William M. Reisinger

Soviet Regional Elite Mobility After Khrushchev

William M. Reisinger — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 12:56:35 PDT

From Glasnost to Freedom of Speech

William M. Reisinger — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 12:54:25 PDT

The Road to Post-Communism Independent Political Movements in the Soviet Union 1985-1991,

William M. Reisinger — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 12:52:33 PDT

From Perestroika to Privatisation: The Politics of Property Change in Russian Society 1985-1991,

William M. Reisinger — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 12:49:57 PDT

Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional Governance

William M. Reisinger — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 12:45:11 PDT

Slavophiles and Commissars: Enemies of Democracy in Modern Russia

William M. Reisinger — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 12:42:56 PDT

Russian Review

William M. Reisinger — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 12:40:26 PDT

The Legacy of State Socialism and the Future of Transformation

William M. Reisinger — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 12:38:03 PDT

Democracy and Post-Communism: Political Change in the Post-Communist World

William M. Reisinger — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 12:35:51 PDT

Parliamentary Power in Russia, 1994-2001: President vs. Parliament

William M. Reisinger — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 12:33:07 PDT

Developments in Russian Politics 6

William M. Reisinger — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 12:30:26 PDT

Legislative Politics and Economic Power in Russia

William M. Reisinger — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 12:27:05 PDT

Authoritarian Backlash: Russian Resistance to Democratization in the

William M. Reisinger — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 12:24:59 PDT

The MNC-Developing State Bargaining Process: A Review"

William M. Reisinger — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 09:47:17 PDT

East European Military Expenditures in the 1970s: Collective Good or Bargaining Offer?

William M. Reisinger — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 09:42:04 PDT

National Entanglements in International Governmental Organizations

Harold K. Jacobson et al. — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 09:37:07 PDT

There has been a growing propensity among states to associate together in international governmental organizations, or IGOs, for a variety of purposes. Why do states join IGOs, and what are the consequences for states of membership in IGOs? In this analysis, an explanation is sought, drawing on the theory of functionalism espoused by David Mitrany and others, taking into account the number of years a state has had sovereignty, level of technology, extent of party competition, and overall power. For Third World states, membership in IGOs is associated with enhanced economic performance. An increasing number of IGOs in the system appears to lessen the states' mean proneness to war. Functionalist predictions are upheld. But functionalism needs to be supplemented both for comprehensive explanations and as a prescription for the future. Already there are so many IGOs that it is difficult for states to control them, which could make them progressively irrelevant or even jeopardize their existence.

Situational and Motivational Assumptions in Theories of Coalition Formation

William M. Reisinger — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 09:31:51 PDT

Positive theories of coalition formation deduce expected behavior from two kinds of assumptions: those concerning the situation under study and those regarding the actors' motivations. To improve their theorizing, scholars must not make these two types of assumptions independently; the characteristics of the setting within which the coalition forms crucially influence what a rational actor can be expected to do. Five types of payoff settings are described here, a typology which clarifies differences among major coalition theories and their realms of applicability. Formal theories of cabinet coalitions require greater attention to the complex nature of the payoffs that political parties and their leaders receive. In studying this and other areas of coalition behavior, theorists must link their motivational assumptions to such important situational assumptions as the nature of payoffs.

2 x 2 Games of Commitment in World Politics

William M. Reisinger — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 09:26:31 PDT

This note expands on a recent article in International Studies Quarterly by Maoz and Felsenthal (1987) that discusses self-binding commitment by actors in three different 2 x 2 games. I augment their work by adding nine more 2 x 2 games in which self-binding commitment can be beneficial. In the three games presented by Maoz and Felsenthal, only one party has an incentive to make a self-binding commitment, that commitment is to a dominated strategy, and the other party benefits from the commitment as well. In other situations, however, each of these three characteristics of the commitment tactic can be different. In addition, in nine of the twelve games of commitment, deadlock danger arises in which both players seek to be the only one to establish a self-binding commitment, but if both do so, both are worse off than in the absence of any commitment. Examining the incentives and disincentives to commit oneself in various situations is vital to understanding this important bargaining tactic.

The Brezhnev doctrine and polish-Soviet bargaining, 1971

William M. Reisinger — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 09:19:53 PDT

Defense allocations in Eastern Europe: Alliance politics and leadership change

Glenn Palmer et al. — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 09:14:22 PDT

Abstract To investigate the influence of international and domestic factors on the defense spending of the East European members of the Warsaw Pact, we evaluate competing hypotheses of 1) intra-alliance dynamics and 2) the effect of changes in political leadership. We analyze data from 1965-1982, both pooled and for each state individually. We conclude that the defense spending of the Pact members does not go primarily toward the purchase of Pact-wide deterrence and that models based upon the public-goods approach have little explanatory power when applied to Eastern Europe. Additionally, we find that East European leadership changes produce only a small impact on military spending levels