I am Kelvin J. Lancaster Professor of Economic Theory at Columbia University. I received a PhD in Economics at the Stanford University in 1991. The same year, I became an Assistant Professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. There, I was promoted to Associated Professor with tenure in 1997 and to Professor in 2000. I joined the Columbia University as Professor of Economics in 2005. My research focuses on market design, auction theory, mechanism design, contract theory and law and economics. I served as editor of Journal of Industrial Economics and associate editor of Journal of Economic Theory. I am currently serving as associate editor of Econometrica and Theoretical Economics. I received the Cho Rakkyo Prize in 2008 and the Maekyung-KAEA economist award in 2009. I was elected Fellow of Econometric Society in 2009.
Articles
Opinions as incentives (with Navin Kartik), Journal of Political Economy (2009)
We study a model where a decision maker (DM) must select an adviser to advise...
Optimal collusion-proof auctions (with Jinwoo Kim), Journal of Economic Theory (2009)
We study an optimal weak collusion-proof auction in an environment where subsets of bidders may...
The NFL Should Auction Possession in Overtime Games (with Terrence Hendershott), Economists' Voice (2009)
Exploiting plaintiffs through settlement: Divide and conquer (with Kathryn E. Spier), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (2008)
This paper considers settlement negotiations between a single defendant and N plaintiffs when there are...
How to Divide the Possession of a Football? (with Terrence Hendershott), Economics Letters (2008)
The current National Football League overtime rule favors the team starting on offense. Auctioning off...
Unpublished Papers
Economic Consequences of Speculative Side Bets: The Case of Naked Credit Default Swaps (with Rajiv Sethi) (2010)
We examine the effects of “naked” credit default swaps on equilibrium debt contracts, pro ject...
Pandering to Persuade (with Wouter Dessein and Navin Kartik) (2010)
A principal chooses one of n ≥ 2 projects or an outside option. An agent...
Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority (2008)
The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common method for assigning objects. The...
Expanding "Choice" in School Choice (2008)
Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice...
Market versus Non-Market Assignment of Ownership (with Ian Gale), Law and Economics Workshop (2007)
We study the initial assignment of ownership of a good. When the good is sold...