Probability of Obtaining a Pure Strategy Equilibrium in Matrix Games with Random Pay-offs
Abstract
If the pay-offs in an mXn zero-sum matrix game are drawn randomly from a finite set of number, N, then the probability of obtaining a pure strategy equilibrium, p, will be a weighted sum of the probabilities of obtaining a pure strategy equilibrium, ps, with s distinct payoffs, the weights, qs, being being the probabilities of obtaining s distinct payoffs from N. The paper also introduced the notion of separation of arrays, which is necessary and sufficient condition to be associated with a mixed strategy solution.
Suggested Citation
Srijit Mishra and T. Krishna Kumar. "Probability of Obtaining a Pure Strategy Equilibrium in Matrix Games with Random Pay-offs" Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research. Ed. T. Parthasarathy, B. Dutta, J. A. M. Potters, T. E. S. Raghavan, D. Ray and A. Sen. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997. 25-31.
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