Prof. Smead received his PhD from the University of California, Irvine and taught at
the London School of Economics before arriving at Northeastern. He teaches courses in
philosophy of science and logic. In addition to these areas, his interests include game
theory, philosophy of biology, and philosophy of economics. His interests extend to
decision theory, modern philosophy and analytic philosophy. His research is currently
focused on idealization and explanation in science as well as on the evolutionary
connections between learning, language and social interaction. 



Indirect Reciprocity and the Evolution of "Moral Signals", Biology and Philosophy (2010)

Signals regarding the behavior of others are an essential element of human moral systems and...



Evolutionary Dynamics of Lewis Signaling Games: Signaling Systems vs. Partial Pooling (with Simon Huttegger, Brian Skyrms, and Kevin Zollman), Synthese (2009)

In Lewis signaling games [Lewis 1969], nature picks one of N possible states of the...



The evolution of cooperation in the Centipede Game with finite populations, Philosophy Faculty Publications (2008)

The partial cooperation displayed by subjects in the Centipede Game deviates radically from the predictions...


Working Papers


The Stability of Strategic Plasticity (with Kevin J.S. Zollman), Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University (2009)

Recent research into the evolution of higher cognition has piqued an interest in the eff ect...