Skip to main content
Technology Licensing in a Differentiated Oligopoly
International Review of Economics and Finance (2014)
  • Aniruddha Bagchi, Kennesaw State University
  • Arijit Mukherjee, Loughborough University
We show the effects of product differentiation and product market competition on technology licensing by an outside innovator. For a certain range of product differentiation, both the innovator and the society prefer royalty licensing compared to auction (or fixed-fee), irrespective of Cournot and Bertrand competition, if the number of potential licensees is sufficiently large. Hence, for such a range of product differentiation, neither the innovator nor the antitrust authority requires information about the type of product market competition in preferring the type of the licensing contract.
Publication Date
January, 2014
Citation Information
Bagchi, A. and A. Mukherjee. 2014. Technology licensing in a differentiated oligopoly. International Review of Economics & Finance 29: 455-465.