The last twenty five years are an “impressive” chronicle of the Indian Supreme Court in action. Its novel functioning has changed the internal dynamics of Indian polity in a manner unknown to constitutional democracies. From an institution entrusted with the task of adjudicating disputes between parties, the Indian Supreme Court has transformed itself into an institution enjoined to promote the ideals of a socio-economic and political justice. Its prior role as an “adjudicator” has undergone a reappraisal. The judges therein are no more adjudicators but activists, energetically contributing to the accomplishment of India's constitutional vision. In this new creation, they not only interpret law, but also make and implement it, or at least try to do so. Within this supraconstitutional denomination, judges now function as searchlights constantly probing the actions of the legislature and executive, often acting on their behalf. “Social Action Litigation,” variedly known as “Public Interest Litigation,” has largely achieved this functional recast.