Copyright (c) 2009 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert Recent documents in Richard J Gilbert en-us Sun, 31 May 2009 10:52:39 PDT 3600 http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/17 http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/17 Thu, 19 Jul 2007 16:24:08 PDT Richard J. Gilbert http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/16 http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/16 Thu, 19 Jul 2007 16:21:42 PDT Richard J. Gilbert http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/15 http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/15 Thu, 19 Jul 2007 16:13:47 PDT Richard J. Gilbert http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/13 http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/13 Thu, 11 Jan 2007 13:27:19 PST Richard J. Gilbert http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/12 http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/12 Thu, 11 Jan 2007 13:23:57 PST Richard J. Gilbert http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/11 http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/11 Sun, 26 Nov 2006 17:13:04 PST This paper reviews the antitrust treatment of patent-pooling and cross-licensing arrangements from E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co., decided in 1902, to the recent Department of Justice business review letters on the MPEG and DVD patent pools. I examine the factors that the courts identified as pertinent to the antitrust outcome and compare them to the competitive factors identified in the DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property. Until recently, the competitive relationship of the patents was not a major determinant of the antitrust outcome in most cases. Instead, the courts have focused on restrictive licensing terms that affect downstream prices. I consider the logic of this approach to evaluating antitrust liability. I also propose an approach to evaluating the antitrust risks of arrangements that combine potentially blocking patents. Richard J. Gilbert L71 L1, L41 http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/10 http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/10 Sun, 26 Nov 2006 17:04:21 PST This paper empirically examines the relationship between vertical integration and wholesale gasoline prices. We use discrete and differential changes in the extent of vertical integration generated by mergers in West Coast gasoline refining and retailing markets to test for incentives to raise rivals' costs. Research design allows us to test for a relationship between vertical integration and wholesale prices, controlling for horizontal market structure, cost shocks and trends. We find evidence consistent with the strategic incentive to raise competitors' input costs and conclude that vertical integration can have a significant impact on wholesale prices. Richard J. Gilbert L41 L71 http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/9 http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/9 Sun, 26 Nov 2006 16:57:40 PST Intellectual property owners often hold the rights to several patents, each of which is essential to make or use a product. We compare the welfare properties of package licenses, under which a licensee pays the same fee regardless of the number of technologies licensed, with component licenses, under which each technology is licensed separately and there is no quantity discount. A central finding is that a long-term package license can induce incentives to invent around patents and invest in complementary assets that are closer to their socially optimal levels than are those induced by a long-term component license. We also identify settings in which a short-term license is a partial substitute for a package license and a prohibition on package licensing induces parties to adopt contracts that result in less efficient complementary investment because of hold-up. Richard J. Gilbert http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/8 http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/8 Sun, 26 Nov 2006 16:51:19 PST Proponents of the $3 billion ballot initiative that created the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine (CIRM) forecast that CIRM-funded research would earn royalty income in the range of $537 million to $1.1 billion. Using data on past licensing revenues as well as expected discoveries, this paper estimates that CIRM licensing income will be only a few percent of expenditures and California's share of this licensing income will be less than one percent of R&D expenditures in current dollars. The allocation of these relatively small revenues is of secondary importance to the greater objective of disseminating CIRM-funded stem cell technology quickly and widely. While investments in stem cell research will generate some financial return for the state of California, the primary benefits from these investments will be progress toward improved therapies for the treatment of major chronic and acute diseases. Richard J. Gilbert L1 http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/5 http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/5 Sun, 26 Nov 2006 16:25:39 PST We examine the effects of market structure and the internal organization of firms on equilibrium R&D projects. We compare a monopolist's choice of R&D portfolio to that of a welfare maximizer. We next show that Sah and Stiglitz's finding that the market portfolio of R&D is independent of the number of firms under Bertrand competition extends to neither Cournot oligopoly nor a cartel. We also show that the ability of firms to pre-empt R&D by rivals along particular research paths can lead to socially excessive R&D diversification. Lastly, using Sah and Stiglitz's definition of hierarchy, we establish conditions under which larger hierarchies invest in smaller portfolios. Joseph Farrell