Copyright (c) 2009 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/theocharis_grigoriadis Recent documents in Theocharis N Grigoriadis en-us Mon, 05 Jan 2009 13:34:44 PST 3600 http://works.bepress.com/theocharis_grigoriadis/4 http://works.bepress.com/theocharis_grigoriadis/4 Sat, 04 Oct 2008 08:43:44 PDT Theocharis N. Grigoriadis Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems http://works.bepress.com/theocharis_grigoriadis/3 http://works.bepress.com/theocharis_grigoriadis/3 Fri, 03 Oct 2008 19:41:44 PDT This paper analyzes the politics of energy restructuring in East Germany and Poland. Its purpose is two-fold: on the one hand, it provides analytical dichotomies between regulatory vs. procedural and horizontal vs. hierarchical restructuring to explain the different paths in the liberal transformation of the energy industry in East Germany and Poland. The substitution of a central and legitimate government by Treuhand in the East German case as well as the central coordinating role of the government in the Polish case constitute the key indicators for these conceptual distinctions. On the other hand, post-socialist energy firms are treated as social redistribution mechanisms, whose restructuring is defined by the existence of an equity constraint. Contrary to Treuhand, which functioned as an institutional sponsor for an ethnically-driven transfer of the East German energy sector to a set of subsidiaries of West German corporations, the Polish Ministry of Privatization preferred to adopt the equity constraint rather than regulate its energy policy preferences through the private sector. The interaction of energy restructuring with social redistribution is presented in the form of a two by two matrix with four different policy outcomes. Private organizations or semi-legitimate public agencies captured by corporate interests are not able to apply the equity constraint as an inseparable redistributive component of energy restructuring as the central government can. Theocharis N. Grigoriadis Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems http://works.bepress.com/theocharis_grigoriadis/2 http://works.bepress.com/theocharis_grigoriadis/2 Thu, 25 Sep 2008 17:12:13 PDT This paper analyzes state responsibility and antitrust as conflicting forces of investment protection under the Energy Charter Treaty. State responsibility is defined in Art. 22 and 23; it imposes a strict liability rule and reinforces the role of government in the conclusion of energy investment contracts. This phenomenon is what I call the socialization of bilateral investment relations. At the same time, Art. 6 proposes antitrust as a normative commitment for all signatory parts; its goal is to advance energy sector liberalization in the ECT region. International arbitration (Art. 26) is a much more effective dispute settlement mechanism than diplomatic negotiations (Art. 27). Four state-investor disputes in the East European energy sector are used to model the interaction between state responsibility and antitrust (Matrix I). Bilateral investment relations are modeled on the distinction between open and closed markets in the case of German-Russian gas relations (Matrix II). Despite the radically different political environment in Germany and Russia, the calculus of the two governments vis-à-vis energy liberalization is the same; none of them really believes in it. Thus, there is no dilemma between liberalization and socialization in energy market development. States have never been able to boost competition, when they are part of the market play; international economic agreements can. Theocharis N. Grigoriadis Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems http://works.bepress.com/theocharis_grigoriadis/1 http://works.bepress.com/theocharis_grigoriadis/1 Mon, 28 Apr 2008 11:49:46 PDT The article introduces the term of energy polarization to explain the politics of energy market reform in the Russian Duma. It controls for the impact of regional energy production, party cohesion and ideology, electoral mandate, on the decisions of the Duma deputies on energy bills and resolution proposals (oil, gas, and electricity) between 1994 and 2003. The existence of a strong mandate divide between SMD and PR deputies is observed. The continuously high statistical significance of gas production shows Gazprom's key position in the post-Soviet Russian economy. Oil production is variably significant in the two first Dumas, when the main legislative debates on oil privatization occur. There is no constant left-right continuum, consistent with the deputies' proclaimed party ideology. The pro-and anti-reform poles observed in our Poole-based single dimensional scale are not necessarily connected with liberal and state-oriented regulatory policies respectively. Party switching is a solid indicator of Russia's polarized legislative dynamics when it comes to energy sector reform. Theocharis N. Grigoriadis Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems