Interpreting Bids From a Vickrey Auction when There Are Public Good Attributes
Copyright © 2003 by Sean P. Hurley and James B. Kliebenstein. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.
This paper provides a model that allows for interpreting bids in a Vickrey auction when the good has public good attributes. It also examines information obtained from a Vickrey auction, which collected consumer’s willingness-to-pay for pork products that had embedded environmental attributes, and applies the new interpretation to the bids.
Sean P. Hurley and James B. Kliebenstein. "Interpreting Bids From a Vickrey Auction when There Are Public Good Attributes" 2003 American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting: Montreal, Canada.. Jul. 2003.
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/shurley/7