Client focus in regulatory agencies: Oxymoron or opportunity?

John Alford, Australia New Zealand School of Governement and Melburne Business School
Richard Speed, Melbourne Business School

Abstract

‘Client focus’ seems like a counter-intuitive notion for regulatory agencies, whose job is to compel people to comply with government requirements. Yet it is becoming the catchphrase for many regulatory authorities. This paper puts forward an argument, based on social exchange and regulatory theory, that a client focused approach is not only compatible with a regulatory role, but also actually facilitates it. It recognises that most people’s propensity to comply is a function of factors other than the fear of punishment, such as their intrinsic or normative motivations and their ability to do what is required. It also assists in delineation and understanding of the proportion of regulatees who opportunistically avoid their obligations. The paper advances a broader model of social exchange between regulators and regulatees.