Like many major targets of social inquiry, the rule of law seems to be an essentially contested concept (Gallie, 1956; Collier, Hidalgo, and Maciuceanu; 2007, Waldron, 2002). The literature teems with definitions of the rule of law, emphasizing attributes ranging from formal legality and checks and balances to order, democracy, and individual rights (Møller and Skaaning, in this issue). And while surveys of competing definitions exist, scholars have yet to converge on a systematized concept amenable to operationalization. One fundamental debate concerns “thick” versus “thin” definitions of the rule of law (Møller and Skaaning, in this issue). Another unsettled question is whether we should only consider legal-based attributes or whether political behavior-based attributes should be included as well (Sarsfield, 2010). As Bergman claims in this issue, “rule of law transcends the competence of courts and the judicial branch” and “should be understood as a social equilibrium where the vast majority of citizens accept to be ruled most of the time by binding and general norms that have a high probability of compliance” (pp. 175).