A proper de jure objection to the epistemic rationality of religious belief
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Copyright © 2010 Cambridge University Press. The definitive version is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0034412509990382.
Abstract
I answer Alvin Plantinga’s challenge to provide a ‘proper’ de jure objection to religious belief. What I call the ‘sophisticates’ evidential objection’ (SEO) concludes that sophisticated Christians lack epistemic justification for believing central Christian propositions. The SEO utilizes a theory of epistemic justification in the spirit of the evidentialism of Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. I defend philosophical interest in the SEO (and its underlying evidentialism) against objections from Reformed epistemology, by addressing Plantinga’s criteria for a proper de jure objection, his anti-evidentialist arguments, and the relevance of ‘impulsional evidence’. I argue that no result from Plantinga-style Reformed epistemology precludes the reasons I offer in favour of giving the SEO its due philosophical attention.
Suggested Citation
Todd R. Long. "A proper de jure objection to the epistemic rationality of religious belief" Religious Studies 46.3 (2010): 375-394.
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/tlong/2