraud and plagiarism. The fiqh markets disregard the disrespectful scholarship because assaults on the Qur’an and the Prophet furnish nothing useful. Sweeping allegations of fraud and plagiarism are similarly disregarded.

Such are the dynamics of the fiqh markets that no opinio-jurist or generation can rig the development of Islamic law. Rigging is impossible where law is developed through free and spirited competition of juristic opinions that millions of Muslims follow with no compulsion. Although the disengaged scholarship rarely affects the fiqh markets, it nurtures prejudice and hostility against Muslims by perpetuating dangerous stereotypes. The negative views about Islamic law owe much of their existence to external scholarship. It is hoped that external scholars will produce scholarship that builds interfaith bridges.

I. INTERNAL SCHOLARSHIP

The Basic Code, which consists of the Qur’an and the Sunna, provides rules and principles in diverse areas of human activity. It contains family law, criminal law, international law, trusts, wills, non-testamentary rules of distributing the decedent’s estate, and the law of contracts. See generally SEYMOUR VESEY-FITZGERALD, MUHAMMADAN LAW: AN ABRIDGEMENT ACCORDING TO ITS VARIOUS SCHOOLS (1931) (chapters on family law, change

26. See id.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See infra Part I.
30. See infra Part II.
31. See generally SEYMOUR VESEY-FITZGERALD, MUHAMMADAN LAW: AN ABRIDGEMENT ACCORDING TO ITS VARIOUS SCHOOLS (1931) (chapters on family law, change
provides a set of normative principles whereas the Sunna furnishes the case law that the Prophet decided in light of the Qur’an. The Basic Code consists of both the Qur’an (text) and the Sunna (case law). These two primary sources of law are immutable. No Muslim community may repeal or modify the Basic Code.

This immutability, however, does not mean that the Basic Code is fixed in meaning. The fiqh markets distinguish between alterations and interpretations of the Basic Code. Outright alterations to the texts of the Basic Code are strictly prohibited.32 Even alterations through interpretation are blasphemous. Good faith interpretations of the Basic Code delivered by pious and knowledgeable Muslim opinio-jurists, however, may freely compete in the fiqh markets for the Umma’s approval and compliant behavior.33 Bad faith interpretations, offered to deceptively undermine clear commandments of the Basic Code, rarely find a place in the fiqh markets.34

A. Beyond Organized Religion

The free markets of fiqh embody a profound theological truth about Islam. Islam establishes a direct relationship between the individual and God, eliminating the requirements for any religious intermediary. Islam is a faith of direct access to God. Each individual opens a separate account with God.35 Muslims may learn from religious teachers, including men and women learned in Islamic laws. However, they are not required to join a clerical organization for expressing or practicing their faith, for Islam is not an organized religion. That said, not every direct access between the individual and God falls in the domain of Islam. Islam provides a basic framework of beliefs that cannot be rejected, and any rejection of this basic framework removes individuals and communities from the fold of Islam.36

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32. Qur’an, Sura al-Anaam 6:115 (None can change God’s words), Sura an-Nasr 10:64 (no change can there be in the words of God) (translated by author).
34. Qur’an, Sura aal-e-Imran 3:7 (The Qur’an itself distinguishes between clear and allegorical revelations, warning that persons with perverse heart interpret allegorical verses to create mischief and discord.) (translated by author).
35. Qur’an, Sura Ibrahim 14:51 (God keeps accurate accounts) (translated by author).
36. For example, the belief that Prophet Muhammad was God’s last prophet is part of the basic faith, called iman. Religious communities that believe otherwise, such as the Ahmadiyya, the Moorish Science Temple of America, The Lost Found Nation of Islam, and the Nubian Islamic Hebrews, are not considered Muslims by mainstream believers. See
While Islam furnishes a strong sense of the community, it departs from other organized communities such as the Catholic Church in that it does not mandate a hierarchical clerical structure to form a community of believers. Muslims have no Pope. No one person, therefore, speaks for all Muslims of the world. There exists no single clerical organization with a monopoly over the interpretations of the Basic Code. In the absence of hierarchical structures, the free markets of Islamic law have shaped diverse Muslim religious communities with different sub-systems of Islamic law. What unifies these diverse communities are the Qur’an and the Sunna. There exists only one Qur’an for all Muslims, and all Muslims are committed to follow the Prophet’s Sunna. Beyond that, Muslim communities have historically been diverse and free to follow their own customs and laws, provided these customs and laws do not offend the Basic Code.

Since the 1979 revolution in Iran, the Shia Muslims appear to be more organized than the Sunni Muslims. In Iran, for example, the Shia clerical infrastructure is hierarchical, with a religious leader at the top. Even in Iran, however, Sunni Muslims are constitutionally protected and cannot be compelled to follow the juristic rules of the Shia fiqh. Article 12 of Iran’s Constitution provides that “[o]ther Islamic schools . . . are to be accorded full respect, and their followers are free to act in accordance with their own

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37. Contrast this absence of a global clerical organization with the formation of an international political organization, called the Organization of Islamic Conference, which consists of fifty-seven Muslim states. This international organization is a political organization, a mini united nations for the Muslim nations. See http://www.oic-oci.org/ (last visited May 11, 2007).

38. The Qur’an recognizes the twin principles of unity and diversity. All Muslims constitute one Ummah, that is one Community. This unity is recognized in the Qur’an, Sura al-Anbiya 21:92 (Muslims constitute one community or one religion or a single brotherhood) (translated by author). See also Qununi Assassi Ijmuhuri’ Isla’mal Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran art. 11] 1358 [1980] (recognizing that all Muslims constitute a single community). Contrast this recognition of unity with diversity that is also acknowledged in the Qur’an. See Qur’an, Sura al-Hujraat 49:14 (the creation of tribes and nations).

39. The Prophet’s Sunna, however, contains some controversy. If the Prophet’s Sunna is authentic and beyond doubt, all Muslims follow it. However, since the Prophet’s traditions were collected long after his death, Muslims disagree on the authenticity of some collections. See infra Part III.A.


41. See Qununi Assassi Ijmuhuri’ Isla’mal Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran art. 12] 1358 [1980]. This article recognizes the pluralism of madhabs that have existed in Islamic law.
jurisprudence in performing their religious rites." Furthermore, Iran’s Shia *fiqh* is territorial and not universal, meaning that Shia Muslims in other parts of the world may or may not follow the opinions of Iran’s clerics. In other parts of the Muslim world, the Sunni Muslims are completely decentralized, with the possible exception of Saudi Arabia, where a loosely organized clerical structure has been established to discourage the proliferation of diverse opinions on the same subject matter. In most of the Muslim world, however, the free markets of Islamic law thrive. Attempts to superimpose a strict clerical hierarchy or state control over the *fiqh* markets have failed in the past and they are unlikely to succeed in the future.

B. Historical *Fiqh* Markets

Although the Basic Code, the Qur’an and the Sunna, provides solutions to numerous legal issues, new questions began to appear soon after the Prophet’s death. These questions were answered through legal opinions that prominent jurists issued. The most remarkable growth of Islamic law occurred in the first two hundred and fifty years of Islam. This first era of *ijtihad* was open, bold, intellectually charged, and controversial, but it was also the most responsive to the need of constructing rules consistent with the Basic Code. Juristic discussions focused on the appropriateness of legal methods as well as substantive rules. How a rule must be extracted from the Basic Code was considered as important as the substance of the rule. Unrestrained imagination to interpret the Qur’an and the Sunna was discouraged. A fundamental distinction that the Prophet himself drew between innovation (*bida*) and interpretation served as the guiding force to safeguard the emerging markets of *fiqh* from speculation and experimentation.


43. The Shia population in Iraq, for example, has its own clerical structure and does not follow the commands of the Shia organization in Iran. See *Shias in Iraq*, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/religion-shia1.htm (last visited May 11, 2007).

44. KHALED ABOU EL FADL, REBELLION AND VIOLENCE IN ISLAMIC LAW 90-92 (2001) (governmental laws do not carry precedential value unless jurists support them). The confrontation between rulers and jurists, however, is not a permanent feature of the Islamic legal system. *Id.* at 93.


46. *Id.* at 362-63.

47. *Id.*

48. *Id.*

49. The Prophet said: “You must then follow my sunnah and that of the rightly-guided caliphs. Hold to it and stick fast to it. Avoid novelties, for every novelty is an innovation, and every innovation is an error.” Sunan Abu-Dawd, Bk. 40, No. 4590, *available at*
Medina and Kufa were the two most vigorous competing jurisprudential markets in which reputable opinio-jurists with broad regional following established the rules of an emerging legal tradition, called fiqh. In the tenth century, the Hanafi jurisprudential market further flourished in Baghdad (Iraq), Balkh (Afghanistan), and Bukhara (Transoxania). “In each network there was at least one central figure... distinguished by his numerous and famous students and by his being the principal opinio-jurist to issue fatwas in his region.” Thus, the Hanafi fiqh was enriched by a robust supply of opinions from these diverse centers of learning. Some jurisprudential markets are more active and influential than others. And an influential market may lose its prominence as another jurisprudential market gains momentum and respectability. For example, the Hanafi jurisprudential market of Bukhara “enjoyed its Golden Age” in the eleventh century and became the most prominent circle in influencing the Hanafi opinio-jurists of later centuries.

Historically, Muslims have belonged to distinct communities of Islam fiqh, known as schools of law or madhabs. For centuries, Islamic fiqh has been broadly available through five distinct schools that freely developed under the guidance of great scholars and opinio-jurists. It is common for an entire Muslim community to follow the rules of a particular madhab.
Muslim communities of distinct geographical areas identify themselves as Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi, Hanbali (the four Sunni Schools), or Jafferi (Shia School) in their adherence to the fiqh. In the past, the adherence to a particular school has been strict, and crossing from one madhab to the other (tafliq) was uncommon and considered unfavorable. The Shia-Sunni jurisprudential divide, the most remarkable development in recent decades, has been overly politicized and the split has been internationalized. Among ill-informed Muslims, the Shia-Sunni jurisprudential divide has resulted in bloodshed and sectarian violence.

C. Solemnity of Markets

The fiqh markets are essentially Muslim markets in which learned jurists offer opinions to solve problems facing a particular Muslim community or the Umma at large. The opinio-jurist must be a practicing Muslim, learned in the Basic Code, who has sound knowledge of legal methods, who is persuasive in legal reasoning and who is familiar with both Muslim history and current affairs. The more knowledge the opinio-jurist has, the more credibility he commands in his opinions. The markets of fiqh carefully scrutinize the opinio-jurist’s personal character, piety, honesty, as well as his intellect and knowledge. A highly pious person with deficient intellect or limited knowledge or a highly intelligent and educated person without a high personal character is viewed with suspicion and his opinions are discounted. The markets demand that Muslim opinio-jurists be both highly pious and highly knowledgeable. Piety without intellect or intellect without piety does not impress the markets. The markets respect opinio-jurists who have devoted their lives to God’s worship and the attainment of high knowledge.

58. VESEY-FITZGERALD, supra note 31, at 10-16.
59. The combining of rulings of different schools or madhabs is known as tafliq or takhayyur. By contrast, taqlid is the following of a particular madhab. Arbitrary tafliq in related actions was often unacceptable. For example, one cannot follow the Shafi school in matters of ablution (wudu) and the Hanafi school in matters of prayers (salat), since wudu and salat are closely related. However, tafliq is acceptable if different rulings are selected in unrelated matters. William R. Roff, Whence Cometh the Law? Dog Saliva in Kelantan, 1937, 25 COMP. STUD. IN SOC’Y & HIST. 323, 329-32 (1983) (using tafliq to allow the use of dogs in a Shafi jurisdiction).
60. See VON DENFFER, supra note 15.
62. Caution must be used to accept the views of a scholar who lacks piety or intellect. VON DENFFER, supra note 15.
The *fiqh* markets are free but solemn. They reject the idea of experimentation, innovation, or revolution away from the Basic Code. Opinio-jurists may not experiment with jurisprudence by offering solutions that challenge the fundamentals of the Islamic faith. Any proposal to amend the text of the Qur’an, for example, is an idea that the markets would never accept. Likewise, any suggestion that the Sunna should be discarded as a source of Islamic law and that opinio-jurists must confine their analysis to the Qur’an would find no recognition in the markets. Even the idea of taking a new analytical or substantive start with the Basic Code without the benefit or burden of the classical *fiqh* will be considered revolutionary and therefore rejected. The classical *fiqh* cannot be abandoned in a wholesale manner. The markets favor seamless development of the *fiqh* without any abrupt or revolutionary departure from the past. Muslim rulers and governments might be overthrown through revolutions and palace coups. These violent political changes in Muslim leadership, however, do not disturb the markets of *fiqh* that retain their solemnity and calm in periods of shared distress or upheaval.

Furthermore, the *fiqh* markets disdain all forms of cultism. Even though Makka and Medina house the sacred places of worship and pilgrimage, the markets of *fiqh* are neither territorial nor cultish. No nation or peo-

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64. Revolutions away from the Basic Code may be distinguished from revolutions toward the Basic Code. The 1979 revolution in Iran, the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, and the rise of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt offer examples of revolutions toward the Basic Code in that these movements wished to replace the existing legal systems with the enforcement of the Basic Code. The dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and the substitution of a secular legal system in Turkey is an example of a revolution away from the Basic Code. The *fiqh* markets disapprove of revolutions away from the Basic Code. The fall of the Iranian Shah in 1979 and the establishment of a theocratic democracy demonstrates that secular systems in Muslim communities are inherently unstable. Secular Turkey might similarly be unstable. See, Ali Khan, *Will the European Court of Human Rights Push Turkey Toward Islamic Revolution?*, JURIST, Sept. 9, 2002, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=941002.

65. The Qur’an repeatedly prohibits changing the revealed words of God. It condemns the people who have changed the words in previous holy books. Qur’an, Sura al-Maeda 5:13 (God curses those who break the covenant and change the words) & 5:14 (Jews change the words from their right times and places), Sura al-Anaam 6:34 & 6:115 (none can alter the words of God), Sura an-Nasr 10:64 (no change can occur in the words of God); Sura al-Kahf 18:27 (none can change God’s words) (translated by author).


67. Id.

68. In this sense, there exists a profound separation between governments and *fiqh* markets. The *fiqh* markets do not seek legitimacy from government nor may a government de-legitimize the *fiqh* markets. Of course, a secular system, such as one in Turkey, may refuse to embrace the laws of *fiqh*. Any such refusal, however, does not diminish the vitality of the universal and timeless *fiqh* markets.
people may claim a privileged station to found or influence the development of *fiqh.*

Any attempt to superimpose the concept of sacred nation or sacred people on Islamic law is incompatible with the logic and spirit of the *fiqh* markets. Even though the Basic Code is originally available in the Arabic language, the markets of Islamic law are not confined to Arab nations or Arab opinio-jurists. A scholar from Indonesia, South Africa, or the United States is equally competent and free to offer opinions, as is an opinio-jurist from Egypt or Saudi Arabia. The concept of a chosen people or a preferred nation to interpret the Basic Code cannot survive in the free markets. Any Muslim opinio-jurist, regardless of his ethnic, territorial, or racial background, is welcome to enter the markets and issue opinions. Imam Abu Hanifa, for example, was not an Arab. The markets rejected the insinuations that he was not an Arab and that he was not a native of Makka or Medina, where the Prophet had lived and where the Qur’an was revealed. Rejecting all cultish criticisms, the markets elevated Abu Hanifa to be the greatest opinio-jurist of Islam. The markets were, of course, not prejudiced against Makka or Medina either. Imam Malik, the founder of another classical school, was a native of Medina, where the Prophet established the first Islamic state and where he is buried.

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69. The Qur’an discloses a common human inclination in that each nation thinks very highly of itself, but each nation is equally accountable to what it does. Qur’an, Sura al-Anaam 6:108 (every nation takes pride in its own virtues); Sura al-Jathiya 45:28 (each nation is held accountable) (translated by author).

70. The Qur’an does indicate that God created a nation that guides with truth and establishes justice. Qur’an, Sura al-Araf 7:181. This indication must inspire every nation to seek truth and establish justice. But this commandment cannot be read in a self-serving way to claim superior spirituality or privileged hierarchy. See also Qur’an, Sura al-Anaam 6:108 (every nation indulges in self-pride) (translated by author).

71. Imam Abu Hanifa drew huge criticisms from rival schools of jurisprudence. Part of the criticism originated for his lukewarm attitude toward the *ahadith* and part of the criticism was made because he is not an Arab. Eerik Dickinson, *Ahmad B. al-Salt and His Biography of Abu Hanifa,* 116 J. AM. ORIENTAL SOC. 406, 406 (1996).

72. The 114 suras (chapters) of the Qur’an are divided into Makkan and Medinan suras. The suras revealed in Makka are called Makkan suras and those revealed in Medina are called Medinan suras.

73. The Muslims of the world and of all generations hold these two cities in great esteem. The pilgrimage (*hajj*), one of the five pillars of Islam, is inextricably bound with these two cities. Kaaba, the holiest structure, is located in Makka. The Prophet is buried in Medina. All great jurists draw spiritual and intellectual inspiration from these cities. However, the *fiqh* markets can exist anywhere in the world for they are not primarily geographical.

D. Markets and Madhabs

The fiqh markets may not be identified with, or confused with, madhabs. A madhab is a distinct school of law that develops its own legal methodology to interpret the Basic Code. A madhab also offers a comprehensive code of substantive rules dealing with worship (ibadat) and worldly transactions (mu'amalat). A jurisprudential market, however, is not confined to a single madhab, but accommodates all competing schools of law. Juristic opinions may differ and compete with each other even within a particular school of fiqh, for no school is internally monolithic or inflexible. A market, however, allows a more vigorous exchange of opinions and juristic discussions between and across schools.

A fiqh market is both physical and conceptual. Certain cities or countries serve as physical markets when eminent opinio-jurists live there. Historically, Kufa, Baghdad, Medina, Mecca, Buhara, and Bukhara have served as great jurisprudential markets. A market, however, is also a virtual entity. Conceptually, a jurisprudential market is a phenomenon. It is an exchange of legal opinions issued to respond to new issues and develop new rules of Islamic law or modify the existing ones. With modern technology, including the availability of the Internet, the markets of Islamic law are more likely to become virtual. Juristic discussions may no longer be confined to a particular city or country. The primary function of the market is to facilitate the cross-pollination of juristic opinions.

A mere exchange of legal opinions, however, does not constitute a jurisprudential market. Several parameters assure the existence of a genuine jurisprudential market. The most important aspect of a genuine market is the freedom that jurists have to issue opinions without duress, fear, and pressure. When domestic governments, armed groups, or foreign nations compel jurists to issue legal opinions, the compulsion distorts the dynamics of the jurisprudential market. Likewise, ordinary Muslims as well as competing jurists must be free to accept, reject, or question the issued opinions.

75. Khan, Second Era of Ijtihad, supra note 1.
76. Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, What Is Islamic Law?, 57 MERCER L. REV. 595, 600 (2005) (pre-Islamic customs are the laws provided they are compatible with the Qur’an and the Sunna).
77. An example is the Balkh and Bukhara Hanafite jurists shifting the classical tax on real property from the owner to the tenant. See Baber Johansen, The Islamic Law on Land Tax and Rent (1988). In Iraqi town of Kufa, public debates (munazaara) were held to argue differing legal viewpoints on specific issues. See Asma Afsaruddin, Muslim Views on Education: Parameters, Purview, and Possibilities, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 143, 151 (2005).
including those of the great Imams, Shia, and Sunni. 79 If the jurists and followers are not free, neither are the markets. An authentic jurisprudential market is founded on two distinct freedoms: that of the opinio-jurists and that of the followers. These combined and inseparable freedoms constitute a *fiqh* market in which legal opinions are freely issued and freely accepted, rejected, or criticized.

E. Markets and Governments

Throughout Islamic history, Muslim governments have issued laws and regulations. These laws and regulations, however, do not necessarily qualify as Islamic law. Free markets, not governments, determine whether official laws and regulations are to be considered Islamic. 80 A government runs the risk of losing spiritual credibility if it interferes with the private markets of opinio-jurists. It loses all trust if it closes down such markets. Acknowledging the power of private markets, governments have rarely attempted to completely close down the private markets of *fiqh*. Imperial governments during the Ummayad, Abbasid, Ottoman, and Mughal empires attempted to universalize the official interpretations of the Basic Code. Most attempts backfired. 81 In the era of nation-states, the control of governments is more diffused. Secular governments that separate law and religion are not considered Islamic. Even religious governments that monopolize lawmaking and shutdown private juristic markets lose credibility and their decrees are viewed with suspicion. Wael Hallaq puts it succinctly: “Islamic law did not emerge out of the machinery of the body-politic, but rather arose as a private enterprise initiated and developed by pious men.” 82

79. Over the centuries, doctrinal constraints have been placed to entrench the strict following (*taqlid*) and thus remove the elements of reflective and active choice in following madhabs. These doctrines argue that the great Imams were infallible and enjoyed close contacts with divinity, and as such their interpretations of the Basic Code are authentic and immutable. The concept of the infallible Imam is critical to the Shia *madhab*. Such doctrines hinder the freedom of *fiqh* markets to re-interpret the Basic Code according to new needs and circumstances. See Rudolph Peters, *Idjihad and Taqlid in 18th and 19th Century Islam*, 20 DIE WELT DES ISLAMS 131, 132 (1980).


81. The most dramatic example of imperial impositions occurred in the reign of the Mughal Emperor Akbar in India. Discontent with legal disputes among the jurists and in an effort to create a unity religion, Akbar invented a new faith called *Din-illahi* (God’s religion) and arrogated himself with the consent of jurists the power to resolve the theological conflicts and pronounce the final ruling. This power of *mahdar* was a blatant innovation that could not survive the test of time. See Aziz Ahmed, *The Role of Ulema in Indo-Muslim History*, 31 STUDIA ISLAMICA 1, 6-7 (1970).

82. See Hallaq, *supra* note 61, at 204.
In most cases, government opinio-jurists enter the law markets as equal participants. The *fiqh* markets critically evaluate the credentials, motives, and qualifications of government opinio-jurists. As a general rule, the *fiqh* markets are suspicious of the independence of government opinio-jurists. The markets assume that government opinio-jurists would interpret the Basic Code to support government objectives and policies. In secular legal traditions, governments are the ultimate source of law formation and law enforcement. The judges are assured judicial freedom through the safeguards of life tenures at their job. In Islam, however, governments rarely enjoy the ultimate power to dominate the law markets. If they overtly dominate the law markets, they lose credibility to influence the development of Islamic law. Even their covert domination has rarely succeeded in bringing about a fundamental change in Islamic *fiqh*. Because governments have coercive machinery to enforce the laws they make, they may temporarily rig the markets in their favor. In the long run, however, government gains obtained through coercion are reversed. That has been the power of the *fiqh* markets. 83

The founders of Islamic *fiqh* were highly skeptical of any association with government. Imam Abu Hanifa went to prison for refusing Caliph al-Mansur’s offer to become the chief judge. Skeptical of the company of rulers, Abu Hanifa is reported to have compared the ruler with fire that benefits from a distance but burns from being too close. 84 When Medina’s governor forced Muslims to take the oath of allegiance to Caliph al-Mansur, Imam Malik issued a legal opinion declaring such an oath to be unlawful. 85 The governor arrested Imam Malik and publicly flogged him. 86 Imam Shafi was also arrested in Yemen for fomenting political dissension. 87 The fourth founder, Imam Hanbal, was brought in chains before the court for refusing to submit to Caliph Mu’tasim’s official ideology. 88 Thus, all the four founders of the legendary schools of jurisprudence demonstrated through their personal life stories that Islamic law must be severed from the power of the government. Opinio-jurists, and not rulers, are the guardians of Islamic law.

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83. The most vivid example of imperial imposition of *fiqh* was during the period of *minha* (inquisition) when the ruling caliph used coercion to impose juristic viewpoints. Later caliphs restored the freedom of the *fiqh* markets. See EL FADL, supra note 78, at 90-96.
86. Id.
Opinions delivered in private chambers of honest and God-fearing opinio-jurists are more worthy of consideration than those issued by government judges or government opinio-jurists. The inherent mistrust of rulers informs the enterprise of Islamic law.89

1. Shift from Jurists to Juristic Institutions

For many centuries, the free markets of *fiqh* have been composed of individual opinio-jurists. As Muslim communities formed distinct nation-states in the twentieth century, a new phenomenon has come to define the *fiqh* markets. Each Muslim state established a legal system with formal legislature and judiciary.90 Some Muslim nations also established state institutions of prominent Muslim opinio-jurists. In almost every state, the legislative activity is becoming highly technical and complex. New areas of law have surfaced that the Islamic markets of *fiqh* have not previously considered.91 Muslim nations also participate in the making of international treaties and customary international law.92 The sheer volume of law that each nation must generate to manage affairs of the community is formidable. It is beyond the capacity, even expertise, of a single opinio-jurist or scholar to provide rigorous commentary on the validity of each and every piece of legislation, domestic and international, that a Muslim nation must enact. These momentous changes will force the free markets of *fiqh* to adjust to new realities and to adopt useful ways to assure that the Basic Code is neither breached nor abandoned.

State institutions, including the legislature and judiciary, play the gatekeeping role in assuring that new laws are in conformity with the Basic Code. Most Muslim states have domestic constitutional provisions that obligate state institutions to review proposed laws, including treaties, for

89. N.J. Coulson, Doctrine and Practice in Islamic Law: One Aspect of the Problem, 18 BULL. SCHL. ORIENTAL & AFR. STUD. 17, 211-12 (1956) (explaining the mistrust of association with government and quoting that “when Allah has no more use for a creature, He casts him into the circle of officials”).

90. A wide variety of governmental structures exist in Muslim states. Turkey, for example, has instituted a secular government whereas Iran is a democratic theocracy. Saudi Arabia is a monarchy without a constitution whereas Jordan is a constitutional monarchy. See KHAN, supra note 6.

91. Muslim countries, for example, must reckon with stem cell research, organ transplant, blood transfusion, and other medical advancements.

their compatibility with the Qur’an and the Sunna. Iran’s constitution, for example, mandates that “[a]ll civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria.” 93 The Constitution also establishes the Council of Guardians,94 consisting of eminent Muslim opinio-jurists, who review the laws to assure that they meet Islamic criteria.95 The concept of the Council of Guardians may breach the principles of the free market because the Council has been empowered to rule on the validity of laws, and when it so rules, laws are binding.96 Any contrary juristic opinions are dismissed and not allowed to compete with the views of the Council of Guardians.97 The extraordinary powers of the Council of Guardians, however, do not affect the international markets of *fiqh* because no other Muslim community, Sunni or Shia, is bound to accept rulings of the Council of Guardians.98 The free markets, however, will not completely dismiss opinions of the Council of Guardians because its opinio-jurists are pious and eminent.

The Constitution of Pakistan provides that “[a]ll existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah . . . and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such Injunctions.”99 This categorical language of the Constitution leaves no room for any laws, past, present, or future, to be incompatible with the Basic Code. To safeguard the Islamic roots of Pakistani laws, the Constitution establishes the “Council of Islamic Ideology.”100 The Council shall consist of at least eight scholars from “persons having knowledge of the principles and philosophy of Islam as enunciated in the Holy Qur’an and Sunna, or understanding of the economic, political, legal or administrative problems of Pakistan.”101 The Council is not a religious entity of Muslim opinio-jurists, since all of its members are not required to be the opinio-

94. *Qununi Assassi Iumhuri’ Isla’mal Iran* [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran art. 91] 1358 [1980]. The Council consists of twelve persons, including six religious men and six jurists of different expertise in the areas of law. *Id.* The language of the article appears to allow women to be part of the juristic chamber of the Council of Guardians.
98. Shias in other parts of the world may or may not adhere to the rulings or decisions of the Iranian Council of Guardians.
100. *PAKISTAN CONST.* art. 228(1) (1980).
101. *Id.*
jurists of the Qur’an and the Sunna. Secular scholars of economics, politics, and law may also serve the Council. Unlike Iran’s Council of Guardians, Pakistan’s Council of Islamic Ideology is less theocratic. However, the substantive provisions of the Constitution require all state institutions, including the legislature and judiciary, to assure that no law is repugnant to the basic principles of the Qur’an and the Sunna.

2. Shift from Extraction to Approval

Another significant change in the fiqh markets is the shift from extracting new rulings from original sources to furnishing approval for laws made elsewhere. In the classical period, the scholar applied interpretive methods to extract a new ruling to solve a problem in the real world. The jurist would interpret the text of the Qur’an and the substance of the Sunna to design a ruling that solves the problem. He would use legal methods such as analogy and public welfare in interpreting the Basic Code. The juristic opinions were essentially legislative in character, at least to the extent that the opinion offered a prescriptive rule. Of course, the prescriptive value of the opinion also depended on its acceptance in the general community. If the community refused to accept the opinion, it remained a paper rule with no corresponding practice in the functional world.

With the rise of national legislatures that seem to have monopolized legislative activity, the role of the opinio-jurist has dramatically changed. Now the opinio-jurist must review the laws for their compatibility with the Basic Code. The juristic opinion is now sought to seek approval of the laws that the legislature or the executive branch of the state enact. The governments may have established state juristic bodies for such review. Private Muslim opinio-jurists not affiliated with the state, however, are free to issue their own opinions on any proposed or enacted laws and declare them to be...

102. The members of the Council may either be persons having the knowledge of Islam or understanding of the economic, political, legal, or administrative problems of Pakistan. Pakistan Const. art. 228(2) (1980).

103. Id.

104. Classical legal methods included qiyas (analogy), ijma (consensus), juristic preference, and compatibility with local customs. These methods restrained the jurist from interpreting the Basic Code without free fancy. For other supplementary sources of Islamic law, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Sources of Islamic Law, and the Protection of Human Rights in the Islamic Criminal Justice System, in The Islamic Criminal Justice System 9 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982).

harmonious with the Basic Code or not. The state opinio-jurists may be viewed with suspicion and biased. Close ties with the ruling elite have been suspect ever since the dawn of the free markets of Islamic fiqh. That suspicion continues to linger even if state affiliated opinio-jurists are pious and highly educated individuals.

F. Diversity and Plurality of Rules

Since the beginning, Islamic law has been diverse and pluralistic in view of differing social customs and practices. No super norm requires the fiqh markets to drive out the rules that fail to win all Muslim communities. Even rules with a minority following survive and remain part of the Islamic legal tradition. A rule of fiqh that makes perfect sense in one community may not successfully function in other communities. Of course, no community may hold on to a local custom contrary to the letter and spirit of the Basic Code. Local customs do not trump the Qur‘an and the Sunna. But they may be accommodated in the juristic rules of the fiqh. Respect for local customs is a fundamental principle of Islamic fiqh. The free markets thrive on this respect for diversity and dignity of local cultures. They refrain from universalizing a rule of the fiqh that discounts local traditions. Islamic jurisprudence is thus inherently flexible and resilient.

1. Differing Cultures

Legal opinions derived from the Basic Code may not differ simply because of different legal methods used to derive meaning from the texts. These opinions may differ because of cultural differences. The Hanafi opinio-jurists of Balkh (Afghanistan), for example, could not accept the rule of diya, that is, monetary compensation that the offender pays to the vic-

106. Pakistan, for example, is in the process of changing the 1979 Huddod (Enforcement of Zina) Ordinance, under which a woman who could not prove rape was charged with committing (zina) fornication on the theory that the woman has already confessed to sexual intercourse. The law silenced women and discouraged them from bringing claims of rape. The new law will not punish the woman if she fails to prove rape. Many opinio-jurists oppose the change in law and argue that the new law would not punish a confessed crime. See David Montero, Rape Law Reform Roils Pakistan’s Islamists, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 17, 2006, at 7.

107. See supra Part I.C.

108. The concept of ikhtilaf, that is positive recognition of differences of legal opinions, is a salient trait of Islamic jurisprudence. Oussama Arabi, Contract Stipulations (Shurat) in Islamic Law: The Ottoman Majalla and Ibn Taymiyya, 30 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD., 29, 30 (1998).

109. Abdul Rauf, supra note 76, at 604 (noting pre-Islamic customs are the laws provided they are compatible with the Qur‘an and the Sunna).
tim’s family. The Arab Hanafi opinio-jurists concluded that the offender’s extended family was liable to pay diya for the commission of unintentional homicide. This diya rule of fiqh presupposes a family structure built on mutual support. This rule could not be imported into Balkh where no such family solidarity existed.

2. Differing Methods of Legal Reasoning

Diverse legal opinions may also arise from differing legal reasoning that the opinio-jurist uses to solve legal problems. Imam Ahmed ibn Hanbal argued that the prayers said in a stolen garment were wholly null and void. Under his analysis, saying prayers in a stolen garment fuse what is right with what is wrong. The purpose of prayer is submission to God and an affirmation of good intentions and the purity of heart. Thus, when the prayers are said in stolen garments, the spirit of submission is breached in a flagrant manner. Imam Abu Hanifa, however, reached the opposite conclusion. He declared the prayers said in a stolen garment to be valid on the ground that the act of stealing does not vitiate the act of worship. The person would be rewarded for his performance of obligation to God but punished for breaching his duty to man. According to Abu Hanifa, the two acts and the corresponding obligations are separate and may not be fused. The act of worshiping in a stolen garment does not cure the act of stealing, and the act of stealing does not taint the prayers. Due to these conflicting and irreconcilable juristic opinions of the Great Imams, the matter is left to individual discretion. When fiqh rulings conflict and provide no clear guidance, Muslims must search their conscience, under the principle of personal accountability, to decide whether or not, for example, to say the prayers in stolen garments.

In all probability, most God-fearing Muslims would choose not to say their prayers in stolen garments, unless necessity dictates otherwise. If the individual has no other garments to say his mandatory prayers, the prayers

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111. Id.
112. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Qur’an, Sura al-Anaam 6:52 (each person is accountable to God) (translated by author).
said in stolen garments are valid.\textsuperscript{118} The individual, however, is still accountable for his theft.\textsuperscript{119} If a Muslim steals the garment for the primary purpose of saying the mandatory prayers, even the act of theft may be punished only lightly or completely forgiven.\textsuperscript{120}

These examples clarify that differing legal methods and reasoning may yield different \textit{fiqh} rulings. No wrong is committed when prudent and honest jurists propose differing rulings on the same issue. As suggested before, the ultimate test of a ruling is what might be called a field test; that is, whether a Muslim community would accept a particular ruling. Once a strict loyalty to a particular \textit{madhab} is relaxed, the field test offers an even more promising and permanent solution to differing opinions. Muslim communities are free to accept a particular rule in good faith and in accordance with their culture and social viewpoint.

G. Universal and Timeless Rules

The rules contained in the Qur’an and the Sunna constitute the universal and timeless rules of \textit{al-fitra} binding on all Muslim communities of all temporal generations, regardless of their diverse culture, tradition, and history.\textsuperscript{121} For example, fasting is prescribed for all Muslim communities, though there are exemptions for individuals suffering from certain specified disabilities.\textsuperscript{122} However, no community may claim exemption from fasting on the ground that fasting is contrary to its customs and local practices.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{118} Qur’an, Sura al-Baqara 2:173, Sura an-Nahl 16:115 (the compulsion of necessity makes lawful what is otherwise unlawful; a person may eat the forbidden pork under the force of necessity) (translated by author). \textit{See also} Qur’an, Sura al-Anaam 6:119 & 6:145.

\textsuperscript{119} Qur’an, Sura al-Anaam 6:120 (persons who commit sins, secret or open, will get due recompense for what they have earned) (translated by author).

\textsuperscript{120} Qur’an, Sura al-Ar’aaf 7:153 (God forgives those who commit a wrong, repent thereafter, and truly believe) (translated by author).

\textsuperscript{121} Qur’an, Sura Saba 34:28 (The Prophet has been sent as a universal messenger to give the good news and warn against wrongdoing) (translated by author). Qur’an, Sura ar-Rum 30:30 (God has created man in a state of \textit{al-fitra}, i.e., the state of upright nature) (translated by author). Sahih Bukhari, Vol. 6, Bk. 60, No. 298, \textit{available at} http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/060.sbt.html (last visited May 11, 2007) (stating every child is born in a state of \textit{al-fitra}). Islamic law contained in the Basic Code has thus been called \textit{al-fitra} or natural law. It is not the law of raw instincts but of a nature that can be cultivated through submission to One God in accordance with His Laws revealed in the Qur’an and in accordance with the Prophet’s inspired wisdom contained in the Sunna.

\textsuperscript{122} Qur’an, Sura al-Baqara 2:283-84 (Fasting is prescribed for all Muslims. However, the sick, the elderly, travelers, and women who are nursing may postpone their fasting) (translated by author).

\textsuperscript{123} Local customs cannot overrule a clear commandment of the Qur’an. These customs however may be allowed to function only if they are compatible with injunctions of the Basic Code.
Likewise, Muslim men and women of all nations and generations are under an obligation to get married, though this rule also has practical exceptions.\textsuperscript{124} These exceptions are available to individuals, however, and not to communities.\textsuperscript{125} No Muslim community may depart from the universal Islamic rule of marriage and establish a counter rule that undermines the institution of marriage.\textsuperscript{126}

Even some universal rules embodied in the Basic Code are flexible. The Qur’an, for example, prescribes the concept of the age of marriage.\textsuperscript{127} However, it prescribes no definite age as the age of marriage. The Qur’an’s injunction mandates that a Muslim community establish an age of marriage. But the injunction leaves it to each community to determine for itself what that age ought to be.\textsuperscript{128} A Muslim community would breach its obligation under the Qur’an if it establishes no minimum age of marriage, but the setting of a certain minimum age of marriage is within the community’s discretion.\textsuperscript{129} Muslim communities would commit no wrong if they adopt an age of marriage that is universally accepted or mandated. For now, the human rights treaties have failed to set a definite minimum age of marriage.\textsuperscript{130} The classical \textit{fiqh} has allowed Muslim men and women of less than eighteen years old to get married.\textsuperscript{131} This ruling may be changed in order for


\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Id.} Under the Hanafi school, a Muslim is forbidden from marriage if he cannot support his wife and children or suffers from an illness that would harm his wife and children. Marriage is also not recommended to Muslims who have no love for children or possess no sexual desire. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{126} Qur’an, Sura an-Najam 53:45 (God has created the two spouses, male and female) (translated by author).

\textsuperscript{127} Qur’an, Sura al-Nisaa 4:6 (balaghoo al-nnikaha).

\textsuperscript{128} Mhamoud Hoballah, \textit{Marriage, Divorce, and Inheritance in Islamic Law, in UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW: FROM CLASSICAL TO CONTEMPORARY 111, 112 (Hisham M. Ramadan ed., 2006).}

\textsuperscript{129} The state of affairs is no different under current international law of human rights. All states agree that there should be a minimum age for marriage but no agreement could be reached on what that age ought to be. See Ann Laquer Estin, \textit{Toward a Multicultural Family Law}, 38 Fam. L.Q. 501, 508 (2004).


\textsuperscript{131} Under customary laws of some Muslim communities, a person below the minimum age of marriage needs the approval of the guardian to contract a marriage. However, spousal consent is a cardinal principle of marriage. Sahih Bukhari, Vol. 9, Bk. 85, No. 79,
Muslim communities to comply with any universal rule that may in the future set a minimum age of marriage. Thus, the Qur'an’s prescriptive flexibility allows Muslim communities to adjust the age of marriage according to the needs and moral imperative of the times.

The rules of *fiqh* are frequently diverse, as uniformity or universality are not conditions precedent for formulating the rules of *fiqh*. However, even some rules of *fiqh* might become universal through widespread acceptance. A universal rule of Islamic *fiqh* emerges in the free markets through a process of convergence and consensus. When the leading opinio-jurists of diverse communities offer similar opinions over the same legal issue, a process of convergence takes place. The commonality of their opinions emerges as the universal rule of Islamic *fiqh*. The rule is established as a firm precedent in its own period and for subsequent generations. A universal rule of *fiqh* established through the free markets may survive indefinitely across nations and cultures.

H. Reopening Settled Rules

Once a rule has been firmly established in any legal system, it is difficult to uproot it.132 This general observation is valid for Islamic law as well. The age of strict precedents was a period in which Islamic law could not be developed, leading to Muslim nations losing touch with changing realities of the world.133 But even in this period, Islamic law continued to change and grow. Iron rigidity has never been part of the *fiqh* markets, as any rigidity doctrine defies open and free markets upon which Islamic law is built. Consistent with commands of the Basic Code, even settled rules of *fiqh* may undergo partial or complete repeal.

1. Interpretation of Authoritative Sources

The most striking example of such a process of change is the *sama* rule. *Sama* refers to listening to music to achieve a state of *wajd* (that is ecstasy). *Sama* connects the minds and hearts of listeners to the beauties of faith.134 Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111)135 was a great proponent of *sama* and believed that the secrets concealed in the heart can only be brought

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132. Classical common law, for example, did not allow the changing of the precedent. Modern common law is highly respectful of the doctrine of precedent, even though it is now much more flexible and open to change.


135. For Al-Ghazali’s biography and works, see http://www.ghazali.org/.
about by sama. In his chapter on Music and Singing, al-Ghazali begins by acknowledging that the first Muslim scholars, including the great Imams, Shafi, Malik, and Abu’ Hanifa, viewed listening to music “as forbidden.”

Imam Shafi compares listening to music with false sport and opines that a person who engages in this sport is disqualified as a credible witness and his testimony shall be rejected. In Medina, most Islamic scholars, including Imam Malik, declared singing to be unlawful. Likewise in Kufa, Great Imam Abu Hanifa and most other Muslim scholars left no doubt in their opinions that listening to singing was contrary to the teachings of Islam.

Ghazali presents a muddled picture with respect to the fourth Imam, Ahmed bin Hanbal. He quotes Ibn Daud to show that Imam Hanbal “disliked listening to music and singing.” But he also cites another source to show that Imam Hanbal listened to the voice of a poet known as Ibn al-Khababaza.

It appears that all the four great Imams had reached a consensus in prohibiting music and singing. To challenge these classical juristic prohibitions, Al-Ghazali makes several distinct arguments. The first argument highlights the gap between practice and juristic opinion. Ghazali lists a number of the Prophet’s companions who themselves listened to music, and others who, despite their asceticism and piety, expressed no disapproval for others. The people of Medina and Mecca did not cease listening to music even in holy days, such as the days of at-Tashriq, set aside for exclusive worship to God. And when the Prophet and his companions arrived in a new city, says Ghazali, the women on the housetops expressed their joy by singing poems with tambourines.

Ghazali draws on these facts to show that no juristic opinion is valid if there is no compliance in the Muslim community. His observation is correct to the extent that the rules of fiqh are more than mere opinions. Compliance is an essential part of a valid rule. This argument must be qualified, however, since the purpose of fiqh is not simply to report a community practice, but sometimes to change it. However, juristic preferences cannot be confused with fiqh. If a community of believers acts contrary to the pre-

137. Id. at 201.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 204.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 204-05.
143. Id. at 202-03.
144. Id. at 224.
scriptive demands of a juristic opinion, Ghazali correctly concludes, the opinion is simply a juristic preference and not a rule of law. Under this logic, the great Imams were simply expressing a preference that did not become a binding rule due to lack of compliance.

After showing the gap between juristic opinion and popular practice, Ghazali invokes the Basic Code to argue that listening to music and singing are not totally prohibited. Ghazali identifies two distinct sources, nass and qiyas, which must be consulted to find a rule for or against sama.145 Nass are the fixed texts; that is, the texts of the Qur’an and the Sunna. Qiyas, also known as analogy, is a legal method that early Muslim opinio-jurists developed to cull meaning from the nass.146 In analyzing these sources, Ghazali articulates the issue in a starkly clear language: to say that music is prohibited in Islam is to contend that God has forbidden it under penalty.147

Ghazali lays out the nass arguments to demonstrate that God loves beautiful voices. The Qur’an states that “verily the harshest voices without doubt is the voice (braying) of the ass.”148 This nass, the words of God Most High, Ghazali says, contain “implicit praise of a beautiful voice.”149 Ghazali also cites a number of ahadith, the words of the Prophet, to reinforce his defense of music and singing: “God has not sent a prophet except with a beautiful voice.”150 “God listens more intently to a man with a beautiful voice reading the Qur’an . . . .”151 The Prophet also praised Biblical Prophet David, says Ghazali, whose beautiful singing of the Psalms would enchant human beings, jinns, wild beasts, and birds.152 Ghazali provides no sources from which he gathered these ahadith.

However, Ghazali does mention the ahadith collected in the two most authentic collections, Sahih Bukhari and Sahih Muslim,153 further prove that singing and music are allowed under Islamic law. One hadith refers to an episode in which the Prophet’s wife Aisha was listening to two singing girls. The Prophet was there but he did not stop the singing.154 The Prophet, however, did turn his face away. When Aisha’s father, Abu Bakr, arrived, he rebuked Aisha, protesting how she could allow the Devil’s pipe

145. Id. at 207.
146. Id.; Khan, Second Era of Ijtihad, supra note 1, at 363.
147. MacDonald, supra note 136, at 207.
148. Qur’an, Sura Luqmaan 31:19 (translated by author).
149. MacDonald, supra note 136, at 209.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. (mentioning David as Da’ud).
153. See id.
in the presence of God’s Apostle. The Prophet, however, said to Abu Bakr: “Leave them alone.”

Ghazali analyzes this hadith to show that the Prophet, even though he was not looking at the singing girls, did listen to their singing and playing the tambourines. There are other viable counter-interpretations, however. This hadith may also be interpreted to argue that the Prophet refused to impose his personal preference over his wife. His turning away from the singing girls and covering his face under the sheet may be seen as indications of minor disapproval. These gestures may also be interpreted as strong disapproval, since the Prophet was a mild-mannered person and made his points gently and subtly, particularly to the people he loved. An argument can be made that this episode does clarify that the Prophet tolerated music and singing even though he refused to absorb himself into the event—though it is one that Ghazali does not make in his teachings. But such an argument would support a broader thesis that no opinio-jurist, not even the Prophet, may universalize his personal tastes and preferences as binding rules for the larger Muslim community.

2. Arguments Drawn from Analogy (Qiyas)

The arguments drawn from qiyas (analogy) are the most striking in Ghazali’s defense of sama. Employing the legal tool of analogy, Ghazali indulges in lawyer-like hairsplitting to challenge the scholastic ban on music. But his main argument appears to draw a sharp distinction between things essentially lawful and essentially unlawful, though each category has its own exceptions. For example, Ghazali says drinking wine, is essentially unlawful. And yet it is lawful for a person choking with a morsel to drink wine if he cannot find any other liquid to relieve his distress. Thus, necessity makes lawful what is unlawful.

By contrast, says Ghazali, music and singing are essentially permissible. But there are circumstances under which what is permissible becomes prohibited. For example, doing business is essentially lawful, but becomes prohibited “at the time of the summons to prayer on Friday.” On the basis of this analogy, Ghazali argues that listening to music and singing are lawful unless some external factors vitiate their lawfulness. Music that generates unlawful sexual craving makes the music unlawful not because music is

155. *Id.*
157. For love of the Prophet, Muslims may follow the Prophet’s preferences and personal tastes, but with the understanding that what they are doing is an act of affection and not an act of duty.
159. *Id.*
160. *Id.* at 242.
essentially unlawful, but because the purpose for which music is employed is unlawful. Likewise, singing is essentially permitted, but this permission cannot be blind to “the content of what is sung.” If the contents of a poem are obscene or contemptuous of God or His Prophet, reminds Ghazali, no melody can make the singing of the poem lawful.

Al-Ghazali’s defense of sama seems to have relaxed the classical ban on listening to music. Music is allowed in most Muslim communities. The invention of qawwali that started with devotional music at the shrines of Sufi scholars may have acquired some of its legitimacy from the works of al-Ghazali. The genre of qawwali has now been perfected and is a popular medium of music in some Muslim countries. It has also been combined with Western music. Muslim communities and groups who still hold on to classical fiqh may have doubts about the legitimacy of sama. But a Muslim community that generally belongs to a classical school of fiqh may select to relax the ban on sama.

3. Rule-Selectivity (Tarjih)

Within the four Sunni schools, the fiqh markets have allowed the concept of rule-selectivity (tarjih). The strict hold of madhab particularism is yielding to rule-selectivity. Muslims are selecting rules from diverse schools of fiqh to fulfill their obligations. For example, a Muslim who generally follows the Hanfai madhab may adopt a Shafi rule that permits, under bad weather, the combining of the noon prayer (dhur) with that of afternoon prayer (as’r) or the evening prayer (maghrab) with the night prayer (isha)—a convenience unavailable under the Hanafi madhab. The same Muslim may adopt a Hanbali rule under which he may perform ablutions (wudu) by touching his socks with a moist hand instead of washing his bare feet, a

161. Id. at 237.
162. Id.
164. NUSRAT FATEH ALI KHAN & MICHAEL BROOK, MUSTT MUSTT (Real World Records 1991) (This compilation of music combines qawwali with western instruments).
165. This concept of choice is also known as taqliq or takhayur. The concept of tarjih has been used in the science of collecting the authentic ahadith. However, the concept of tarjih must be distinguished from the legal method by which a preference is made. For example, Al-Bukhari used the concept of tarjih but used the legal method of “a greater number of transmitters” to exercise his tarjih. See Ermin Sinanovic, Democracy and the Majority Principle in Islamic Legal-Political Thought (2002), http://www.messageonline.org/2002aprilmay/cover4.htm (last visited May 11, 2007).
requirement under the Hanfai rules of ablutions.\textsuperscript{167} This selectivity offers great convenience to Muslims living a fast-paced life in places where ablutions facilities are inadequate or unavailable. The concept of \textit{tarjih} does not apply to mandatory rules of the Qur’an and the Sunna. Muslims are forbidden from making any changes to the text and the meaning of the Basic Code. \textit{Tarjih} applies only to juristic rules where different opinio-jurists have ruled differently upon the same issue.\textsuperscript{168} Even with respect to \textit{tarjih}, Muslims are careful not to follow rules of an opinio-jurist who lacks standing and respect in the circles of piety and knowledge. Nor can \textit{tarjih} be used in bad faith to avoid obligations arising from law or contract.\textsuperscript{169}

I. Tainted Opinions

The \textit{fiqh} markets protect their independence and authenticity by discounting tainted opinions. The opinions of jurists and juristic bodies, including courts, are considered tainted if the markets are unsure about the freedom of opinio-jurists or juristic bodies.\textsuperscript{170} The markets presume that government opinio-jurists and judges render tainted opinions.\textsuperscript{171} Even the opinions of private jurists and juristic institutions closely associated with governments are considered tainted.\textsuperscript{172} Any opinio-jurist who works for a non-Muslim institution or government will almost always be viewed with suspicion.\textsuperscript{173} By contrast, opinio-jurists who suffer abuse and persecution

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\textsuperscript{167} Id.
\textsuperscript{168} Id.
\textsuperscript{169} Qur’an, Sura al-Maeda 5:1 (believers are commanded to fulfill all obligations) (translated by author).
\textsuperscript{170} Reference, for example, the rise of professional jurists in Muslim India who played a complex role in subverting the free and authentic \textit{fiqh} markets. Aziz Ahmed, \textit{The Role of Ulema in Indo-Muslim History}, 31 STUDIA ISLAMICA 1, 6-7 (1970) (explaining the rise of official jurists in Muslim India through the centuries).
\textsuperscript{171} Id. at 7 (discussing the distinction between evil and ruthless jurists) (ulama-i-su and ulama-i-Haqq).
\textsuperscript{172} After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, a number of organizations emerged in America to “reform” Islam. For example, the American Islamic Congress, directed by eminent professors from notable universities and academic centers, promotes the separation of church and state in the Muslim world. See American Islamic Congress, \textit{Frequently Asked Questions}, http://www.aicongress.org/faq_islam.html (last visited May 11, 2007). This view, though meritorious even from an internal viewpoint, will be seen “tainted” as coming from an organization that advocates “American patriotism” more than Islamic values. See American Islamic Congress, \textit{Statement of Principles}, http://www.aicongress.org/sop.html (last visited May 11, 2007).
\textsuperscript{173} For example, Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl serves as a commissioner on the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. President George W. Bush appointed him to the Commission. See United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, http://www.uscirf.gov/about/commissioners.html (last visited May 11, 2007). Professor El Fadl is an eminent scholar whose works are serious and authentic. His close association with the U.S. government, however, might discount his works in some juristic
enjoy higher credibility in the free markets, and their opinions are presumed to be authentic.\textsuperscript{174} Of course, governmental abuse per se does not render an opinion authentic, because the fiqh markets will scrutinize credentials of the persecuted opinio-jurist and contents of the banned opinion.

1. \textit{Positional Consciousness and the Tainting of Believers}

For example, the fiqh markets may discount the opinions of Muslim opinio-jurists living in the United States and other Western countries, for these opinio-jurists are considered to be intellectually, emotionally, and spiritually unfree despite the fact that most Western legal systems protect free speech and do not persecute opinio-jurists for their opinions. That said, the fiqh markets penetrate deeper into the dynamics of personal freedom and are rarely fooled by a show of overt freedom that legal systems claim to grant.\textsuperscript{175} Muslim opinio-jurists living in the Western legal tradition are psychologically predisposed or coerced to find ways to synthesize Western values with the Islamic way of life.\textsuperscript{176} In their attempts to find solutions agreeable to non-Muslims, Muslim opinio-jurists may offer tainted opinions, overtly dishonest in analytical reasoning, or unknowingly compromised because of positional consciousness. In the post 9/11 world, tainted circles in the Muslim world. Muslims would note the fact that a majority of countries accused by the Commission for committing egregious violations of religious freedom (countries of particular concern) are Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran.\textsuperscript{174} Some of the most influential Muslim jurists of the twentieth century, for example, suffered great abuse in their personal lives. Hassan al-Banna (1906-48), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, was assassinated. Syed Qutb (1906-66), a critical figure in developing the Salafi ideology, a jurist educated in both Islamic and Western institutions, was executed on the absurd charges of being a Marxist subversive.\textsuperscript{175} Tariq Ramadan, a jurist who has spent most of his life in Europe and has a European mother, was denied entry in the United States, subverting his contract to teach at the University of Notre Dame. Ramadan has accused the United States of being afraid of ideas. Tariq Ramadan, \textit{Why I'm Banned in the USA}, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2006, at B1. This episode informs the fiqh markets that the United States' freedoms of speech and religion are unavailable to some Muslim jurists. Yusuf Islam (Cat Stevens) was similarly denied entry in the United States. Some argue that the United States would allow academics like Alan Dershowitz to argue for torture but demands progressive and moderate views from Muslim academics. See Blog on Journalism and Islam in America, http://www.tabsir.net/?p=17 (last visited May 11, 2007).\textsuperscript{175} Tariq Ramadan, a jurist who has spent most of his life in Europe and has a European mother, was denied entry in the United States, subverting his contract to teach at the University of Notre Dame. Ramadan has accused the United States of being afraid of ideas. Tariq Ramadan, \textit{Why I'm Banned in the USA}, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2006, at B1. This episode informs the fiqh markets that the United States' freedoms of speech and religion are unavailable to some Muslim jurists. Yusuf Islam (Cat Stevens) was similarly denied entry in the United States. Some argue that the United States would allow academics like Alan Dershowitz to argue for torture but demands progressive and moderate views from Muslim academics. See Blog on Journalism and Islam in America, http://www.tabsir.net/?p=17 (last visited May 11, 2007).

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opinions issued in Western countries have proliferated as Muslim opinio-
jurists fear personal safety and mobility.177

The importance of these principles becomes evident when one consid-
ers the use of the controversial tactic of suicide bombings in occupied Mus-
lim lands such as Gaza, West Bank, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In these lands,
Muslim militants have used guerillas strapped with bombs to attack military
and civilian targets. Suicide bombing has been an effective weapon in
asymmetrical conflicts, since it defies all theories of deterrence and has
proven to be an elusive weapon to detect or control. The shock, surprise,
and terror associated with suicide bombing have been a frustrating experi-
ence for occupiers and their formidable armed forces. It is also a weapon
that the Westerners, including Israelis, do not use. Historically, part of war-
fare has been to ban the unique weapons of the enemy. The West is there-
fore determined to ban suicide bombing, citing all sorts of moral and legal
reasons. Massive propaganda has been launched to associate suicide bom-
b ing with indiscriminate killing of the civilians, discounting its destructive
power to the occupation infrastructure and military assets.178 Some in the
West, who may defend the use of nuclear weapons, resent the morality of
suicide bombing.

What does Islamic law say about suicide bombing? The Qur’an and
the Sunna do not provide a direct answer to the question. The issue, there-
fore, is one that belongs to the fiqh markets, where Muslim opinio-jurists
must provide an answer. Opinio-jurists from all over the world may partici-
pate in the fiqh market to determine the validity of suicide bombing. These
opinio-jurists will use classical legal methods, including analogy, logic,
customs, purposes, and preferences to interpret the text of the Qur’an and
the meaning of appropriate ahadith (Sunna). They may also consult classi-
cal opinions that the founders of original schools had issued in the context
of the Islamic law of war.

The geographical location of opinio-jurists might influence their opin-
ions on suicide bombing. Opinio-jurists living in the occupied territories of
Palestine, for example, will have a unique perspective on suicide bombings
that other opinio-jurists residing elsewhere might not share. Sheikh Ahmed
Yassin, the spiritual founder of the Hamas and a Muslim opinio-jurist,179
appeared to have sanctioned suicide bombings. Dozens of soldiers belong-

177. Daniel Pipes, Why Revoke Tariq Ramadan’s U.S. Visa?, N.Y. SUN, Aug. 27,
2004, at 9 (Pipes, an external Islamic scholar argues that Ramadan’s visa was rightfully
revoked because Ramadan questioned the thesis that Bin Laden was behind 9/11).
178. John Alan Cohan, Necessity, Political Violence and Terrorism, 35 STETSON L.
REV. 903 (2006) (discussing how Alan Dershowitz and Nathan Lewin propose to punish the
culture that takes pride in suicide bombings).
179. Yassin was later assassinated by Israel. See Ali Khan, The CHANGING LAW OF
d404041502100.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2007).
ing to the Hamas undertook suicide bombing missions while he headed the organization. Israel defended the Sheikh’s assassination since he allegedly “masterminded scores of suicide bombings.”

Abu-Basir al-Tartusi, a Muslim opinio-jurist who lives in London, issued an opinion in which he declared that suicide bombing is *haram* (forbidden). Al-Tartusi invoked a number of *ahadith* to demonstrate that suicide bombing is closer to forbidden suicide than it is to favored martyrdom. He cited Prophet Muhammad’s sayings: “Anyone who harms a believer has no jihad”, “[a] Muslim and his blood, possession, and honor are haram to another Muslim”, “the Muslim is the one who Muslims are safe from his tongue and hand”, and “[t]he Believer is the one that people trust with their possessions and lives.” Al-Tartusi concluded that suicide operations contravene a number of the *Sharia* texts. Al-Tartusi’s opinion generated huge criticism. One Muslim asked: “What do you expect from him when he lives in London?” Others warned that the law of war comes from the fighters in the battlefield and not from opinio-jurists sitting in London.

This discussion is not to take a particular position on the matter, but rather to illustrate the importance of an opinio-jurist’s situated consciousness in determining how it will fare in *fiqh* markets. At this point, the *fiqh* markets are receiving conflicting opinions from Muslim opinio-jurists. It is unclear how the *fiqh* ruling on suicide bombing will eventually take shape. While it is unlikely that the *fiqh* would sanction an unrestricted use of suicide bombing, the opinio-jurists may consider factors such as the state of oppression, the availability of means of resistance, the intention of the suicide bomber, the harm caused to innocent civilians, and other considerations in justifying suicide bombing as a possible legal weapon.

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182. Id.

183. Id.


185. Al Shafey, supra note 181.

186. Id.

187. Id.

188. Id.
2. Believers and Non-Believers

While the fiqh markets are open to all Muslim opinio-jurists, they are nonetheless skeptical of non-Muslim scholars of Islam. Knowing this barrier, many non-Muslims scholars serve as lobbyists. They clarify the rules of fiqh and offer ideas to Muslim opinio-jurists who take these offerings to the markets. Their influence is indirect but powerful. One might ask why non-Muslims are denied the formal opportunity to propose, amend, or repeal the rules of fiqh.

This denial is by no means unusual or unfair, since all legal systems interpose formal barriers to outsiders. In the United States, for example, the lawmaking activity is confined to a periodically elected Congress and the President. Outsiders may influence the legislative activity only indirectly, through lobbying with members of Congress and the President. Islamic lawmaking, however, is not territorial, nor is there a specific body authorized to make new rulings of fiqh. In fact, no formal procedures exist for influencing Muslim opinio-jurists. In highly fluid processes of fiqh lawmaking, external scholars may freely introduce their ideas to influence the opinions of Muslim jurists.

The scope of external scholarship varies from reverence to hostility toward the fiqh enterprise. Some non-Muslim scholars write within the constraints of the Islamic legal tradition, even though they do not accept the faith of Islam.189 Others are critics of the fiqh markets, fiqh jurists, and fiqh rulings. External criticisms may play a constructive role in the development of fiqh rulings provided they engage Muslim opinio-jurists and persuade them to apply rigor in the defense of their opinions. Some external jurists are hostile to the fiqh markets. They raid the markets to de-legitimize fiqh processes, assumptions, and conclusions. Their highly negative criticisms belong to what might be called spurious or disengaged scholarship, which flourishes in circles and cultures that have serious doubts about the faith of Islam. As discussed below, it may also sow the seeds of prejudice and hostility against Muslims and the religion of Islam.

II. EXTERNAL SCHOLARSHIP

This Part examines the external scholarship produced to influence Islamic law, but which for the most part is ineffective. This failure to influence the fiqh markets may be attributed to at least two causes. First, the fiqh markets disallow non-Muslim jurists to shape Islamic law. The fiqh markets are formally open to Muslim opinio-jurists of all nations and times who

may render opinions without fear or favor. But even the most learned external scholars have no formal authority to issue opinions. Their scholarship remains marginal and is considered suspect. Second, the external scholarship, mostly produced in the West, has been disrespectful of Islamic law and its fundamental sources embodied in the Basic Code. Muslim opinio-jurists dismiss disrespectful scholarship as blasphemous.

Although the external scholarship rarely influences the *fiqh* markets, it remains a potent source of information in the external world. Millions of people in the West and other parts of the non-Islamic world receive information about Islam only through external sources. When the *fiqh* markets do not respond to blasphemous scholarship, negative and even dangerous caricatures about Islam and Islamic law multiply in the non-Muslim world, paving the way for misunderstanding, even prejudice and hatred. In recent years, however, Muslims have begun to openly protest and condemn blasphemous distortions of Islam.

A. Scholars of Faith

As indicated earlier, the exclusion of external “lawmakers” is not unique to Islamic law. Most legal systems protect themselves against external interventions. Territorial legal systems, including those of the nation-state, allow only domestic legislatures to make, modify, and repeal laws. No external legislature can make or repeal laws of a nation-state unless the state has been occupied or colonized. Even religious legal systems are internally autonomous. The Catholic Church, for example, has its own internal structure to make and modify the canon law. The Mormon Church is similarly fortified against external interventions. Ancient tribal systems, even when the tribe moved from place to place, had internal sources of law. As a general rule, legal systems are officially closed to external lawmakers, even though external influences are at times difficult to resist.

190. In the United States law schools, for example, many professors who teach Islamic law are non-Muslims and they primarily use the external scholarship to construct courses on Islamic law.

191. Vivian A. Peterson, *The Development of the Canon Law Since 1500 A.D.*, 9 CHURCH HIST. 235 (1940) (defining canon law as the body of law that ecclesiastical authority makes for the community of believers). However, state intervention to curtail the authority of the church to legislate and even to modify canon law has been a perpetual struggle between church and state. *Id.* at 249.

192. NEWELL G. BRIGHURST, SAINTS, SLAVES, AND BLACKS: THE CHANGING PLACE OF BLACK PEOPLE WITHIN MORMONISM (1981) (showing complex political and social forces at work that forced the Church of Latter-Day Saints to finally allow black priests).

But no legal system worth the name is open-sourced in that it allows itself to be freely changed.

Though self-protective, the fiqh markets are surprisingly open to non-Muslim scholars. External jurists are denied the formal authority to influence the shaping of Islamic law. But they are not denied access to the Basic Code or reflections upon it. Non-Muslims are free to study the Qur’an and the Sunna and produce informative scholarship. As mentioned in the introduction to this Article, a fundamental distinction between mu’miin and munkiriin helps fiqh markets evaluate jurists’ credibility.194 Mu’miin are practicing Muslims who believe in the Qur’an and the Prophet’s Sunna. Munkiriin are non-Muslims who deny the basic elements of the Islamic faith. A fundamental background rule of Islamic law requires that jurists and scholars who issue the fiqh opinions be Muslims. Non-Muslim scholars are not formally qualified to make or change Islamic law.195 Yet the fiqh markets weigh and consider the contributions of external scholars. The Qur’an itself refers to previous books of revelation, particularly Torah (Old Testament) and Injeel (New Testament),196 and urges Muslims to believe what has been revealed in the Qur’an and what has been revealed in the previous books.197 The scholars of faith who explain the Torah and the Injeel may illuminate biblical stories that are mentioned in the Qur’an but not fully described. Hence, Islam is not a historically isolated religion, but instead forms unbreakable bonds with other monotheist religions. The Qur’an describes the utility of the interfaith dialogue in the following verse:

Say: ‘O People of the Book! Come to common terms as between us and you: That we worship none but Allah; that we associate no partners with him; that we erect not, from among ourselves, Lords and patrons other than Allah.’ If then they turn back, say ye: ‘Bear witness that we (at least) are Muslims (bowing to Allah’s Will).’ 198

This invitation to participate in a common enterprise refutes the notion that the fiqh markets must be confined to Muslims.199

The fiqh markets recognize that the scholars of faith who do not believe in Islam nonetheless share numerous common beliefs with Muslim opinio-jurists. The scholars of faith, for example, see no indispensable con-

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194. See supra Introduction.
195. This is so because an indispensable pre-qualification requires that a jurist believe in the basic tenets of Islam. However, non-Muslim scholars may, through their scholarship, assist Muslim jurists in arriving at rules consistent with the Basic Code.
196. Qur’an, Sura aal-e-Imran 3:3 (translated by author).
198. Qur’an, Sura aal-e-Imran 3:64 (translated by author).
199. Muslim individuals and states actively participate in the making of international law with the People of the Book and even others.
nection between lack of religion and modernity. Nor do they see any contradictions between faith and inter-faith. They strive to maintain the purity of their faith without damning other religions. They see no tension between the observable world of the material and the revealed word of the invisible, called *al-Ghaib*. The scholars of faith do not see intellect as the exclusive source of information and insight, nor do they see faith as an irrational constraint on imagination or reason. The scholars of faith synthesize the per-rational with rational and post-rational, stretching the boundaries of reason. They use submission to God as a way to connect the known with the unknown. The scholars of faith reject value cynicism. Interfaith discourse cannot be driven out of the *fiqh* markets, for any such exclusion is contrary to God’s design expressed in the Qur’an.

B. Two Islamic Principles in Dealing with External Scholarship

The Basic Code provides guiding principles with respect to external scholars who respect the *fiqh* markets, others who raise legitimate questions, concerns, and criticisms, and still others who mount attacks on Islamic law. As noted earlier, one principle teaches disengagement. The principle of *Lakum Diinukum wa li-ya Diin* (To you be your Way, and to me mine) highlights the fruitlessness of dialogue with external scholars who advocate ideologies that cannot be reconciled with the basic elements of Islam. For example, the Qur’an asks believers to leave the company of persons who are cursing God or showing utter disrespect to His most beautiful names. Rather than engaging in useless discussions over irreconcilable elements of conflicting ways, disengagement is the best course. The disengagement principle rejects debates, coercion, and violence to settle the matters of


203. *See* Oswald O. Schrag, *Faith and Reason: Still Shifting for First Place*, 23 J. Bible and Religion 197 (1955) (stating the relation between reason and faith has fluctuated from equivalency to supplementation to independence to opposition to contradiction); Paul Arthur Schlipp, *A Rational Basis Demanded for Truth*, 21 J. Phil. 209, 212 (1924) (arguing the divine is the most rational).

204. Robert Merrihew Adams, *Moral Faith*, J. Phil. 75, 80 (1995) (arguing that moral life has intrinsic value and is worth living for its own sake even if no great consequences flow from it).

205. *See supra* Introduction.

206. Qur’an, Sura al-A’raf 7:180
The Qur’an specifically advises all believers to “have patience at what they (the peoples of scriptures and unbelievers) say” for what they say is often mentally and spiritually “hurtful.” The Prophet showed patience when the peoples of scriptures and unbelievers tormented him, until God permitted him to fight back if and when tormenting turned into physical aggression.

The disengagement principle embodied in lakum Diinukum wa li-ya Diin is framed in personal terms. In sura al-Kafirun, God offers the disengagement principle to the Prophet and commands him to “say” to the unbelievers that “your way” and “my way” are not the same and will not be the same; and, therefore, to you be your way and to me mine. The same principle is also binding on each Muslim who must similarly disengage himself or herself from ideologies that cannot be reconciled with Islam. When the disengagement principle is applied to external scholarship, it informs Muslim jurists to disregard writings that oppose the core beliefs of Islam. The responsibility to disregard kufr scholarship is placed on each Muslim jurist in a personal way. No prudent Muslim jurist should engage in fruitless debates with external scholars who reject the authenticity of the Qur’an or challenge the Prophet’s integrity.

The disengagement principle, however, does not mandate that Muslim jurists become self-righteous and hastily dismiss any and all scholarship that non-Muslims may offer to the fiqh markets. A blind dismissal of all external scholarship is incompatible with the core essence of Islam, which teaches Muslims to believe in revelations found in the Qur’an as well as those found in the Old and New Testaments. Biblical scholarship is part of the fiqh markets, since Islamic law is best understood in biblical contexts. Furthermore, a broad and thoughtless application of the disengagement principle will isolate the Muslim world from useful religious and secular knowledge that non-Muslim scholars have produced through intellectual labor and analytical rigor. The fiqh markets are aware that God’s gifts are not denied to Muslims or non-Muslims. The Qur’an states so in unambiguous terms: “Of the bounties of thy Lord We bestow freely on all—these as

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207. Qur’an, Sura ash-Shura 42:15 (unto us our works and unto you your works; no argument between us and you) (translated by author).
208. Qur’an, Sura Sad 38:17 (translated by author).
210. Sahih Bukhari, Vol. 6, Bk. 60, No. 89, available at http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/060.sbt.html (last visited May 11, 2007). This is a highly informative hadith that describes how the Prophet used the disengagement principle to stay away from acrimonious disputes. Id.
211. Qur’an, Sura al-Kaafirun 109:1-6 (translated by author).
212. Id. (translated by author).
well as those: The bounties of thy Lord are not closed (to anyone)." 214 Accordingly, the fiqh markets cannot dismiss the bounties of intellect and insight that God has given to non-Muslims.

To prevent harmful self-cloistering under the disengagement principle, the Basic Code offers a second tenet, one that recommends interacting with the external circles. This second principle offers gracious engagement with the non-Muslim world. The Qur’an instructs Muslims to argue in ways that are best and most gracious (jaadililhum bil-latii hiya ahsan).215 Gracious engagement allows Muslims to participate in discussions with non-Muslims and to answer their questions and concerns. Furthermore, the principle of gracious engagement is not simply reactive in that Muslim opinio-jurists must wait for external scholarship to appear before they respond. Muslim opinio-jurists may be proactive in inviting dialogue with the external scholars. Invitation (D’awah) is an essential part of the engagement principle.216

In the fiqh markets, the principle of gracious engagement allows Muslim opinio-jurists to invite, and respond to, external scholarship that is sincerely inquisitive and respectfully exploratory. Islam is a religion of knowledge, and the fiqh markets cannot shy away from any knowledge, including the knowledge that external scholars provide to clarify rules of the classical fiqh.

1. **Gracious Engagement (D’awah)**

The external scholarship is at its best, and contributes much to the understanding of scholars, including Muslim opinio-jurists, when it undertakes to clarify the meaning of the fiqh rulings without challenging Islam’s basic tenets. If the clarificatory scholarship is analytically rigorous but respectful, Muslim opinio-jurists draw a good deal of instruction from it. Although the authors of such scholarship are non-Muslim, their scholarship becomes part of the Islamic literary tradition. From an internal viewpoint, the author’s lack of faith is no longer an irritant but a fact that does not disturb the quality or power of the offering.

Such external scholarship falls into what may be called “the Abu Talib legacy.”217 Abu Talib was the Prophet’s beloved uncle who did not become a Muslim but did nothing to harm the cause of Islam.218 In fact, he used his

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216. Id.
217. Here, the Abu Talib legacy means a pro-Islamic attitude without embracing the faith of Islam.
218. It is reported in authentic hadith that the Prophet invited his dying uncle, Abu Talib, to accept Islam and renounce his previous faith. But Abu Talib refused to do so. Sahih Bukhari Vol. 2, Bk. 23, No. 442, available at http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/023.sbt.html; Sahih
personal prestige and tribal influence to protect the Prophet and other Muslims from their enemies. The Prophet prayed for his uncle’s conversion to Islam but, according to the Qur’an, the matters of faith are in God’s hands. Abu Talib represents a legacy, a phenomenon that has existed throughout the centuries. Thousands of non-Muslims do not accept the faith of Islam though their contributions to the preservation and development of Islam are held in high esteem. Belonging to this legacy are non-Muslim scholars who add value and insights to the development of *fiqh* through their works. Under the principle of gracious engagement, they are part of the *fiqh* markets.

In her superb treatise, *Quranic Christians*, Jane Dammen McAuliffe probes the Islamic understanding of Christians. She clarifies in the introduction to her treatise that the conception of the Qur’an that undergirds her study is one of the committed Muslim; namely, one who believes that the Qur’an is God’s own word. This clarification instructs the reader that the treatise is written from an internal viewpoint. After reading the treatise, most Muslim opinio-jurists would conclude that McAuliffe adhered to the internal viewpoint in her rigorous and illuminating analysis of the Qur’an’s verses dealing with Christians and Christianity. And yet, her analysis of the Qur’an through *tafsirs* (exegetical works of Muslim scholars) is not aimed at constructing a dishonest commonality or conflict between Christianity and Islam. One purpose of the treatise is to demonstrate that Islam views Christians with favor and respect, and yet it rejects some of the fundamental tenets of Christianity. The author’s main purpose, however, is to study an important question: “Does Christian self-definition match the Muslim understanding of Christians?” Muslim opinio-jurists may consult McAuliffe’s book to refine the juristic rules of religious tolerance. Even if the book does not dramatically influence any rule of *fiqh*, it shall remain a book of Islamic literary tradition, validating the point that the markets of *fiqh* will continue to receive and acknowledge the external scholarship written with intellectual rigor, honesty, and piety.

Thus scholarly rigor is not enough for a work of external scholarship to gain credibility. Contrast McAuliffe’s book with that of Michael Cook.

221. McAuliffe, *supra* note 189.
222. Id. at 3.
223. Khan, *Intellectual Property*, supra note 220, at 632 (describing internal viewpoint as one that treats the timeless assets of Islam, the Qur’an and the Sunna, as protected knowledge that cannot be dishonored).
Cook’s new book, *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought*, is impressive scholarship meant to explain the concept of commanding right and forbidding wrong embodied in the Qur’an and explained through *tafsirs*.\(^{225}\) Cook’s methodology is in some ways similar to that of McAuliffe. Cook examines numerous Islamic schools of law to compare and contrast the concept in their respective exegetical works.\(^{226}\) The intellectual rigor with which Cook presents his comparative analysis of Islamic sources spread over centuries cannot be discounted. But to most Muslim jurists, Cook will remain an untrustworthy scholar. Part of the reason is an earlier book that Cook coauthored with Patricia Crone, in which they challenged just about everything that constitutes the core of Islamic faith.\(^{227}\)

The other reason his scholarship will be viewed warily stems from the lack of respect that Cook still seems to nurture against Islam, a distaste that Muslim jurists would readily spot in his new book. Throughout the new book, for example, Cook chooses to spell Qur’an as Koran, though he cites it with a Q and not a K—a minor irritation that poisons the well.\(^{228}\) Contrast this with McAuliffe’s generous care in citing the Qur’an not through numbers only but by providing names of the *suras*, a practice of citation that Muslim scholars prefer.\(^{229}\) Furthermore, the language used by Cook, though erudite, would also strike Muslim jurists as contrary to *adaab* (manners) of discussion. His assertion, for example, that “the Koranic conception of forbidding wrong is vague”\(^{230}\) may come across to Muslim jurists as disrespectful, since it seems to suggest that God’s word is unclear.\(^{231}\) Cook’s new book might be considered an important contribution in the external critical literature, but the piety-sensitive *fiqh* markets will remain distrustful of Cook’s intentions.\(^{232}\)

\(^{225}\) *Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought* (2000).


\(^{228}\) See, e.g., Crone & Cook, supra note 227, at 15.

\(^{229}\) McAuliffe, supra note 189, at 3.

\(^{230}\) *Cook, supra* note 225, at 15.

\(^{231}\) The Qur’an itself intimates that its fundamental verses are crystal clear while some are “allegorical.” The Qur’an warns that some commentators would misinterpret the allegorical verses to sow discord. Qur’an, Sura aal-e-Imran 3:7.

\(^{232}\) Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl, however, pays high tributes to Michael Cook and regards him as “true scholar and teacher.” KHALED ABOU EL FADL, REBELLION AND VIOLENCE IN ISLAMIC LAW (2001).
2. Disengaged Scholarship

Unfortunately, most external scholarship has been ineffective in influencing the fiqh markets, yet highly influential in constructing a “wicked” view of Islam. Over the centuries, several successive generations of Western scholars have relied on the same facts to perpetuate themes that Islamic law is barbaric and fraudulent. As Norman Daniel puts it: “The style of the day changes, but the themes are perennial.” Fraud is attributed to the person of the Prophet, to the compilation of the Qur’an’s text, and to the gathering of the Prophet’s Sunna.233 The allegations of fraud are not limited to the Prophetic era (610-632) but extend to Muslim historians, scholars, and opinio-jurists who were the first authors of the Islamic literary tradition.234 Muslim historians are accused of writing fraudulent accounts of existent and non-existent facts.235 Muslim scholars are charged with plagiarism, stealing ideas and methodologies from Christian and Jewish sources. In this alleged enterprise of wholesale fraud, Islamic law and jurisprudence are presented as copied and corrupted versions of Hellenistic, Roman, and Talmudic traditions.236

The fiercest attacks of the disengaged scholarship have been on the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the Prophet.237 In their attacks, the disengaged scholars strive to demolish the foundation on which Islamic law is built. In the last fourteen hundred years, however, these scholars have been completely unsuccessful in weakening the Muslims’ internal viewpoint on the veracity or validity of the Basic Code. This failure to influence the fiqh markets occurs because Muslim opinio-jurists simply refuse to respond to what they see as blasphemous literature, which cannot shape the fiqh markets in any meaningful way. In the external circles, however, the disengaged scholars build on each other’s works to continue to challenge the authenticity of the Basic Code.238

Thus, two distinct bodies of scholarship, internal and external, flourish side by side, sharing little in common. One should not conclude, though, that the disengaged scholarship does not meet resistance in the external circles. Even in the times of the crusades, voices of reason, wisdom and interfaith dialogue, though small in number and ineffective, were raised to pro-

234. See infra Part II.
235. See infra Part III.
236. See infra Parts II & III.
238. See infra Part II.C.
239. Id.
test the murderous intentions of hateful literature against Islam and Muslims.\footnote{240}

C. Historical Contexts

In the Middle Ages, the European negativity towards Islam and its Prophet reflected the threat that an overwhelming Muslim domination posed to the Christian Europe. South of the Mediterranean, Muslim powers held the whole of North Africa.\footnote{241} In the East, the Ottoman Empire penetrated into the Balkans and was closing in on Hungary and Austria. The Muslim Tartars had seized much of southern Russia.\footnote{242} In the Christian Europe, Islam was seen as a competing religion that must be defeated by all means necessary.\footnote{243}

As the Muslim empires began to lose their world domination and the Europeans experienced a Protestant reformation coupled with an outward expansion through colonialism, the negativity toward Islam changed course.\footnote{244} Overt hatred of Islam was no longer fashionable.\footnote{245} Positive images of the Prophet began to appear in European literature. Scotsman Thomas Carlyle rejected the entrenched notion that the Prophet was a scheming imposter or that Islam was quackery and fatuity that deluded millions of people over hundreds of years.\footnote{246} Western universities began to research Islam more seriously. The rise of orientalism, however, analyzed Islamic law through the eyes of colonial superiority.\footnote{247} Islamic law was no longer declared to be backward and barbaric.

Furthermore, a more secular Europe began to see all religions, including Islam, through the eyes of secular reason. The European scholarship against Islam and its infrastructure would no longer be written to defend Christianity. An intellectual Europe, fascinated with science and the scientific method, shunned pre-rational aversion of Islam.\footnote{248} It then embarked on a rational scrutiny of Islamic history and fiqh. It was now determined to demonstrate that the Muslim history of Islam was founded on uncritical

\footnote{240. J. Kritzeck, Moslem-Christian Understanding in Mediaeval Times: A Review Article, 4 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & Hist. 388, 394 (1962).}
\footnote{241. LAPI DUS, supra note 219, at 365-413.}
\footnote{242. C.E. Bosworth, A Dramatization of the Prophet Muhammad’s Life: Henri de Bornier’s Mahomet, 17 NUMEN 105 (1970) (showing that the eighteenth century Europe was starting to treat Islam with less venom and more respect).}
\footnote{243. See id.}
\footnote{244. Id. at 112.}
\footnote{245. Id. at 112-14.}
\footnote{246. Id. at 114. See also THOMAS CARLYLE, SARTOR RESARTUS ON HEROES, HERO-WORSHIP AND THE HERO IN HISTORY (1840).}
\footnote{247. See Gyan Prakash, Orientalism Now, 34 Hist. & Theory 199 (1995), for further insights into charges and counter-charges of the distortions of colonial scholarship.}
\footnote{248. Bosworth, supra note 242, at 113.}
devotion to original sources. No longer would the Prophet be portrayed as an imposter. The secular Europe began to research Muslim opinio-jurists and historians who allegedly defrauded the world through false historical accounts.

In all these periods, the external scholarship produced in the West was predominantly fruitless in the fiqh markets. It also failed to build durable interfaith bridges. The following discussion is offered to furnish the examples of disengaged scholarship that failed to influence the fiqh markets but has nonetheless produced a culture of perceptions that paint Islam as an irrational, fraudulent, and even wicked religion. It is hoped that a new generation of external scholars will take a different course than the one taken in the past and that they will produce engaging scholarship which may assist in the development of genuine and respectful interfaith discourse.

1. Scholarship on the Qur’an

The fiqh markets unflinchingly assume that the Qur’an is God’s immutable word that has been preserved in its original purity. According to the Islamic tradition, the Qur’an was revealed to Prophet Muhammad in small portions, over a period of twenty-two years (610-632). In its original form, the Qur’an is an oral text that was later transferred to writing. Because of its oral textuality, the Qur’an is easier to remember. During the Prophet’s life, each and every portion of the revealed Qur’an was memorized in the breasts of believers. In addition, all portions of the revelation were preserved in tangible media, including bones, palm leaves, and other materials. The first two Caliphs, Abu Bakr (d. 634) and Umar (d. 644), gathered these pieces of the Qur’an and prepared a written copy of the entire scripture, known as mushaf, which was under the custody of Hafsa, Caliph

249. F. E. Peters, The Quest of the Historical Muhammad, 23 J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 291 (1991) (concluding that Islamic sources are unreliable). Id. 308-15 (including extensive footnotes that examine the critical literature).
250. In the Islamic mind, the West has been unable to erase its negative image of a crusading continent determined to defeat Muslims and Islam. This image derived from crusades and colonization warns Muslims to be extremely wary of what the West says about Muslims and Islam. As such, any reformative literature produced in the West by Muslims or non-Muslims is heavily discounted in the fiqh markets.
251. Ali A. Mazrui, Religion and Political Culture in Africa, 53 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 817 (1985). Mazrui presents the internal viewpoint of Islam that the Qur’an is the same as it was in the days of the Prophet Muhammad. Id. at 827.
252. This fact is also reported by some external scholars. See G. W. Davis, Islam and the Kuran, 10 OLD AND NEW TESTAMENT STUDENT 334, 337 (1890).
254. Id.
Umar’s daughter. Caliph Uthman (d. 661) appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Zaid bin Thabit, the Prophet’s scribe, to collect a final and authentic copy of the Qur’an. Within thirty years after the Prophet’s death, the entire text of the Qur’an was standardized in accordance with the dialect of the Quraysh. The standardized copy was reduced to writing and sent to the major cities of an expanding Islamic empire.

Beginning in the twentieth century, the external scholars began to challenge the Islamic consensus about the compilation of the Qur’an. In 1915, Alphonse Mingana argued that the Qur’an was compiled in the reign of the Umayyad Caliph Abd al Malik (685-705), and not during the reign of Caliph Uthman. In the 1970s, John Wansbrough located a compilation of the Qur’an dated even later, toward the end of the eighth century. He asserted that the canonical Qur’an appeared in the eighth century simultaneously with the appearance of exegetical literature (tafsir). Patricia Crone and Michael Cook reaffirmed Mingana’s views and placed the Qur’an in Caliph Malik’s reign with an additional twist. Crone and Cook argued that the Qur’an was concocted in Caliph Malik’s reign, projected back in time, and attributed to the Prophet.

These external assertions about the history of the Qur’an point to an inescapable conclusion that a great fraud was perpetrated centuries ago. The fiqh markets disregarded these new findings about the Qur’an. A great controversy, however, erupted in the external circles. Commenting on Wansbrough’s findings, Whelan points out that his thesis leads to an inescapable conclusion, though Wansbrough does not say it, that the entire Muslim tradition about the early preservation of “the Qur’an is a pious forgery, a forgery so immediately effective and so all-pervasive in its acceptance that no trace of independent contemporary evidence has survived to betray it.”

The external scholars may reject the “new findings” about the origin of the Qur’an but nonetheless argue that the Qur’an was concocted from external sources available to the Prophet. The Qur’an contains numerous biblical stories, though most are described in less detail than versions found

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255. Id.
256. Id.
259. John Wansbrough, Quranic Studies: Sources and Methods of Scriptural Interpretations (1971).
260. Id. at 45.
262. Whelan, supra note 257, at 3.
263. Norman O. Brown, The Apocalypse of Islam, 8 SOC. TEXT 155 (1984). The notion that Muhammad was a charlatan who stole from Western civilization to fool unsophisticated Bedouins is very much alive. Id. at 169.
in the Old and New Testaments. The Qur’an describes events related to Adam,264 Eve,265 Abraham,266 Isaac,267 Ishmael,268 Jacob,269 Noah,270 John the Baptist,271 Mary,272 and Jesus.273 Old Testament episodes are mentioned more frequently than New Testament events, and there is no mention of Mark, Luke, Peter, Paul, or John. Western scholars have raised the question of the sources of these stories.274 As a result, three distinct views have emerged from Western scholarship. One view is that the Prophet could read and write or, barring that, he heard biblical stories from his Jewish and Christian friends.275 The second view argues that biblical stories had become part of Arab folklore and were circulating when the Prophet was receiving the revelations.276 The third view credits the Qur’an to Talmud, contending that the Prophet gathered these stories from Talmud, which had been completed by the time the Prophet started his ministry.277

264. Qur’an, Sura al-Baqara 2:31-38 (discussing creation, Satan’s temptation, and expulsion from the heavens).
265. Id.
266. Abraham is mentioned in more than sixty-five verses of the Qur’an in various contexts. See, e.g., Qur’an, Sura al-Saffa 37:102 (Abraham had a dream of sacrificing his son).
267. Isaac is mentioned in more than sixteen verses of the Qur’an in various contexts. See, e.g., Qur’an, Sura al-Saffa 37:102 (Abraham praising God for giving him Isaac and Ishmael in old age).
268. Ishmael is mentioned in more than twelve verses of the Qur’an in various contexts. See, e.g., Qur’an, Sura al-Baqara 2:127 (Abraham and Ishmael jointly building the House of God).
269. Jacob is mentioned in more than sixteen verses of the Qur’an in various contexts. See, e.g., Qur’an, Sura al-Baqara 2:133 (Jacob asking his sons whom they would worship after his death).
270. Noah is mentioned in more than forty-four verses of the Qur’an in various contexts. See, e.g., Qur’an, Sura al-Ankubat 29:14 (mentioning Noah and the flood that engulfed the people).
271. John is mentioned in five verses of the Qur’an. See, e.g., Qur’an, Sura aal-e-Imran 3:39 (the good news of the birth of John).
272. Mary the mother of Jesus is mentioned in more than thirty-one verses of the Qur’an in various contexts. See, e.g., Qur’an, Sura al-Maeda 5:75 (Mary was a saintly woman).
273. Jesus is mentioned in at least twenty-five verses of the Qur’an in various contexts. See, e.g., Qur’an, Sura az-Zukhruf 43:63 (Jesus came with clear proofs).
274. See, e.g., D. Shepardson, Jr., The Biblical Element in the Quran, 10 OLD & NEW TESTAMENT STUDENT 207 (1890) (analyzing the theories of borrowing from biblical sources); J. Leveen, Mohammed and his Jewish Companions, 16 JEWISH Q. REV. 399, 401 (1926) (claiming that Jews were feeding distorted biblical stories to the Prophet for “leg-pulling” purposes).
275. Shepardson, supra note 274, at 212; Crawford H. Toy, Mohammed and the Islam of the Koran, 5 HARV. THEOLOGICAL REV. 474, 478 (1912) (discussing the Prophet receiving information from Jews and Christians).
276. Shepardson, supra note 274, at 212; Davis, supra note 252, at 334 (discussing Jewish, Christian, and Persian belief systems at the time of the Prophet’s ministry).
277. Shepardson, supra note 274, at 212.
The theories of the Qur’an’s historical concoction are disregarded in the *fiqh* markets. At the heart of these theories is a simple assertion that the Qur’an is not God’s Word but the Prophet made it up by borrowing stories from biblical sources. The *fiqh* markets are quite familiar with these charges and no findings are likely to undermine the markets’ confidence in the Qur’an’s truth. Ever since its revelation, the attacks on the Qur’an’s genuineness have been relentless. The Qur’an itself mentions the charges of *iftra* (invention) made against its authenticity. These *iftra* charges include that the Prophet fabricated the Qur’an, that “this is nothing but the tales of the ancient,” and that the Qur’an is mere poetry. “We have not instructed the (Prophet) in poetry,” says the Quran. Reaffirming its relationship with previous revelations, the Qur’an presents the concept of the Mother Book. From this Mother Book are derived the Old Testament, the New Testament, and the Qur’an. “This Quran is not such as can be produced by other than Allah; on the contrary it is a confirmation of (revelations) that went before it, and a fuller explanation of the (Mother) Book—wherein there is no doubt—from the Lord of the worlds.” Therefore, the *fiqh* markets also connect the Qur’an with Christian and Jewish sources. And yet the external scholarship and the *fiqh* markets stand apart on the subject. The external scholarship sees the connection in terms of secular borrowing, the *fiqh* markets in terms of spiritual unity of all revelations. The two viewpoints cannot be reconciled, meaning that the disengagement principle offers the best solution.

The external scholarship creates dangerous chasms between religions and cultures when it argues that the Qur’an is wicked. In the past centuries, few European publishers dared to publish translations of the Qur’an because even the publishers of Latin translations that had smeared the Qur’an were “rebuked for disseminating such damnable material.” Most writers attacked the Qur’an on hearsay without reading it in Arabic or in their own tongue. The first English translation of the Qur’an appeared in 1649 without a named translator, publisher, or printer. Its lack of credibility was further illuminated by Alexander Ross, who introduced the translation with a scathing preface to mitigate the act of publication. The translator, wrote

278. Qur’an, Sura al-Nasr 110:38 (describing the charge that the Prophet invented the Qur’an and challenging that let someone produce a sura comparable to one in the Qur’an).


285. *Id*.

286. *Id* at 51.

287. *Id*.
Ross, bared a monster whose ugliness enhanced the beauty of the Gospels and therefore no reader should consider this translation as an act of proselytizing.\textsuperscript{288} The Qur’an is “without head or tail . . . being immethodical and confused, contradictory in many things, written in rude language, consisting of lies and useless follies.”\textsuperscript{289}

It was enough, however, to portray the Qur’an as “immethodical” and “rude.” The portrayal of Muhammad as the incarnation of the Devil or Anti-Christ was a favorite theme of the Middle Ages that lasted until the beginning of the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{290} In fact, some of these conceptions originated in Byzantine literature during the period when the Byzantine Empire was fighting for its survival.\textsuperscript{291}

The more recent attacks on the Qur’an’s integrity have come from a pair of scholars who wrote a sensational thriller in their youth in England.\textsuperscript{292} Michael Cook and Patricia Crone\textsuperscript{293} argue that there exists “no hard evidence for the existence of the Koran in any form before the last decade of the seventh century.”\textsuperscript{294} They surmised that the Qur’an was assembled from a plurality of materials, put together possibly by Al-Hajjaj, who governed Iraq in the suggested period.\textsuperscript{295} The authors also insist that the literary character of the Qur’an, which lacks an overall structure, links disparate materials, repeats whole passages in variant versions, and uses obscure language; all of these editorial imperfections suggest that the Qur’an was “a sudden, not to say hurried, event.”\textsuperscript{296} This charge challenges a core belief of the fiqh markets that the Qur’an was revealed to Prophet Muhammad over a period of twenty-two years (610-632) and collected soon after his death.\textsuperscript{297}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{288} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{289} \textit{Id.} at 52.
  \item \textsuperscript{290} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{291} Kritzeck, \textit{supra} note 240, at 395.
  \item \textsuperscript{292} \textit{Crone} \& \textit{Cook}, \textit{supra} note 227. They suggest that the Qur’an was composed in the late seventh century during the reign of Caliph Abdul Malik (685-705), projected back in time, and attributed to the Prophet. \textit{Id.} at 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{293} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{294} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{295} Al-Hajjaj governed Iraq for twenty-three years (692-715) and implemented draconian policies to bring peace to the region. Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies 60 (1988). This is the period in which the authors (Crone and Cook) speculate the writing of the text of the Qur’an.
  \item \textsuperscript{296} \textit{Crone} \& \textit{Cook}, \textit{supra} note 227, at 18.
  \item \textsuperscript{297} The authors even challenge the name “Muslims” and insist that the name is also a later invention. Early Muslims were known as Mahgraye in Syriac, Magaritai in Greek, and Muhajirain in Arabic. These terms have genealogical meaning. They refer to the descendants of Abraham by Hagar (thus distinguishing them from Jews who are descendants of Abraham by Sarah). These terms also mean exodus. However, the authors challenge the Muslim belief that this exodus took place from Mecca to Medina. They instead argue that the exodus refers to the emigration of the Ishmaelites from Arabia to the Promised Land.
\end{itemize}
Under the disengagement principle, the *fiqh* markets, for the most part, ignored the Cook and Crone thesis. The Cook and Crone thesis, however, was condemned in Western intellectual circles. Michael Morony called it a “thin piece of *Kulturgeschichte* full of glib generalizations, facile assumptions, and tiresome jargon.” Leon Nemoy questions the sources that Cook and Crone used to attribute a Machiavellian *tour de force* to the seventh century Arabs, including the Prophet. J. Wansbrough, on whom Cook and Crone showered gratitude for giving them the courage to rethink the conventional Islamic sources, remarks that the “eccentricity” of Hagarism “lies as much in its historical methodology as in its controversial thesis.” Indeed, the authors themselves have refuted the thesis. As indicated earlier, the *fiqh* markets are likely to disregard all scholarship that Cook and Crone would produce about Islam and Islamic law, simply because the *fiqh* markets will no longer trust their motive and research.

2. Scholarship on the Prophet

The *fiqh* markets resent the scholarship that portrays Prophet Muhammad disrespectfully. Respect for Prophet Muhammad and all biblical prophets is a cardinal principle of Islamic faith. Even more generally, the Qur’an prohibits annoying believers. Even though Muslims worship One God and no one else, the principle of respect defines the ethos of Islam. In external scholarship, almost all prophets have been accused of being mad men. Moses, Noah, and Muhammad have all been called sorcerers, men possessed. The disengaged scholarship has relentlessly demonized the Prophet of Islam over the centuries. Because the Prophet was the transmitter of the Qur’an and the author of the Sunna, he is the ultimate source of the Basic Code from which the entire Islamic *fiqh* is directly or indirectly

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(Palestine). *Id.* at 8-9. Hagarism is a term coined to capture these two meanings of the activities of early Muslims.


299. *Id.* at 180-81.

300. CRONE & COOK, supra note 227, at 18.


302. Khan, *Intellectual Property*, supra note 220 (noting interviews with the authors of the book revealed that the authors have repudiated the thesis of their book).

303. Qur’an, Sura al-Ahzab 33:56.

304. Qur’an, Sura al-Ahzab 33:58.


306. See id.
derived. All roads of Islamic law lead back to the Prophet. All scholars know this fundamental fact. If it can be successfully shown that the Prophet was a fraudulent operator, as the disengaged scholars seem to believe, the edifice of Islamic law borne of God’s word (Qur’an) and God-inspired wisdom (Sunna) would crumble. Scholarly attempts at discrediting the Prophet have been inefficacious. The fiqh markets refuse to review the Prophet’s piety, sincerity, and credibility.307

The negative scholarship about the Prophet makes no positive contributions to the fiqh markets, instead generating disrespect for Islam and deepening misunderstanding between cultures and civilizations. Elie Salem researched the Elizabethan literature to retrieve the images of the Prophet found in the writings of travelers, historians, and publicists.308 For the most part, substandard research informed the literature. Even Muhammad’s basic biographical facts were reported inaccurately.309 Some writers presented Muhammad as of Jewish ancestry, some as a Persian, some of an unknown origin, and some as a slave sold to a Palestinian merchant.310 Some took his wife Khadijah as his mother; while others reported that he finished writing the Qur’an at the age of twenty-five.311 In the Latin literature, Muhammad was portrayed as a citizen of Rome who, upon failing to become a pope, rebelled against the church.312

Disrespectful stories most popular in Europe were invented during the Middle Ages; they lingered in the Elizabethan era and have not yet vanished completely from Western consciousness. One story presents the Prophet suffering from epilepsy or “falling sickness,” a disease that “‘took him so extremely, that he grovelled along the ground and foamed piteously at his mouth.’”313 The story about the Prophet’s death is the most fantastic, as it incorporates all things forbidden in Islam. According to the story reported by several authors, the prophet drank a large quantity of poisoned wine and subsequently suffered a seizure and died. This resulted in his body—which was partly eaten by boars—to begin to rot in the open as it waited to be resurrected, and when nothing happened it was transported to the famous temple of Mecca.314 Such stories not only show disrespect for the Prophet, but they also paint Muslims as ignorant believers.

307. Even in the Prophet’s time, critics called the Prophet “all kinds of names,” a historical fact that the Qur’an itself memorialized. Qur’an, Sura al-Furqan 25:9 (translated by author).
309. Salem, supra note 308, at 43.
310. Id. at 44.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 45.
313. Id. (quoting HENRY SMITH, GOD’S ARROW AGAINST ATHEISTS 44 (1617)).
314. Id. at 48.
Even the United States Supreme Court cases refer to an untrue story known as the “Mahomet’s coffin.”

A story popular in Europe but unknown in the Islamic world narrates that Prophet Muhammad’s coffin is hung in the air separating the ground and the sky, the iron coffin held there by two powerful magnets. Edward Pococke (1604-91), the first chaired professor of Arabic studies at Oxford, repudiated the story with ridicule. The story, however, lingered in popular fables. The story’s metaphorical meaning survived even longer. In 1799, the United States Supreme Court referred to the story with respect to a legal action that failed in both law and equity jurisdictions because the remedy was suspended between law and equity. This metaphor has not totally disappeared from court opinions. It has been used thirty times in the state courts of Michigan, Kansas, Texas, Pennsylvania, Florida, and others. More recently, the Georgia Court of Appeals used the metaphor in 1970. It is unclear whether the American courts were aware of the historical meaning of the metaphor. If they were, the use of the metaphor demonstrates a highly negative image of the Prophet Muhammad prevalent even among the educated classes.

Disrespectful stories about the Prophet may have been concocted in missionary circles that wanted to promote Christianity by all means necessary but have since been accepted and promoted in subsequent scholarly works. External scholars who knew better made little effort, perhaps out of cultural or political fears, to present a more accurate account of the Prophet. Consider another story contending that the Prophet kept a dove and trained the bird to eat from his ear. This charade, as the story goes,

317. Id. at 454. Pococke presented Islam and Islamic history in a positive light, showing that the Islamic civilization was worthy of serious studies by educated men. Id. at 455.
318. See id.
319. Sim’s Lessee, 3 U.S. at 454. In 1832, Mahomet’s coffin was metaphorically mentioned yet another time before the Chief Justice Marshall’s Court. Fowl v. Lawrason’s Ex’r, 30 U.S. 495, 501 (1831).
326. However, some scholars, such as Edward Pococke, Ockley, Sale, and Gibbon, made serious efforts to present Islam in a more accurate light. Holt, supra note 316, at 455.
327. Grotius mentioned this story in his missionary writing known as De veritate religionis christianae. Id. However, Edward Pococke confronted Grotius on the dove story. Id.
was perpetrated to fool the Arabs that the dove was the archangel, the Holy
Ghost, uttering God’s revelations in the Prophet’s ears. The story was per-
petuated in the works of Hugo Grotius, a great Dutch jurist and the father of
modern International law, who knew that the story was not based on Muslim
authority.328 This story was so popular that even Shakespeare could not
resist its inclusion into one of his plays. “Was Mahomet inspired with a
dove?”329 Ironically, Voltaire, himself guilty of writing a scandalous play
on the Prophet, offered a line delivered through the Prophet that ridicules
false stories: “prejudice rules o’er the vulgar with despotic sway.”330 When
the most learned scholars embrace false stories, the fiqh markets begin to
apply the disengagement principle even more strictly. Mistrust disrupts
even positive communications between internal and external scholars.

The disengaged literature perpetuates stereotypes that increase misun-
derstanding between the West and the Muslim world. The boldest allega-
tion accuses the Prophet of deliberately lying that he was a prophet.331
Other allegations paint him as a fraudulent magician who would resort to
trickery by conjuration of demons and through visions induced at will.332
Still others paint him as a clever man who would publicly hide from family
and friends but secretly consult his Christian co-conspirator “preparing the
details of the fraud.”333 The purpose of this fraud was to hoodwink the pa-
gan and Jewish audience of Arabia, leading them to believe that Muham-
mad was receiving revelations from God.334 Roger Bacon, the thirteenth
century English empiricist who was a noted skeptic of all religions, stopped
short of charging the Prophet with feigned prophecy. Bacon, who also be-
lieved in occultism, conjectured that demons possessed the Prophet of Is-

International fraud is often purposeful. It has an aim and pursues an
end game. Why was Muhammad feigning prophecy? What did he want?
The disengaged literature seems to advance two distinct theories to explain
the Prophet’s fraud. One theory, focusing on the psychological import of
the fraud, explains it in terms of the Prophet’s need to overcome his low
birth.336 It highlights the fact that the Prophet married Khadija, a rich and
influential woman, to improve his class, and he resorted to the fraudulent

328. Id. at 454.
329. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 1, sc. 2.
330. VOLTAIRE, MAHOMET THE PROPHET act 2, sc. 4 (E. P. Dupont trans. 1901)
(1741).
331. DANIEL, supra note 233, at 47.
332. Id. at 30-31, 47, 51.
333. Id. at 262.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 51. ROGER BACON, MORALIS PHILOSOPHIA (Eugenio Massa ed., 1953).
336. DANIEL, supra note 233, at 262.
enterprise of prophecy to overcome his humble origin.337 The other branch of disengaged literature focuses on secular power as the prime motivation for undertaking the prophecy fraud. According to this thesis, the Prophet invoked divinity to seek and obtain a kingdom.338 This thesis highlights the wars with non-believers and presents these wars as further proof that the Prophet’s ultimate purpose was to install himself as the most powerful man in Arabia and beyond.

Even in the twentieth century, the disengaged scholarship continued to generate speculative but disrespectful theories about the Prophet. In 1928, Worrel acknowledged that the old Western view that the Prophet was epileptic had been abandoned.339 However, he presents his own speculative thesis that the Prophet suffered from some sort of sexual ailment that, in its suppressive stage in Mecca, produced poetry and Prophecy.340 However, the Prophet lost these gifts after he made his many marriages.341 His tranquil life with several wives in Medina, says Worrel, released him from his poetic prophecy, causing a “sore decline in poetic quality, sincerity, humility, idealism, and spirituality.”342

The disengaged scholarship is determined to revise history to show that at no point did there exist any respect for the Prophet in the external circles. Yehuda Shamir argues that Maimonides, a great Jewish philosopher, who was raised in the Islamic culture, believed that Muhammad was a madman and a plagiarist who stole from the prophecies of Moses.343 Shamir begins with the assumption that Maimonides, who lived in Egypt and who had experienced fanaticism, could not have openly spoken his mind about Islam and its Prophet.344 Accordingly, Maimonides left subtle and indirect clues in his writings to reveal his innermost thoughts. Decoding overt and covert messages in Maimonides’s writings, Shamir discovers that Maimonides held Muhammad to be a false prophet for many reasons, including that the Prophet was illiterate and had too many wives.345 True prophets are supposedly rational and unimaginative; and they banish all pleasures of the flesh. This reading of Maimonides’s scholarship fails to explain why nu-

337. Id.
338. Id.
340. Id. at 144-45.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 145.
344. Shamir, supra note 343, at 220.
345. Id.
merous biblical prophets were polygamous. It also fails to note for most scholars of faith that reason is not opposed to imagination or vice versa.

In our own times, caricatured views of the Prophet continue to occupy popular and scholarly Western consciousness. In the popular media, the Prophet’s cartoons have been published to portray him as a terrorist. Pope Benedict XVI quoted a fourteenth century Christian emperor to insinuate that the Prophet brought the world only evil and inhuman things. These criticisms are now defended under the freedom of speech and in the name of starting a new dialogue with Muslims who are presently engaged in wars with the United States and its allies. Disrespect for the Prophet, however, turns off the fiqh markets, disrupting scholarly communications between internal and external scholars.

III. BORDERLINE SCHOLARSHIP

All external scholarship cannot be divided into two neat categories of gracious and disengaged scholarship. Some external scholarship may fall into the middle. This borderline scholarship may be founded on questionable assumptions about Islam that nonetheless raises serious and difficult questions the fiqh markets must attempt to answer. Controversies about the Prophet’s Sunna, for example, are not foreign to the fiqh markets. Early Muslim opinio-jurists spent decades sorting out the authentic ahadith. The fiqh markets may engage with external scholars who challenge the authority of what Muslims consider to be authentic ahadith. Similarly, the question of whether Muslim jurists borrowed from external sources may be examined. The fiqh markets are open to ideas compatible with the Basic Code. An opinio-jurist commits no wrong if he or she borrows a useful rule from some external source and demonstrates that the rule is compatible with the basics of the Qur’an and Sunna. The following discussion provides examples where external scholars might be engaged.


347. Iran’s Supreme Leader condemned the Pope’s remarks as part of the crusade. The Pope apologized and denied that the views quoted were his. Many Muslim groups accepted the apology; some did not. Pope Comment ‘Linked to Crusade’. BBC News, Sept. 18, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5356820.stm (last visited May 11, 2007).

A. Scholarship on the Sunna

After the Qur’an, the Prophet’s Sunna is the second major source of Islamic law.349 It is composed of the Prophet’s decisions, explanations, clarifications, and other pronouncements, collectively called *ahadith*. If the Qur’an is the text, each *hadith* is a case. The Sunna is thus the case law decided in light of the Qur’an. The Sunna is the first *tafsir al-Qur’an*. The Qur’an mandates that Muslims obey both God and the Prophet. “And whatever the Messenger gives you, take it, and whatever he forbids you, leave it. And fear Allah: truly Allah is severe in punishment.”350 Therefore, the Sunna embodies a valid and mandatory source of law. However, not every *hadith* embodies an obligatory rule. Some *ahadith* contain the Prophet’s personal preferences that he did not wish to impose on all Muslims.351 Some *ahadith* are fact-based and must not be interpreted in an over-inclusive manner, while others contain clear rules.352 Muslims who wish to follow the Prophet’s personal preferences in each and every way are free to do so. However, the *ahadith* that impose obligations must not be confused with others that simply contain the Prophet’s personal practices that he did not wish to be considered obligatory.353

349. In its more general meaning, the word *Sunna* simply means following the course of action set by another person. In this sense, the Sunna of the Prophet is confined to the Prophet’s practices. The *sunan* of other Islamic leaders, including the first four *caliphs*, may also provide guidance for good behavior, but their *sunan* do not create the binding norms of Islamic law per se. Only when such *sunan* are broadly accepted as constituting the binding norms of behavior are they elevated to the level of law. Otherwise, these *sunan* compete in the *fiqh* markets for approval. For different meanings of the word *sunna*, see HALLAQ, supra note 61, at 47-49.


352. A *hadith*, for example, contains a clear rule that there is no *zakat* on less than five camels. Malik bin Anas, Muwatta, Vol. 1, Bk. 17, No. 17.1.2, http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/muwatta/017.mmt.html#017.17.1.2 (last visited May 11, 2007).

353. For example, the Prophet prohibited every intoxicant. Sahih Muslim, Vol. 3, Bk. 23, Nos. 4956-66, available at http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/muslim/023.smt.html (last visited May 11, 2007). This is not simply the Prophet’s preference but an obligation on all Muslims to refrain from intoxicants. Contrast this to the Prophet’s preference for sweet things and honey. Sahih Bukhari, Vol. 7, Bk. 69, No. 504, available at http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/069.sbt.html (last visited
Since the *ahadith* were collected long after the Prophet’s death, their authenticity was less than automatic. This is so because some *ahadith* were falsely attributed to the Prophet. Some of these fabrications were harmless, while others were fabricated to promote concrete political and ideological goals. One of the greatest scholarly enterprises in the Islamic legal tradition has been to identify the false *ahadith*. Scholars of great piety and intelligence devoted their entire lives to rigorously scrutinize each and every *hadith* attributed to the Prophet. Finally, the works of a few great scholars, particularly Imam Bukhari and Imam Muslim, have been broadly accepted as the most reliable compilations of authentic *ahadith*.

The monumental work of painstakingly separating the false *ahadith* took about two hundred and sixty years following the Prophet’s death. By the end of the ninth century, Muslim scholars finally agreed that a body of *ahadith* may be accurately attributed back to the Prophet, since the contents of the *ahadith* were compatible with the message of the Qur’an and chains of transmission were reliable. Furthermore, any *ahadith* that testified to the actual practices of a community of believers, including recognized pious men, were considered authentic. By contrast, the *ahadith* without any corresponding practice were more likely to have been fabricated. Thus the authenticity of a Prophet’s *hadith* was not simply in the transmission of an abstract normative law. Its authenticity lies in the actual practice (*amal*) of the pious people. “In other words, hadith lacking foundations in practice

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354. Hallaq, *supra* note 9, at 75 (explaining the traditional Islamic viewpoint on sorting out the authenticity of a *hadith*, using distinct methodologies of their textual and meaning veracity).

355. For example, a famous *hadith* says that “the reward for deeds depend upon intentions.” Sahih Bukhari, Vol. 1, Bk. 1, No.1, available at http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/001.sbt.html (last visited May 11, 2007). This *hadith*, even if shown to be weak, is harmless and promotes a worthy behavior among Muslims. It is waste of scholarly time and resources to dispute the authenticity of this *hadith*. But see Hallaq, *supra* note 9, at 89 (Ibn al-Salah challenging the high validity of this *hadith*).


357. For Imam Muslim’s biographical information, see Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, Imam Muslim, http://www.sunnah.org/history/Scholars/Imam_muslim.htm (last visited May 11, 2007).


was rejected. For the Islamic world, the debate over the sources of the Sunna had come to an end, but not for the external scholars.

More than a thousand years later, however, the controversy over the authenticity of the Sunna erupted again, this time not in the *fiqh* markets but in the external circles of the West that had colonized almost the entire Muslim world. A new breed of Western scholars, Jews and Christians, began to attack the veracity of the Sunna. Some of these scholars spent time in Muslim countries and learned Arabic and Persian in order to gain legitimacy and inside information found in the ancient manuscripts of Islamic religious tradition. They concluded that the entire enterprise of the Sunna was fabricated and fraudulent.

Ignaz Goldziher, an Austrian Jew who experienced “the best, the happiest, and the most fruitful time of his life” in Damascus and Cairo, led the charge on the Sunna’s authenticity. Goldziher contended that the *hadith* served as an open-ended source, as a convenient mode, to borrow rules and principles from “[o]ld and new Testaments, rabbinic sayings, quotes from apocryphal gospels, and even doctrines of Greek philosophers and maxims of Persian and Indian wisdom.” This contention implies that a mass fraud was being committed in the Muslim world, and Muslim scholars were deceitful plagiarists who, disregarding their faith, were freely stealing materials from external sources and putting them in the Prophet’s mouth with impeccable chains of transmission. It also implies that Muslim scholars who spent their lives in identifying the fabricated *ahadith* were intellectual dopes who either completely failed in their research or they themselves were fabricators. These conclusions exposing a massive fraud in the Sunna are unlikely to influence the free markets of Islamic law.

Joseph Schacht, a Polish Catholic who was raised in Poland and who spent several adult years in Cairo learning Islamic law, carried on the attack on the Sunna, providing legitimacy to Goldhizer’s dubious findings.

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361. HALLAQ, supra note 61, at 105.

362. For example, Kister argues that *tahannuth* was an ancient Arab (Quraysh) custom (belonging to the period of Ignorance, i.e., Jahiliyya), under which Arabs would go to Mount Hira, do charitable deeds, and then pray at Ka’ba by going around it seven or more times. In presenting this thesis, Kister disputes Imam Bukhari, who reports that the Prophet went to Mt. Hira without his wife and that he loved solitude, which was a pre-Prophetic signal. M. J. Kister, *Al-Tahannuth: An Inquiry into the Meaning of a Term*, 31 BULL. SCH. ORIENTAL & AFR. STUD. 223 (1968).

363. For the prejudice that the Western scholars have shown toward Islam during the period of colonization, see Joseph H. Escovitz, *Orientalists and Orientalism in the Writings of Muhammad Kurd Ali*, 15 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 95 (1983).


Schacht praised Goldziher and his conclusion that the Sunna is “not the inherited knowledge of the views and practices of Muhammad” but [rather] reflect opinions held during the first two and a half centuries after the hijra. Schacht calls it a “fundamental discovery.” “[F]or the first time,” says Schacht, “our study of early Islam” has been put “on a sound basis.” Rejecting the Islamic conceptions of the Sunna, Schacht concludes that the West “must . . . abandon the gratuitous assumptions that there existed originally an authentic core of [ahadith] going back to the . . . Prophet.” The recognition of any such core, says Schacht, is prejudicial to the historical understanding of ahadith. As far as legal ahadith are concerned, Schacht posits a broad thesis that all these traditions containing legal elements must be presumed “fictitious” until the contrary is proved. This shifting of presumption and burden on the veracity of legal ahadith turns Islamic fiqh on its head, throwing away centuries of scholarly efforts to extract and refine rules from the rich mines of the Sunna. Schacht emphasizes the fraudulent nature of isnads, which confer legitimacy on the contents of ahadith.

Islamic legal methodology places special emphasis on isnads for tracing the accuracy and reliability of a reported hadith. Isnads are transmission lines, and each isnad constitutes a chain of persons through which the contents of a hadith were transmitted. An isnad may work as follows: D heard from C, C heard from B, B heard from A, and A heard from the Prophet. D, C, B, and A are persons belonging to different periods. If any person in the chain was of doubtful character, the hadith was not rated highly. But if all the transmitters in the chain are persons of credible knowledge and piety, the hadith is considered authentic. Challenging this methodology, Schacht argues that the reliability of the chain is a sure indication of its fraudulent nature; “the more perfect the isnad, the later the tradition [hadith].”

In this fraudulent enterprise of manufacturing Prophetic traditions, Schacht focuses on what might be called the family fraud. Schacht points out that manufacturing ahadith within a family occurs when the sequential transmitters are related to each other, “e.g. from father to son and grandson,

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369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 144-45.
372. See id. at 145.
374. Schacht, supra note 368, at 145.
from aunt to nephew, or from master to freedman.”  Whereas Muslim scholars of hadith analyze each hadith on its own merit, Schacht presents a broad thesis of fraud, asserting that “the existence of a family isnad, contrary to what it pretends, is a positive indication that the tradition in question is not authentic.”

Schacht furnishes good insights into the dynamics of intellectual fraud. If someone is going to invent a hadith for worldly gain, he might as well do it right. A consummate crook will therefore forge the isnad as well as the matn (substance). A hadith with a highly reliable chain of transmitters, which include the Prophet’s family members and highly-regarded companions of the Prophet, will obviously look good on its face, adding apparent legitimacy to the matn. By contrast, only a stupid forger will invent a momentous hadith to advance or protect worldly matters, but will choose a dubious line of transmission that includes thieves, liars, or other criminal characters as the intergenerational transmitters who ultimately attribute the matn to the Prophet. It does not take a genius to figure out the dynamics of such a fraud. And if so, one wonders why hadith with dubious transmitters would ever enter the fiqh markets.

Schacht’s fraud theory will have some credibility if the Sunna was fabricated in the secret chambers of an imperial government. The hadith freely circulated in the fiqh markets. Any scholar was perfectly free to judge the validity of any hadith. The free markets in the Muslim world would raise a storm if state officials or fraudulent theologians were pumping fabricated hadith into the system. To believe in Schacht’s fraud theory, we are left with no option but to assume that the fiqh markets of private opinion-jurists and scholars were corrupt or that there existed a grand and monolithic conspiracy to deceive ordinary Muslims with fabricated sayings of the Prophet. Historical facts, and even common sense, do not support the existence of a monumental fraud industry working in tandem to manufacture hadith for crass worldly gains.

Despite the vacuity of his thesis, Schacht remains a scholar of Islamic law in the Western world. His works are cited as an authority on the subject, even though external scholars have also criticized Schacht’s find-

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375. Id. For approval of Schacht’s theories, see Rafael Talmon, Schacht’s Theory in the Light of Recent Discoveries Concerning and the Origins of Arabic Grammar, 65 STUDIA ISLAMICA 31 (1987).
376. Schacht, supra note 368, at 145.
378. A quick research (as of April 1, 2006) on Westlaw shows that Schacht’s AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW has been cited about 108 times. ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY was cited nine times. Majid Khadduri is cited 117 times. Khadduri’s THE ISLAMIC

The *fiqh* markets have dismissed his work without much debate, but the external scholars continue to pay homage to him.380 Once an erroneous work on Islamic law gains influence in external circles, subsequent scholars begin to rely on it, and the ripple effect compounds the error for generations.

The *fiqh* markets produced dozens of competing schools of jurisprudence that were fiercely independent of imperial government as well as of each other.381 Each school of scholars was free to judge and critique each other’s assumptions, materials, analysis, and conclusions. These schools did show profound respect for each other, but no evidence exists that they cooperated with each other to hoodwink their followers. Furthermore, the schools came up with competing solutions to the same problem. This jurisprudential diversity constructed in the *fiqh* markets demonstrates that legal scholars were not engaged in some monumental scam to fabricate the Sunna materials.

Goldziher and Schacht stunned Western scholars with their “fraud findings,” as if an unassailable truth has been found to discard an essential part of the Basic Code.382 Any further investigation into the truth of the Sunna was abandoned for the most part in the Western literature. Dismissing the scholarly works of Muslim opinio-jurists spanning over fourteen centuries, Goldziher and Schacht were also determined to shock the Muslim world with their fraud discoveries. But the *fiqh* markets were too seasoned to discard an entire past on the basis of fraud charges that non-Muslim jurists made thirteen centuries later.383

For the most part, the *fiqh* markets did not receive the Goldziher and Schacht studies.384 Even Muslim scholars who might have known these

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**Conception of Justice** is cited twenty-seven times. Khadduri’s *Islamic Law of Nations* is cited twelve times.

379. *See generally John Burton, An Introduction to the Hadith* (1994) (disagreeing with Schacht’s thesis but presenting an equally problematic thesis that the *hadith* literature was fabricated for exegetical wars).


381. *See supra* Part I.

382. Talmon, *supra* note 375, at 32 (disputing Schacht’s “irrefutable truth”).

383. Many modern constitutions of Muslim states specifically identify, in addition to the Qur’an, the Sunna as a fundamental super-source of law. *See, e.g.*, Pakistan Const. art. 227 (1980).

384. In the United States, there were present too few Muslim jurists to challenge these authors. Nonetheless, Fazalur Rahman of the University of Chicago offered an impressive critique of Schacht’s thesis. When G. M. Azmi criticized Fazalur Rahman even for his limited acceptance of Schacht, Rahman promptly denied the charges. *See generally* Fazalur Rahman, Book Note, 47 J. Near E. Stud. 228 (1988) (reviewing G.M. Azami, On Schacht’s Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (1985)).
studies would dismiss them as enemy propaganda. Goldziher and Schacht challenge an established presumption in the fiqh markets. For over twelve hundred years, and after an intense controversy over fabricated ahadith in the first two centuries of Islam, the fiqh markets have settled the issue of the Sunna authenticity. It is unlikely that the fiqh markets would discard the Sunna on the basis of reasoning offered by two non-Muslims far removed in time and from original sources, especially when they challenge the Qur’an as God’s Word. Goldziher and Schacht may shine in the external circles, but the pietistic and rational fiqh markets have no place for external scholars who analyze the Basic Code in a state of unbelief.

B. Scholarship on Borrowing

Another theme that runs through Western scholarship is the charge that Muslim opinio-jurists, including the Prophet himself, borrowed laws and jurisprudence from Jewish, Christian, Greek, and Roman sources. Implicit in this charge is perhaps the presumption that the Islamic tradition has been inherently incompetent in generating its own laws.385 Goldziher contends that Prophet Muhammad borrowed from Zoroastrianism that the Sabbath day was not a rest day.386 According to the Qur’an, God made the universe in six days, but there is no mention that He rested on the seventh day.387 In another verse, the Qur’an declares that God needs no rest, slumber, or sleep because He feels no fatigue.388 Accordingly, there is no Sabbath in Islam. Muslims are obligated to leave work for the Friday afternoon community prayer (al-Jumu‘ah) but they are free to do business before and after the service.389

Lassner argues that in finding parallels between Moses and Muhammad, Muslim exegetes were linking the Islamic tradition with the Jewish tradition and claiming the Jewish history to be their own.390 In selecting Muhammad to the Prophethood at the age of forty, an age that embodies a perfect balance of physical and intellectual powers, God was invoking the ancient Jewish tradition, says Lessner, because Moses too was summoned to

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385. Some external scholars argue that early Muslims lacked the “requisite intellectual capacity” to construct a fine legal system, a point that other external scholars do not accept. See S.V. Fitzgerald, The Alleged Debt of Islamic to Roman Law 67 L.Q. REV. 81 (1951), reprinted in ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 25 (1996).
386. Goldziher, supra note 365, at 15.
387. See Qur’an, Sura al’Araf 7:54.
388. See Qur’an, Sura al-Baqara 2:255.
389. See Qur’an, Sura al-Juma 62:9 (commanding Muslims to leave business and attend the Jumu’a prayer).
Prophethood at the same age. Lassner relies primarily on Ibn Ishaq’s biography (the first biography of the Prophet that has survived) to advance his thesis of linkage. Lassner leaves the impression that Ibn Ishaq was deliberately concocting Muhammad’s age of prophecy for an ulterior motive. That is, Ibn Ishaq was not simply reporting a fact but constructing a mystical linkage between Moses and Muhammad. Lessner knows that the Qur’an itself declares that the man achieves his full strength at the age of forty years. The Qur’an, however, makes no connections between Moses’s ministry and the age of forty. On the contrary, the Qur’an clarifies that Moses was given forty nights, and not forty years, for pre-Prophetic solitude. Lessner offers no explanation why Ibn Ishaq would concoct the age linkage that the Qur’an does not support.

Seemingly inspired by the works of Goldziher and Schacht, and relying heavily on the linguistic findings of other scholars, Judith Romney Wegner claims that the four basic sources of Islamic fiqh—Qur’an, sunna, ijma (consensus), and qiyas (reasoning)—have all been borrowed from the Torah and the Talmud. The first two sources, the Qur’an and the Sunna, are related both etymologically and conceptually to the Hebrew terms. The Qur’an is derived form Miqra (Torah) and the Sunna is drawn from Mishnah (Jewish oral law). Ijma, the third source, is conceptually related to hakol in that each term means juristic consensus. The fourth source of Islamic law, qiyas, tells the story of what Wegner calls “misborrowing” from Jewish sources. Qiyas, which is reasoning by analogy, says Wegner, which Muslim opinio-jurists imported into the Islamic fiqh. However, in borrowing the concept, the Arabs misapplied the Hebrew phrase. Finding no clear etymological connections between qiyas and some Hebrew/Talmudic phrase, Wegner conjectures that “what must have occurred here was a misreading of the Talmudic maqqi’s.”

Wegner seems resolute in finding connections between Islamic and Talmudic jurisprudence. When Wegner cannot find direct borrowing from Hebrew/Talmudic sources, she paves a more belabored route to show the

391. See id. at 221-22.
392. Qur’an, Sura al-Ahqaf 46:15.
393. Qur’an, Sura al-Baqara 2:51, Sura al-A’raf 7:142.
395. See id. at 49-54.
396. Id. at 56.
397. See id. at 49-54.
398. See id.
399. Id. at 56.
way. In furnishing these connections, however, Wegner does not explain the reason and motive behind juristic borrowings.

Hebrew and Arabic were related languages, as are Urdu, Persian, and Arabic today. Words in closely related languages may have shared roots, but the shades of meaning frequently change as words cross languages.\textsuperscript{400} Some words undergo dramatic changes and are “misborrowed” when they enter into other languages.\textsuperscript{401} If Wegner is indulging in Hebrew/Arabic linguistic cross-influences, she will find hundreds of words to prove her point, words both inside and outside Islamic and Talmudic jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{402} What she seems to be doing is to establish the superiority and originality of Talmudic jurisprudence over Islamic \textit{fiqh}. She is painting a picture in which first the Prophet and later Muslim opinio-jurists freely borrowed, over a period of more than two hundred years, from Jewish sources without crediting the Torah and Talmudic law.\textsuperscript{403} Wegner comes close to laying the charges of jurisprudential plagiarism. To promote her creditor-debtor thesis, Wegner relies on etymology as much as she does on concepts. In her analysis, she seems to be suggesting, hopefully unwittingly, how a lesser

\textsuperscript{400} For example, the word \textit{ghulam} means boy in Arabic but servant in Urdu. From this misborrowing, one can make intriguing speculations depending on one’s flight of fancy, prejudice, or personal cultural presumptions. One could speculate that a less developed Urdu speaking world in India treated children as servants or that a class-oriented Urdu elite thought that servants’ intellectual competence was no more than that of children. Conversely, one could also fish for evidence to show that the Arabs treated their children as servants or belittled their servants as children.

\textsuperscript{401} Karl F. Koenig, \textit{German Loan Words in America, 1930-40}, 15 \textit{German Q.} 163 (1942). During this period, most of the loan words from Germany acquired pejorative meaning. For example, the word “Nazi” was simply the abbreviation of “National Socialist” and became so derogatory that the German government banned its use in German broadcasts. \textit{Id.} at 164. Likewise, Fuhrer and Gestapo, ordinary words in German, became associated with ridicule and scorn in America. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{402} For a rewarding analysis of the early differentiation of Semitic languages, see W. Volck, \textit{The Semites}, 2 \textit{Hebraica} 147 (D.M. Welton trans., 1886). The authors argue that all Semitic languages, including East Aramaic, West Aramaic, the Hebrew of the Old Testament, the language of the Qur’an, Syriac and Babylonian dialects, all these variations branched off from one primitive mother language. \textit{Id.} at 149. The seat of the primitive mother language, however, is disputed. Some scholars place it in Arabia, others in Mesopotamia. \textit{Id.} Some scholars proposed to call this group of languages as Syro-Arabic, rather than Semitic. \textit{Id.} at 148. The word “Semitic” is a descriptive label for all these languages, because the word is now primarily associated with Jews and not with other ethnic groups in Arabia, builds the false impression as if Hebrew had been the original mother language. At the micro level, some words may have originated in the Hebrew dialect and crossed over to others. At the macro level, however, there exists no evidence to demonstrate that the Hebrew of the Old Testament or that of the Talmud was the dominant language of Arabia and Mesopotamia during the time the Prophet received revelations of the Qur’an.

\textsuperscript{403} See Wegner, \textit{supra} note 394, at 81 (noting Shafi expunged references to foreign sources). Wegner also implies that if Imam Shafi produced his classical work \textit{Risala} in a short time, he must have “tapped a ready-made but unacknowledgeable source.” \textit{Id.} at 80. This is a charge of plagiarism placed on one of the most revered Muslim jurists of all times.
people with a lesser language and lesser minds appropriated developed concepts from a superior legal tradition, instead of applying rigor and industry to the intricacies of their new faith-based jurisprudence.404

Wegner’s thesis of Islam’s clandestine acquisitions from Jewish texts is momentous in the case of the Qur’an. The concept of the Qur’an, both as a book of divine revelation and as a primary code of law, says Wegner, is Jewish in origin.405 Wegner invokes linguistic parallels that supposedly exist between the words Qur’an and miqra to show that “in coining the term qur’an, Muhammad used Hebrew/Aramaic terminology.”406 The word Qur’an was apparently invented to absorb the meaning of miqra, which refers to Torah read aloud during public worship.407 Wegner allows the possibility that the word Qur’an might have been derived from the Aramaic word qeryana, itself a term for “reading,” a word that Christians used for their scriptures. However, Wegner notes that miqra, both as a word and a concept, was in ritual practice over five centuries before the beginning of the Christian era. Thus per Wegner, even if the Qur’an is morphologically closer to Christian qeryana, both words qeryana and qur’an on “a first come, first serve” basis would be derivatives of Jewish miqra.408

Wegner offers no original research of her own to trace the origin of the word Qur’an from miqra. She credits her linguistic thesis to Arthur Jeffrey, an author of a book on the foreign vocabulary in the Qur’an.409 Borrowing from Jeffrey, Wegner intimates that the word Qur’an is derived from qara’a.410 To this extent, Wegner breaks no new ground, as other scholars would agree to a similar origin.411 The next step Wegner takes, however, is critical. She asserts that the word qara’a has no native root in Arabic but is derived from Hebrew/Aramaic sources.412 The word qara’a first appeared in the north Semitic languages (Hebrew and Aramaic) and not in Arabic, proposes Wegner, “because of the earlier development of literacy among the northern Semites.”413 Put simply, Wegner is saying that since Northern Semites could read long before Arabs, the word qara’a (translated as read-

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404. Wegner, for example, makes statements that northern Semitic languages (Hebrew/Aramaic) were more developed than Arabic. Id. at 42.
405. See id. at 43.
406. Id. at 42.
407. See id. at 41-42.
408. See id. at 42.
410. See id. at 233. Some Muslim philologists speculated that the word qara’a was derived from qaran, which means “to being together.” Other Muslims believed that the Qur’an was a unique word derived from no other word. Id. at 233-34.
412. See Wegner, supra note 394, at 42.
413. Id.
ing) is Jewish invention. While Wegner might be correct, the problem with her bold assertion is that *qara’a* also means “to recite,” a fact that Wegner admits in a footnote.\(^{414}\) Since *qara’a* (translated as recitation) is the ritual of an oral culture, as the culture of southern Semites (Arabs) is portrayed, it is equally likely the root word *qara’a* originated in oral communities. It must be kept in mind that the Qur’an was revealed as an oral text, for God did not send the Qur’an in a written form.

Indeed, suppose that the root word *qara’a* originated in literate north Semitic communities. Even then, Wegner’s thesis need not be damaging, since an additional question must be asked: in which period did the word originate? Since *miqra* is derived from *qara’a* and since *miqra* denoted Torah read in synagogues, the root word *qara’a* must have preceded *miqra*. Wegner herself assumes that the ritual of *miqra* had been invented at least five hundred years before Christ, “since the time of Ezra in the fifth century B.C.”\(^{415}\) In terms of Islam, this would mean that the word *miqra* existed in north Semitic languages for at least eleven hundred years before the Qur’an was first revealed to Prophet Muhammad in 610. In these eleven hundred years, we cannot assume that *qara’a* remained confined to the north and did not enter the south Semitic dialects. Scores of Jewish tribes lived in south Arabia,\(^{416}\) including Medina and other towns.\(^{417}\) These tribes were reading Torah in synagogues. It is highly unlikely that the Jews in Medina were equally unfamiliar with the word *qara’a*. A more sensible conclusion would seem to yield that the word *qara’a* had entered the Arabic language, perhaps due to the courtesy of local Jewish tribes, long before the Prophet began to receive the Qur’an. It is highly improbable that the word *qara’a* was a foreign word in the seventh century Arabia.

According to the Islamic tradition, the very first word revealed to the Prophet was *iqra*, another word derived from *qara’a*.\(^{418}\) If *qara’a* and its derivatives were foreign words, it is unclear why the Qur’an would use a
foreign word as its first word, a word foreign to the Prophet. After all, the purpose of the revelation was to empower the Prophet to convey God’s message to the people of Arabia: “And thus: We have revealed to you a Qur’an in Arabic so that you may warn the major cities and those who dwell around it.”419 It defies common sense that, according to the externalist scholarship, neither the Prophet nor his Arab audience knew the very first word of the first revelation of the Qur’an.

Wegner is not alone in asserting the presence of foreign words in the Qur’an. There has been a sturdy scholarly industry devoted to finding foreign words in the Qur’an. For example, the word iman (faith), which connotes believing, embodies a fundamental concept of the Qur’an.420 Mu’min is a person who possesses iman, one who believes.421 The Qur’an repeatedly addresses Muslims as mu’minin.422 Ringren correctly points out that the word mu’min and its plural mu’minin appear more frequently in the Qur’an than the word Muslim.423 Ringgren makes these accurate observations, though, to further argue that the word—amana—from which the words iman, mu’min, and mu’minin are derived—in the sense of “believing” is “a loan-word,” borrowed from Syriac, Aramaic, Ethiopic, or Hebrew.424 He concedes, however, that the word amana in the sense of “safety” did exist in Arabic.425 But the native meaning of amana, concludes Ringgren, does not fully explain most verses of the Qur’an in which amana connotes the belief of the mind and of the heart.426 It is unclear how Ringgren’s linguistic assertion, even if it is credible, will change any article of faith in the fiqh markets.

The externalist scholarship that is determined to find foreign words in the Qur’an aims at refuting the claim that the Qur’an was revealed in clear

419. Qur’an, Sura ash-Shura 42:7 (translated by author).
420. See, e.g., Sura al-Baqara begins with a set of beliefs required to seek guidance from the Qur’an. Qur’an, Sura al-Baqara 2:2-4 (Qur’an is guidance for those who believe in the Unseen and those who believe in the Revelation). Repeatedly, the Qur’an identifies the people who believe and do good works. See, e.g., Qur’an, Sura al-Baqara 2:25 & 2:82 (those who believe and do good works).
421. See, e.g., Qur’an, Sura al-Baqara 2:91 (demanding explanation and showing inconsistency in the behavior of those who claim to be believers but who slew the prophets of God).
423. Helmer Ringgren, The Conception of the Faith in the Koran, 4 ORIENS 1 (1951). In sura al-Baqara, for example, the word “Muslim” appears only in one verse, Qur’an, Sura al-Baqara 2:128, whereas the word “believe” in its various forms appears in forty-one verses.
424. See id. at 1, 16.
425. See id. at 16.
426. See id. at 16-20. But see Qur’an, Sura al-Anaam 6:82 (the word amana appears in both senses of “faith” and “security” in the same verse) (translated by author).
Arabic, contrary to the Qur’an, which says, “Behold, We have made it a Qur’an in clear Arabic language that you may fully understand.” By showing the presence of foreign words in the Qur’an, the externalist scholarship is also suggesting, as discussed above, that the Prophet was concocting the Qur’an by consulting foreign sources. At the time of revelation, however, the objections were raised from the opposite side. The critics were questioning why the Qur’an was revealed in Arabic and not in another language. To these objections, the Qur’an offers the following answer:

Now if We had made it a Qur’an in a non-Arabic tongue they would surely have said, ‘Why is it that its verses have not been made clear? Why—a foreign tongue and an Arab (messenger)?’ Say, ‘For those who accept it, this is a guidance and a healing for a wholesome life. But as for those who will not believe (Arabs or non-Arabs), in their ears is deafness, and so it remains obscure to them. They are like a people who have been addressed from a far away place.’

In light of these verses, the fiqh markets disregard etymological scholarship that belabors to show that numerous words of the Qur’an originated in other regional languages. Furthermore, the point is trivial. According to the Qur’an, God is the creator of all languages: “And among His Signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the variations in your languages and your colors.” The presence of foreign words does not diminish the revelatory character of the Qur’an.

C. New Developments in Fiqh Markets

1. Geopolitical Rivalries

The disengaged scholarship flourishes the most in periods of intense geopolitical rivalry with the Muslim world. It is no coincidence that the abusive scholarship about Islam first emerged in what Southern calls “the ignorance of [a] confined space,” a period of several centuries in the Middle Ages when authentic information about Islam was unavailable or the

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427. Qur’an, Sura Yuusuf 12:2, Sura az-Zukhruf 43:3 (translated by author).
428. See text accompanying supra notes 394-426.
429. Qur’an, Sura Haa-Miim Sajdah 41:44 (translated by author).
430. See, e.g., James A. Bellamy, More Proposed Emendations to the Text of the Koran, 116 J. AM. ORIENTAL SOC’Y 196, 196 (1996) (showing word “errors” in the text of the Qur’an); Textual Criticisms of the Koran, 121 J. AM. ORIENTAL SOC’Y 1 (2001) (making fun of the Prophet that he did not proofread his revelations and making a sarcastic comment that the Prophet was indeed “illiterate” as the Muslims believe). Such blasphemous literature is unlikely to have any developmental influence on the fiqh markets.
431. Qur’an, Sura Ar-Ruum 30:22 (translated by author).
scholars were unprepared to accept it.\textsuperscript{434} Part of this ignorance stemmed from a belief among external writers and their audiences that Islam was a false faith and, therefore, all means, including misrepresentations and distortions of historical facts, were necessary to expose Islam’s fraudulent foundation.\textsuperscript{435} The common people in ancient Europe knew little more than fictitious and ill-informed versions of Islam. The dread of a dominating Muslim world that had defeated the Byzantine and conquered Jerusalem and Spain furnished the catalyst for distortions about Islam.\textsuperscript{436}

In the twentieth century, independence movements against European colonialism provided a backdrop for external scholars to deform the letter and spirit of Islam. Even today, the Bosnian Muslims seeking separation from Christian Serbs, the Arabs struggling to regain occupied Palestine from European Jews, and the Chechens fighting for independence from Russia, all these liberation movements have been successfully labeled as terrorism—as violent pictures of Islam.\textsuperscript{437} A new Western consensus has emerged, portraying Islam as essentially violent. Propagandists disguised as terrorist experts have been boldly arguing that the roots of terrorism sprout from the puritanical faith of Islam, and not from oppression, territorial theft, settlements, assassinations, and occupations.\textsuperscript{438}

The 9/11 terrorist attacks proved a godsend for the propagandists. As before, geopolitical rivalries produced a massive scholarship of distortions. In pre-9/11 America, the Muslim world was seen through racial caricatures of Arabs and other Muslims and through the mixed menace of the Middle Eastern oil power and general social backwardness that had gripped most Muslim nations.\textsuperscript{439} In post-9/11 America, the understanding of Islam has been shockingly simplified. Islam is now equated with gratuitous violence.\textsuperscript{440} Since Muslims living in America constitute a marginal minority, they have little resources to turn the tide of distortions.\textsuperscript{441}

The establishment of Israel in the Middle East has also spawned externalist scholarship that does not view Islam kindly.\textsuperscript{442} It is no secret that the Qur’an speaks more softly about Christians than Jews, even though in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{434} Daniel, supra note 233, at 17.
\item \textsuperscript{435} Id. at 271.
\item \textsuperscript{436} See Throop, supra note 432.
\item \textsuperscript{437} L. Ali Khan, A Theory of International Terrorism: Understanding Islamic Militancy (2006) (analyzing in the first chapter the plight of aggrieved groups that resort to violence).
\item \textsuperscript{438} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{439} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{440} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{442} Liaquat Ali Khan, The Essentialist Terrorist, 45 Washburn L.J. 47 (2005).
\end{itemize}
many aspects Islam is closer to Judaism. Sir William Muir notes the Qur’anic verses that capture the differing view of Jews and Christians and offers an explanation of why the Qur’an treats the two communities of believers differently. The Prophet fully acknowledged the scriptures of Jews and Christians. The Christians were pleased that the Prophet had accepted the truth of their gospels, though with modifications. This acceptance was a welcome relief as compared to the complete Judaic repudiation of the New Testament. Christians and Muslims were also aligned because they both believed in the Jewish scriptures. Furthermore, Muir states that per the Qur’an, the Christians were not arrogant and they “are never accused of wresting the Scriptures, or dislocating passages from the context.”

The distortions about Islam are not mere theological disputes, but can lead to war. “At the time of the Crusades, preposterous tracts against Islam were common in the West. Some fabricated outrageous lies about Mohammed.” These lies paved the way for aggression and genocide. European warriors committed to liberate Holy Jerusalem “saw Muslims as godless heathen[s]; others thought them polytheists who worshipped a blasphemous trinity of gods; still others thought they worshipped Muhammad himself.” Most of this confusion was introduced through scandalous scholarship. A similar phenomenon to paint Islam as a source of terrorism and fascism is brewing in the Western world, particularly in the United States where a legion of scholars are committed to malign Islam and pave the way for invasions and occupations.

The role of external scholars in intense periods of geopolitical rivalries, classical and contemporary, has been complex and complicit toward distortions. In such times, some external scholars of Islam did have a more accurate understanding of Islam but said nothing, others fanned the ignorance, while still others manufactured their own distortions to perpetuate ignorance. The European age of distortions produced crusades. The American distortions have given birth to the war on terrorism. In every conflict-ridden period, some external scholars stood up against the tide and refused to lay blame on the Basic Code or Islamic fiqh.

444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id.
448. Id.
449. Khan, The Essential Terrorist, supra note 442.
450. Id.
451. Id.
2. Temporary Coercions

External forces, including international institutions, may pressure Muslim opinio-jurists and scholars to answer their concerns, questions, and criticisms of the *fiqh* rules. Because Islam is not an organized religion, however, external forces are rarely successful in shaping the Islamic *fiqh*. Organized religions, such as the Mormon Church, are more susceptible to external pressures. Its leadership may be persuaded, coerced, or threatened to change the Church law. The United States Supreme Court, for example, outlawed the Mormon Church’s permissive rules on polygamy.\(^\text{452}\) The Mormon Church was threatened with forfeiture of its property if it did not comply with the laws of the federal government in outlawing polygamy.\(^\text{453}\) In order to preserve itself, the Mormon Church changed its doctrine on polygamy.\(^\text{454}\) External coercions may pressure Muslim governments not to enforce the *fiqh*, but they have no influence on the *fiqh* markets. Thus free markets protect what Muslim governments cannot.

In recent decades, for example, Muslim states have come under external pressure to change some rules of the Islamic *fiqh*.\(^\text{455}\) An international campaign has been launched to change the Islamic law of apostasy, under which a Muslim who converts to another religion faces the death penalty.\(^\text{456}\) Since conversions from Islam are few and far between, the campaign has been unable to gain momentum.\(^\text{457}\) But even when Muslim’s conversion to another religion receives international attention, Muslim states diffuse the

\(^{452}\) See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon man for practicing polygamy).

\(^{453}\) In 1890, twelve years after deciding *Reynolds*, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the confiscation of church property. See *Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States*, 136 U.S. 1 (1890). See also Todd M. Gillett, *The Absolution of Reynolds: The Constitutionality of Religious Polygamy*, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 497, 518 (2000) (noting the practice of polygamy was a factor in the justification for confiscation).

\(^{454}\) Edwin Firmage & Richard Mangrum, *Zion in the Courts* (1988) (The Mormon Church is not the official name of the people who believe in the Book of Mormon. The church is called *The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints*, a designation that affirms the church’s relation with Christianity).


\(^{457}\) Despite the negative image of Islam in the Western world, particularly with respect to women, more and more Western women are converting to Islam rather than Muslim women converting away from Islam. See Anne Dixey, *Allah’s Daughters: Muslim Converts*, TIMES (LONDON), July 1, 2006, at 33 (explaining that for British women, Islam offers an alternative view of feminism).
matter by finding a loophole, such as the convert’s mental illness, for not enforcing the apostasy law. Some resist the pressure and uphold the law. 458 Even when Muslim states succumb to external pressures, the fiqh markets are immune from any forced changes. And even when Muslim governments are forced to modify well-established rules of the fiqh, the fiqh markets continue to uphold the validity of impugned rules. 460 The fiqh markets may adopt more flexible rules on apostasy through a genuine reconsideration of the freedom of religion that the Qur’an preserves and mandates. 461 External pressures will only stall the action of the fiqh markets.

That pressure can coerce rulers but not the fiqh markets is evident from colonial coercions. Western colonial powers played a big role in forcing occupied Muslim communities to abandon some rules of fiqh. In Algeria, for example, the colonial France passed laws to neutralize the restrictive elements of waqf property. 462 According to the laws of waqf, property placed in a public trust could not be sold in the free market. 463 Such public trusts are created to provide charitable services in perpetuity. 464 This forcible change, however, did not dismantle the Islamic law of waqf property, which has served the Islamic civilization for centuries. 465

3. The Erosion of Language Barriers

For centuries, the externalist scholarship has been written in languages inaccessible to Muslim scholars, particularly European languages. For the most part, Islamic scholarship produced by Muslims was also inaccessible to non-Muslim scholars. There has been a language barrier between the two scholarships with each enjoying its own audience. External scholarship is written primarily for non-Muslims, whereas internal scholarship is written for Muslims. Even internal scholarship is not always accessible to all Mus-

461. Qur’an, Sura al-Baqara 2:256 (there is no compulsion in religion) (translated by author). See also Khan, Intellectual Property, supra note 220, at 663-66.
463. Id.
465. Id. at 848.
lims. For example, Islamic scholarship written in Arabic remains inaccessible to Muslims who do not speak Arabic. Even in external circles, language has been a barrier. It is unclear how frequently and how promptly the scholarship published in different European languages was accessible to the external scholars of Islam.

The language and audience barriers may have emboldened externalist scholars to attack Islamic law more ferociously, and somewhat irresponsibly, because they knew that their theses would not reach Muslim scholars for rebuttal. Even in these segregated times, the externalist scholarship was not free of all restraints. Some external scholars were more sympathetic to Islam than others. This division among external scholars created some scholarly rivalry, providing some checks and balances over their research methodologies and scholarly products. However, as Muslim scholars equipped with European languages begin to read and react to externalist scholarship, the external scholars will no longer be free to get away with sloppy or sensational research. In the new world, the language barriers are fast disappearing. Major works are promptly translated into the major languages of the world. Muslim scholars in the West can read the externalist literature and the Islamic literature is now available in the external circles. Furthermore, Muslims speaking both Arabic and European languages have translated the Qur’an, the Sunna, and other basic texts into European languages. These translations of basic Muslim texts furnish more reliable sources for scholarly research free of distortions caused through negligence, incompetence, or malice.

A new breed of scholars is producing externalist scholarship that is markedly different in tone and competence. This new externalist scholarship is owed to non-Muslim scholars from the Muslim world. Philip Hitti (1886-1978), a Christian Lebanese, has had great influence in introducing

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466. Edward Said, however, argues that Western governments, corporations, and experts in the academy all are parts of a closed circle that distort Islam for domination and exploitation. See Edward W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (1981).

467. Orientalists may be distinguished from other externalist scholars who may not share some of the orientalist assumptions or presumptions about Islam. Bernard Lewis, for example, is an orientalist who sees Muslim nations as enraged, irrational, and envious of the Western civilization. By contrast, an externalist scholar, though a non-Muslim, may reject some or all of the orientalist assumptions. As indicated earlier, external scholars do not write or analyze Islamic sources out of submission to One God, respect for Prophet Muhammad’s Sunna, or belief in the Qur’an as the final source of revelation. But not all external scholars share the same assumptions about the genesis, history, or development of Islamic fiqh. The most powerful critique of orientalism, for example, has come from Edward Said, a Christian, not a Muslim. See Edward W. Said, Orientalism (1979).

Islamic studies to the United States. Edward Said (1935-2003), a Christian Palestinian, has been even more influential in exposing distortions of the Orientalists. Even though these authors were not Muslims, they did understand the culture, language, and traditions of the Muslim world. Scores of non-Muslim scholars from the Islamic world occupy influential positions at premier colleges and universities.

Scholars who speak to both worlds with authority and credibility are a rare breed. External scholars unfamiliar with Islamic cultures, languages, and communities mustier little credibility in the fiqh markets. Their scholarship has little positive influence on the development of Islamic law—just as a Muslim scholar who loathes the Western world and holds Western values in open contempt ceases to speak to the Western world. External scholars with double connectivity may be able to produce more effective scholarship. Double connectivity, however, is not an automatic ticket to influence the fiqh markets. Some Muslim and non-Muslim writers with dual connections have produced highly scandalous scholarship that contributes nothing to the fiqh markets. Effective double connectivity emerges from a genuine understanding of and authentic respect for Islamic law as well as Western values.

4. Popular Protests

In the mix of new developments, a disturbing trend has arisen in the Muslim world. Popular Muslim reactions against the externalists’ attacks on the Basic Code and the Prophet demonstrate that the principle of disengagement is no longer fully obeyed. The controversy over the cartoons of Prophet Muhammad, showing him as a terrorist, demonstrates that Muslims throughout the world have become increasingly more assertive in reacting to gratuitous distortions of their faith. The murder of Dutch filmmaker


470. The Orientalist scholar surveys the East, says Said, from above and through reductive categories, creating ideas without evidence and regardless of evidence. Said, supra note 466, at 239.


472. Cem Ozdemir, Germany’s Integration Challenge, 30 Fletcher F. World Aff. 221, 225 (reporting that fifteen million Muslims in Europe protested peacefully over the publication of the cartoons); see also Prophet Drawings Anger Kuwait Lawmakers, Assoc. Press Online, Nov. 8, 2006 (referring to the Kuwait parliament’s passage of a resolution to sever diplomatic relations with Denmark over the cartoons and spend $50 million to defend the Prophet’s image in the West).
Theo van Gogh, who made a movie called Submission, which highlighted the ill treatment of women in the Islamic world by showing verses of the Qur’an tattooed on the semi-naked bodies of dancing girls,473 is another example of militant popular defense of Islam.

Under the disengagement principle, Muslims should ignore attacks like those of the Muhammad cartoons and van Gogh’s film—not react violently. Respect for other religions is an issue that the external legal systems must address under their own values. Whether the people in external cultures should be free to trash prophets and holy books and whether it is appropriate under their laws to inflict emotional distress on communities of believers is not an Islamic problem, because Islam forbids Muslims from making fun of any religion. Muslims may simply ignore the attacks on the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the Prophet under the disengagement principle: “La-kum Diinukum wa la-yi Diin (To you be your Way, and to me mine).”474 It appears, however, that a new rule has emerged in the fiqh markets. If an artist or writer publicly insults the Prophet or the Qur’an, Muslim populations will protest and show their resentment.

CONCLUSION

The fiqh markets are founded on the belief that the Qur’an and the Sunna are the primary sources of Islamic law. Muslim opinio-jurists, pious and able, may offer opinions on new issues. An opinion compatible with the Basic Code that is broadly followed in the Muslim world becomes the rule of Islamic law. Because opinio-jurists may offer competing rules on the same issue, the fiqh markets are tolerant of pluralist rulings that may coexist. Islamic law in this sense is not monolithic. The fiqh markets do not allow non-Muslim jurists to issue opinions. However, external scholars may provide constructive criticisms that might persuade Muslim jurists to apply more rigor in proposing new rules of Islamic law. Unfortunately, the external scholarship has often been disrespectful of the Qur’an and the Prophet. Such blasphemous scholarship has had little impact on the fiqh markets but it negatively affects the interfaith discourse, straining relations between the West and the Muslim world.