Copyright (c) 2008 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/sara_benson Recent documents in Sara R Benson en-us Mon, 17 Nov 2008 07:04:15 PST 3600 http://works.bepress.com/sara_benson/2 http://works.bepress.com/sara_benson/2 Wed, 02 May 2007 13:35:57 PDT This brief Article focuses on a 2004 decision from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in which the court considers a claim of discrimination stemming from a 36 year absence of minorities serving as grand jury forepersons. Although the court ultimately affirmed the decision in favor of the defendant, the court's conclusion focuses on the prevalence of unconscious bias in our society and the troubling subjectivity involved in the judge's selection of the grand jury forepersons. Through a study of Chin v. Runnels, I delve deeper into the salience of unconscious discrimination in Equal Protection jurisprudence. In particular, I address whether the antidiscrimination principle should address such subtle discrimination (to which question I answer yes), and if so, how? My response is to argue for the Supreme Court to overrule the intent requirement from Washington v. Davis and adopt the disparate impact doctrine's burden-shifting framework in subjective selection cases. Only when the intent doctrine is dismantled and a heavier burden is placed on the government can unconscious discrimination be addressed and remedied by United States courts. Sara R. Benson http://works.bepress.com/sara_benson/1 http://works.bepress.com/sara_benson/1 Wed, 02 May 2007 13:34:06 PDT Currently, children who are born intersexed (having some characteristics of both males and females, either genetically or physically) have no constitutional right to choose whether to remain intersexed or to "become" male or female. The current practice allows parents to "choose" to set their child's physical sex at birth. Assuming that by raising a child in a specific gender that child will grow up "normal," parents make the tragic decision to create a vagina, shorten a clitoris that is "too large," remove gonads, or change a penis that is "too small" to function into a clitoris. This Article will transform the typical arena for the intersex rights debate by focusing attention on the fundamental rights of the intersexed. By infusing constitutional law principles into the informed consent doctrine, the rights of the intersexed (and not their parents) can be formulated and protected. Through its protection of fundamental rights, the informed consent doctrine is given the capacity to protect the only party that can give truly informed consent for genital mutilation/reconstruction surgery on an intersexed child: not the parents, not the doctors, not the judges, and not society, but the intersexed individual him/herself. Sara R. Benson