Corporate Finance and Finance
Economic Consequences of Speculative Side Bets: The Case of Naked Credit Default Swaps (with Rajiv Sethi) (2010)
We examine the effects of “naked” credit default swaps on equilibrium debt contracts, pro ject...
My New Papers
Economic Consequences of Speculative Side Bets: The Case of Naked Credit Default Swaps (with Rajiv Sethi) (2010)
We examine the effects of “naked” credit default swaps on equilibrium debt contracts, pro ject...
Pandering to Persuade (with Wouter Dessein and Navin Kartik) (2010)
A principal chooses one of n ≥ 2 projects or an outside option. An agent...
Experimental Economics
Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment (with James Andreoni and Jinwoo Kim), Games and Economic Behavior (2007)
This paper studies experimentally how information about rivals' types affects bidding behavior in first- and...
Contract Theory
Pandering to Persuade (with Wouter Dessein and Navin Kartik) (2010)
A principal chooses one of n ≥ 2 projects or an outside option. An agent...
Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation (with Jinwoo Kim), Econometrica (2005)
A contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion. We show that agents' collusion...
Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending, Contributions in Theoretical Economics (2002)
This paper studies an incentive rationale for the use of group lending as a method...
Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting (with Donald Hausch), American Economic Review (1999)
Auction Theory
Optimal collusion-proof auctions (with Jinwoo Kim), Journal of Economic Theory (2009)
We study an optimal weak collusion-proof auction in an environment where subsets of bidders may...
How to Divide the Possession of a Football? (with Terrence Hendershott), Economics Letters (2008)
The current National Football League overtime rule favors the team starting on offense. Auctioning off...
Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment (with James Andreoni and Jinwoo Kim), Games and Economic Behavior (2007)
This paper studies experimentally how information about rivals' types affects bidding behavior in first- and...
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types (with Ian Gale), Theoretical Economics (2006)
This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders' types come...
Microeconomic Theory
Pandering to Persuade (with Wouter Dessein and Navin Kartik) (2010)
A principal chooses one of n ≥ 2 projects or an outside option. An agent...
Opinions as incentives (with Navin Kartik), Journal of Political Economy (2009)
We study a model where a decision maker (DM) must select an adviser to advise...
Market versus Non-Market Assignment of Ownership (with Ian Gale), Law and Economics Workshop (2007)
We study the initial assignment of ownership of a good. When the good is sold...
Lawyer Advising in Evidence Disclosure (with Sergei Severinov), Discussion Papers (2007)
In this paper we investigate how the advice that lawyers provide to their clients affects...
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types (with Ian Gale), Theoretical Economics (2006)
This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders' types come...
Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation (with Jinwoo Kim), Econometrica (2005)
A contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion. We show that agents' collusion...
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Buyer (with Ian Gale), Journal of Economic Theory (2000)
Law and Economics
Exploiting plaintiffs through settlement: Divide and conquer (with Kathryn E. Spier), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (2008)
This paper considers settlement negotiations between a single defendant and N plaintiffs when there are...
Market versus Non-Market Assignment of Ownership (with Ian Gale), Law and Economics Workshop (2007)
We study the initial assignment of ownership of a good. When the good is sold...
Lawyer Advising in Evidence Disclosure (with Sergei Severinov), Discussion Papers (2007)
In this paper we investigate how the advice that lawyers provide to their clients affects...
Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting (with Donald Hausch), American Economic Review (1999)
Political Economy
Pandering to Persuade (with Wouter Dessein and Navin Kartik) (2010)
A principal chooses one of n ≥ 2 projects or an outside option. An agent...
Opinions as incentives (with Navin Kartik), Journal of Political Economy (2009)
We study a model where a decision maker (DM) must select an adviser to advise...
Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply (with Ian Gale), American Economic Review (2006)
Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale (1998) studied the impact of imposing a cap on lobbying...
Mechanism Design
Optimal collusion-proof auctions (with Jinwoo Kim), Journal of Economic Theory (2009)
We study an optimal weak collusion-proof auction in an environment where subsets of bidders may...
How to Divide the Possession of a Football? (with Terrence Hendershott), Economics Letters (2008)
The current National Football League overtime rule favors the team starting on offense. Auctioning off...
Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation (with Jinwoo Kim), Econometrica (2005)
A contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion. We show that agents' collusion...
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Buyer (with Ian Gale), Journal of Economic Theory (2000)
Market Design
The NFL Should Auction Possession in Overtime Games (with Terrence Hendershott), Economists' Voice (2009)
Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority (2008)
The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common method for assigning objects. The...
Expanding "Choice" in School Choice (2008)
Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice...
No subject area
Strategic judgment proofing (with Kathryn E. Spier), Rand Journal of Economics (2008)
A liquidity-constrained entrepreneur raises capital to finance a business activity that may harm bystanders. The...