Article
HOW MAY THE UNITED STATES LEVERAGE FATCA TO INCENTIVIZE GOOD TAX ADMINISTRATIONS AMONG THE WORLD OF BLACK HAT AND GREY HAT GOVERNMENTS?
Emory International Law Review
(2017)
Abstract
This Essay serves as a preliminary narrative to examine the serious challenge of Control Firsters’ vision that every jurisdiction should have complete information on all transactions by any taxpayer. The world has many, potentially a majority, of grey hat and black hat governments and tax administrations. One measure of which governments fall into these categories is Transparency International’s corruption index. Of 167 countries ranked by Transparency International for breadth of corruption from one hundred (very clean) to zero (highly corrupt/failed state), only fifty countries ranked above a score of fifty, and only twelve scored above eighty. A question that Control Firsters must address is whether it is prudent for taxpayers to trust the governments of the 117 countries that scored a fifty or below on Transparency International’s corruption index. Quite possibly, the complete information system invoked by Control Firsters encourages, even prolongs, the bad behavior by providing fuel (financial information) to feed the fire of corruption and suppression of rivals.
Keywords
- FATCA,
- tax evasion,
- CRS,
- AEOI,
- OECD,
- corruption
Disciplines
Publication Date
Spring March, 2017
DOI
http://law.emory.edu/eilr/recent-developments/volume-31/essays/united-states-leverage-fatca-iga-tax-world-governments.html
Citation Information
William H. Byrnes. "HOW MAY THE UNITED STATES LEVERAGE FATCA TO INCENTIVIZE GOOD TAX ADMINISTRATIONS AMONG THE WORLD OF BLACK HAT AND GREY HAT GOVERNMENTS?" Emory International Law Review Vol. 31 (2017) p. 1033 - 1049 ISSN: 1052-2850 Available at: http://works.bepress.com/william_byrnes1/74/