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■ When Walker Conner posed the important question, "When is a nation?" he was not simply reasserting the historicity of a concept that, almost by definition, has often feigned amnesia about its historical production,[1] he was reminding us that national consciousness is fundamentally a mass phenomenon that cannot simply be studied through written artifacts mostly created by social elites. The nation may be, as Benedict Anderson says, an imagined community, but even in Anderson's scheme what is crucial is not simply the form of that imagining, but its material extent. That is one reason Anderson closely ties the emergence of the nation with the development of print capitalism, to him a means of spreading and standardizing the vernacular and enabling the simultaneous imaginings of community by mass populations.[2] Ernest Gellner similarly makes industrialization and modernization a condition for nationalism, although his emphasis is on the development of an exchangeable labor population rendered non-exchangeable with those of other nations by a language and knowledge shaped by nationwide education systems.[3]

This only underlines the necessity of a double-pronged approach to analyzing nationalism or its extreme form, fascism, defined by Roger Griffin

as "a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of popular ultra-nationalism."[4] Fascism's aestheticization of politics, stressed by Walter Benjamin,[5] does, as Andrew Hewitt emphasizes, actually function "on the basis of one of the most radical reaffirmations of the *autonomy* of the aesthetic—*l'art pour l'art*" because it renders politics—as well as the ultimate pursuit of politics, war—a disinterested object of contemplation.[6] Yet that subsuming of politics to the cultural realm does not deny the fact that Susan Sontag's mass spectacles of "fascinating fascism,"[7] or the processes of "internal colonization" that Mabel Berezin sees as essential in the creation of fascist identities,[8] require national forms of material organization and mobilization to be realized. Just as cultural analysis is essential in understanding the phenomenon of fascism, so must we delineate the sociopolitical enactment of that culture, the extent of a hyper-nationalism usually predicated as "popular" and "mass."

I will use this two-pronged approach to focus on the question of fascist cinema, concentrating more specifically on the degree to which film in Japan achieved a degree of nation-ality—the state of being a national phenomenon—in an age of ultranationalism.[9] In alignment with Anderson and Homi Bhabha,[10] much work on national cinema has focused on the relation of nation-state and film in terms of intertextual imaginings of community. Including problems of intertextuality in the study of national cinema has allowed scholars to work against the ideological tendency of reinforcing the nation through film (studies) and instead reveal the contradictory dynamics of the national cinema enterprise. The recent focus on deconstructing the conceptual category of national cinema can itself, however, occasionally lead to a dead end. A scholar of British cinema such as Andrew Higson, for instance, can offer many reasons for how the concept of national cinema is problematic (e.g., it emphasizes unity over diversity, home over homelessness, and presumes imagined communities are bordered and national not diasporic),[11] but his ultimate "deconstruction" of the idea leaves us with little room to understand either the historical conditions behind the emergence of the concept of national cinema or the material struggles over time in the realms of production, distribution, and exhibition to create or tear down national borders in the motion picture world.

In the field of Japanese film studies, Darrell Davis's *Picturing Japaneseness* has offered an important contribution to the study of wartime militarist cinema but one that is similarly hampered by its historical blinkers.[12] His study of Mizoguchi Kenji's *Genroku Chūshingura* (*The Loyal 47 Ronin*; 1941–42) powerfully describes the film's aesthetic sacramentalization of the nation through what Davis calls the "monumental style"—a style that could be termed fascistic if only because of Mizoguchi's contemporary written praise for Goebbels's cultural policies.[13] He also argues that the film's Japaneseness—its status as the epitome of a national film (*kokumin eiga*)—is a product of its textual appropriation of traditional aesthetic forms, its ideological project of expanding *bushidō* into the realm of women,[14] as well as, importantly, its efforts to teach spectators to perceive in a more purely Japanese way. Here national cinema is not simply a set of textual or conceptual features but a practice of spectatorship. Unlike Noël Burch, who assumes that the film embodies age-old Heian aesthetics even in wartime Japan,[15] Davis historicizes to the degree he recognizes the film as a conscious product of the state's effort to reconstruct Japaneseness during the war. Nevertheless, Davis never fully addresses either the material or the discursive implications of the fact that this most "Japanese" of films was not only a box-office failure, but was also cited by some critics as a specific example of what should not represent the nation.[16] The problem is not simply Davis's failure to address mass consciousness, but his tendency to make assumptions about what is Japanese—in this case, Mizoguchi's version of Genroku aesthetics—and thus about the nation-ality of a cinema, when it was precisely these issues that, as I will show, were still subject to intense debate and struggle on various planes even during the war. Such inadequacy in delineating the enabling environments for a national cinematic textuality prompt us to join Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano in her call for more specificity in accounting for the relation between modern mass culture and nationalism.[17]

This essay will adumbrate these struggles and conflicts over the form and meaning of a Japanese cinema from the arrival of motion pictures in Japan in 1896 through the Second World War. My intention is to specify and historicize the conditions that (dis)enable a national cinema in Japan and thus clarify how these varied antagonisms were a definitive aspect of the national-ization of film in the period. Not only were conceptions of national cinema torn between such opposites as the Western eye and national tradition or high culture and mass entertainment, practical issues such as the national-ization of the film industry and the "training" of spectators hampered the national cinema enterprise. Such a picture should complicate any attempt to term wartime Japanese film a *fascist cinema* both by relocating the texts in larger conditions of production and reception and by re-emphasizing militarist Japan's contradictory stance between tradition and

modernity, the local and the national, and the Japanese and the Western. In the end, I will argue, it is the very gap—as well as interactions—between a cultural aesthetics and its material conditions that define the question of a fascist cinema in Japan; the difficulty, even impossibility, of nation-alizing film during the war was in many ways the condition for the (im)possibility of a fascist cinema, rendering a fascist cinema less an aesthetic than a process attempting to overcome the hybrid contradictions that were at the source of such futility, and realize through force the ideal of a total, mass, and hyper-national cinema.

Stealing the Western Cinematic Gaze

In some senses, the cinema was from its beginning an international medium, albeit one clearly centered in Europe and the United States. Films traveled the globe, and no nation indisputably dominated their domestic market. Where a movie came from was not yet important: until around 1910 in Japan, film magazines would often report on the newest films without even mentioning where they had been made (despite the fact that in those days the vast majority were from abroad). National difference only became discursively significant in Japan around 1910, when intellectual reformers began targeting the domestic cinema for critique, arguing that its use of theatrical acting, *onnagata*, and immobile, long-shot, long takes, in addition to its reliance on the *benshi* (lecturers who explained every film shown during the silent era) for narrative enunciation, was inherently uncinematic. These "pure film" reformers called for a form of cinematic modernization that would rid Japanese cinema of these impurities. Just as the conception of film as a problem to be solved (given its perceived pernicious effects) helped distinguish between the filmic and the non-filmic and formulate a unique meaning for the term *cinema*, the boundaries of nations aided the mapping of the limits of cinema (and vice versa).[18] These are discursive structures that would shape the national-ization of Japanese cinema through the Second World War. Japanese cinema thus appears on the map through discourses differentiating exciting, liberating foreign films from the lackadaisical, seemingly uncinematic Japanese output, a map with the legend note: Japan equals non-cinema.

The state of Japanese film was taken by many to be a source of national shame, so much so that one senses Japanese cinema being articulated as subject to a gaze that was not just Japanese. This was not unique to film: modernization in Japan was itself a kind of performance before the gaze of

the other, one conscious of potential embarrassment yet intended to earn the recognition of that foreign spectator. Given such a discursive context, it is not surprising that most reformers proposed exporting Japanese cinema. Acceptance in the eyes of foreign audiences became the sign of cinematic achievement; in the words of one writer, "Only when Japanese-made films are exported abroad as commodities can we say that they have for the first time reached the stage of completion."[19]

The aggressive calls for export largely coincided with the rise of American- and European-made films featuring stories centered on Japanese characters and situations (performed by Caucasians or, in the case of films by Thomas Ince, by Japanese-born actors such as Sessue Hayakawa). Many considered this proof that well-made Japanese films could succeed abroad and chastised producers for wasting a good business opportunity. Yet the stereotypes and racism evident in such works provided reasons for many to prevent importation or, at least, censor them. With such films gaining worldwide popularity, there was an almost national urgency to the project of producing and exporting more accurate films on Japan. The following words by Kaeriyama Norimasa, the polemical leader of the reformers and later a director in his own right, indicate how complex these burgeoning national feelings toward the cinema were:

> Look! Has not the U.S. Kay-Bee Company created a six-reel epic on the eruption of our Sakurajima Island, using immigrant Japanese actors and boldly selling the film on the market?[20] Did not the Pathé cameraman Meneaux [?] photograph the volcanoes of Japan, braving in particular the dangers at the time of Sakurajima's eruption to boldly shoot an excellent film that Japanese cameramen were incapable of making? . . . Although Japanese producers possess this unique and splendid land called Japan, they do not make a single film aimed for overseas. Isn't it a colossal loss that they let it be stolen from them by the hands of foreigners?[21]

It is interesting that Kaeriyama's discourse renders Japan not only a commodity to be traded on the world market, but also the object of theft. This recalls, but puts a different spin on, Slavoj Žižek's discussion of the nation in terms of "theft of enjoyment." To Žižek, what is at stake in national or ethnic oppositions is "possession of the national Thing. We always impute to the 'other' an excessive enjoyment; s/he wants to steal our enjoyment (by ruining our way of life) and/or has access to some secret, perverse enjoyment."[22] Kaeriyama's comments make a public issue of this theft of the national "Thing," but his central anxiety was that foreigners want something

that Japanese neither appreciate nor know they have. As such, the nation involved less "our Thing"—"something 'they,' the others cannot grasp"—than something that was easily taken because it was unacknowledged. It is this ability to take what technically is theft-proof that underlines a difference between Japan and Žižek's situation. Žižek considers the West's current fascination with Eastern Europe, wherein Eastern Europe's gaze functions as the means by which the powerful West fantasizes its superiority in the eyes of others. Japan's West, like the West's Eastern Europe, is in some ways Japan's ego ideal, cited to urge Japanese filmmakers to be more conscious of their own territory. But the bearer of the gaze here, unlike Eastern Europe, is in a position of geopolitical superiority; the West in many ways also functions as Japan's superego. The thieving gaze of Western cinema is more threatening, taking what is normally not its own with the backing of a colonialist world system; its vision is more parental, as Japanese (often rendered childlike in reformist discourse) strive to gain the recognition of the Law (of the Father, of cinema). The Western gaze can also objectify Japan, making it impossible for it to assume the gaze as a full-fledged subject (unless it adopts that same gaze itself). It is here that shame before the Western gaze enters the national cinema picture.

This is first reflected in what was ultimately an ambiguous attitude toward foreign-made "Japanese" pictures. While roundly criticized for their inaccuracies, they were still termed more "cinematic" than Japanese-made films and thus were also an object of admiration. Any effort to teach foreigners about the truth of Japan was imbricated with—or even undermined by—the simultaneous quest to earn their approval, both as the other that constitutes the self and as the producers of this more cinematic cinema. The success of the export policy always depended on acceptance on the part of foreign spectators. "If we can just make films even foreigners can understand," said *Kinema rēkodo* (Kinema Record), "then we should be able to export our works abroad for a long time."[23] Here the quest for a Japanese cinema (to truly represent Japan) closely intersected with the desire for a cinematic cinema. For a vision of Japan to be recognized abroad, it had to be represented in a supposedly universal language comprehensible on its own to other spectators, one that, to reformers, necessitated eliminating such uncinematic markers of Japanese uniqueness as the benshi. Japanese cinema was to be particular to the degree it first assumed the universal form of the exchangeable commodity. Reformers in effect emphasized that a pure film was a necessary condition for a purely Japanese film: Japan was possible in film only if it first became cinematic (which implies that Japan

is partially a product of cinema). The inherent paradox of Japanese cinema was that for it to become different, it first had to negate its cultural distinctness; for it to become a national cinema, it was required initially to become the "translation" of foreign film style.[24]

Žižek notes that "what we conceal by imputing to the Other the theft of enjoyment is the traumatic fact that *we never possessed what was allegedly stolen from us*,"[25] but in Kaeriyama's discourse, the traumatic lack of ownership is ultimately disavowed less by accusing foreign cameramen of stealing images of beautiful Japan than by putting the ultimate blame on Japanese film producers who failed to take them themselves. That which reformers wanted "back" in Japan, then, were not the images of landscape themselves but the way they were filmed, the attitude toward cinema itself. In a perverse way, the stolen object that must be "returned" was that which properly belonged to the other in the first place: the film style of Hollywood and Europe. (If this was to found a Japanese cinema, then perhaps the origin of Japanese cinema lies more in Thomas Ince than in Kabuki.) Resentment over the theft of mere images of Japan thus masked a desire to possess the stylistic means by which those images were turned into cinema. The theft of enjoyment was (or was to be) actually committed by Japan and not the other. Perhaps we can say that guilt over this crime helped construct much of future Japanese cinema.

Such guilt was quickly displaced away from reformers advocating "translation" of Western cinema and onto the body of Japanese film itself. Domestic motion pictures were made the source of shame that seemingly necessitated the transgression of stealing film style from the other. The blame for this crime was also directed at those audiences—often composed of lower-class workers, women, or children—who were seen to favor such Japanese fare. The justification of modernization through discourses labeling these audiences vulgar and ignorant reveals how class divisions were essential to constructing a more cinematic Japanese film—a national cinema. This perception of the vulgarity of Japanese movie fare and its audience was in many ways a confirmation of how the West would supposedly view current Japanese movies. The quest for pure film reform, pitting a true Japanese film against the socially vulgar fare, then, marked the internalization of the other into the Japanese self, the adoption of the foreign mode of looking as the mirror image of the national cinema. If we just substitute "national cinema" for "national identity," the following statement by Yoshioka Hiroshi would fit well the case of Japanese film: "the very core of the national identity was constituted through the internalized eye of the West."[26]

National-izing Japanese Cinema

This equation of the Japanese with the uncinematic, the internalization of the cinematic gaze of the West, the adoption of its so-called universal cinematic language to obtain recognition of Japanese national cinema, and the class-based division of the universal and modernized versus the local and backward were all discursive moves that gave significance to the term *Japanese* in Japanese cinema. Yet this linguistic shaping of the country's motion-picture output by intellectuals was not sufficient to mold a national film industry. Reformers were painfully aware that their revolution in criticism—to be followed by practical efforts like those of Kaeriyama—was hampered by the current mode of production of Japanese motion pictures. In spite of the potential of this mechanical means of reproduction, Japanese film producers throughout the 1910s were mostly making only one print of every film produced.[27] To reformers, this ignorance of the potential of the medium proved that contemporary producers were hopelessly unable to vie for the foreign market and right the mistaken views of Japan circulating abroad. Worse yet, they were failing to use cinema as a reproductive medium capable of unifying the nation. Cinematic texts in Japan of the 1910s were more local than national since they were shown only in one place at one time, accompanied by a benshi and other elements in an exhibition space, which produced meaning deeply rooted in local experience. In the end, exhibitors and their theaters were more powerful in the industry, both economically and semiotically. Since no film possessed significance that transcended those local differences, cinema in Japan was far from being the kind of medium Anderson imagines bolstering the shared imaginations of a national community. Critics were profoundly aware that industrial reform was necessary for the cinema to be national. This contributed to what would be a long-running discourse on "modernizing" the industry in line with Fordist rationality. Eliminating such practices as developing a sole print was part of a larger effort to institute a clear division of labor in the industry, separating production, distribution, and exhibition, and to centralize both power and signification in the space of production. Kaeriyama Norimasa's model for the film industry was the publishing business, where publishers/studios would create the product that was distributed to the readers/spectators, leaving it such that "exhibitors are [like] retail book stores."[28]

A post-1918 history of Japanese cinema could paint a picture of this modernization, this national-ization of the domestic industry. Kaeriyama's first

films, *Sei no kagayaki* (*The Glow of Life*) and *Miyama no otome* (*Maid of the Deep Mountains*)—both made in 1918 and released in 1919)—are often credited in orthodox movie histories as the first cinematic Japanese films, ones that began to adopt the motion-picture techniques of Hollywood. This trend in reform was accelerated in 1920 by the formation of two studios, Taikatsu and Shōchiku, both of which claimed as one of their goals the export of Japanese films, in part through a film style (they brought in Japanese film-making talent who had worked in Hollywood) and a studio structure that emulated the Hollywood example (Shōchiku officials, for instance, traveled to California to inspect that industry's layout). The number of films per print increased, and a burgeoning national film press helped to assert universal meanings for individual texts. As Hase Masato has argued, early censorship also targeted local, "live performance" aspects of exhibition (especially the benshi) to facilitate a film text that would have the same meaning in the theater as it did in the sterile censorship room—and thus in any other locality.[29] Nationalization of censorship by the Home Ministry in 1925 in effect assumed that local differences no longer mattered in the regulation of the motion pictures. The coming of sound in the early and mid-1930s also encouraged, as Fujii Jinshi has argued, both a concentration of capital that enabled a shift from craft to Fordist production and the articulation of film as medium, molding the film work as a standardized product founded in a naturalized style that hides technique.[30] It was as if cinema was being well prepared for its role as the bearer of the nation during the war.

Quite a number of factors complicate this linear narrative of nationalization, however. First, industrially, studios would continue to produce a small number of prints into the late 1930s, opting, as their predecessors did in the 1910s, for increased production of films over multiple reproduction of prints. Studios were mostly capital poor, protracting their reliance on powerful local exhibitors to keep afloat. Thus, even though Fujii's example of a capital-rich studio like Tōhō (backed by Kobayashi Ichizō) presented one model of respectable modernization in the industry, other studios such as Daito were headed by figures tied to Yakuza and exhibition bosses, who churned out films cheaply without rationalized management practices. While companies like Shōchiku could present, as Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano argues, a "light" vision of urban modernity that ideologically accommodated traditional national identity,[31] that image was always contrasted with a "vulgar" entertainment that critics still decried as a national disgrace. Such hybridity, in which different modes of production and conceptions of cinema mixed and conflicted, underlines how the multiple facets of

cinema—industry, style, reception, discourse, and so on—were all sites for struggle over the meanings of cinema, the nation, and the modern.

Much had changed since the 1910s, but hybridity hampered the imagining of a homogeneous national cinema. Even as late as 1941, well into the state's total mobilization for war, the critic Imamura Taihei could express in writing his deep worries over the possibility of a Japanese national cinema, a concern directed less at textual than at material problems. According to the statistics Imamura cited, as of July 1940 only 10 percent of the cities, towns, or villages in Japan had cinemas, which meant that, while a country such as the Soviet Union had a population of 4,362 people per cinema, Japan had 29,625. Japan could boast 400 million admissions to movie theaters in 1939 (about four times a year per capita), but most were concentrated in the city.[32] Clearly, most Japanese did not attend movies often, and when they did, they were confronted with an extremely divided industry, with ten feature-film companies producing a total of about five hundred pictures a year—second in the world. Even if a splendid cinematic aestheticization of the nation like *The Loyal 47 Ronin* was produced, it would be drowned out in the flood of movies and become a *kokumin eiga* unseen by most of the *kokumin* (national citizenry). Given these conditions, in the words of the film director Kurata Bunjin, "The majority of Japanese films could not develop and grow as national films either in name or in reality."[33] The argument of Imamura and Kurata was in effect that cinema was not the kind of shared medium envisioned by Anderson and thus could not (to their chagrin) contribute to the formation of common Japanese imaginaries, fascist or not, or to the effective aesthetic expression of the nation.

This problem was not lost on authorities. Wartime film policy never simply pursued the utilization of an existing tool for the propaganda purposes of war and nation; it always involved a reformation of the medium to make it more capable of representing or even constructing the nation. If a national cinema was industrially problematic, given the number of studios, the excess of films, and problems in distribution, bureaucrats used their powers under the 1939 Film Law to consolidate the industry in several stages (reducing, for instance, the number of feature-film companies from ten to three), regulate the use of film stock and shorten program length (thus reducing the number of films made while increasing the number of prints produced), and, finally, in the waning days of the war, to streamline distribution so that audiences effectively had only two films to choose from a week. Given the lack of resources, the construction of extra theaters was impossible, but mobile projection units were created to show appropriate

films in rural locations. These measures did effectuate state influence over the industry, but they also put into practice longstanding proposals on how, through material reform, to improve the films, rationalize and modernize the industry, and, it was hoped, enforce the true national-ization of Japanese cinema.

An Un-Japanese Cinema

Limitations on material resources in part prevented the realization of the ideal of a nationwide film industry. Film theaters, for instance, would be scarce until well after the end of the war. One could argue that such material restrictions were particular to film; that the inability of cinema to nationalize signifies little about the condition of fascist nationalism in Japan. It is my argument, however, that what complicated the national-ization of cinema involved discourses extending beyond cinema into the core of the nation itself. To consider this, I would like to discuss two other factors that hampered efforts to perfect a national film industry: the issue of spectatorship and contradictions inherent in the discourse on film and nation. I will consider the latter first.

Longstanding arguments by critics about the deficiencies of Japanese film laid the foundation for government-led reforms, again providing evidence of the role that speaking about cinema historically has played in the construction of both the textuality and the industrial conditions of Japanese film. It was inevitable, then, that policies on kokumin eiga suffered from the same contradictions that had been borne by discourses on national cinema since the 1910s. One such contradiction was the fact that cinema was still predominantly conceived as a problem—that its definition in part depended on it being a social dilemma. While leading government bureaucrats had been conscious of the propaganda potential of the medium since the 1920s, this was always coupled with a concern for—and, one could say, fear of—its deleterious effects, the unknown impact of these flickering shadows in dark theaters surrounded by neon (the less rational side of its modernity). Cultural elites remained ambivalent toward film's capacity to express "nation-ality." The government may have encouraged roving projection units, but the low number of theaters in the country was partially the result of longstanding efforts by the police to curb theater construction. And even though government agencies were recommending films to be seen by the entire nation, the majority of schools, fearing the ill effects of the cinematic apparatus, still maintained a policy (begun around 1920) of

prohibiting students from seeing movies without adult accompaniment.[34] Young Japanese were being told simultaneously that they had to see certain films and that movies as whole were bad for them.

This is one reason the nation was inherently difficult to represent in film: to many, cinema was too alien a medium to be entrusted with constructing the nation. Consider, for instance, the image of the emperor, himself represented in propaganda as the father of the family state, the embodiment of the *kokutai*. While films, especially newsreels and *bunka eiga*, were encouraged to represent the nation, the emperor was a problematic symbol. Censorship regulations, designed in part to protect the emperor from this fearful medium, strictly curtailed cinematic representations of his figure. When he did appear on film, it was usually in extreme long shots, in a car, or through metonymic emblems such as the imperial crest. There was thus a contradiction between the need to represent the kokutai through the emperor and the need to deny cinematic representation of the emperor (so as not to sully his divine status), a situation that produced an endless deferral of signification as the kokutai was represented by the emperor who was represented by the crest and so on. The paradox was that the sign meant to represent the nation in film was itself unrepresentable in cinema.

Much of this reflects continued ambivalence over the modernity film did or could represent, ambivalence perhaps inevitable in an Asian culture confronting modernity. But it also relates to lingering conflicts over the shaping of a modern Japan. A central contradiction complicating the nationalization of film was the fact that Japanese cinema could only be constructed on the basis of the equation Japan equals non-cinema. Even after the pure film reform of the late 1910s and early 1920s, and the appearance of such widely praised directors as Itō Daisuke, Ozu Yasujirō, Mizoguchi Kenji, Yamanaka Sadao, Itami Mansaku, Uchida Tomu, and Tasaka Tomotaka, the majority of Japanese film critics still held the domestic output in low esteem. The liberal critic Hazumi Tsuneo, for instance, began an essay entitled "The Tradition of Japanese Cinema" (1941) with the bold declaration that Japan was below even the second rung of national cinemas in quality.[35] This attitude, however, became less tenable as official policy came to frown on the foreign films (eventually banning their exhibition after Pearl Harbor) and to put the stamp of approval on certain domestic films. This prompted a sort of *tenkō* (apostasy) in film critics who had to reevaluate the standards by which they judged motion pictures. Hazumi, for instance, speaks of this change in opinion when he compares the anger he felt around 1920 toward Japanese spectators who had laughed at the first reformist films with his

eventual appreciation of the reason for their laughter—the absurdity that the Japanese on screen were mere copies of Westerners. The founding premise of Japanese cinema—that it was to be a translation of Western film—was now under question, as was the assumption of a universal language essential to cinema. Hazumi came to reject the statement that there is a tempo inherent in cinema and instead asserted a national difference in tempo—and thus, cinema. He, like other critics around him, now had to conceptualize the difference of Japanese cinema—for example, a slower, more leisurely tempo—not as a violation of cinematic essence or quality, but as an authentic expression of a unique culture. They had to renegotiate the relationships not only between the universal and the particular, the Western and the Japanese, and the cinematic and the uncinematic, but also between modernity and tradition, as Japanese cinema's uniqueness was often tied to the legacy of ancient arts.

This renegotiation, however, was rarely without problems. While recognizing the slower tempo of Japanese films as an expression of Japanese life, Hazumi nonetheless openly admitted his desire for Japanese society to speed up; he could not completely free himself of the suspicion that slow Japanese films were simply not good cinema. Almost by definition, their conception of cinema's universalist modernity could not totally allow for Asian alterity. One thus sees such figures as Imamura Taihei, who, while devoting considerable amounts of his writing to the relation between cinema and Japanese traditional arts, sought in these arts not an explanation for the national cinema's difference but, instead, the markers of universal cinematicity.[36] Hazumi's somewhat confused solution to the contradiction between cinema's universality and its particular nationality was to resort to a humanism in which belonging to a nation was itself the universal human essence.[37] To him, rootless (*nenashigusa*) films devoid of national identity were based neither in human life nor in cinema, a charge he often leveled against contemporary Japanese cinema.

What these discursive conflicts between universality and particularity, modernity and tradition, and Japan and the West reveal is a fundamental uncertainty over the definition of the nation Japan to which cinema is supposed to be attributed. This is reflected in Hazumi's hope that Japan itself would speed up, a future he believed might come true, since "cinematic traditions cannot but have some sort of influence over everyday sentiment."[38] It is also, I would argue, expressed in a basic indeterminacy in the articulation of kokumin eiga. Peter B. High has documented the seemingly endless contemporary debates over the definition of kokumin eiga, especially

revolving around such poles as education versus entertainment and propaganda versus pleasure, debates, he correctly notes, that never reached a conclusion.[39] Hana Washitani takes these same debates as the intertext for the contradictions that are textually evident in a *kokusaku* (national policy) films such as Makino Masahiro's *Ahen Sensō* (The Opium War; 1943), which incredibly was both a critique of Western imperialism and a celebratory imitation of the Hollywood musical.[40] Such conflicts over the cinematic articulation of the nation reveal that the struggle in wartime Japan was not simply over how to use the cinema to represent the nation, but over what nation the cinema should represent and how to place Japan in the oppositions between universal and particular, East and West, and tradition and modernity.

Training Imperial Spectators

The fact that many Japanese spectators stayed away from kokumin eiga such as *The Loyal 47 Ronin* indicates how they, too, were involved in conflicts over the definitions of both cinema and nation. Their participation, however, also made them one of the primary problems in articulating a national cinema, for while various regulatory forces could promote films representing the *kokutai*, there was no guarantee that audiences would correctly read the meaning inscribed in such works.[41] Especially given that the picture of a Japanese cinema catering to vulgar tastes was still vivid into the wartime, many felt that not only the films, but also the spectators, had to be improved to facilitate national consciousness through film. In the words of the director Itami Mansaku, "Half of what determines the quality of cinema is the people who make it, but the other half is the society that makes them make it. Therefore, the true meaning of improving cinema must involve upgrading not only the films, but at the same time, the culture of regular spectators who are the foundation of those films."[42] Spectators were acknowledged as a power capable of "changing, revolutionizing, and moving the cinema,"[43] and this is in part why those in charge of film regulation, like the Information Bureau's Fuwa Suketoshi, spoke of "training (*kunren*)" spectators.[44] A consciousness of the need to more actively construct "correct spectators"[45]—or, at least, to direct them in their viewing—had been evident since the early 1920s. I have written about how censors conceived of the benshi as a potential educator and censor, responsible for instructing spectators about the film at the same time that they checked on the propriety of their reactions. Benshi were articulated as the force in the theater that inserted public meaning into private fantasies to bring about both the

absorption of national meaning and the internalization of self-regulatory functions. Parents and educators were also envisioned as substitute benshi who would watch over their children as they viewed movies and ensure that they received the proper meaning.[46] Such trained viewers would presumably read films as imperial subjects within a cultural milieu defined by the fascist "political ideal that denies the separation of the public and the private self."[47]

Some argued that Japanese spectators in fact were already well trained by wartime. In a fascinating article dating from 1941, the critic Mizumachi Seiji, pointing to cinema audiences who dutifully stood in line awaiting the film, argued that "they line up without even being conscious of order, and that itself creates a splendid order." His example implies spectators as imperial subjects who had so internalized the regulation of meaning that they established their own "correct order of entertainment," even when Mizumachi thought the film was a poor one. Assuming a different position from those who stressed that films, as weapons in the "film war (*eigasen*)," must not be "unexploded bombs (*fuhatsudan*)," he highlighted the spectator's own service to the state:

> For better of worse, films must be made. But in the case of cinema, an "unexploded bomb" can be impossible depending on the beliefs of the people. As long as a film exists here, we spectators can have the resolution to follow it as a splendid piece of entertainment. As long as we follow it, it cannot be an unexploded bomb, since we conceive that following a film can render our daily life an element in our service to the state. It is when film spectators do not think of it as a service that they become dangerous.[48]

True imperial subjects thus render any film imperial. In this case, propaganda is less a rhetorical means of convincing the unconvinced than an occasion to answer the hail of the state and confirm one's place in the imaginary community, this time by completing films for the country as part of one's "service."

The last sentence of the quote, however, expresses both the potential threat of misreadings and the continual necessity to "train" spectators. If one of the conditions articulating the formation of a national cinema was spectatorship, one of the problems confronting wartime film bureaucrats was that, to have a cinema that was truly nationwide, it had to show to audiences who were not yet "trained" to confirm the ideology of a film. Presumably one could imagine a point at which all the "people" would

be trained, but Japanese cinema was too imbricated in class differences to allow equality among viewers: if Japanese film was always a problem, so were some of its spectators. Consider, for instance, the liberal theorist Hasegawa Nyozekan's writings on film. When most professional film critics were still extolling the superiority of foreign film, Hasegawa valorized a difference in Japanese cinema that he located in a certain relaxed tempo, an atmospheric line (*jōchō no sen*). Hasegawa found this tone in everything from contemporary film (his example is *Tsuchi to heitai* [*Mud and Soldiers*], dir. Tasaka Tomotaka, 1939) to Noh drama and everyday speech, thus considering it less an artistic creation than an ethic, "The condition of the heart and form of Japanese everyday life." Yet despite attributing this slow atmosphere to "the Japanese," he nonetheless points to a different Japanese: "in drama, it is the speech of servants that is curt, contracted, and suddenly quickens. Their line of movement is poor in atmosphere, becoming extremely constricted spatially and temporally. This symbolizes the fact that they are of a morally low class."[49] What is supposedly representative of the nation is seemingly lost on some of "the people" (here represented on stage), classes who logically must be less Japanese than those of higher status. Hasegawa reproduces this structure with regard to Japanese cinema as he criticizes the fast-tempo *jidaigeki* films popular at the time (usually with lower-class audiences) for "lacking the morality that constitutes the internal condition of Japanese aesthetic sense," a lack that is "impossible for a Japanese art." By drawing borders within Japanese cinema that are mapped onto a social hierarchy, he denies the Japaneseness of much of Japanese cinema and creates the necessity for filmmakers both to train in the proper form of Japanese cinema and to "cultivate Japanese life."[50]

While such divisions in morality and Japaneseness, backed by assertions of necessity, serve to legitimize an ethical social hierarchy—which we can call the emperor system—they also create an imperative to work at being a good Japanese (film), to submit to training. That the end of this training is none other than the internalization of the emperor system implies that to become Japanese is always predicated on an inadequacy of being Japanese.[51] The same is true of Japanese cinema: to be a national cinema, Japanese film must always fall short of being Japanese and thus must always be subject to state authority to be more Japanese. The Japaneseness that spectators help articulate in a film is thus perpetually deferred, as those audiences themselves are continually working at being Japanese while always being one step short of it.

Confronting the Other Gaze

The problem of spectatorship was exacerbated when, with the creation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, new imperial subjects who had never before viewed Japanese films were compelled to watch them.[52] Export, of course, had been one of the defining myths of prewar cinema, yet despite fitful attempts in the 1920s and 1930s, it remained just a myth. The Second World War, then, was the first time Japanese cinema was actually being viewed by non-Japanese on a mass scale, an occasion that sparked immense interest and concern on the part of the industry, bureaucrats, and the press in how other spectators were viewing these films.[53] While a central question was what films were appropriate for representing the nation to its new subjects, the issue frequently shifted into a consideration of how Asian spectators would read these texts. Audiences in China, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and elsewhere became the objects of dozens of magazine reports. On the basis of these, some, like Kawakita Nagamasa, who became the head of occupied Shanghai's film industry, argued that local spectators did not possess the tools to read Japanese films and thus that, at least at the start, local staff should produce films under the direction of Japanese.[54] Other commentators contended that Japanese-made films could speak to other Asians but only if they used the universal language of cinema.

Washitani surveys these debates and argues that they were inconclusive. Nonetheless, it is clear that in many cases, the dream of export from the 1910s, now backed by wartime necessity, was again called forth to regulate the domestic industry and further prompt reform. As one commentator argued, "The problem of exporting films to Southeast Asia is, simply, the problem of domestic cinema."[55] Mori Iwao, the head of Tōhō's studio, proposed as a means of correcting what to him was a mistaken trend in Japanese cinema:

> I worry that at this rate, Japanese film will progressively take up forms of expression that not only Japanese but also people of other nations will find difficult to adapt to. There wouldn't be a need to worry if the forms of expression of Japanese film were only more straightforward and distinct in form, polishing an American film technique understood by anyone; that is, if it had the simple charm of old silent movies.[56]

To Mori, this Americanization of Japanese film style was in part necessary to capture an audience trained in American cinema. The paradox was that

to expel both Western colonialists and their cinema from Asia, Japan had to adopt the film technology of the colonialists.

As occurred with film discourse in the 1910s, the strategy of spreading Japan abroad through its cinema called into question the Japaneseness of its cinema. Many like Mori complained of the slow tempo, wordiness, and excessive use of allusion in contemporary Japanese film—qualities that some critics like Hasegawa were identifying as the defining characteristics of Japanese cinema. Speaking from his own experience in Southeast Asia, a former military press officer argued for replacing the "Japanese characteristic" of suggestiveness with a more visual and concrete language and proceeded to cite Mizoguchi's *The Loyal 47 Ronin* as the prime example of which films not to send abroad.[57] It was again necessary for Japan to become cinema before its cinema could be consumed. In the words of the film critic Tsugawa Shūichi, "To capture the interest of [all the peoples of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere], who have not yet experienced familiarity with the customs, traditions, and ways of thought of the Japanese people, one can only depend at first on the technological superiority of cinema itself."[58] After some time, many from the field were reporting that Asians in occupied territories were watching and understanding Japanese films—works such as *The Opium War*, *Shina no yoru* (*China Night*, dir. Fushimi Osamu, 1940) and *Hawai marē oki kaisen* (*The War at Sea from Hawaii to Malaysia*, dir. Yamamoto Kajirō, 1942) were particular hits—as long as they were good cinema.

In contrast to the Western gaze postulated in the 1910s, other Asian spectators could serve as Žižek's form of ego ideal for the Japanese nation, confirming the superiority of its cinema. Their position as subjects to Japanese rule helped articulate this role, but the problem was when, as with Mori, they were simultaneously recruited to solve the errors of Japanese cinema, a fact that complicated the power relationship. Such audiences were often pictured as simple peoples in need of Japanese leadership, but their gaze was nonetheless essential to improve Japanese film, as if behind their mask of ignorance lay a superior knowledge of cinema. One writer spoke of Manchurian spectators viewing an inferior Japanese product in the following, suggestive terms:

> When we Japanese stare at the eyes of the young Manchurian crowd devouring the screen, an indescribable shame runs through our bodies if the film is something worthless. . . . In the faces of those Manchurians who have come to see these films—works unbearable to watch and a disgrace to the nation—rises a strangely wry smile impossible to explain. When they chance to exchange glances with a Japanese, they immediately return to a stern, expressionless visage reminiscent of a mud snail. Most of them will in no way speak what is really on their mind. . . . They are critics (*hyōronka*) who neither speak nor debate. But their eyes are as merciless as a snake's and their critical spirit refuses all forms of compromise.[59]

One sees here the same shame for the national cinema evident in the 1910s, the same idealization of a foreign spectator with a masterly cinematic eye, but with a difference: Japanese are now supposed to be the "leading nation (*shidō minzoku*)" and the foreigners (Manchurians), the followers. Cinema clearly upsets this hierarchy and leads to an almost paranoid surveillance of the Asian spectator. Film, it seems, threatens to both belie Japanese pretensions (that it is the leading Asian nation; that it is a modern nation) and expose the reality of Japan (such as its class differences—the poverty the commentator said should never be shown in film to Manchurians). Remember that many Asian spectators were skilled in the Hollywood cinematic code—a fact often stressed in the film press—and thus could compare Japanese cinema to the Western film it first hoped to emulate. The paranoia is that the quiet, mud-snail-like faces of Manchurian spectators conceal, if not the "secret, perverse enjoyment" that exceeds that of the self, at least the perception that Japan—and its cinema—is a poor copy of the West, or, perhaps more precisely, a facade of nation-ality covering over the lack of nation-ality. Perhaps behind the wry smile of these Manchurian viewers is the realization of the irony of Japan's stealing the cinema of the West in order to steal Asia for its own.

Not only these spectators, but also those working-class audiences of districts such as Asakusa who mystified film intellectuals just as much, seemingly withheld the proper judgment on the national film product. Andrew Higson has rightly asked, "What is a national cinema if it doesn't have a national audience?"[60] but in the Japanese context, a factor complicating the construction of a national cinema during the war was the simultaneous need for two different audiences: one defined as imperial subjects capable of completing the construction of a national film; the other, inexperienced in Japanese film, who could recognize Japanese national essence when addressed in a language clean of the marks of nationality. This contradiction between the internal and the external definition of the nation could be metaphorically linked to contemporary ambiguity over what constituted

the inside and the outside of the state and who was an imperial subject and who was not, and it expressed one of the fundamental incongruities cutting through the often contradictory ideologies of nation and colonialism in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.[61]

Conclusion: Enforcing a Fascist Cinema

A growing amount of research emphasizes that national cinemas are never unified or distinctly national, that they are always subject to hybridity and contamination.[62] My research in many ways confirms this, underlining the contradictions evident in the notions both of film and of the nation that complicate any account of a monolithic fascist cinema in Japan.[63] Yet this is not the crucial issue; what matters is how cinema responded to these conditions. I argue that fascist cinema in Japan attempts to overcome hybridity as much as it politically enforces a given national aesthetic.

Certainly, there was a discursive framework for the production of stylistically fascistic texts. In one essay in 1941, Imamura Taihei defined kokumin eiga as the "aesthetic expression in cinema of the entire nation (*kokumin sōryoku no eiga geijutsutekina hyōgen*),"[64] a conception that all too closely echoes Walter Benjamin's view of fascism as the aestheticization of politics. Here national film is defined less by referential content (the representation of national things or ideas) than with textual processes, rendering national cinema a primarily textual—or intertextual—issue. Yet we have seen that the conditions surrounding Imamura's statement render it confused, if not contradictory. "Aesthetic" was torn between notions of the entertaining and the educational, the traditional and the modern, the Western and the Eastern, all the while implying divisions between low and high culture that obviated any aesthetic for the "entire nation." "Expression" itself focused attention on cultural production, but never to the extent of hiding the perpetual crisis in the nation-ality of the both the creators and the readers of those expressions. "Cinema" was intersected by various forces that, on the one hand, internationalized filmic expression at the same time as industrially limiting its extent, and, on the other, aimed to elevate a spectacle of nationhood at a time when film remained to many an object of distrust. Finally, the "nation," attempting to encompass intellectuals bearing the Western gaze and lower classes eternally less than Japanese, or a Westernized modernity and Asian colonialism, could only turn to media like the cinema to imperfectly imagine itself as a community.

If these were the conditions that complicated the formation of a fascist cinema—some unique to Japanese cinema, some incumbent on the concept of the nation and national cinema—it is not surprising to see that wartime Japanese cinema was materially different from Nazi cinema. The industry was never nationalized, as it was in Germany, in part because Japanese bureaucrats largely frowned on nationalization, but also because cinema never enjoyed the wholehearted favor of government officials as it did with Goebbels. The case of Japanese national cinema also lends a cautionary note to the narration of the modern Japanese nation-state. While it is certain that many of the intellectual and government apparatuses of the nation were in place by the late Meiji period, my contention is that mass entertainment was not easily recruited into these apparatuses until much later. At least in the case of the nation-ality of cinema, history appears to be multilayered, with numerous, often conflicting strata operating in different temporalities. Disjunctions between different layers can constitute forms of hybridity and enable opportunities for struggle and opposition. While I am hesitant to declare a manifestation of "resistance" in certain forms of prewar Japanese culture, it is clear that conflicts existed not only between elites, but also between sectors of the industry and audiences over the meanings of cinema, modernity, and the nation.

Citing these and other problems, I deny neither the pertinence of the concept of fascism to wartime Japanese cinema nor the reality of the nation, in effect deconstructing both into oblivion. I have not taken the framework of national cinema as a given (so as to show how cinema constructed the nation), but rather focused on the historical operations, pursued by forces often conscious of the contradictions I have shown, which attempted to create the conditions to enable a national cinema itself. The fact they did not really "succeed" does deny the effect of these operations, or the oppression they often created. It is these processes of creating nations and national cinemas that, I believe, reveal much more historically than an account of their conclusions. One can argue that any fascistic element to Japanese cinema lies less in the vision of the nation represented or the cinematic aesthetic itself than in the process involved creating a national cinema.

Hase Masato's study of the film critic Tsumura Hideo proves instructive in this regard. Hase's central question is how Tsumura, who in the 1930s was a champion of the director's artistic freedom from commercial constraints, could become one of the primary mouthpieces for the government's totalitarian (*zentaishugitekina*) film policy. His description of one

of the engines of Tsumura's *tenkō* is provocative. To Hase, the effects of capitalism and industrial technology on the purity of cinematic expression produced an anxiety (*fuan*) in Tsumura and others that, since they were not willing to accept such impurities, "called on totalitarianism when they tried to overcome that anxiety through strong 'will-power' and a 'struggle of the spirit'"[65]—the buzzwords of Tsumura's articulation of national spirit. The problem is that the sources of this anxiety were, at least at the time, nearly insurmountable, a fact that demanded the intervention of even more power—total mobilization of the nation itself. Hase's framework suggests to us that fascism in the wartime Japanese cinema world is less an aesthetic of the national spirit in film, than the total reliance on power to surmount the contradictions and obstacles I have described here and construct a pure national cinema. Tsumura actually relied on such power as means to "correct" Asian spectators who showed an inability to understand Japanese film. To him that power involved forced dissemination of the Japanese language and things Japanese,[66] but we can add that it also involved the power of cinema, using the "technological superiority of cinema itself"[67]—the cinema as war machine—to overwhelm the spectator.[68] It thus is no surprise that wartime Japanese cinema made tremendous advances in the fields of special effects (e.g., *The War at Sea from Hawaii to Malaysia*), animation (e.g., *Momotaro no umiwashi* [*Momotaro's Sea Eagles*, dir. Seo Mitsuyo, 1943]), and spectacle (*The Opium War*).

Hase's mention of the problem of purity is telling, because it reminds us that historically the notion of purity in Japanese film has always called for the intervention of power. It was the pure film reformers who, from the 1910s on, looked to the power of capital (marketing films abroad), the independent artist (not catering to the common denominator), the cinematic text (unmoved by extra-cinematic intertexts and spectator play), the government censor (ridding the industry of riffraff), and especially the power of the gaze of the West and the Westernized intellectual to purge the cinema of uncinematic elements, ensure the clear transmission of cinematic meaning, rationalize the industry, cleanse the medium of lower-class influences, and create a national cinema. The fact that these projects never quite succeeded—in fact, some could not possibly succeed—and that the Japanese cinema world remained hybrid into the war only accelerated calls for even more power. In this sense, fascism is a *process* in wartime Japanese cinema, less a state; one that finds its roots in the 1910s but gained its form in the very obstacles and contradictions specific to the historical narrative of Japanese prewar film. That many of these contradictions and impurities were inevitable—were, in fact, the product of the very same desire for purity—means that the fascist ideal of a pure, controlled cinema was based on its own impossibility.

Notes

1. Walker Conner, "When Is a Nation?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 13, no. 1 (1990): 92–100.
2. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).
3. See Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).
4. Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 26.
5. This is the famous statement that concludes Walter Benjamin's "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 217–51.
6. Andrew Hewitt, "Fascist Modernism, Futurism, and 'Post-modernity,'" in *Fascism, Aesthetics and Culture*, ed. Richard J. Golsan (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1992), 44.
7. Susan Sontag, "Fascinating Fascism," *New York Review of Books*, February 6, 1975.
8. Mabel Berezin, *Making the Fascist Self: The Political Culture of Interwar Italy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997).
9. My use of the hyphenated term "national-ity" is intended to distinguish the act of branding a cinema as a product of a particular nation (nationality in its strict sense) from the process of making a specific entity a shared object of national consciousness.
10. See Homi Bhabha, "Introduction," in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990).
11. Andrew Higson, "The Limiting Imagination of National Cinema," in *Cinema and Nation*, ed. Mette Hjort and Scott MacKenzie (London: Routledge, 2000), 63–74.
12. Darrell William Davis, *Picturing Japaneseness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
13. Mizoguchi Kenji, "Kokumin eiga no kokoro—*Genroku Chūshingura ni kanrenshite*," *Eiga hyōron* 1, no. 9 (September 1941): 71–73.
14. Yomota Inuhiko disagrees with Davis on the role of women in *Genroku Chūshingura*, ultimately claiming for them the function of critiquing the male discourse of *bushidō*: see Yomota Inuhiko, "*Genroku Chūshingura* ni okeru joseitekinaru mono," in *Eiga kantoku Mizoguchi Kenji*, ed. Yomota (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1999), 177–223.
15. Noël Burch, *To the Distant Observer* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).
16. Murao Kaoru, "Nanpo kara mita Nihon eiga," *Eiga Hyōron* 1, no. 7 (July 1944): 5–7.

17. See Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano, "The Production of Modernity in Japanese National Cinema: Shōchiku Kamata Style in the 1920s and 1930s," *Asian Cinema* 9, no. 2 (spring 1998): 69–93.
18. The following thesis on 1910s Japanese film discourse was first expounded in my "Writing a Pure Japanese Cinema: Articulations of Early Japanese Film," Ph.D. diss., University of Iowa, Iowa City, 1996.
19. Yanagi, "Shokan: Zoku," *Katsudō shashinkai*, vol. 12, August 1910, 18.
20. Kaeriyama is probably referring to *The Wrath of the Gods* (1914), a dramatization of the eruption starring Sessue Hayakawa and Thomas Kurihara and directed by Reginald Barker. It was, however, produced by Ince's New York Motion Picture Company.
21. Kaeriyama Norimasa, "Jiko o shireri ya," *Kinema rēkodo* 19 (January 1915): 2.
22. Žižek points to enjoyment in the psychoanalytic sense as that "real, non-discursive kernel . . . which must be present for the Nation qua discursive-entity-effect to achieve its ontological consistency." The Nation is then a "Thing," "Enjoyment incarnated"—a means by which a community "organizes its enjoyment" by delineating a set of pleasures that only it, by definition, can have, but which the other perpetually menaces: Slavoj Žižek, "Eastern Europe's Republics of Gilead," *New Left Review* 183 (1990): 53–54.
23. "Nihon eiga yushutsu no koki ni saishite," *Kinema rēkodo* 40 (October 1916): 428.
24. Kaeriyama's agreement with Murata Minoru before making the reformist production *Sei no kagayaki* (*The Glow of Life*; 1918–19) stipulated, "We will make a film different from all other Japanese films until now, using dialogue titles instead of *kagezerifu* [the practice of the benshi speaking character dialogue] and resembling a Japanese translation of a Bluebird film." Bluebird films were relatively minor U.S. melodramas produced at Universal that proved extremely popular in Japan: quoted in Kondō Iyokichi, "Yukeru Eiga Geijutsu Kyōkai," in *Kaeriyama Norimasa to Tomasu Kurihara no gyoseki*, Nihon eigashi soko 8 (Tokyo: Firumu Raiburari Kyōgikai, 1973), 63.
25. Žižek, "Eastern Europe's Republics of Gilead," 54. Emphasis in original.
26. Yoshioka Hiroshi, "Samurai and Self-Colonization in Japan," in *The Decolonization of Imagination*, ed. Jan Nederveen Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh (London: Zed Books, 1995), 104.
27. For more on this phenomenon, see my "One Print in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction: Culture and Industry in 1910s Japan," *Screening the Past* 11 (2000).
28. Kaeriyama Norimasa, "Katsudō shashin no shakaiteki chii oyobi sekimu," *Kinema rēkodo* 41 (November 1916): 479.
29. Hase Masato, "Ken'etsu no tanjō," *Eizōgaku* 53 (1994): 124–42.
30. See Fujii Jinshi, "Nihon eiga no 1930-nendai," *Eizōgaku* 62 (1999): 21–37.
31. Wada-Marciano, "The Production of Modernity in Japanese National Cinema."
32. Imamura Taihei, "Senjika no eiga goraku," in idem, *Sensō to eiga* (Tokyo: Daiichi Geibunsha, 1942).

33. Kurata Bunjin, "Eiga tōsei no kikō seibi," *Eiga Hyōron* 1, no. 12 (December 1941): 19.
34. Ōtsuka Kyōichi, "Eiga to seinen," *Eiga Hyōron* 2, no. 3 (March 1942): 56–59.
35. Originally published in *Shin eiga*, and included in Hazumi Tsuneo, *Eiga no dento* (Tokyo: Aoyama Shoin, 1942), 17–47.
36. See, e.g., Imamura Taihei's essay "Nihon geijutsu to eiga," in idem, *Eiga geijutsu no seikaku*, 2d ed. (Kyoto: Daiichi Geijutsusha, 1941), 120–136. In looking for cinematicity in such arts as *emakimono* (picture scrolls), Imamura rarely cited Japanese cinematic examples, instead comparing Japanese art mostly with European film. His discourse can be considered nationalist to the extent that it valorizes Japanese tradition through universal/Western standards, praising its modernity, but it does not question modernity itself from the standpoint of Japanese alterity.
37. We must remember that this nationalist humanism, which became the dominant discourse on film in postwar Japan, was well represented during wartime.
38. Hazumi, *Eiga no dentō*, 30.
39. Peter B. High, *The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years War, 1931–1945* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003).
40. Hana Washitani, "*The Opium War* and the Cinema Wars: A Hollywood in the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 4, no. 1 (2003): 63–76.
41. I first introduced some of these issues surrounding wartime spectatorship in "*Miyamoto Musashi* to senjichu no kankyaku," in *Eiga kantoku Mizoguchi Kenji*, ed. Yomota Inuhiko (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1999), 226–50.
42. Itami Mansaku, "Omoi," *Eiga Hyōron* 1, no. 10 (October 1941): 43.
43. Yamazaki Isamu, "Kankyaku no shinpan," *Nihon eiga* 8, no. 11 (November 1943): 25.
44. See, e.g., his comments in the roundtable discussion "Kanyakusō no kakudai kyōka zadankai," *Eiga Junpō* 43 (April 1, 1942).
45. The term *tadashii kanshū* was used by the psychologist Hatano Kanji: see Hatano Kanji, "Kankyaku shinri to kankyakusō," *Eiga Junpō* 44 (April 11, 1942).
46. See my "Kankyaku no naka no benshi: Musei eiga ni okeru shutaisei to kazoku kokka," in *In Praise of Film Studies*, ed. Aaron Gerow and Abe Mark Nornes (Yokohama: Kinema Kurabu, 2001).
47. Berezin, *Making the Fascist Self*, 25.
48. Mizumachi Seiji, "Rinsen taiseika no kankyaku ni tsuite," *Eiga Hyōron* 1, no. 12 (December 1941): 60–62.
49. Hasegawa Nyozekan, *Nihon eigaron* (Tokyo: Dai Nippon Eiga Kyokai, 1943), 93.
50. Ibid., 95.
51. This is evident in the internalization of censorship that Peter High notices among wartime filmmakers. High cites the repeated demands by filmmakers and producers that authorities provide even more specific definitions of *kokumin eiga* as not only a relinquishing of creative control to the state, but also as evidence that,

in a climate of uncertainty over what would be approved or disapproved, creators were afraid to act without state approval and thus censored their own actions (see his *The Imperial Screen*). I would argue that this supplements the process in which filmmakers, never in complete grasp of the Japaneseness of film, must always continue to rely on authorities to make their films, if not their selves—that is, to train the filmmakers.

52. A longer version of some of this section's arguments are available in my "Tatakau kankyaku: Dai Tōa Kyōeiken no Nihon eiga to juyō no mondai," *Gendai shisō* 30, no. 9 (2002): 139–49.
53. Japanese films were being viewed by Koreans and Taiwanese before that, but their gaze was rarely a matter of great concern in the film press or the industry.
54. See Kawakita Nagamasa, "Chūgoku eiga no fukkō to Nanpō shunshutsu," *Eiga Junpō* 43 (April 1, 1942): 6–7.
55. Ueno Ichiro, "Nanpo eiga kōsaku no konpon mondai," *Eiga Hyōron* 3, no. 1 (January 1943): 25.
56. Mori Iwao, "Yume to hyōgen," *Eiga Junpō* 43 (April 1, 1942): 5.
57. Murao, "Nanpo kara mita Nihon eiga."
58. Tsugawa Shūichi, "Nanpō eiga kōsaku no konpon mondai," *Eiga Hyōron* 3. no. 1 (January 1943): 27.
59. Watanabe Hisashi, "Manshu kokkyo no eiga kankyaku," *Nihon Eiga* 8, no. 7 (July 1943): 86.
60. Andrew Higson, "The Concept of National Cinema," *Screen* 30, no. 4 (1989): 46.
61. See, e.g., Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "Becoming Japanese: Imperial Expansion and Identity Crisis in the Early Twentieth Century," in *Japan's Competing Modernities*, ed. Sharon Minichiello (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1998), 157–80. Oguma Eiji considers the conceptual model of the *ie* as one of the ideological means for accommodating (assimilating) Koreans and Taiwanese as imperial subjects while still separating them as outside the "main house" (*honke*) of mainland Japan: Oguma Eiji, *The Genealogy of "Japanese" Self-Images* (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2002). I have yet to see evidence of a similar ideological model in wartime discussions of spectatorship, but perhaps one could pursue this issue using Sumita S. Chakravarty's notion of "imperso-nation" when discussing national cinema. Imperso-nation's slippages between the mask and identity, the cinema and the real, or surface and depth, could also be connected to these tensions between creating a national cinema and "translating" the Hollywood style: Sumita S. Chakravarty, *National Identity in Indian Popular Cinema* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993).
62. See, e.g., Tom O'Regan, *Australian National Cinema* (London: Routledge, 1996), or Darrell Davis, "Reigniting Japanese Tradition with *Hana-bi*," *Cinema Journal* 40, no. 4 (2001): 55–80.
63. Jeffrey Schnapp has found similar contradictions in Italian fascist culture: see Jeffrey T. Schnapp, "Epic Demonstrations: Fascist Modernity and the 1932 Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution," in *Fascism, Aesthetics and Culture*, ed. Richard J. Golsan (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1992), 1–37.
64. See the chapter "Kokumin eiga to wa nani ka," in Imamura Taihei, *Nihon geijutsu to eiga* (Tokyo: Suga Shobō, 1941), 140–47.
65. Hase Masato, "Nihon eiga to zentaishugi: Tsumura Hideo no eiga hihyō o megutte," *Eizōgaku* 63 (1999): 18. Hase's description of Tsumura's *tenkō* is problematic, if only because he mistakenly describes Tsumura's position in the 1930s as "Nouvelle Vague" instead of locating it in the traditions of prewar reformist film criticism and their idealization of art as uninterested in capital.
66. Tsumura Hideo, *Eiga seisakuron* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1943).
67. Tsugawa, "Nanpō eiga kōsaku no konpon mondai."
68. Paul Virilio argues that the warlike nature of the cinematic machine was inherent, but I have stressed the historical construction of that nature: see my "Tatakau kankyaku."