This paper replies to Professor Bruhl's response, Against Mix-and-Match Lawmaking, to my opening article: Noncontemporaneous Lawmaking. The trilogy of articles discuss the constitutional validity (or invalidity) of noncontemporaneous lawmaking, i.e., the House and the Senate passing the same bill, but not within a given two-year House term, followed by subsequent presentment to the President (some unspecified time thereafter). Professor Bruhl's erudite essay required that I clarify and fine tune my prior position. I respond to his arguments with textual, historical, and quasi-structural arguments.

This paper, like the opening article, makes heavy use of foreign authority, particularly Irish and Australian authority.

See Tillman, Noncontemporaneous Lawmaking, 16 Cornell J. of Law & Public Policy 331 (2007); Professor Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Response, Against Mix-and-Match Lawmaking, 16 Cornell J. of Law & Public Policy 349 (2007); Tillman, Reply, Defending the (Not So) Indefensible, 16 Cornell J. of Law & Public Policy 363 (2007).

[June 9, 2009]