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<title>University of San Diego School of Law</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2012 University of San Diego All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/usdlaw</link>
<description>Recent documents in University of San Diego School of Law</description>
<language>en-us</language>
<lastBuildDate>Wed, 08 Feb 2012 09:46:29 PST</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>3600</ttl>





<item>
<title>Digital Rights Management Lite: Freeing ebooks from Reader Devices and Software.</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/dana_robinson/2</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/dana_robinson/2</guid>
<pubDate>Sat, 28 Jan 2012 11:15:32 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>With explosive growth in the ebook market, publishers are looking for ways to effectively distribute ebooks while preventing those ebooks from being resold or used in violation of terms of use.  The current market is dominated by ebook reader software and hardware (Kindle/Nook), which is intended to control the ebook, and prevent redistribution of the digital file.  However, users want ebooks free of constraints and can easily crack the digital rights management "DRM" currently being used.  Those intent on misconduct are not stopped by DRM, while honorable consumers are punished by complicated DRM solutions.</p>
<p>Some in the industry are calling for ebooks to be distributed without DRM, but others are concerned that the removal of DRM will lead to ebook anarchy.</p>
<p>This paper proposes a solution that allows ebooks to be sold as portable documents that can be used on any device without technical restriction.  The paper proposes a novel solution that the author calls DRM Lite, consisting of a visible digital watermark the contains the consumer's name, email and other personal information, as well as publishing information, as a means of preventing the redistribution of an ebook.</p>

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</description>

<author>Dana B. Robinson</author>


<category>Digital Rights Management</category>

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<item>
<title>Commercial Contracts in Muslim Countries of the Middle East: A Comparison with the United States</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/jacqueline_mccormack/2</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/jacqueline_mccormack/2</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 03 May 2010 07:20:56 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Outside of the common law and civil law legal traditions, what is termed “Islamic law” forms one of the world’s largest legal systems. There are more than one billion Muslims world-wide, and millions of those Muslims populate some of the world’s richest trading zones. As of 2005, the Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.), comprised of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, was the United States’ fifth largest trading partner.</p>
<p>In this time of rapid globalization, it is imperative that an attorney from the United States, who works in international commerce, understands the commercial law of this influential region. As the emerging markets of the Middle East continue to grow, the ability to trade goods internationally will help to solidify these ever increasing economic ties. This paper attempts to explain the theories and thought processes surrounding contracts for the sale of goods in Muslim countries. My purpose is to describe the important similarities and differences between commercial contracts in the United States and commercial contracts in Muslim countries of the Middle East. By forging stronger trade relationships between the United States and the Muslim Middle East, these two culturally rich regions will learn to tolerate each other’s differences while recognizing and embracing each other’s similarities.</p>

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</description>

<author>Jacqueline McCormack</author>


<category>Commercial Law; Contracts</category>

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<item>
<title>Smoking Out a Bad TTAB Decision: Cuban Cigars and Cuban Seed Tobacco The Incompleteness of the Anncas Decision on the Lanham Act Section 1052(e)(3)  Finding Primarily Geographically Deceptively Misdescriptiveness of HAVANA for Cigars Made of Tobacco Grown from Cuban Seed Tobacco</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/dana_robinson/1</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/dana_robinson/1</guid>
<pubDate>Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:55:33 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>ABSTRACT</p>
<p>Synopsis:</p>
<p>The USPTO has traditionally allowed tobacco registrations that use “Havana” or “Cuba” for tobacco products where the goods are identified as being made of “tobacco grown from Cuban seed tobacco” or similar limited descriptions.  The theory was that the marks would not be “primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive” if the goods were in some way sufficiently “Cuban” to justify the use of that geographic reference in the trademark.  Anncas attempted to completely foreclose this convention by finding that Cuban seeds that were taken from Cuba 30-50 years ago cannot now be said to produce “Cuban” tobacco today.  The decision was published, and immediately, applications for “Havana” and “Cuba” began to receive a categorical refusal to register, no longer surmountable by identifying goods as tobacco “grown from Cuban seed tobacco.”</p>
<p>Thesis:</p>
<p>The Anncas decision is flawed.  The decision relies on a mistaken fact: that the only way to have a Cuban seed tobacco plant was related to seeds exported from Cuba prior to the Castro regime.  The theory was that all such seeds were exported long ago, and therefore the plants that grow in Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and other places are decades old and the seeds that each new crop produces to make the next crop are no longer Cuban in nature.</p>
<p>The case did not have this fact in evidence: growers can and do acquire Cuban seeds today from Cuba and plant those seeds immediately to grow a crop of tobacco plants that are in fact “grown from Cuban seeds.”  Therefore, the holding of the Anncas case can only be said to limit those tobacco products which were grown from old Cuban seeds, not new Cuban seeds.</p>
<p>Growers can and do import Cuban seeds to non-Cuban farms, grow tobacco, manufacture cigars from that tobacco and sell those cigars into the US.  Therefore, based on the decision of Anncas, these products can rightly bear the “Cuba” and “Havana” designations as part of registered U.S. trademarks.  Moreover, the decision is likely to result in a shift in tobacco growing to newly imported Cuban seed tobacco, and thus render the entire Anncas decision inapplicable to any real world trademark applications going forward.</p>
<p>The broader question that Anncas leaves is whether the USPTO should be in the business of making the kind of factual analysis that the Anncas board made.  The rule in 2(e)(3) disallows registration of a trademark that would be “primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive.”  However, in Anncas, the decision opens the door to a factual inquiry that seems outside of the scope of the USPTO’s decision making capability.  The way in which cases are brought, the manner of evidence presented, the ability for a party to persist through trial without presenting significant evidence, seem to make the USPTO an inadequate forum for making a decision about something like the subject matter of Anncas.  The Board ended up making a questionable decision that impacts an entire industry based on the facts presented by an opposer with self-serving motivations, using an expert whose credentials are questionable to make a decision that, while quite narrow, has been applied broadly by the PTO ever since.</p>
<p>Thus, the present article not only finds that the decision missed an important fact, which should change the outcome of future similar trademarks, but that the decision itself is an example of the USPTO going too far in its role.  The USPTO’s analysis of marks that are “primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive” should be stripped down to a more basic inquiry.  If there are deeper facts that make the mark truly deceptive, then the market players should seek remedies in state court for false advertising, or the legislature should address the matter specifically, rather than leaving it to the USPTO to decide how many times a tobacco plant can be repropogated before it becomes no longer “from Cuban seed.”</p>

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</description>

<author>Dana B. Robinson</author>


<category>Intellectual Property Law</category>

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<title>The Greatest Legal Movie of All Time: Proclaiming the Real Winner</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gmorris/8</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/gmorris/8</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 12 Jan 2010 17:33:42 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>In August, 2008, the ABA Journal featured an article entitled: “The 25 Greatest Legal Movies.” A panel of experts, described in the article as “12 prominent lawyers who teach film or are connected to the business” selected “the best movies ever made about lawyers and the law.” This distinguished panel ranked its twenty-five top legal movies, choosing To Kill a Mockingbird as its number one legal movie. The panel also selected twenty-five films as “honorable mentions,” which were listed in alphabetical order. In my opinion, however, the real greatest legal movie of all time was not selected as the winner. It was not ranked in the top twenty-five. It was not included in the twenty-five honorable mentions so that it would rank in the top fifty. I would wager that it was not even considered by the panel as a candidate for inclusion as a “legal” movie. In this article, I discuss the movie that should have been ranked first. I compare my choice with the experts’ choice, describing similarities and differences between the two movies. In To Kill a Mockingbird, an African American man is wrongfully accused of raping a white woman. Despite the best efforts of his attorney, he is convicted of that crime. Prejudice prevails over justice. In the movie I have chosen, another victim of prejudice is able to succeed due to the best efforts of his attorney. Justice prevails over prejudice. That difference convinces me that the movie I have selected is truly the greatest legal movie of all time.</p>

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</description>

<author>Grant H. Morris</author>


<category>Civil Rights</category>

<category>Constitutional Law</category>

<category>Courts</category>

<category>Criminal Law and Procedure</category>

<category>Human Rights Law</category>

<category>Law and Society</category>

<category>Professional Ethics</category>

<category>Legal Education; Law and Literature;  Law School Exams</category>

<category>The Legal Profession; Discrimination</category>

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<title>Teaching with Emotion:  Enriching the Educational Experience of First-Year Law Students</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gmorris/7</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/gmorris/7</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 25 Nov 2009 12:17:33 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Through the case method and Socratic dialogue, first year law students are taught to develop critical legal analytic skills–to “think like a lawyer.”  Those skills, however, are primarily, if not entirely, intellectual.  This article discusses the need to address emotional issues in educating law students.  Unlike other articles, my article does not merely urge professors to raise such issues in their classes and discuss them analytically.  Rather, I want students to actually experience emotion in the classroom setting as they discuss various fact situations and the legal principles involved in the resolution of disputes involving those facts.  Law students need to understand and appreciate the emotions of people, including their own emotions, if they are to become the best lawyers they are capable of becoming.  Educating law students about emotions should not be deferred until upper class clinical courses or professional responsibility courses.  The place to begin that education is in the first year.  To encourage such education, I present specific examples from my first-year Torts class in which I raise issues in a manner that results in an emotional response by students.  I demonstrate how such methodology stimulates class discussion and enriches the law student’s educational experience.</p>

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</description>

<author>Grant H. Morris</author>


<category>Psychology and Psychiatry</category>

<category>Legal Education; Law and Literature;  Law School Exams</category>

<category>Emotion and the law; torts</category>

</item>


<item>
<title>Commercial Contracts in Muslim Countries of the Middle East:  A Comparison With the United States</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/jacqueline_mccormack/1</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/jacqueline_mccormack/1</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2009 20:25:59 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>As the emerging markets of the Middle East continue to grow, the ability to trade goods internationally will help to solidify these ever increasing economic ties.  This paper attempts to explain the theories and thought processes surrounding contracts for the sale of goods in Muslim countries.  My purpose is to address the important similarities and differences between commercial contracts in the United States and commercial contracts in Muslim countries of the Middle East.  Hopefully, by forging ever stronger trade relationships between the United States and the Middle East, these two culturally rich regions will learn to tolerate each other’s differences while embracing each other’s similarities.</p>

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</description>

<author>Jacqueline McCormack</author>


</item>


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<title>Why Barring Settlement Bars Legitimate Suits: A Reply to Rosenberg and Shavell</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/ted_sichelman/2</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/ted_sichelman/2</guid>
<pubDate>Sat, 22 Nov 2008 14:18:22 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Professors David Rosenberg and Steven Shavell recently proposed granting defendants an "option to bar settlement" to discourage frivolous suits filed for a mere "nuisance-value" settlement.  By exercising this option, a defendant could prevent judicial enforcement of any ensuing settlement agreement between the parties.  Rosenberg and Shavell contend that if courts were to foreclose settlement, a plaintiff would drop its nuisance-value suit, because its costs of litigating to judgment would exceed its expected benefits.  They conclude that because defendants would only exercise the option if faced with a nuisance-value suit, adopting it would be socially beneficial.  Although an option to bar settlement is an innovative proposal and an important scholarly contribution, this Article shows that it could be highly problematic.  First, a defendant would often exercise the option in small-stakes, high-cost, meritorious suits, which would decrease social welfare.  Second, the option would fail to prevent many high-stakes, low-cost, frivolous suits.  Finally, Rosenberg and Shavell’s analysis depends on a problematic definition of "nuisance suit," questionable simplifying assumptions, and speculative, empirical assertions.  In sum, without additional investigation, it would be folly to adopt an option to bar settlement.</p>

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</description>

<author>Ted M. Sichelman</author>


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<title>&quot;Let&apos;s Do the Time Warp Again&quot;: Assessing the Competence of Counsel in Mental Health Conservatorship Proceedings</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gmorris/6</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/gmorris/6</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 11 Nov 2008 15:33:24 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Thirty years ago, I wrote an article on mental health conservatorships in California and the role of counsel for persons for whom a conservatorship has been proposed.  Data was gathered on the performance of attorneys in court hearings conducted in San Diego County Superior Court.  The data revealed that lawyers representing proposed conservatees were inactive and ineffective in representing their clients’ interests.  The lawyers did not consider themselves advocates in an adversary  process in which conservatorship was to be avoided.  A year after the article was published, the California Supreme Court, citing that article as authority for the “paternalistic attitude” exhibited by appointed counsel for proposed conservatees, ruled that proof beyond a reasonable doubt and jury unanimity are constitutionally mandated standards necessary to assure that mental health conservatorships are accurately established.  I have now replicated that study to determine whether the California Supreme Court’s critique of attorney performance has significantly improved the representation of persons who have been proposed for mental health conservatorships.  The data reveal that the quality of legal representation for proposed conservatees has not improved significantly.  Stated simply, paternalism persists.  The article explores reasons why the paternalistic model of legal representation continues today, despite the California Supreme Court’s disapproval of such model in these cases 29 years ago, and what changes are needed to assure that individuals for whom a conservatorship has been proposed receive effective assistance of counsel in proceedings to establish a conservatorship.</p>

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</description>

<author>Grant H. Morris</author>


<category>Civil Rights</category>

<category>Constitutional Law</category>

<category>Courts</category>

<category>Health Law and Policy</category>

<category>Human Rights Law</category>

<category>Law and Society</category>

<category>Medical Jurisprudence</category>

<category>Professional Ethics</category>

<category>Psychology and Psychiatry</category>

<category>Law and Psychiatry</category>

</item>


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<title>Why the Incompatibility Clause Applies to the Office of the President</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/sai_prakash/4</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/sai_prakash/4</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 08:06:06 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This paper argues that the Incompatibility Clause applies to the President.  This precludes either Senator Obama or Senator McCain from becoming President and retaining a Senate seat.  If they wish to become President, they must resign the Senate</p>

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</description>

<author>Saikrishna Prakash</author>


<category>Constitutional Law</category>

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<item>
<title>New Light on the Decision of 1789</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/sai_prakash/3</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/sai_prakash/3</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 07:58:59 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>In the Constitution’s earliest days, members of the House engaged in one of the nation’s most momentous constitutional debates.  While deliberating on the Department of Foreign Affairs bill, representatives considered the mechanisms for removing executive officers.  The final Act conveyed no removal authority but discussed what would happen when the president removed the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.  The traditional view of the Decision, voiced by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and William Howard Taft, is that because the Act conveyed no removal authority and laid out what would happen when the president removed, the Act presumed that the president had a preexisting constitutional power to remove executive officers.  But there has long been a revisionist view that the Decision did not decide any constitutional question, certainly not in any definitive way.  Citing a split in the House majority on a crucial amendment, Louis Brandeis, Edward Corwin, and others have claimed that the majority coalition that voted for the Foreign Affairs Act was deeply divided on constitutional principles.  In particular, revisionists have asserted that about half of the majority that approved the Foreign Affairs bill rejected the view that the Constitution granted the president a removal power.  Using evidence recently made accessible, this article argues that the traditional reading of the Decision is the correct one. A majority in the House and the Senate concluded that the Constitution’s grant of executive power enabled the president to remove executive officers.  Moreover, on two subsequent departmental bills, majorities in the House and the Senate voted to reaffirm the view that the executive power granted the president a removal power.  The Decision of 1789 thus stands as the first significant legislative construction of the Constitution and as an exemplary episode when Congress approached its constitutional obligations with sophistication, sincerity, and deliberation.</p>

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</description>

<author>Sai Prakash</author>


<category>Constitutional Law</category>

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