The timely and appropriate education of children with disabilities became a national priority with the enactment of the ambitious and comprehensive Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The IDEA entitles a child with disabilities to an appropriate education at public expense. But does the IDEA mean that whenever this goal is not met, the child and parents can recover damages?

 

Most courts initially considering the issue read the IDEA's express right of action as not including a right to sue for money damages.  Thus, plaintiffs began filing damage claims for violations of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and for constitutional claims using section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Congressional amendments to the IDEA in 1986 rejected a Supreme Court holding that the IDEA was an exclusive remedy for special education related claims, but mandated the use and exhaustion of the IDEA's administrative remedies. Parents of children with disabilities can now bring suits not only under the IDEA directly, but may also seek relief in the form of damages based on a number of other legal theories. Claims have been brought seeking relief in damages for violation of the IDEA under section 1983. Circuit courts confronting such IDEA-specific claims under section 1983 have split on how to interpret the current IDEA's nonexclusivity provisions, dividing on whether such actions can be brought at all and whether damages can be sought. They have also had to confront arguments that the IDEA's exhaustion requirement should not apply to cases seeking damages.

 

This Article contends that Congress intended for "appropriate" relief under the IDEA to be, first and foremost, equitable relief, as opposed to tort-like damage awards. While the amendments to the IDEA made clear that the statute does not preclude other remedies for violations of the educational rights of disabled children, this Article contends that those amendments are not properly interpreted as creating a damages remedy for IDEA violations through the use of section 1983. Opening up liability for damages for missteps in the special education process would likely do little to improve the delivery of services to children on a timely basis and would divert more resources away from their educational purpose. This Article further contends that exhaustion of the IDEA process should precede the hearing of claims for damages asserted under other legal theories whenever the claim raises issues relating to a child's special education services that the IDEA administrative process, with its array of equitable remedial measures, may be able to address.