This amicus brief proposes that the court of appeal below and the parties to this litigation have asked the wrong question regarding the governmental activity in question. While the court of appeal was quite correct in recognizing that elected officials’ actions in voting upon legislation and negotiating do not involve exercise of First Amendment rights, this recognition is short sighted. In actuality, no governmental action furthers the First Amendment rights of the government actor. Public officials engage in activity which in many ways resembles constitutionally protected speech and petitioning. They speak, vote, evaluate and otherwise involve themselves in official proceedings and the dialogue over issues of public interest. This is simply because that is what they do as government agents. It is not because they are exercising or furthering rights. The real question raised in this case is whether any governmental activity qualifies for protection under §425.16. The correct answer to that question is no - anti-SLAPP protection does not extend to legislating, adjudicating, administering; to any governmental act.