Copyright (c) 2009 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/sven_feldmann Recent documents in Sven Feldmann en-us Tue, 10 Nov 2009 23:25:22 PST 3600 http://works.bepress.com/sven_feldmann/7 http://works.bepress.com/sven_feldmann/7 Mon, 09 Nov 2009 15:18:08 PST We use survey responses by firms to examine the firm-level determinants and effects of political influence, their perception of corruption and prevalence of bribe paying. We find that: (a) measures of political influence and corruption/bribes are uncorrelated at the firm level; (b) firms that are larger, older, exporting, government-owned, are widely held and/or have fewer competitors have more political influence, perceive corruption to be less of a problem and pay bribes less often; (c) influence increases sales and government subsidies and in general makes the firm have a more positive view on the government. In sum, we show that strong firms use their influence to bend laws and regulations, whereas weak firms pay bribes to mitigate the costs of government intervention. Sven Feldmann http://works.bepress.com/sven_feldmann/6 http://works.bepress.com/sven_feldmann/6 Sat, 12 Jul 2008 06:25:17 PDT We analyze informational lobbying in the context of a multimember legislature that decides on the allocation of a public good. First, we observe that a majoritarian legislature provides widely different incentives for interest groups to lobby than a single decision maker does. Second, we compare a decentralized legislature, such as the U.S. Congress, to a parliament with strong party cohesion. Congress's decentralized nature allows the strategic formation of policy coalitions among high-demand districts and the exclusion of low-demand districts. This increases the incentive to provide information about districts' demand relative to a legislature in which the governing coalition is fixed. Sven Feldmann http://works.bepress.com/sven_feldmann/5 http://works.bepress.com/sven_feldmann/5 Sat, 12 Jul 2008 05:53:57 PDT This paper analyzes how the structure of the legislature affects interest groups' incentives to lobby. Lobbying is modelled as the strategic provision of information by an interest group to a multi-member legislature, and the effectiveness of lobbying lies in the ability of information to change the winning policy coalitions. We show that with a long enough time horizon for policymakers, the distinguishing feature between the U.S. Congress and European parliamentary systems--the vote of confidence procedure--reduces an agenda setter's willingness to change policy coalitions, and thus significantly lowers the incentives for interest group lobbying. Sven Feldmann http://works.bepress.com/sven_feldmann/4 http://works.bepress.com/sven_feldmann/4 Sat, 12 Jul 2008 05:27:57 PDT We study how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policy outcomes and how it changes the legislature's willingness to delegate decision-making authority to the bureaucracy. We extend the standard model of delegation to account for interest group influence during the implementation stage of policy. We analyze how the decision to delegate changes when the bureaucratic agent is subject to external influence. The optimal degree of delegation as well as the extent to which interest groups influence policy outcomes differ depending on whether the system of government is characterized by unified or divided control. The result is a comparative theory of bureaucratic lobbying. Sven Feldmann http://works.bepress.com/sven_feldmann/3 http://works.bepress.com/sven_feldmann/3 Sat, 12 Jul 2008 05:17:45 PDT Initiated by interest groups representing the interest of a class of agency clients, structural reform litigation shapes the administration of important policy domains, particularly in the social services. Employing a spatial bargaining model we show that, instead of holding the agency to its mandate, structural reform litigation constitutes an institutional tool that creates bureaucratic drift even if courts are policy neutral. Since courts permit negotiation between agency and interest group plaintiff in designing remedies, it is very difficult for a legislature to enforce statutory constraints via judicial oversight and to stem this form of policy drift. Sven E. Feldmann http://works.bepress.com/sven_feldmann/2 http://works.bepress.com/sven_feldmann/2 Sat, 12 Jul 2008 05:10:38 PDT This article develops an institutional spatial theory of presidential appointments to administrative agencies that falls within the spirit of a recent line of theoretical research toward an institutional theory of the presidency. We show that when bureaucrats implement policy that results from negotiation with constituents, the ally principle--appointing political allies--holds only as a knife-edge condition. Presidents are better served by appointing administrators whose preferences partially offset the influence of organized interests. The incentives described have implications for the selection of a whole range of bureaucratic personnel at various levels, generating significant implications for the study of public management on issues such as personnel administration, representative bureaucracy, and the devolution of administrative authority. Sven Feldmann http://works.bepress.com/sven_feldmann/1 http://works.bepress.com/sven_feldmann/1 Sat, 12 Jul 2008 05:02:05 PDT Interest groups can potentially influence political decision-makers by offering contributions and by providing relevant information that sways the decision in the group's favor. What mix of these two instruments should an interest group choose, and how does the use of one instrument affect the effectiveness of the other? In this paper we identify an information externality that raises the cost of offering contributions and show that this indirect search cost reduces the group's incentive to gather information when contributions are allowed. Furthermore, we analyze how competition among lobby groups as providers of information and contributions affect the choice and effectiveness of the instruments. We show that the information externality rewards the group that can abstain from information search and focus its influence on contributions. Sven Feldmann