Copyright (c) 2011 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/shenequa_grey Recent documents in Shenequa L. Grey en-us Mon, 31 Jan 2011 12:15:17 PST 3600 http://works.bepress.com/shenequa_grey/2 http://works.bepress.com/shenequa_grey/2 Fri, 04 Sep 2009 12:48:47 PDT In Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009), the United States Supreme Court recently revisited the search of an arrestee’s vehicle pursuant to the “search incident to a lawful arrest” exception to the warrant requirement. The Court held that police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if: (1) the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search; or (2) if it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. This decision resolved long debated issues regarding the applicability of this exception as it relates to vehicles.In establishing these limitations on the exception, the Court in Gant re-examined the original purpose and justification for establishing the exception in prior decisions and concluded that the rule was clearly based on evidentiary and safety interests. As a result, the Court rejected theories offered to support expansion of the rule, and limited the exception to only those situations when the underlying evidentiary and safety interests are legitimately at stake. In establishing these limitations, Gant overruled prior decisions allowing automatic searches of an arrestee’s vehicle. This exception is only one of several exceptions and numerous other principles established by the court based upon specific justifications that warrant dispensing with constitutional requirements. This decision seems to be a part of a recent trend of the United States Supreme Court to hold true to those original justifications of rules in deciding new cases before it. Gant also demonstrates the Court’s intent to revert back to those underlying justifications when its decisions have diverted from the original purpose for establishing the principle. This trend was recently demonstrated in Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006), where the Court re-examined the purpose and justification of the “exclusionary rule” to conclude that it did not require the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the “knock and announce” rule. In overruling decades of precedent excluding such evidence, the court concluded that exclusion was inappropriate because it did not further the purpose and goal of the exclusionary rule. This decision like Gant overruled decades of precedent and adhered to the original justification of the exclusionary rule.This article demonstrates how the justifications or rationales upon which legal principles are developed form the basis for compliance with the United States Constitution; and that therefore, failure to comply with those justifications leads to unconstitutional government activity. This article demonstrates that strict compliance with the underlying justifications is essential to protecting individual constitutional rights. Shenequa L. Grey General Law Criminal Law and Procedure Constitutional Law http://works.bepress.com/shenequa_grey/1 http://works.bepress.com/shenequa_grey/1 Wed, 05 Sep 2007 12:54:40 PDT In Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006), the United States Supreme Court overruled decades of precedent and held that evidence obtained in violation of the “knock and announce” rule was admissible in the prosecutions case in chief against the defendant even though this evidence was technically unconstitutionally obtained. In doing so, the Court upheld the knock and announce rule, but strictly applied a “cost/benefit analysis” to conclude that the “exclusionary rule” was not applicable in this context. This analysis is consistent with other exceptions to the exclusionary rule established by the Court as well as with the “good faith” exceptions to the exclusionary rule when an officer reasonably relies upon a statute later held unconstitutional or upon a warrant later held invalid. In each of these instances, a technical constitutional violation has occurred, but the Court has held the evidence admissible because the goal of the exclusionary rule is not furthered by excluding such evidence. In establishing the good faith exceptions, the Court carved out a number of exceptions to the good faith exceptions where the Court concludes the exclusionary rule is applicable. When applying the cost/benefit analysis as applied in Hudson, however, it is apparent that in most of those instances, the evidence similarly should not be excluded. In those instances the costs of excluding the evidence outweighs the deterrent benefit of exclusion and therefore, the evidence should be admitted at trial against a defendant in the prosecutions case in chief. This article thoroughly explains the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Hudson for application of the exclusionary rule and details the factors the Court considered in conducting the cost/benefit analysis. The article demonstrates how this analysis has been used to establish the exceptions to the exclusionary rule including the good faith exceptions. The article then uses the cost/benefit analysis to demonstrate that when applied to the exceptions to the good faith exceptions, the exclusionary rule is not appropriately applied. Although this analysis would overrule precedent providing for the exclusion of this evidence, admitting the evidence is consistent with the Court’s analysis of when the exclusionary rule should be applied. The article concludes by addressing what implications, if any, Hudson may have on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as well as on future application of the exclusionary rule. Shenequa L. Grey General Law Criminal Law and Procedure