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A New Perspective

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Scholarship in Somali studies, especially that which addresses the origin and culture of the people, has accepted the homogeneity of the society without any extensive investigation of the cultural intricacies of the country. Thus historians, anthropologists, and successive Somali governments alike have failed to recognize the cultural, socioeconomic, and the ecological differences among the people. Rather, they tend to concentrate more on how the country was divided and certain regions were incorporated within Ethiopia and Kenya by the colonial powers. A large part of Somali political literature also concentrate on how these colonial divisions affect the country’s relations with Ethiopia and Kenya.

This portrayal of the Somali nation has painted a picture for students of Somali studies and for Somali experts in which the slightest hint of a civil war remained inconceivable. Yet, Somalia is currently experiencing one of the worst civil wars in Africa. Tens of thousands have died since December 1990 or have become refugees in Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Another several hundred thousand individuals are homeless in and around Mogadisho, Kismanyo, Baidoa, and Hargiesa.¹

In order to understand the current political strife in Somalia and its persistent and lethal clan conflicts, one needs to grasp the origin and the formation of these clans: how they came to acquire their identities, and most of all, how these shared surface identities came to perpetuate nationalistic emotions that work against presumed external Christian enemies but fail to create a strong national unity among the people. In fact, it
has been partly this creation of an external enemy that has solidified Somali unity over the past thirty years. As long as the Somali people perceived an external enemy, they remained united. Once this enemy ceased to exist, long suppressed internal conflicts have surfaced, creating the current civil war.

This article will provide some conceptual understanding for the causes of the current civil war in Somalia. It is also my intention to investigate how historical, linguistic, and ecological differences have contributed to the present situation. In order to do so, several important factors that may have contributed to the current civil war will be examined. The construction of the pre-colonial history and the origin of the people will be analyzed. The nature of Islam and language and how history is used will be examined. We will also see how the Constitution of 1960 (despite its good intentions) has failed to recognize the historical differences that have existed among the Somali people for several centuries and thus perpetuated an unrealistic and unachievable nationalistic ambition based on an overestimated cultural, religious, and historical homogeneity.

The Construction of the Past

Both contemporary students of Somali studies and late-nineteenth century travelers in the Horn of Africa have unanimously agreed on the assumption that Somalia is essentially a nation. Unlike any other part of Africa, the population is said to be virtually homogeneous. It is assumed that almost all the people speak the same language, subscribe to the same religion, and, following the traditional folk tale, believe in descent from a fabled, noble Arab immigrant in southern Arabia. Yet despite the well-elaborated mythology about the culture, uniqueness, and the origin of the people, there was no such thing as the Somali people before the second half of this millennium.

The first time the name Somali appeared in history it was recorded in the victory claim of Negus Yeshak (1414–1429) of Ethiopia over the neighboring Islamic Sultanate of Adal. However, Al-Idrisi (1100–1166) mentioned a group known as Hawiye living near a river, presumably the Shabelle. This reference to the Hawiye before the name Somali itself appeared in the written history is a clear indication that the Somali political
organization (in the past) was far from being unified. The occupants of
the Horn consisted of several distinct groups. Based on this historical
fact, one may also hypothesize that the Somali identity itself is a recent
phenomenon. Today, the Somali population is divided into six major clan
families and two linguistically and culturally distinct groups. These are
the Dir, Darood, Isaq, and the Hawiye—who are said to be overwel-
ingly nomadic—and the Ree-Win and Digil agropastoralists. It is also
important at this juncture to point out that these clans have occupied
separate geographical areas until recently. For example, H. S. Lewis in-
dicates that the Somali clans of Dir, Isaq, Hawiye and Ree-Win have
inhabited relatively restricted areas and show no recent movements.
Furthermore, Somali society historically consisted of several distinct kin,
cultural, and economic communities occupying separate geographical
grazing lands. Recent uneven demographic growth has led to the cur-
rent mixed population distribution.

Contrary to the widely published literature concerning both the mi-
gration and the origin of the Somali people, it is now well documented
that the Somali, along with the Oromos, originated in southern Ethiopia.
Recent linguistic findings indicate that Proto-Sam, the ancestor language
of the Rendille, Boni, and the Somali, is a member of the Omo-Tana lan-
guages. All the speakers of the Omo-Tana are found between Lake Abayo
and the Tana River. This shows that the speakers of the Omo-Tana, in-
cluding the Sam speakers originated in this area. The original Sam
group split into two groups, Eastern and Western Sam. The Rendille
western Sam speakers maintained their original location until today. On
the other hand, the eastern Sam speakers—particularly the Somali—mi-
grated to the northeast and settled around the lower course of the Jubba
River. This group later expanded its territory to include most of the fer-
tile lands between the two great rivers of Jubba and the Shabelle.

Based on Turton’s description, the Garre-Pre-Hawiye can be seen as a
major part of this group. The other major group could be the Ree-win.
The Garre Somali were associated with the Tana and the Jubba Rivers
long before any presence of Oromo was mentioned. This is supported by
the fact that neither written records nor oral tradition have indicated any
Oromo presence, before the last two centuries, in what is today the So-
mali Republic. Therefore, all the available resources, aside from Somali
oral tradition, indicate that the Proto-Garre have lived in central Somalia
during the past two millennia. It is important nevertheless, to establish
the direct descendants of this Proto-Garre. Two current Somali clans can
be seen as good candidates: the Hawiye, who have been associated with
central Somalia for at least the past 800 years or their Ree-win neighbors
in the south.\textsuperscript{11} It is very difficult to determine precisely the answer to
this question due to the recent uneven population growth in the area.
Also the Islamization of the Somali people has diluted the distinctiveness
of the Somali clans. Nevertheless, it could be argued that both the Proto-
Garre of the 17th century and modern day Somali Garre may have had
more similarities to the Ree-win clans than the Hawiye. Also, cultural
differences between the Hawiye and the Ree-win, as we will see later,
only appeared in the 19th century when those Hawiye bordering the Da-
rood abandoned their farming traditions to take up the camel culture.
Since we do not have any written documents or oral traditions to deter-
mine the precise descendants of the Proto-Garre, we may assume that
their ancestral roots trace back to either the Hawiye or the Ree-win.

**Early Migration Patterns of the Somali Clans**

We now return to the Somali movement to the edges of the Red Sea and
the Indian Ocean. The Proto-Garre, the ancient ancestors of the modern
Somali people, migrated between southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya
during the beginning of the Christian era. In contrast to I. M. Lewis's
claim of the presence of a Bantu community prior to the arrival of the So-
mali, Heine argues that the Horn of Africa (or what is today the modern
Somali republic) was probably uninhabited before the Somali occupa-
tion.\textsuperscript{12} In fact, the first descendants of the Proto-Garre can be considered
to have discovered the Horn of Africa. At any rate, after reaching the
lower course of the Jubba River, the Proto-Garre split into three major
groups.\textsuperscript{13}

The Ree-win/Digil migrated and settled toward the southern edges of
the River Shabelle, later occupying all of southern Somalia. The Hawiye,
after a brief stop south of the Shabelle River, migrated north of the river
and later expanded to the central parts of the republic. The Dir however
migrated to what is today western Somalia along the Ethiopian border.
Later, the Dir split into two major groups, the Darood migrating to the
northeast and the Isaq to the northwest. This process of migration and
settlement may have taken several hundred years and several phases. By 1000 A.D., however, most of the different clan families were well established in their socioeconomic, cultural, and geographical locations.

**Socioeconomic Culture of the Somali Clans**

The socioeconomic culture of the Somali people in the past is subject to debate. Some historians maintain that they were practicing agriculture supplemented by animal husbandry and commerce with coastal towns. This is supported by the observations of some historians of the introduction of the camel economy concurrent with the introduction of Islam. Others suggest that the camel economy has been the basic ingredient of both Somali economy and culture.\(^{14}\)

Nonetheless, if we assume that my hypothesis about the migration and the origin of the Somali people are valid observations, then we are bound to lean toward the agricultural picture. This reasoning further indicates that the central point of population dispersion lies among the Reewin and Digil, who still today practice a mixture of farming and animal husbandry. Despite these different observations of historians of the Horn regarding the socioeconomic culture of the Somali clans, it seems that a large number of previously-categorized nomads have been practicing agriculture. The Hawiye of the central region have had a long history of agricultural practices. Oral traditions of those clans show that their settlement and subsequent farming practices have been going on for several centuries. For example, Wa’dan, Abgal, Bimal, and Hintire have long had traditions of farming.\(^{15}\)

Therefore, the Hawiye clans of central Somalia on the one hand and the Darood and the Isaq of the north on the other, have had long standing differences in their socioeconomic cultures. The Hawiye practiced a mixture of farming and herding while the Darood practiced fishing and camel herding. The Hawiye and some Reewin clans may have employed Bantu clients as farmhands while they remained pastoralists.\(^{16}\) Whether these clans actually farmed or employed Bantu groups to do so is not at issue. The important point here is that these groups have been dependent on farming and thus were settled communities. Also, a sizable number of the Somali population in the north practiced farming.\(^{17}\) This shows that the majority of the population in Somalia are either pure cultivators or
agropastoralists and cattle nomads, who settled around the major cities of Mogadisho, Merka, Barave, Baidoa, and Hargiesa. At least the overwhelming majority of the Hawiye along with the Digil and Ree-win are either agropastoralists or cattle herders.

Moreover, the first and the only published Somali census of 1957 indicated that the population of these three groups was greater than the other three.\(^{18}\) This can provide a great deal of information as to whether the majority of Somalis have practiced camel pastoralism and actually owned a considerable number of camels or whether they merely claimed to. It is not strange for Somalis to claim ownership of camels, for the beast is associated with the storied Arabian origin. Therefore, both the culture on which the current political organization is based and the socioeconomic structure of the Somali people must be studied anew, and the regional differences that have been suppressed for a long time must be clarified. With the new information, a meaningful democracy and a stable Somali government may be achieved and civil wars avoided.

Notwithstanding, the overriding assumption of long standing social, linguistic, religious, and cultural unity, the Somali people have long consisted of distinct groups occupying different grazing lands, interconnected only by the harsh environment that they inhabited. This environment made the Somali people create and abandon alliances based on the prevailing environmental and ecological situations. Understanding how these different clans maintain their distinctness and at the same time collaborate with each other is very important in determining the current political organization of the country. In spite of a common environment, language, and religion, a unified Somali people traditionally existed only on the surface and in the face of potential external enemies, but never succeeded in building an internally unified Somali nation.

The Ecological Bases of Differences

As mentioned earlier, the Somali clan families have for a long time occupied and been restricted to their geographical location. However, due to highly variable rainfall, especially in the north, the nomads are forced to move from one location to another in search of pasture for their cattle, goats, and camels.\(^ {19}\) This condition also makes it difficult for any single clan to remain within its geographical location, for in most cases, all the
necessary resources to maintain both the clan and its herds cannot be found within any one locale. The clans have devised inter-clan alliances, treaties, and clientships to deal with these difficulties without compromising territorial and geographical boundaries. During the dry seasons, a whole clan family can move to the land of a neighboring clan where they have formal treaty rights, and where water and grazing are abundant. In this situation, the guest clan acquires the right to remain in the land in exchange for contributing to the collective defense of the host clan.

This type of patron-client relationship also exists between nomads and cultivators. Usually the former move to the more watered areas and enter into a client status with the cultivators. In some situations the nomads accept a temporary clientship. However, in other cases, incoming nomads who have lost their herds find themselves in a permanent, subordinate client status. In this situation, the incoming nomads are allowed to farm the land in return for rent-in-kind, and they are required to abide by the rules and regulations of the dominant clan. One might assume that such relationships and ties between the clan families have facilitated integration. However, these types of relationships exist only during drought.

Another indication that the different Somali clan groups have been confined to their geographical locations is how they formed their commercial and seaport centers. Each Somali clan group has tried to obtain a commercial debauch for its products. The Abgal sub-clan of the Hawiye has established Mogadisho as its port of access. The Ree-win clans have used both Barave on the southeast coast and Luug on the southwest. Another example is Kismayo, a small fishing town, which became a major center of livestock trade in the later years of the 19th century when Harti pastoralists settled around the area. As Cassanelli notes “Mareeg, Hobyo, and Boosaso appear to have been established as coastal outposts of various Sultanates which emerged among Somali pastoralists between the 15th and the 19th centuries. Bullahaar, the sister port of Berbera, owes its early 19th century origins to a dispute between segments of the Habar Awal clan whose members had traditionally traded through Berbera.”

Somali clan politics in the past also indicate a clear segmentation of political authority in the region. As has been shown in the preceding pages, the Somali nomads never came under the control of a single political authority. Somali history indicates the appearance or the existence of
several regional sovereignties, such as the Ajuran Sultanate in the 16th century, the Majerteen Sultanate in the northeast of the 18th century, and the 19th century Geledi and Hobyo Sultanates. Even though some or all of these Sultanates expanded beyond their lineage area, it is doubtful that they controlled more than one or two clans.

Also, both the British and the Italian colonies were not interested in interfering with the lifestyle of the Somali nomads, especially in the north. In the south, Italians settled along the Shabelle River for they saw agriculture as the only economically feasible operation. Even the indigenous Somali government of the early 1960s, despite its legitimate authority and strong nationalistic will, never reached its subjects across the land. It was only the government of Siyyad Barre from 1969 that created an efficient and centralized government.

Two important factors helped the Siyyad Barre government to achieve cohesiveness. First the writing of the Somali language enabled the government to reach the people through its publications. Second the restriction and the ban on tribalism in the country helped facilitate integration. Through these two linkage points, the Siyyad government was able to spread an ideology of unity. By 1975, however, the Siyyad government was unable to distance itself from the deeply-rooted clanism and tribalism which together created and maintained the Somali political organization for several hundred years.

By the end of the Ogaden war in 1978, several different clans started to voice their disappointment about their status under Siyyad Barre. As a result, the president started to ally himself with more people from his clan. As Samatar points out, as "the leaders of the Majerteen, Hawiye, and Isaq began to voice their qualms about their status under the rule of Siyyad Barre, the president began to surround himself with more people from his clan, from the clan of his mother, and the clan of his son-in-law. Despite Siyyad Barre's early intention to eliminate tribalism, he found himself in the center of a Marehan-Ogaden-Dulbahante clan-based coalition known as (MOD)."  

**Religion and Somali Nationalism**

The history and the arrival of Islam in the Horn is subject to debate. Some historians indicate that Islam may have arrived in Somalia in the first century of the faith itself. Others point to the tenth century. At
any rate, aside from a few port cities, Islam did not make any progress into the interior regions of the country until the spread of Sufism and Tariiqah in the late 1800s. Several Muslim leaders were successful in creating Somali unity through Islam and mobilizing some parts of the country against the Ethiopian Kingdom or the British Empire. These include, Ahmed Gurey, who almost succeeded in conquering the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia and, more recently, Sayyid Mohamad Abdile Hassan who managed to convince the Somali people to shed their clan loyalties and stand up together against the Christian British colony. Through his call for defending the religion of the land against the Christian enemy, he was able to create what is characterized today as Somali nationalism. Despite the success of Islam in uniting the Somali clans against external Christian enemies, it was never successful in creating a lasting sense of unity among the people. In order to understand why Islam was not so successful in maintaining Somali unity one has to look at the nature of Islam in Somalia and how it spread into the interior.

Notwithstanding this early arrival of Islam to the Horn of Africa, the current political organization can be related to the spread of the Islamic brotherhoods (Tariiqah) of the late 19th century. There are four major Tariiqah or Sufi orders in Somalia today: the Qadiriyyah, Ahmadiyya, Salihyya, and Rafaiyya. Every Somali today identifies with one or another. “A Sufi Tariiqah (way) is essentially a systematic method of worship with prescribed exercises which can lead the aspiring devotee to a clear knowledge (macrifa) of God and to the ideal virtuous life.” Sufi Tariiqah were successful in converting all the Somali people in the interior to Islam. But soon after its spread, Sufism was given a clear Somali identity modified to accommodate clan differences among the Somali people. Frequently, the Tariiqah leader sought lineage descent from Prophet Mohammed and those who followed him acquired the same lineage. In a short time, clan and Sufi lineages became intertwined. Despite the original intention of the Sufi leaders to replace clanism with Islam, prior cultural affiliations superseded Islam. Therefore Islam in Somalia, albeit a potential force for Somali unity, was overrun by its powerful contender, “clanism.” I. M. Lewis has observed this challenge thus,

The Muslim orders contribute to national unity through Islam and seek to overcome the sectional rivalries which separate men in their secular activities. However, given the circumstance of Somali
life and society in which, lacking any large centralized political uni-
ties, the only security was provided by small bands of kinsmen, the
loyalties of kin and clan remained paramount.30

Language and Society

Even though successive Somali governments and scholars of Somali stud-
ies have downplayed the existence and the significance of different lin-
guistic groups within the Somali people, a closer look will reveal a
different picture. Some historians have argued that, despite the existence
of a distinct southern language, all Somalis can communicate with the
standard language. For example, I. M. Lewis claims that,

the widest dialect difference is between the speech of the northern
pastoralists and the Digil and Ree-Win cultivators. These differ to
much the same extent as Portuguese and Spanish. Yet since many of
its speakers are also familiar with the standard Somali, the extent of
this distinctive southern dialect does not alter the fact that from the
Jabuti republic to Garissa on the Tana river in Kenya, standard So-
mali provides a single channel of communication and a common
medium in which poems and songs compete for popularity.31

This statement points out the extent of difference between the two di-
ialects. Yet, it fails to recognize that the overwhelming majority of the
Ree-Win speakers live in the rural areas and therefore cannot speak the
standard language. It is also important to point out that, if we include
the Somali speakers who live outside the Somali Republic, 30 percent of
the total Somali population speaks the southern language. However, if we
only count the population of the Somali Republic, these figures may show
a higher proportion.32 The standard language is also divided into three
dialects. The first and the most common is spoken in the northern third
of the country and is associated with the Darood. The second one is spo-
ken in central Somalia among the Hawiye, and the last one is spoken in
the Benadir region. In many cases, therefore, immediate communication
is difficult.33

Notwithstanding these historical and linguistic facts, certain Somali
clans (under the leadership of some Sufi leaders) opted to connect their
origin to Arabia and have formulated a very elaborate genealogical tree supporting their argument. When and why the Somali people started to identify themselves with southern Arabia must be associated with the introduction and the spread of Sufism in the late nineteenth century. As H. S. Lewis notes,

the Muslim Somali places high value on descent from Mohammad and his family, or at least from Arabs. Many Somali clan-families and clans therefore claim descent from immigrant Arab sheikhs or saints who married indigenous Somali women.\(^{34}\)

At any rate, these clans have successfully imposed their mythical genealogy upon the rest of the population. These Sufi leaders also legitimized their power through their claim of descent from Arabia. Thus, the Darood clan has been the dominant political power in the country since independence. That is also why the Hawiye and Ree-win have deeply resented the Darood clan. It was mainly this deep resentment between the Hawiye and the Darood that has culminated into this savage civil war.

**The Impacts of the 1960 Constitution**

The first Somali National Assembly of 1960 started off with a well-conceived constitution based on liberal democracy. The vote was extended to all the citizens of the nation, who would chose the members of the assembly. The latter then voted for the president who, was to in turn select the prime minister. In spite of this well-intentioned constitution, efforts to disband the long and deeply held clan divisions proved difficult. Moreover, despite the rhetoric of Somali nationalism and the stance of political leaders against tribalism and clanism, the division of political power was based on clan balance. The first administration of Adan Abdulle Osman reflected this clan balanced distribution. His cabinet consisted of four members from the Darood clan, two members from Isaq, three members from Hawiye,\(^{4}\) and three from Ree-win and Digil.\(^{35}\) Why the first Somali government, despite their claim of moving the Somali people from tribalism, resorted to clan based cabinet is a difficult question to answer. Even if the first government wished to create a government that was not based
on tribalism, officials were handicapped by their lack of understanding of the extent and influences of the forces of tribalism in the country. However, the strength of these particularistic differences and their universal appeal is more powerful in Somalia than one could imagine.\textsuperscript{36}

Somali politicians and religious leaders have for a long time tried to subdue clan differences, for they have realized its potential to destroy and hinder collective goals. In Somalia, we tend to underestimate the potential lethality of clan differences in dividing the people and perpetuating conflicts among the people. Clan divisions have also challenged the last venue of Somali unity, namely Islam. No individual belongs to Somali society unless he belongs to a kinship group, even if a Muslim.\textsuperscript{37}

The most profound indication of the long suppressed differences among the Somali clans can be seen in the preliminary agreement reached by the six different clan families in Djibouti from 15–21 July 1991. This conference has shown that Somali political leaders have finally recognized the existence of these differences. For example article 4, section C of the preliminary constitutional agreement penned in Djibouti was drafted in recognition of the need for an article to establish regional autonomy in the official Somali Constitution. This was the first time an official Somali document divided political positions on the bases of clan distribution. The conference has thus more than ever reaffirmed that Somali politics must be based on power sharing between different clans rather than on a rhetorical national unity. For example, the delegation agreed to give the presidential position to the Hawiye clan. The first vice president to the Ree-win and Digil, the second vice president to the Darood clan, and the prime minister to the Isaq clan.\textsuperscript{38}

Therefore, the current civil war in Somalia is a direct result of both the long suppressed historical, cultural, and ecological differences among the Somali clan families and how they have used history. The Somali clans have for a long time occupied and been restricted to their geographical locations. In fact, on the eve of the colonial period, Somali society consisted of several distinct cultural and economic communities. This is supported by the accounts of the Arab and European travelers in the region. Also, the Somali language is divided into two main dialects and several intermediate ones. Despite the great popularity of Islam in Somalia, its nature has been modified to serve traditional cultural affiliations. Therefore its force to create unity remained minimal.
Also, both the current civil war and the results of the Djibouti conference show that Somali nationalism is fading and that future Somali political organization will be based on regionalism and clanism. Traditionally, Somali nationalism was fueled by the existence of the continued conflict with Ethiopia and the ambition to reunite all the Somali people outside the republic but the geopolitical situation of the Horn has recently acquired a new face. For example, the political situation in Ethiopia has changed, and regional autonomy is now recognized in Ethiopia. This may attract the Somali people in Ethiopia to establish their own autonomous state. It is however highly unlikely that the Somali population in the Northern Frontier District of Kenya will become part of the Somali nation.

On top of these cultural and environmental differences, the Somali nation has used history in a very divisive and negative way. Unlike other African countries, where history was used to empower the people against the colonial powers, the Somali people used history to depreciate each other. Those who created the most elaborate mythology that attached them to southern Arabia considered themselves more Arabs, and thus claimed the right to rule the country single-handedly. The recently-challenged North-South migration created by some anthropologists support this myth. This is the major reason why the Hawiye and the Darood have had a deeply suspicious relationship and why the Ree-win as a whole never trusted any government in the country. It is also why the current civil war has escalated.

Conclusion

The purpose of this essay was to examine the specific historical, cultural, and environmental factors that underlie the current civil war in Somalia and how they contributed to the present situation. Despite the popular belief that the Somali people are virtually homogeneous, there have been long-standing cultural and socioeconomic differences among the major clans in the nation. Also, the Somali clan groups never came under the control of a single political authority until 1960. Both religious leaders of the late-nineteenth century and modern political leaders have successively collaborated to forge the origin and the identity of the Somali people and to suppress their differences, only to introduce a more divisive
element in the Somali culture which finally created a division based on how one was related to southern Arabia. Although these leaders have on several occasions tried to unify the Somali people under the banner of Islam, clan differences have prevailed. It is this suppression of the existing Somali clan differences that have led to this savage war. Finally, the aim of this paper was not to deny the existence of Somali nationalism or of a Somali nation. Rather it is to point out how some neglected internal cultural, socioeconomic, and environmental differences have ignited the current civil war in Somalia.

Notes

4. I. M. Lewis, A Modern history of Somalia: Nation and state in the Horn of Africa (London: Longman, 1980), 5. The name Ree-win is used in this article instead of Rahanwayn, because that is the exact pronunciation of the name; this name means the older family instead of a large crowd as some have defined it.
13. See Figure 1 for migration patterns of the Proto-Garre and its later descendants.
16. Ibid., 162.
18. Mukhtar, "The Emergence and the Role of Political Parties in the Inter-River Region of Somalia From 1947 to 1960 (independence)," 85. Note also, that the government of Siyyad Barre did not publish the results of the 1974 census.
20. For a good description of clan treaties and clientship, see Cassanelli, *The shaping of Somali Society*, 75–78.
21. Ibid., 75.
22. Ibid., 70.
23. This information is based on an investigation of the Italian settlements around the Shabelle River by the author in February, 1988.
24. For a good description of how the Siyyad government changed its policy from nationalism to tribalism see, Laitin and Samatar, *Somalia a Nation in Search of a State*.
25. Ibid., 44.
29. Ibid., 262.
31. Ibid., 5
32. These numbers are based on an informed guess rather than actual
census, for there is no reliable census in Somalia. The Somali population is estimated at about three million based on 1960 (Cassanelli, *The shaping of Somali Society*, 3).

33. This classification is based on the authors experience with the Somali dialects.


35. For a description of how the constitution was framed, see Samatar. Pages 30, 70.


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