

Curriculum Vitae
Yeon-Koo Che
April 2010

ADDRESS

Department of Economics
Columbia University
420 West 118th Street, Rm 1016 IAB
New York, NY 10027

Phone: 212-854-8276; Fax: 212-854-8059.
E-mail: yc2271@columbia.edu
Home Page: <http://www.columbia.edu/~yc2271>

EDUCATION

Stanford University, Ph.D., 1991 (Advisor: Paul Milgrom)
University of Toronto, M.A., 1986
Seoul National University, B.Econ., 1984

EMPLOYMENT

Kevin J. Lancaster Professor of Economic Theory, Columbia University, 2009-
Professor, Columbia University, 2005-2009;
Professor, University of Wisconsin, 2000-2006;
Associate Professor, University of Wisconsin, 1997-2000;
Visiting Professor, Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica, Barcelona, Spain, 1998-1999;
John M. Olin Faculty Fellow, the Yale Law School, 1996;
Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin, 1991-1997;
Consultant, RAND Corporation, 1989 Summer.

EDITORIAL POSITIONS

Associate Editor: *Econometrica* (2010-).
Associate Editor: *Theoretical Economics* (2005-).
Editor: *Journal of Industrial Economics* (2003-2009).
Associate Editor: *Journal of Economic Theory* (2008- 2010).
Co-Editor: *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*
(1999-2003);
Associate Editor: *Journal of Industrial Economics* (2002-2003).
Editorial Board: *International Economic Journal* (1999-).
Editorial Board: *Korean Economic Review* (2005-)

GRANTS

National Science Foundation Grant, on “Two Projects on Market Design” (PI), 2010-2013.

National Science Foundation Grant, on “Market Design” (PI), 2007-2010.

National Science Foundation Grant, on “Holdup” (PI), 2003-2005.

National Science Foundation Dissertation Grant, on “Experiment on Asymmetric Information Auctions,” (with Jinwoo Kim) 2002-2003.

National Science Foundation Grant, on “Optimal Contest Design,” (PI), (with Ian Gale), 2000-2001.

National Science Foundation Grant, on “Team Incentives,” 1998-1999.

National Science Foundation Grant, on “Mechanism Design with Financial Constraints,” (PI), (with Ian Gale), 1996-1998.

Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation Grants, 1991-1993, 1997, 1999, 2002.

CSIC Grant (Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica), 1998.

VA Grant on “Industrial Organization of Health Economics,” 1995.

PUBLICATION (Refereed Journals)

“Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: the ‘Boston’ Mechanism Reconsidered,” (with Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Yosuke Yasuda), forthcoming, *American Economic Review*.

“Bidding with Securities: Comment,” (with Jinwoo Kim), forthcoming, *American Economic Review*.

“Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms,” (with Fuhito Kojima), forthcoming, *Econometrica*.

“Opinions as Incentives,” (with Navin Kartik), *Journal of Political Economy*, (2009), 117, 815-860.

“The NFL Should Auction Possession in Overtime Games,” (with Terry Hendershott), *The Economists’ Voice*, (2009), 6, Iss. 9, Article 5.

“Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions,” (with Jinwoo Kim), *Journal of Economic Theory*, (2009), 144, 565-603.

“Strategic Judgment Proofing,” (with Kathryn Spier), *Rand Journal of Economics*, (2008), 39, 926-48

“Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer,” (with Kathryn Spier), *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, (2008), 164, 4-23.

- “How to Divide the Possession of a Football?” (with Terry Hendershott), *Economics Letters*, (2008), 99, 561-565.
- “The Role of Lockups in Takeover Contests,” (with Tracy Lewis), *Rand Journal of Economics*, (2007), 38, 648-669.
- “Auctions with Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types: an Experiment,” (with Jim Andreoni and Jinwoo Kim), *Games and Economic Behavior*, (2007), 59, 240-259.
- “Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation,” (with Jinwoo Kim), *Econometrica*, (2006), 74, 1063-1107.
- “Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply” (with Ian Gale), *American Economic Review*, (2006), 96, 1355-1360.
- “Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types,” (with Ian Gale), *Theoretical Economics*, (2006), 1, 95-118.
- “A Dynamic Theory of Holdup,” (with Jozsef Sakovics), *Econometrica*, (2004), 72, 1063-1103.
- “Competitive Procurement with Corruption,” (with Roberto Burguet), *Rand Journal of Economics*, (2004), 35, 50-68.
- “Auctions with Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types,” (with Jinwoo Kim), *Games and Economic Review*, (2004), 46, 383-397.
- “Optimal Design of Research Contests” (with Ian Gale), *American Economic Review*, (2003), 93, 646-671.
- “Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending,” *Contributions to Theoretical Economics*, (2002), 2, Article 3.
- “The Economics of Collective Negotiation in Pretrial Bargaining,” *International Economic Review*, (2002), 43, 549-576.
- “Optimal Incentives for Teams,” (with Seung-Weon Yoo), *American Economic Review*, (2001), 91, 525-541.
- “The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Buyer,” (with Ian Gale), *Journal of Economic Theory*, (2000), 92, 198-233.
- “Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities?: A Comment on De Fraja,” *Games and Economic Behavior*, (2000), 33, 195-205.
- “Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions” (with Ian Gale),

- Games and Economic Behavior*, (2000), 30, 22-43.
- “Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting,” (with Don Hausch), *American Economic Review*, (1999), 89, 125-147.
- “Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments,” (with T-Y Chung), *Rand Journal of Economics*, (1999), 30, 84-105.
- “Mechanism Design with a Liquidity Constrained Buyer: The 2×2 case,” (with Ian Gale), *European Economic Review*, (1999), 43, 947-957.
- “Section 365 and Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance” (with Alan Schwartz), *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, (1999), 15, 441-467.
- “Standard Auctions with Financially-Constrained Buyers,” (with Ian Gale), *Review of Economic Studies*, (1998), Vol. 65, 1-21. (Reprinted in *The Economic Theory of Auctions*, edited by Paul Klemperer.)
- “Caps on Political Lobbying,” (with Ian Gale), *American Economic Review*, (1998), 88, 643-651.
- “Rent Dissipation When Rent Seekers Are Budget Constrained,” (with Ian Gale), *Public Choice*, (1997), 92, 109-126.
- “Optimal Use of Information in Litigation: Does Withholding Information Deter Frivolous Suits?” (with Dietrich Earnhart), *Rand Journal of Economics*, (1997), 28, 120-134.
- “Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition,” (with Ian Gale), *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*, (1997), Vol. 6, 175-200.
- “Equilibrium Formation of Class Action Suits,” *Journal of Public Economics*, (1996), 62, 339-361.
- “Expected Revenue of All-Pay Auctions and First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions with Budget Constraints,” (with Ian Gale) *Economics Letters*, (1996), 50, 367-371.
- “Customer Return Policies for Experience Goods,” *Journal of Industrial Economics*, (1996), XLIV, 17-24.
- “Performance-Based Pricing for Nuclear Power Plants,” (with Geoffrey Rothwell), *Energy Journal*, (1995), 16, 57-77.
- “Revolving Doors and Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion,” *Rand Journal of Economics*, (1995), 26, 378-397.
- “Buy-In through Gold-Plating,” *Economics Letters*, (1994), 45, 397-405.

“Second Sourcing and the Incentive for R & D Investment,” *Seoul Journal of Economics*, (1993), 6, 149-171.

“The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation,” (with Jong Goo Yi), *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, (1993), 9, 399-424.

“Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions,” *Rand Journal of Economics*, (1993), 24, 668-680. (Reprinted in *The Economic Theory of Auctions*, edited by Paul Klemperer.)

“Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation,” (with A. Mitchell Polinsky) *Rand Journal of Economics*, (1991), 22, 562-570.

OTHER PUBLICATION

“Procurement,” *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*, Second Edition, forthcoming.

“Hold-Up Problem,” (with Jozsef Sakovics), *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*, Second Edition, forthcoming.

“Contests with Discontinuous Success Functions,” (with Ian Gale) in *Recent Developments in the Theory of Contests*, ed. Michael Baye, *Advances in Applied Microeconomics*, 1998, 7, 1-13, JAI Press Inc.

“Financial Constraints in Auctions: Effects and Antidotes,” (with Ian Gale), in *Recent Developments in the Economics of Auctions*, ed. Michael Baye, *Advances in Applied Microeconomics*, (1996), 6, 97-120, JAI Press Inc.

“Buy-In and Gold Plating under Defense Profit Policy,” in *Essays in the Economics of Procurement*, eds. Bower, G. A., and Dertouzos, J. N., (1994), RAND: National Defense Research Institute.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

“Market versus Non-Market Assignment of Ownership,” (with Ian Gale), revise and resubmit, *Review of Economic Studies*.

“Lawyer Advising in Evidence Disclosure” (with Sergei Severinov), revise and resubmit, *Economic Journal*.

“Implementing Random Assignments: A Generalization of the Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem,” (with Eric Budish, Fuhito Kojima, and Paul Miglrom).

“Expanding Choice in School Choice,” (with Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Yosuke Yasuda).

“Shrink Wraps: Should the Sellers be Required to Disclose (and Explain) the Terms Before Sale?” (with Albert Choi).

“Contractual Remedies to the Holdup Problem: A Dynamic Perspective,” (with Jozsef Sakovics).

AWARDS AND HONOR

Fellow of the Econometric Society (since 2010).

KAEA-Maekyung Economist Award, (KAEA; Maekyung Daily), 2009; Awarded to a Korean economist with significant academic contributions.

Cho Rakkyo Award, (Yonsei University), 2008 (inaugural recipient); Awarded to the best Korean economist.

Shoemaker Fellow, (UW-Madison), 2004-2005;

Mary Claire Phipps Fellow, (UW-Madison), 2004-2005;

H.I. Romnes Prize, (UW-Madison), 1999;

John M. Olin Faculty Fellowship, Yale Law School, 1996;

Lynde and Harry Bradley Fellowship, Stanford University, 1990;

John Olin Law and Economics Fellowship, Stanford University, 1990.

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

WCU/BK Summer Program on Market Design, Networks, and Information: Director and Organizer, 2009.

Econometric Society: Program Committee for the North American Summer Meeting, 2009.

The 17th Jerusalem Summer School in Economics Theory: Invited Lecturer, 2006.

Econometric Society: Program Committee for the Far Eastern Meeting 2003.

International Summer School Invited Lecturer (Oberwesel, Germany), 2000.

John M Olin Invited Lecturer (USC Law School), 1999.

REFEREEING

National Science Foundation, American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, RAND Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, International Economic Review, Economic Theory, Journal of Industrial Economics, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, BE Press Journal, Journal of Legal Studies, European Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Economic Survey, Journal of Economics and Business, International Review of Law and Economics, Southern Economic Review, Economic Inquiry, Eastern Economic Journal, Seoul Journal of Economics.

TEACHING

GRADUATE COURSES:

Industrial Organization Theory
Microeconomic Theory
Topics in Microeconomic Theory

UNDERGRADUATE COURSES:

Law and Economics
Game Theory
Intermediate Microeconomics

RECENT SEMINAR

2010:

New York University
Duke Law and Economics Conference
Gerzensee Conference (Focus Session)
Korea Econometric Society Meeting (Invited Session)
KDI Forums (on Market Institutions and Financial Economics)
BK Lectures on Market Design (Korea University)
WCU Lectures on Financial Crises (Yonsei University)

2009:

University College London
University of Maryland
Yonsei Microeconomic Theory Conference in Honor of Eric Maskin
NBER Market Design Conference
Yale Cowles Foundation Conference
Bonn Conference on Law and Economics
Boston College
Yale University
Yahoo! Research Group

2008:

Northwestern University
Chicago Business School
Penn State University
Brown University
University of Pittsburgh
University of Rochester
Washington University
Princeton University (Institute for Advanced Studies)
SES Lecture on Mechanism Design (Seoul National University)
Yonsei University (Cho Award Lecture)
Hong Kong Science and Technology Conference on IO

Korean Econometric Society Meeting (Invited Session)
Association for Public Economic Theory Conference

2007:

Berkeley Law School
Stanford University
Harvard Market Design Workshop
Brown University
Duke University
University of California - San Diego
NYU IO Day Conference
American Law and Economics Conference (Harvard Law School)
IAE-University of Autonomia at Barcelona
University of Pompeu Fabra
GREQAM (University of Mediteranea in Marseille)
Prague Conference on Contract Law
Paris School of Economics
University of Hong Kong Mini-Conference on Micro Theory
Yonsei University Mini-Conference on Micro Theory

2006:

Harvard University
Princeton University
University of Southern California
University of Michigan
Hong Kong Science and Technology University
Korean Economic Association Conference (Seoul National University)

2005:

Northwestern University (MEDS)
University of British Columbia
Stanford University (Economics and GSB Joint Seminar)
Columbia University (Law, Economics and Finance Seminar)
University of Virginia (Law School and Economics)
University of Pennsylvania
University of Toronto
SUNY-Albany
Soongsil University
Yonsei University.

STUDENTS ADVISED

PRINCIPAL ADVISOR: Kazumi Hori (Hitosbashi University, Japan, 2005), Jinwoo Kim (USC, 2003), Yasu Tamada (Keio University, Japan, 2002), Kyoungwon Rhee (KISDI, Korea, 2000).

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE: Changxiu (Sue) Li (Lehman Brothers), Unjy Song (UBC), Ming Li (Concordia University), Cheng-Tai Wu (National Chengchi University, Taiwan), Yeongkwan Song (KERI, Korea), Menesh Patel (Stanford Law School, student), Wei-jen Wen (National Chengchi University, Taiwan), David Vanness (Mayo Medical School), Jaeho Cheung (KIPF, Korea), Meng-Yu Liang (Western Ontario), Hyun-Ok Han (KERI, Korea), Soren Hauge (Ripon College), Li-Chen Hsu (National Chengchi University, Taiwan), Michael Conlin (Cornell), John Gale (Charles Rivers), Jee-Hyeong Park (Wayne State University), Valy Goepfrich.